On an side note i always wondered what the british were thinking, why on earth didnt they send Slim to Africa and europe first? He was way way above montgomery.
For Gallifrey! For Victory! For the end of time itself!!
Monty was far too afraid of the Germans to be a good commander against them. While it's mainly his near-cowardice during the Ardennes battles that colors my whole opinion of him, his plodding and generally unimaginative pace was at least in part dictated by the restrictions placed on him by the British government. I'll give you that.Originally Posted by Triple C
But overall I rate him as pretty poor, for all that my opinion matters.
-dale
Bolo,
That he was a better general than Montgomery was by no means established at that point. Remember that Montgomery was far from the first choice for Nth Africa & it was his success there that made him the pre-eminent British general in the ETO. In 1941 Slim was just one more General commanding an Indian division. Slim's reputation is based on events 1943-45.
Slim was closely associated with the Indian Army. I suspect this was a factor in his not being involved in the NA/ETO & quite possibly in his being somewhat overlooked by history. This did mean that he got to take part in a bunch of more peripheral operartion (East Africa, Lebanon/Syria, Iraq) that no doubt proved useful in acquiring the skill necessary for later ops. Further, the Far East had often been seen by the Brits as a bit of a dumping ground for less talented generals, whose appointment to hight office sometimes led to disaster (Percival in Malaya). They needed some able commanders on the Burma/India front, and so much the better if that person had experience commanding Indian troops.
Win nervously lose tragically - Reds C C
That analogy doesn't work, Dale.
They were both self-promoters and excellent organizers and trainers of their armies, and both had overwhelming material superiority over their opponents.
But Monty won his campaigns, and was only ever promoted, ending up as deputy commander of NATO.
Little Mac was sacked twice in the top job and ended up running against his Commander-in-Chief in the 1864 election.
Both were slow to begin offensives ... Monty because he wanted everything brought to bear before proceeding, McClellan unfortunately because I think he was frightened.
I can't really think of another Civil War comparison.
In several ways, Grant and Montgomery resemble each other ... humble backgrounds, quite junior in command at the start of their wars, both stubborn in conducting their strategies, both socially awkward but clear communicators, and both unruffled by setbacks.
But there are still too many differences. For starters, only Grant could have chosen to deliberately operate cut off from his supplies at Vicksburg, while on the other hand, Monty would never have planned a slaughter of his own troops like Cold Harbor.
Are you thinking of the wrong person?
US First Army's General Courtney Hodges was found in his HQ weeping when confronted by German attack in the Ardennes, in the same way French General Georges had been in 1940.
The right person for Ike to put in charge, Montgomery 'grouped the British XXX Corps as a strategic reserve behind the Meuse and reorganised the US defence of the northern shoulder, shortening and strengthening the line and ordering the evacuation of St Vith. The German commander of the 5th Panzer Army, Hasso von Manteuffel said
"The operations of the American 1st Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough."'
American troops were surprised by Monty's visits, as only Patton ever made it regular practice to inspect the frontline. In being ordered to withdraw from St Vith, (they were handled differently from the 106th at Bastogne), the US 7th Armored Division came to respect Montgomery's desire to prevent unnecessary losses as much as British, New Zealand, Australian, Free French, Canadian, South African, Indian and Polish troops already did.
Last edited by clackers; 31 Aug 09, at 06:30.
It's the opposite for me, Dale ... he was terrible at all the backroom politics and strategy stuff, but a superb field commander who was able to beat Rommel again and again in attack and defence ... as they say, amateurs study strategy, professionals study logistics.
He was keen to win the war while minimizing casualties (as you've hinted at), even if it meant 'winning ugly' as we say in Australian Rules Football.
Before D-Day there was a feeling that a bloodbath was inevitable. Army Intelligence reports had made it clear that the average young officer was expected to die on the frontline. Montgomery toured the British Isles in a special train visiting every unit taking part in the assault, talking up to five or six times in a day (thirty thousand troops was one daily total), for all up a million personnel by May 1944.
He asked on one inspection, "What's your most valuable possession?" The soldier replied, "It's my rifle, sir." "No, it isn't, it's your life, and I'm going to save it for you. Now listen to me ... " Montgomery went on to say that he would never push anyone forward without full artillery and air cover, and that he would never hurry an operation just for effect.
Having witnessed pointless and massive waste of life at first hand as a young divisional Chief-of-Staff in the First World War, he was not going to repeat it now he was in charge.
His methodology included encouraging all his officers to replace much paperwork with verbal orders and to run a battle from as far forward as possible ... he frequently used a mobile HQ himself and left great powers of discretion to his Chief of Staff back at the permanent headquarters.
He believed in close air support as additional artillery, and his Desert Air Force at the beck and call of ground commanders really changed American doctrine with the later Ninth Tactical Airforce, since the USAAF initially believed that if it had any non-strategic role at all, it was only interdiction.
