clackers

Ortona surprised both the British and the German commands with the unexpected viciousness of its fighting.

Vokes' artillery hadn't cleared as many defenders in the approach as thought because they were in a depression ('the Gully') that gave them natural protection from projectiles.

Ortona itself was subject to a limited amount of preparatory fire because the object was to capture the port with as little damage as possible. Just as well, because as in Stalingrad rubble was piled up by the defenders (up to twelve feet high) to force attacking armoured vehicles to go down certain streets and not others.

But First Canadian Division had originally crossed onto the Italian mainland with a hail of artillery, naval and air bombardment.


That certainly wasn't possible, for logistical reasons. The Allies in September 1944 had reached areas that they'd only budgetted on getting to in Spring 1945. Twelve Channel ports were still held by the Germans and Eisenhower was unable to supply one army to its satisfaction let alone the five he had. 2nd Tactical Air Force supporting 21st AG was trying to rebase from England to the Continent, and had to split its available planes between Crerar and Dempsey. There was such a shortage of infantry that Montgomery had to break up one division and provide its troops as replacements to the others. One reason he went ahead with Market-Garden was that since he'd been refused the use of US First Army, with this more limited operation he would at least be assigned extra ground troops with the parachute divisions of the SHAEF Reserve.

So I don't think both efforts should have been attempted, I think Monty and his theatre commander Eisenhower should have forgotten about trying to win the war before Christmas and instead done the dull, boring but essential move of concentrating on the Scheldt in September, rather than October.

All that hard work and preparation was due to Monty and his staff, OoE. The Normandy landings weren't the sort of half-hearted efforts of Salerno or Anzio.

As a result of queries coming out of exercises on English beaches, they even had teams of two dropped off on the Normandy beaches at night with a penetrometer to get soil samples so that the suitability of tank landings could be judged. Monty's brother-in-law was able to invent a Sherman that rolled out a big mat for other tanks to follow up the sand.


There certainly is this tension between Crerar and Montgomery over Crerar's additional role as senior Canadian soldier. Mackenzie King had assured Monty that national interests would not take precedence over operational interests. As Stephen Hart describes the incident and its lead-up:

"Crerar ordered the halt [of Canadian 2nd ID and 4th AD] even though Dempsey's forces were over 100 miles ahead of the Canadians and still advancing. That evening, Montgomery, newly promoted to Field Marshal, became irritated by Crerar's sluggishness and signaled that both Crerar's armoured divisons should 'push forward with all speed' and that did 'not consider this' a time for any division 'to halt for maintenance' ...

... The next day Montgomery summoned Crerar to an operational conference, but Crerar had already arranged to attend the ceremony honouring the Canadian casualties of the 1942 Dieppe raid. Through signals error, the fact of Crerar's absence was not conveyed to Montgomery, who waited in vain for Crerar to turn up. It seems that Crerar deliberately ensured that no messages preventing him from attending the ceremony reached him. During a stormy meeting later that evening, Montgomery indicated with the words 'Our ways must part' that Crerar was to be removed. However, when Crerar stated that he would raise the matter with higher authority - the Canadian government and the Joint Chiefs of Staff - Montgomery precipitously backed down. A few days later the Field Marshal wrote a sickly note of apology ... At that moment, Montgomery 'would have been happy to replace Crerar whom he had never wanted as one of his army commanders, but he was not prepared to risk a political row in doing so.

Colossal Cracks, pp162-3

clackers

Retreat over the Meuse? What he did was to deploy the British XXX Corps at the Meuse so the whole Ardennes offensive was suddenly pointless. Any MkIVs, Panthers and Tigers that actually made it through US First Army were going to get wiped out just as Monty had waited for Rommel's Panzers at Medenine in 1943.

As US historian Carlo d'Este (biographies of Eisenhower and Patton) has written:

Montgomery’s presence and his decisions to reassign responsibilities and realign units of both First and Ninth Armies was precisely the fitting remedy. For American commanders, to cede ground was considered sinful, however, after visiting St. Vith and determining that if the 7th Armored remained it would be annihilated, Montgomery decreed that further defense of the town was futile and, with Hodges’s concurrence, ordered what was left of the division to withdraw to new positions on December 22. The 7th Armored’s brilliantly orchestrated defense of St. Vith against near-impossible odds had stemmed the advance of Manteuffel’s Fifth Panzer Army until December 23, when the last elements evacuated the shattered town. The defense of St. Vith was a key factor in the German failure in the Ardennes. The official U.S Army historian wrote that Montgomery’s decision reflected his "ability to honor the fighting man which had endeared him to the hearts of the Desert Rats [of the British 7th Armored Division] in North Africa: ‘They can come back with all honor. They come back to the more secure positions. They put up a wonderful show.’" The defenders of St. Vith were unambiguous about their feelings toward the field marshal. "Montgomery saved the 7th Armored Division," said Robert Hasbrouck.

