Thread: Chamberlain a new look.

Too much trust that in that piece of paper?A too high dose of political idealism?Even after Adolf did to them.

Originally Posted by zraver

A paper for class, once again looking for peer review. I had to either defend or refute the argument by Martin Gilbert's position in Roots of Appeasement, that Chamberlain's actions at Munich were, "an emergency plan, intended to buy peace at the expense of the disintegration of Czechoslovakia..." Moreover, "Munich was a policy , dictated by fear and weakness, which Neville Chamberlain devised as means, not of postponing war but, as he personally believed, of making Anglo-German war unnecessary in the future."

I chose to refute it on two grounds. First that what Neville Chamberlain really believed in late 38 is in doubt based on both his actions during the May Crisis and on the fact that what a politician says they believe is more often than not mere expedient. Instead I argue that Britain lacked the means, the will and the allies to do more than accept the German fait accompli.

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You picked a fascinating topic. I just finished reading Pat Buchanan's book, Churchill, Hitler and the Unnecessary War. He comes down less hard on Chamberlain and more so Churchill in assigning the blame for World War II.

He agrees with you that Chamberlain was swayed by Britain's lack of military preparedness to deal with Germany over Czechoslovakia. But he says there was more to it.

Chamberlain, along Halifax and others in government at that time, believed Germany had been shafted by the Treaty of Versailles and had a just grievance in wanting to reunite German-speaking populations that had been carved off of Germany by the treaty.

Czechoslovakia had been one the beneficiaries of this partition having been given dominion over the 3.5 million Germans living in Slovakia. But the real Czechs under Benes were outnumbered by the Germans. All might have worked out had they not retained all political power for themselves. By 1938, more than 90% of the German-speaking Slovaks were fed up and clamoring to rejoin Germany.

Another factor was Hitler's oft declared assurances that his ambitions in Europe were limited to bringing German speaking people together into a greater Germany. Chamberlain probably thought the best way to avert war with Germany in the future was to accede to Hitler and get something in return, which turned out to be the infamous promise signed by Hitler.

The implication that always hovers in the air when Chamberlain's "appeasement" is mentioned is that it led to World War ll. I was guilty of thinking that at one time.

Here is what Buchanan has to say about it.

...it is a myth to say that Munich led directly to World War II. It was a diplomatic debacle, but it is not why Britain went to war. The casus belli of World War II emanated from a decision, six months later, that would drag England into a six-year death struggle at the wrong time, in the wrong place, for the wrong reason. That decision would prove the greatest blunder in British history...

Chamberlain had been hailed as a hero when he came back from Munich; the French were ecstatic; FDR congratulated him; the king patted him on the back. Then the rest of Czechoslovakia fell. The British people came to feel ashamed of what had happened, and Chamberlain's popularity waned. Under pressure from Churchill and others he was compelled to draw a line in the sand. Can anyone explain what happened next?

On March 31, 1939, Chamberlain rose in the House of Commons to make the most fateful British declaration of the twentieth century:

"I now have to inform the House that...in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces, His Majesty's Government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish Government all support in their power. They have given the Polish Government an assurance to that effect."

One thing I found out of joint in this was that Chamberlain did not know or seem to appreciate at the time that Hitler did not want a war with Britain, France and the rest of western Europe. Hitler had long said that his aim was to expand eastward. Land to grow food for a growing Germany was one of his goals.

Why Chamberlain committed Britain to protect Poland, which was completely beyond Britain's sphere of national interests reinforces your idea that his thinking was unclear. By pledging to come to the aid of Poland, he surely must have known that he was putting Britain's fate in the hands of Poland's leader, whose intransigence on the issue of giving Germany access to Danzig was bolstered by Britain's promise. Germany grew weary of bargaining with Poland and invaded. That triggered Britain's declaration of war on Germany and that led to World War II.

Have you come across Buchanan's book? If so, what do you think of his analysis?

Originally Posted by zraver

Nice framing, but it ignores several important realities- Poland was not a British ally

Maybe not on paper but since the enemy of my enemy is my friend the august common defence pact is just a piece of paper since UK cannot guarantee Polish safety.

Originally Posted by JAD_333

The implication that always hovers in the air when Chamberlain's "appeasement" is mentioned is that it led to World War ll. I was guilty of thinking that at one time.

But it did...it was a open admission of weakness and Hitler saw right trough it.
A strong leaderships would either refuse to talk or send a message along the lines:
- make your decision and we would make ours -