He believed in fixed defences in depth, especially minefields, and El Alamein was to really influence Rommel's thinking later on in Normandy. As a lowly divisional commander of the BEF that was overrun in the debacle of France 1940, he had already taught his 3rd Division how to retreat in good order, and it was able to keep so much of its equipment that it was one of the first ready to fight any Operation Sealion after the Dunkirk evacuation.
In the desert he helped teach his infantry mastery of night attacks to break German lines and use the tanks for exploitation.
His modus operandi was a series of initial feinting attacks to cause the opposition to commit their scarce reserves over a widespread area, holding back all his own reserves to eventually concentrate them on a very, very, small section of the front.
While he enjoyed set-piece battles (and thought it wise not to ask much more of his unimaginative subordinates and troops of variable quality), he remained close to the action and flexible, once changing the plan for Mareth in ten minutes in the middle of the night in response to a sudden German counterattack.
While keen after victories to avoid surprising counterattacks by the Germans (who had plagued prior British commanders in the desert with their ability to 'rebound' ... a similar phenomenon US II Corps experienced at Kasserine Pass), he could move fast if needed. By dropping off one corps and allocating its transport entirely to another, advancing into Holland from the River Seine the Second Army was able to match the Blitzkrieg pace the Germans set in 1940, and in 1942 the Eighth Army's chase into Tunisia (for which Monty was criticised for not destroying Panzer Armee Afrika) at times happened so quickly - 670 miles in 17 days - that the lead pursuit units were outrunning their supplies. The Germans learnt that Montgomery was having to supply fuel to his advance guard by air ... when several American transports accidentally landed at one of their bases!
So he could take imaginative risks ... Arnhem is the best example of that gone wrong ... and while he closely supervised operations at the army or even at times corps level, that had more to do with the dour characteristics of his army commanders - Dempsey, Crerar, even Hodges and Simpson, than anything else. If he had been blessed with the sort of commanders US Grant had in the ACW - Sherman, Thomas and Sheridan - he would have been able to take more of a back seat role.
You can't possibly rate a pen-pusher like Devers, an out-of-touch leader like Alexander, or a vain soldier-killer like Clark, Dale!
Last edited by clackers; 31 Aug 09, at 07:02.
We weren't too happy about the Schelt ... and not being invited to Antwerp.
Sorry to disappoint but Canadians usually have a poor view of the FM.
Chimo
Bolo, Bigfella's already pointed out the unfortunate reasons, the particular theatre being one of them. My three favourite US generals - Walter Krueger, Robert Eichelberger and George Kenney suffered from the same fate.
There are statues of just three World War 2 generals outside the Bitish Ministry of Defence in Whitehall. Can you guess who they are?
One is Monty. But who are the others?
The second is Lord Alanbrooke. As Chief of the Imperial General Staff, the British equivalent of George Marshall, he coordinated the Commonwealth war effort, and unlike Marshall, who had a sensible political leader in Roosevelt to deal with, had a capricious, obsessed and micromanaging one in Churchill.
The third is Slim.
So, while not a household name ... or even familiar to all historians ... those 'in the know', especially within the British Army, and at its Sandhurst War College, understand that Bill Slim's right up there with two other overseas warriors, the Duke of Marlborough in the 18th Century and the Duke of Wellington in the 19th.
Last edited by clackers; 31 Aug 09, at 14:39.
Thanks for the info Bigfella, Clackers.
I guess what you are saying comes down to: at the time they knew he was good, but it took most of the war for them to realise he was great.
For Gallifrey! For Victory! For the end of time itself!!
If we are looking at 'unsing hero' types among generals then Alanbrooke probably rates even higher than Slim. I think we often get excited by the cut & thrust of generals who command armies & forget that there are other ways in which a general can achieve greatness.
I have long been a huge fan of Marshall for his role in forgeing the weapon that combat officers wielded. Alanbrooke should probably have been sainted for managing to deal with Churchill so successfully for so long. Without him it would have been a good deal harder for the likes of Montgomery & Slim to achieve what they did.
Win nervously lose tragically - Reds C C
Bolo,
It is probably for the best that Slim got the Burma command. He MIGHT have made a difference in the ETO, but Britain had much greater depth of talent there & was only one part of a larger force. In Burma he was able to make a HUGE difference that a lesser man might have struggled to do.
Ultimately he ended up where he was able to do the most good, for which the men he commanded were forever grateful.
Win nervously lose tragically - Reds C C
I wonder where that comes from? He oversaw the formation of the First Canadian Army, a level of unit that for Canada had not existed in WWI. Wikipedia notes he visited the units down to battalion level, and helped with officer selection, shaping the fledgling army.