Well, you haven't given your evidence for this assertion at all, Dale. If it's just based on unrepentant critics like Martin Blumenson, or a fanboi like Nigel Hamilton, it's useless. As d'Este writes:

Historians of World War II have proven remarkably incapable of judging Montgomery on his merits. From Alexander the Great to Napoleon, history records that most successful military commanders were ruthless bastards. Montgomery was merely the latest in this long lineage. He has been bashed and castigated with equal fervor by British and Americans unable to separate his professional virtues from his personal faults, of which there were indeed many. As his official biographer writes, "the very virtues which gave his leadership its inspiring quality - absolute conviction, insistence on proper planning, ruthless professionalism - made him an infuriatingly opinionated and stubborn ally."

D'Este's more balanced approach to this controversial figure is here:

Armchair General Magazine - We Put YOU in Command! Monty: World War II’s Most Misunderstood General, Part 1 Print

Officer of Engineers

Doesn't change the facts on the ground that we were chewed up.

It would still been a hell of a lot easier than allowing the Germans to flood and fortify the Scheldt up the ying-yang.

And after Dieppe where tanks could not get over pebbles. We were the ones demanding a closer look.

Clackers, you can quote all the books you want. This will still not change the fact that the Canadian regiments do not have a favourable view of Monty.

__________________
Chimo

dalem

Clackers, you and D'este are welcome to your opinions. It won't change mine much. Keep in mind that I'm not just summing it all up with "Monty was a dickweed". He was, but as you point out, so were a lot of generals. And I am careful to not fall prey to the "he wasn't perfect so he must have sucked" disease because again, which military leader is/was perfect?

But, he was enough of a dickweed, and enough of a plodder, and enough of a "wait and see"-er that I rate him pretty low as an army commander after combining all of that. (If it helps to clarify my position, I don't think either Patton or Rommel were "great" army commanders either. I subscribe to Perret's position that all three men were better corps commanders than army commanders. Monty was just more of a jerk about it than the others.)

But so what? He was certainly a gajillion times better than I could ever hope to be, better than many of his opponents and some of his peers, and certainly effective in his role. So he wasn't perfect - big deal. So Ike almost fired him three or four times - big deal. Almost doesn't count.

-dale

clackers

It'd be interesting to hear exactly what the regimental histories have to say, then, OoE. They couldn't - or shouldn't - be about Ortona, whose conduct was due to neither Kesselring or Montgomery, but to Vokes and Heidrich at divisional level.

Or the use of the 'carpet laying' tank, which was invented by Monty's brother-in-law. The Americans did not really use any of his inventions at their beaches other than his DD, despite being offered half of all the vehicles produced.

The Crerar incident we've seen was more over his unsatisfactory battlefield conduct. Canadian troops got the excellent army commander they deserved when Guy Simonds temporarily took over from him.

I agree that overlooking the Scheldt was a blunder ... two in fact ... strategically in September by Eisenhower who should have ordered it as first priority, and before that operationally by Montgomery, who need not have even had to fight for it if he had cut off the 15th Army's retreat.

clackers

As we've seen, only when it suited him and his forces. 2nd Army's advance through the Low Countries was at a faster rate than the German Blitzkrieg of 1940, and 8th Army's pursuit of the Afrika Korps to Tunisia was so quick the spearheads at times needed supply by air. If he'd only plodded in September '44, the 1st Airborne Division wouldn't have been hammered at Arnhem.

But as a ... um ... dickweed ... he was right up there with Patton, Clark, MacArthur, et al.

Officer of Engineers

And here is where we also differ. The Canadians do not hold Crerar in the low light that you and Monty seems to be.

That Simonds was a better field commander than Crerar is without a doubt but Crerar was the man to command the 1st Canadian Army, not Simonds. Crerar kept the army together despite Monty ... and at times Simonds from chopping it apart.

Added to this, Crerar, knowing his own weaknesses, never interfered with his corps commanders, ie Simonds, except to protect them from Monty's unrealistic demands.

So, in the end, while replacing Crerar with Simonds would have enhanced the 1st Canadian Army operationally somewhat at the cost of its unity, it would not have been that much of a difference.

clackers

I'd find it remarkable if the Regimental Histories were kind to Crerar after as a desk general he brought about the sending of the Winnipeg Grenadiers and Royal Rifles of Canada to Hong Kong to be captured in 1941.

It is also fortunate that Simonds raised enough objections to help Crerar's planned one division Operation Siesta attack get cancelled as an unnecessary prelude to Operation Veritable in 1945.

In his study of the 21st Army Group, Stephen Hart writes of Crerar:

... it can be seen that Crerar was a competent army commander, but not much more than that. He was too concerned with nonoperational matters, too inexperienced, too weak a field commander, and too determined to protect Canadian interests to gain Montgomery's confidence. This was so, despite Crerar being fully inculcated with the Field Marshal's operational methods. However, these weaknesses exerted only a limited adverse impact on the campaign because Crerar held both of his two capable corps commanders [Simonds and Crocker] on a loose rein. p172

In Australia, we had a situation with some similarities. Our most capable field commander (Leslie Morsehead) remained subordinate to a more senior guy (Thomas Blamey) who Douglas MacArthur had absolutely no confidence in, and Australian troops later in the Pacific War took part only in operations not considered absolutely vital ... similar to the Canadian so-called 'Cinderella' First Army of NW Europe.

