Thread: Paul Hausser: Great or Over-rated?

Originally Posted by Triple C

Everyone thinks the General Paul Hausser was a great commander. But was he really? His handling of Pz Lehr and 2 SS Pz in Normandy was arguably maladroit, and Glantz had no kind words to spare for his performance during Second and Third Kharkov. Was he really an excellent tactician? Or his reputation was based on his association to the success of the Waffen SS arm instead of real ability?

The only flop of the division in Normandy occurred when the London Yeomanry found a gap but Whitmann plugged that hole. Also Bayerlein was in command followed by a succession of others, Hausser's only role in Normandy was as an overpaid battalion commander in charge of kamfgroup Von Hausser.

Official Historian of the US Army gave Hausser a much bigger role in the battle.

According to the official story he was involved in a duel of orders and counter-orders with Kluge, which threw the German divisions at the American sector into chaos. Kluge was supposedly fully absorbed in his fight against Montgomery around Caen to understand what Hausser was doing as the Corps commander, and when he found out COBRA bombed the daylight out of Pz Lehr he nearly had a fit. Another accusation was Hausser's order for the 2 SS Pz to counterattack southwest into the American penetration instead of breaking out due south. The move delivered the 2 SS Pz into the maws of the 2 AD. Kluge believe that this decision by Hausser, which was against both 2 SS Pz Div commander and Kluge's inclination, cost him the battle.

I think that Hausser stepped up to 7th Army command shortly after II S.S. Panzer Korps arrived on the battlefield. As I recall, Hausser's appointment caused a shakeup in commands as Bittrich moved up from 9th S.S. Div Cdr to II S.S. Panzer Korps commander at the same time that Hausser stepped up.

This ripple effect coincided with the planned counterattack by II S.S. Panzer Korps and somewhat mitigated its net effect.

Hausser's largest contribution lay, foremost, in 1.) the training of the early S.S. battalion and regimental officers and, 2.) his specific training and command of the S.S. Das Reich Division prior to and through Barbarossa.

Triple C, I'm very interested in this commander and have a generally high regard for his soldier skills and ballz. I didn't recall any criticism of note in Glantz' Kursk treatise. Can you maybe throw in some of the comments which Glantz evidently made elsewhere?

I'd be appreciative if possible. Thanks.

Well, pleasure to have TWO pro's on board.

Despite this threat, Hitler was determined to conduct a counterofensive. He assembled the SS Panzer Divisions Das Reich and Liebstandarte Adolf Hitler under a new SS corps headquarters and ordered them to hold Kharkov against the advancing Voronezh Front forces, while simultaneously counterattacking against the Southwestern Front. The new SS headquarters lacked the experience to perform either mission and retreated . . . Instead of punishing the SS for disobedience, Hitler relieved Gen. Hubert Lanz, the army officer who had tried to make the SS Panzer Corps obey orders.

144, When Titans Clashed.

I take this to be a negative assessment of Hausser, at least in this operation. It's a very short passage on which to base a judgement of his service record, of course... I will try to post the American critique of Hausser during Cobra if that is needed, but this school boy needs to go sharpen his German and will leave that til the morrow.

That interpretation is debatable. Officially Lanz was replaced by Kempf in order for tanker to be in charge instead of a mountain trooper.Whether of competence or luck the retreat was perfectly justified.

I'd further offer that the assessment of the staff may have been correct but very understandable. The Corps itself had only been stood up. The divisions unavailable for training as they were busy reorganizing to Panzergrenidier (really Panzer) divisions and refitting their equipment and personnel scales following over a year of continuous combat for all three divisions. Their corps and division staffs would have had no experience commanding anything higher than a division nor commanding mechanized forces.

To this they were thrust into a battlefield both fluid and lethal in late January-early February. Testimony to their skill is the rapid evolution of that staff while controlling an additional division (Totenkopf), fighting a major battle of manuever, and then recapturing the city of Kharkov.

In general, I see little that suggests a personal failing of Hausser's professional skills from the Kharkov battles of early 1943 given the inexperience of his staffs and their divisions in mechanized warfare. All things being equal, I thought that their performance was generally excellent during the Manstein counter-offensive.