Thread: Broad Front versus Narrow Front: Who was Right?

To steer the conversation back to Europe--

I have a creeping suspicion that Ike was right because there was no way the Allies could concentrate enough to overpower German defenses at single point. The Wehrmacht remained a formidable adversary. Logistics did not permit the building of a sufficiently massive force to roll over the Germans at any sector. The way to go was to deliver as much combat power as possible by taking advantage of a wide front, lest the Germans isolate a spearhead and choke it to death.

That the Germans did collapse in 1945 under the narrow front assault of the 12th Army Group was the result of the success of the attritional strategy at bleeding the German Army white during 1944, not a vindication of the narrow front proposal.

Originally Posted by Triple C

To steer the conversation back to Europe--

I have a creeping suspicion that Ike was right because there was no way the Allies could concentrate enough to overpower German defenses at single point. The Wehrmacht remained a formidable adversary. Logistics did not permit the building of a sufficiently massive force to roll over the Germans at any sector. The way to go was to deliver as much combat power as possible by taking advantage of a wide front, lest the Germans isolate a spearhead and choke it to death.

That the Germans did collapse in 1945 under the narrow front assault of the 12th Army Group was the result of the success of the attritional strategy at bleeding the German Army white during 1944, not a vindication of the narrow front proposal.

I am going to disagree. The Germans tried to match strength on strength in Normandy when the allies where hedged in, but the allied material superiority and air support doomed that effort. Those same conditions were going to exist everywhere. Market garden failed because it was a natural bottleneck. Once the allies force a crossing of the Rhine, its Katy bar the doors across Germany as across France. The Rhine is a barrier, but when the allies have complete air and artillery dominance its not much of a barrier.

The German collapse in early 45 was due to a combination of factors. More and more Germans soldiers gave up and either surrendered, deserted or simply stopped the fanatical resistance in the west, it became about surviving the war not winning it. Russian pressure- the summer-fall of 44 was the death of the German army. Between defeats like the destruction of AGC and the stupid festung policy the Ger,many army was shedding troops and equipment faster than it could be replaced. Germany's last hope for an extended defense was the carefully collected armored reserve that got thrown away at the Bulge.

Originally Posted by Triple C

To steer the conversation back to Europe--

I have a creeping suspicion that Ike was right because there was no way the Allies could concentrate enough to overpower German defenses at single point. The Wehrmacht remained a formidable adversary. Logistics did not permit the building of a sufficiently massive force to roll over the Germans at any sector. The way to go was to deliver as much combat power as possible by taking advantage of a wide front, lest the Germans isolate a spearhead and choke it to death.

That the Germans did collapse in 1945 under the narrow front assault of the 12th Army Group was the result of the success of the attritional strategy at bleeding the German Army white during 1944, not a vindication of the narrow front proposal.

Von Rundstedt's chief of staff,Gen. Blumentritt said that after Normandy all the Allies had to do was to send an armored spearhead,wherever they chose to.The Allies had the bad luck of executing poorly Market Garden.It was the surprisingly poor planning in the sector of the 1st Abn. as well as the unjustified delay of the Guards Div that doomed the effort.

Gang shot a doe and a fawn in the afternoon hunt. I'll split the discussion after we finish cleaning and hanging the animals. 22 thus far this year. Just loved that nusianace tag.

Originally Posted by zraver

I am going to disagree. The Germans tried to match strength on strength in Normandy when the allies where hedged in, but the allied material superiority and air support doomed that effort. Those same conditions were going to exist everywhere. Market garden failed because it was a natural bottleneck.

But by the time the Allies stormed the West Wall, wide-spread fuel and shell shortages as well as bad weather had severely degraded the Allied advantage in firepower and mobility. If the First Army hit the Wall a day or two earlier they would have hit it when it was still unmanned, but that's not what happened.

Originally Posted by zraver

The German collapse in early 45 was due to a combination of factors. More and more Germans soldiers gave up and either surrendered, deserted or simply stopped the fanatical resistance in the west, it became about surviving the war not winning it. Russian pressure- the summer-fall of 44 was the death of the German army. Between defeats like the destruction of AGC and the stupid festung policy the Ger,many army was shedding troops and equipment faster than it could be replaced. Germany's last hope for an extended defense was the carefully collected armored reserve that got thrown away at the Bulge.

I think the Bulge and Vistula-Oder were prerequisites for that collapse.

Originally Posted by Mihais

Von Rundstedt's chief of staff,Gen. Blumentritt said that after Normandy all the Allies had to do was to send an armored spearhead,wherever they chose to.The Allies had the bad luck of executing poorly Market Garden.It was the surprisingly poor planning in the sector of the 1st Abn. as well as the unjustified delay of the Guards Div that doomed the effort.

That is interesting. I wonder, however; both Patton and Hodge were pushing armored spearheads as hard as they could and they did not break the Sigfried like shit through goose. By September deliberate assault was the name of the game.