Thread: Chamberlain a new look.

Originally Posted by redco

Unfortunately for your scenario the Poles had no wish to align their national interests to Germany.

Y'mean I can't consider a make-believe scenario wherein the opposite of an actual event takes place because the actual event took place?

From what I've found out from a bit of digging is that the American writer Simon K. Newman's book is a revisionist book in which its argued that Chamberlain and Halifax had decided on provoking a war with Germany after Munich

Did you read it yourself? To clarify, rightly or wrongly (mostly wrongly) Halifax believed war was unavoidable. He, therefore, did not envision himself provoking the war, but rather provoking an earlier start to it. He feared that the more countries Hitler rolled up bloodlessly, the worse it was for Britain's standing in the world and its economy.

Possibly, Halifax had come to realise at Munich that appeasement was a failed policy, but its equally true that the events of March 1939 had shocked Chamberlain to the core, and that he also felt the need for a line in the sand against any further aggressive German territorial demands.

You are quite right that Chamberlain was shocked by the failure of his Munich deal. But he reversed policy (drew a line in the sand) for political as well as geopolitical reasons. He wanted to co-opt Churchill who was rallying support in Parliament for abandonment of the policy of appeasement. Had Churchill prevailed, Chamberlain's government might have fallen. Second, Chamberlain believed a guarantee would block any possibility of a German-Polish alliance and threaten Hitler with a two-front war. (Romania had signed trade treaty with Germany a few days before, and he feared Poland would follow.) They also wanted Poland's 55 divisions facing Germany not Britain and France.

Any claim that Halifax wanted war is nonsense, Halifax hated war, but it was also true that he was concerned that Germany was getting too powerful for Britain, so he had come to the conclusion that a 'line in the sand' had to be drawn on any attempts by Germany to force other European nations to cave into her territorial demands.

This is pure Sophistry. A leader can hate war, not want it, and yet initiate it for the good of his country. We don't want to pay taxes, but we do.

Halifax clearly backed a policy he knew or should have known would certainly trigger war. Maybe he hated doing it, but he believed it had to be done.

The only thing you need to remember is that if Germany hadn't attacked Poland on the 1st September 1939 there would have been no war with Britain and France.

But wait...that's what I said from the start, and it was also the main premise in my scenario, which you dismissed...I feel like I'm in a taffy pull...

Originally Posted by cape_royds

Since it has been historically demonstrated that there was no future for an independent Poland under the Soviet aegis, then the question arises as to what the Poles could possibly have done in the late 1930's to preserve their independence in the face of the revival of their two great power neighbours.

I can't think of much. "Sux 2BU," about sums it up. It's the kind of story that makes it easy to understand the world's urgent need for nuclear proliferation.

Not really, Poland big downfall was the poor disposition of its military in September 1939 and the low amount of tanks and fighters. Both of these are reversible errors if a brighter mind had been at the helm.

A robust chicken-bone defense that concentrated on preserving the core polish areas while inflicting the most attrition possible on an enemy. A Poland that can defend its core areas is a serious problem for Germany. Hitler might be able to take Poland, but if the Germany army chokes to death doing it he hasn't gained anything.

The Soviet Union is a different problem. The sheer size of the Russian army is a problem. Denied the snow and broken terrain of Finland all Poland would ahve would be its own skill at arms and Soviet ineptitude.

Originally Posted by cape_royds

JAD,

I can't see any possible advantage for Poland in making an alliance with Germany to war upon the USSR, or vice-versa.

Well, for starters, not getting it's butt kicked by the Germans would be nice and secondly not having the Soviets raping and pillaging would be nice too. A big bonus would be seeing the Soviets get a major haircut. Perhaps in time the price of an alliance would prove to be worse than having been invaded. You can assert that, but not prove it.

The only reason Polish independence had ever been power-politically conceivable in the first place, was that in 1918 both Germany and Russia were crippled. Once those two recovered, Poland's situation became most unenviable

.

All the more reason to settle on Dansig and strike an alliance with Germany. Hell, the Germans gave the Poles the opportunity for what amounted to protection from the Soviets. Beck miscalculated.

Note that even in our current era the same power-political logic applies: by 1989 both Germany and Russia were crippled as major powers, hence Polish independence revived.

I don't see the logic, just the parallelism.

Bigfella is quite correct about what would lie in store for Poland if they decided to embark on an inglorious career as "Crocodile Feeder."

With all due respect to Big's excellent hypotheses, he cannot be "quite correct" about Poland's fate as a German ally for the simple reason no alliance came about. One could argue that it would not have been in Germany's interests to treat its allies severely, even those they controlled. If Polish forces, fighting on the German side, were to learn that its ally was running roughshod over their homeland, just how reliable would they be?

If by chance that war doesn't go well, and the old Entente revives, as I think it probably would under those circumstances (remember it was only Polish obstructionism that had aborted an Anglo-French compact with the USSR in 1938/39), then Germany eventually gets beaten, and Poland shares in the German downfall. Their independence gets ignominiously extinguished at the peace table, and nobody in the world would shed a salt tear for them.

A credible scenario. Perhaps that's what Beck had in the back of his mind when he repeatedly turned down all of Germany's proposals, some quite generous, to settle the Danzig question. And in a way, he was right, although it took more than 40 years and a lot of suffering and oppression to prove it. Surely, Poland would not be in such good shape today had it allied with Germany in 1939.

Since it has been historically demonstrated that there was no future for an independent Poland under the Soviet aegis, then the question arises as to what the Poles could possibly have done in the late 1930's to preserve their independence in the face of the revival of their two great power neighbours.

Punt. Ally with Germany, help knock off the Soviets, assassinate the German-blessed Polish dictator as allied troops (minus the Soviets) near Warsaw, and surrender. Worked for Italy.

It's the kind of story that makes it easy to understand the world's urgent need for nuclear proliferation.

JAD,

Sir, I politely disagree. To argue Britain's policy initiated the war is to presume Germany did not want war. There is no evidence to suggest Hitler was not itching for a fight. Invasion of Russian was an issue already decided even before he came to power and what are the chances that Hitler would go East before he settled accounts with the French and the British? Anyone who could read a map knew conquering Russia would take all of Germany's divisions and then some. Would Hitler do that without securing his rear against a rigorous French or British response?

We know from hindsight that the French and the British had no stomach for a fight at that time, but Hitler did not know that--until Munich. As Bluesman said, Hitler could now tell his generals that the West was weak and ripe for destruction. =(