Thread: Chamberlain a new look.

zraver,look at pages 11-13 that deal with Munich.The rest of my docs including some primary sources require translation.I'll try to translate a few Friday,if it's not to late.

p.s The doc. is translated somewhat sloppy.The guy didn't knew that the English translation is General Staff not Major State ,among others.

Originally Posted by Bluesman

I think it is revisionist history, and I think history's original verdict was correct: Chamberlain appeased because he believed in it, not because he was compelled by hard power circumstances.

Then can you provide the evidence showing he had another course of action open to him?

He was weak, his political opponents were strong,

He was not politically weak 1938 saw him at the height of his popularity after calling Hitler's bluff spur of the moment during the May Crisis, and then in securing peace.

and to think that he was just doing the best he could with bad cards would be to slander Churchill as a political opportunist that simply made political hay out of a pore ole victimised but ultimately wise Chamberlain.

No it wouldn't, Churchill saw where the events were leading, but there is little evidence that if the roles were reversed and had Churchill chose war that anything of substance would have changed. English military power was at a low ebb, there was no public support to force 3 million Germans to live under Czech dominance. Plus to suddenly do an about face from established British and Conservative party policy would be strange. Britain had been appeasing long before Chamberlain came to power. Baldwin and McDonald both allowed Hitler's re-armament while not re-arming Britain.

Well, Churchill was The One Single Human Being that saved the entirety of human civilization from barbarism,

poppycock and hubris, I dare you to support that claim with any evidence at all.

BTW, you are aware the Churchill supported Japanese action in China an was a supporter of Mussolini?

and Chamberlain was a weakling that risked it by empowering a brute that need not have been any threat to anybody, but for that very weakness.

The Brute had already been empowered by previous British governments and Hitler had been allowed to re-arm.

By forgiving Chamberlain his completely avoidable error that cost so many so much,

what other choice existed?

you imply that Churchill was not merely wrong, but mendacious.

No I don't, Churchill saw where it was going, but his vision does not instantly give Britain the means to do a damn thing about it.

And the historical record isn't as muddy as you'd like to make it to score your point: it was CLEARLY seen by the eyewitnesses to these events that Chamberlain was weak, dishonorable, and it was HIM that had made a political calculation that placed the national interest second.

Source it please

All of those supposedly crucial details that you've cited really doesn't accumulate to make anything near the weight of his error on the side that HE BELIEVED IN, which was that he would have literally done ANYthing to avoid war.

BS, there is no evidence to support what your claiming. At the very least had France chosen war, Chamberlain would ahve gone along with for no other reason than to preserve the alliance. That something is far from your anything.

And Churchill knew exactly what that decision meant when he said that the choice was between dishonor and war, and Chamberlain's choice brought both to Great Britain and the world.

Assuming Chamberlain had chosen war, how exactly was Britain to prosecute it?

Originally Posted by zraver

Assuming Chamberlain had chosen war, how exactly was Britain to prosecute it?

The only way possible - through France.

Originally Posted by Mihais

zraver,look at pages 11-13 that deal with Munich.The rest of my docs including some primary sources require translation.I'll try to translate a few Friday,if it's not to late.

p.s The doc. is translated somewhat sloppy.The guy didn't knew that the English translation is General Staff not Major State ,among others.

That document doesn't really show Romania being a friend of the Czech's, the desire to preserve Czech territory seems to be based on Romanian self interests.

Originally Posted by Kansas Bear

BUT, would France have moved against Germany in '38?

Was France prepared to move against Germany in '38?

Remember the "Sitz-krieg"? The months of nothing after the declaration of war?(Granted that is a bit of use of hindsight, but still...)

Nope, nope and yep. France, more than anybody, threw away a golden opportunity to stop Hitler dead in his tracks in 1939.

They threw it away again after September 1 1939. The Ruhr was ripe for the picking...and instead they did nothing.

I have to look more into the intel picture France,UK and Poland had in 1938 and 1939 on German Army.However their performance during the Anschluss was next to absymal.I'm not convinced that a German attack would have been a walk in the park(heck,the German generals were so afraid of a French move they planned a coup in the event of a war with the Czechs supported by France).General Fritsch was removed because of his opposition.No matter how you look at it the force ratio is not that great in German favor,the terrain,the fortified line are major obstacles.The 3 sides encirclement also could work against them because of division of forces.The things going against the Czechoslovaks are mainly:-the German minority acting as a 5th column
-the danger of Hungarian attack

Now for Chamberlain,I have to side with Bluesman that it's revisionism. All support Uk could provide was indeed moral and financial.But more is not really needed.All military steps would have had to be made by the French.While chances of convincing France to attack were next to nil,Britain should not have a move that was likely to blow the entire system of alliances to dust.A strong move to disavow German agression would have sufficed.At the worst case Britain would have bluffed.What really negative repercusions such a bluff could have had?A break with France??

Z,only after Munich E. Europe moved closer towards Germany.

Z,

I'm not sure about the military situation as you postulated. While I agree that the Czechs were destined to lose, it would not have been an easy fight. Germany planned to commit 88 of its 100 divisions to the battle, leaving only 12 divisions facing France.

Hitler NEEDED peace with France and GB before he could take on the Czechs.

Originally Posted by Officer of Engineers

Hitler NEEDED peace with France and GB before he could take on the Czechs.

He needed peace with France more than anything, and France had no intention of budging. Dadalier while vocal, had no intention of moving from behind the Maginot. Without concrete French commitment to send its army into Germany everything else falls apart. The British army is too small, and there is no reason for Poland not to stab the Czech's in the back unless the choice is that or keeping the alliance against France.

Then, I'm not sure the main thrust of your paper is correct - that Chamberlain was in the driver seat. That it was his decision to accept or to reject the proposal when Dadalier was the main decision maker.

Originally Posted by Officer of Engineers

Then, I'm not sure the main thrust of your paper is correct - that Chamberlain was in the driver seat. That it was his decision to accept or to reject the proposal when Dadalier was the main decision maker.

Chamberlain is in the drivers seat for Britain, not France. The thrust of may paper is the the UK lacked the allies in actual position and possessing adequate will to do something. The UK itself also lacked the national will, and military or economic means to do anything alone. It is this conflation of lack of real allied support and not possessing the means to act unilaterally (in a manner that could actually win) that forced Chamberlain to accept the German fait accompli.

One thing that is missing imho is that Chamberlain was urged by several members of the Wehrmacht to a strong resistance against Hitler, claiming that if he would face enough oppossition a Putsch would be posible.

Tarek,who were these guys?Canaris,Halder,Fritsch?

There were different groups, often unaware of each others (a big factor in their lack of succes).

Halder with Witzleben was the most important in the planned 38 coup. Canaris (together with Beck) was informed shortly before the planned attemp but had little involvement (as far as I know). Werner von Fritsch had been already sacked early 38 due is open opposition to Hitler but still was in contact with Halder and a few others (though not really able to be much of a help).

Many more were involved like Hans Oster or Gisevius. Even people like Brauchitsch who oposed any coup and were loyal to Hitler were aware of plans but did not make any move to stop them.

Sorry,I meant who has established contact with the Brits?My bet is someone from Abwehr,which would be Oster,but just to be sure.