Officer of Engineers

That was viewed as a political decision, not a military one.

And your example of Simmonds canceling a Grerar operation plays into my point, that Grerar knew enough not to overrule his commanders BUT also knew more than enough when it was far more important to keep the 1st Canadian Army together than to play 2nd fiddle to Monty's incompetence.

And your last point about your own army, Mac was also an incompetent leader.

clackers

Crerar was the one providing the military advice to the politicians, OoE. It all occurred after he and the outgoing Hong Kong garrison commander, another Canadian, had a chummy conversation.

On top of that, he also insisted that Canadian troops take part in Dieppe.

That's another three regiments who shouldn't be writing favourably about him.

Do you think Crerar cancelled Siesta just because of the views of a fellow Canadian he didn't like and felt challenged by?

He only cancelled because later on Brian Horrocks (whose XXX Corps was to be attached for Veritable) also said it was unnecessary ... and of course Horrocks had a phone line to you-know-who.


What's your evidence of that?

Crerar would never have said that. Or Simonds. Or Crocker. Or Vokes. These Canadian officers all based their generalship on him, Simonds imitating him to the extent of wearing the same black Royal Armoured Corps beret, and Vokes the moustache, IIRC.

Crerar admired Montgomery, according to Canadian historian JL Granatstein, saying he "played for publicity ... but is absolutely sound tactically ..." The generals: the Canadian army's senior commanders in the Second World War , p108

Montgomery protected his Canadian subordinate commanders from their superiors. MacNaughton had been forbidden to disrupt Simonds with a visit in Italy, and Crerar was told not to interfere with Crocker's tactical preparations in Normandy.

Monty gave the Canadians the task of taking Falaise in the Normandy campaign and wrote during that time: "Harry Crerar is fighting his first battle and it is the first appearance in history of a Canadian Army HQ. He is desperately anxious it should succeed. He is so anxious tht he worries himself all day. I go and see him a lot and calm him down. He will be much better when he realizes that battles seldom go completely as planned, that great patience is required, that you keep on at it until the other chap cracks, and that if you worry you will eventually go mad!! He seemed to have gained the idea that all you want is a good initial fire plan, and then the Germans all run away!"

But there was no personal animosity, simply a feeling that Crerar was not just unsuited to leading Canadians, but all the other nationalities who at various times were also part of Canadian First Army. Monty also felt that at times about Miles Dempsey, the commander of British Second Army. At the end of the war, Montgomery even recommended Crerar for a knighthood (KCBE).

Very true, OoE, and he had political protection in the Australian and US governments.

And outstanding military subordinates in Kenney, Eichelberger and Krueger, along with an extremely active kingmaker/publicity machine/de facto commander in Richard Sutherland as his CoS.

Officer of Engineers

The defence of Hong Kong was a military responsibility. The decision to send the two battalions was a political one. Once the two battalions arrived, their success or failure was due to the British Mission Commander, not the decision to send.

Are you serious? THE ONLY FORCES CAPABLE of doing Dieppe were the Canadians. Yeah, you can hobble enough British Regts to do it but right off the bat, you're looking at the Canadians. It WAS A NO BRAINER!


I have to ask. Did you ever serve?

Do you not read your own posts? The Schelt!

No, the Canadian Regiments said so.

The failure of Hong Kong falls to British defence plans, NOT to the decision to send.

Monty gave impossible orders to the 1CA when he was taking on Market-Garden. I fail to see why you blame Crerar for Monty's incompetence in this matter.

In short, NOTHING YOU HAVE POSTED contradict Canadian perception of Monty.

Chaobam Armour

Alan Brooke said of Montgomery:

A difficult mixture to handle, a brilliant commander in action and trainer of men, but liable to commit untold errors in lack of tact, lack of appreciation of other people's outlook. It is most distressing that the Americans do not like him and it will always be a difficult matter to have him fighting in close proximity to them.

He was a good General, however he did lapse concentration at times, hence Market Garden and the Scheldt estuaries.

Chaobam Armour

A cautious, thorough strategist, Montgomery largely eschewed military innovation. Instead he insisted on complete readiness of both men and material before attempting a strike, a policy that exasperated his superiors, but produced several successes in battle, and his ensured popularity with the men.

Chaobam Armour

Montgomery was a soldiers General, he always made time to see his soldiers, ensuring they got what they wanted i.e. Cigarettes, women etc. He always praised his soldiers, where it was due.

"We could not have won the battle El Alamein in twelve days without that magnificent
9th Australian Division."

Officer of Engineers

And he was more than willing to lose men than to admit his mistakes.