'In his memoir, The General Who Never Was, Canadian [regiment commander] Strome Galloway wrote, "The most remarkable thing about General B.L. Montgomery, as we Canadians knew him in our early days together, was his lack of remoteness." Six different levels of command existed between the ordinary soldier and "Monty." Yet, observes Galloway, to the soldier the Army Commander seemed to be his own personal commander, with no one else in between: "It was this remarkable ability of Montgomery to project his personality over the heads of all his subordinate formation commanders, that made him the soldier's general." '
The Canadians did have a tough time in the ETO ... used at Dieppe, even though when Montgomery left for Egypt he urged the operation not go ahead.
Postioned on the left flank of the Allies, the Canadians were always going to have to move up the coast and fight in Dutch territory with few roads but many river crossings and the potential of floods.
With Eisenhower's broadfront strategy (as opposed by Churchill, Patton and Montgomery, but supported by Roosevelt and Marshall), Canadian First Army was unable to have the resources to both take the Estuary and clear the Channel ports, just as Monty, Bradley, Patton and Devers were all unable to advance across the Rhine in September 1944, given that the advance after Normandy had been too rapid and the logisticians of a broadfront strategy had only planned to reach those points in April of 1945.
However, a very serious issue exists with 'Harry' Crerar that I only hinted at in an earlier post.
In retrospect, he was, at worst, a competent general, even if he was a political appointment.
But Montgomery did not think so.
Crerar was a gunner by background, and a good staff officer, but had never commanded a large unit in combat before, and back in Italy Montgomery had suggested that he voluntarily take a demotion and learn how to fight by commanding one of the divisions. This didn't happen. Monty thought both Crerar's corps commanders were better generals, and in particular, that Guy Simonds should have been the army commander. Simonds found Crerar relied on his staff officers for his planning, and in particular disputed his superior's assumption that the Breskens Pocket would be almost unopposed.
Montgomery told Alanbrooke once that Crerar had "gained the idea that all you need is a good fire-plan, and then the Germans all run away!"
Certainly, when Crerar took sick leave during the Scheldt operation, Monty did not want him to come back, since Simonds was making real progress, but Crerar did, and oddly, did not take command again immediately but watched Simonds do it for a couple of days!
Monty trusted the British Second Army slightly more, if only because he had slightly more confidence in Miles Dempsey as its commander. First Canadian Army was left back in England on D-Day, and was originally not planned to take the lead in Operation Veritable, 21st AG's advance to the Rhine in February of 1945.
It must be said as an Australian, that our campaign in the South-West Pacific was hindered for a similar reason ... our commander Thomas Blamey did not have the confidence of Douglas MacArthur and our troops were relegated to a lot of backwater fighting from 1943-45.
Last edited by clackers; 31 Aug 09, at 14:41.
Very much so, Bigfella ... Montgomery was first noticed by Alanbrooke during the retreat before the Blitzkrieg in 1940, while Slim was effectively sacked in 1945 by his new theatre commander (a bizarre moment from one of the better British ETO generals, Oliver Leese) and an angry Alanbrooke had to override the decision.
Like Marshall, Alanbrooke was disappointed to have not been made commander of Overlord, but got to do even bigger things in winning the war from his office.
The achievements of these two (and the Soviet Aleksi Antonov) contrast with the poor contributions of their Axis counterparts - Keitel, Sugiyama and Cavallero.
Last edited by clackers; 31 Aug 09, at 14:31.
From the regiments and since Oratona. I don't know when Monty started believing in CAS or artillery support but that fight, including all the approaches, was a straight meatgrinder.
The Scheldt should have been the first priority, not MARKET-GARDEN. The failure of MARKET-GARDEN was two fold. Not only the operation itself but it allowed the Germans to fortify and flood the Scheldt down to the last walkway and that left no room to manuver and straight up the roads into machine gun fire.
Hell, had Monty given the gold ahead to the Canadians, the Scheldt could have been taken as the simultaneous assault as MARKET-GARDEN.
And as far as JUNO was concerned, it was despite Monty, not because of him. There was more paperwork at JUNO than all the other beaches combined. Learning from Dieppe, nothing was left to chance, not even the beach itself whether it was sand, pepples, or concrete.
Monty nearly got fired for bringing Crerar on charges for direclition of duty when Grerar left for a ceremony honouring the Scheldt. Ottawa was in an uproar that Monty had not only snubbed the Canadians at Antwerp, we were not invited to that ceremony but had the gall to charge a Canadian commander for honouring Canadians. Monty had to write a letter of appology.
Regimental history always remember the slights against the regiments.
Chimo
No. Monty screamed for control of American troops (as he always did) and when Ike finally relented, Monty's first idea was to retreat over the Meuse with them, which would have handed the Germans the victory they couldn't achieve on their own.
Shoulda been fired at that point.
Of course I can. And I do. I find his ability to build up and motivate an army to be first rate, and his ability to use it in the field to be abysmal. Easy for me to say from my armchair, but that's the way I read his history.You can't possibly rate a pen-pusher like Devers, an out-of-touch leader like Alexander, or a vain soldier-killer like Clark, Dale!
-dale
Last edited by dalem; 31 Aug 09, at 20:04.
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