Thread: Could Germany Win WWI

Originally Posted by stratadmir

I think they could have, but do you? Ther first mistake, while the war was already in motion, was probably taking two corps off the Western front and transfering them to Russia.

Given the French Plan 17, Germany did have a chance to win early. First mistake was strengthening the left wing at the expense of the left. Von Moltke et al just didn't get the point of the plan, which was to allow the French some meaure of success against the German left - drawing them forward - while the left cut around behind them. Then shipping the corps east. Plenty of mistakes on both sides after that. I would say a couple strategic mistakes after that were continuing to attack in the west rather than switching east and then bringing the US in against them. Without the US, the Germans still might have forced a favourable peace - or both sides would have finally come to a compromise settlement out of exhaustion.

Originally Posted by stratadmir

I think they could have, but do you? Ther first mistake, while the war was already in motion, was probably taking two corps off the Western front and transfering them to Russia.

Absolutely, but in more ways than you might think.

German mistakes/errors

1)Germany fails to make alliance/warm ties with England. As late as 1904, the British were offering the olive branch, and Germany stayed on the fence. Without Britain, France and Russia would have been crushed.

2) Germany launches attack through Belgium. This was only justified if it knocked France out of the war. It was the direct cause of England entering the conflict (although there were other reasons as well). Had such an offensive not been launched, England might have stayed out of the war, and Germany alone vs Russia and France would have been a foregone conclusion.

3) Making the right hook through Belgium substantially weaker in the revised Schlieffen Plan, in order to strengthen the forces in Alsaace-Lorraine. The original Schlieffen Plan (1905) had called for stronger forces involved in the thrust through Belgium. Overall, those two corps probably wouldn't have made that much of a difference, but two additional armies (or more) would have.

4) Verdun. On the Eastern Front, there was opportunity. The Russians had shown a complete inability to compensate for Mackensen's slashing attacks along the long front, and the Germans gained much ground and destroyed huge numbers of Russian troops during 1915. Falkenhayn changed the focus of the war back to France, however, where the lines were static. His attempted war of attrition was ruinious for the German army (and was an easily avoidable and obvious error), and had the military focused on Russia, the Russian collapse could have been brought about much sooner.

5) Initiating an unrestricted submarine campaign which brought the United States into the war (among other things). Quite frankly, without the United States in the conflict, the allies would have been unable to stop the German armies in their final offensive. The French stupidly massed their troops in the forward trenches (and this after the mutinies), where they were suppressed by the artillery barrage and then overun by the Stosstruppen. There were next to no reserves left to resist the German drive to Paris in that final offensive, save the American forces (and that is with the American army holding substantial sections of the quiter fronts). Without those forces, the Germans wouldn't have been stopped short of Paris.

6) Not transfering more of their army from Russia to the Western Front for the final offensive in 1918. They had a million men in Russia, that were not necessary for occupation (they could have gone back once France was crushed, the Bolsheviks were no match). Their final offensive fell just short of victory, due to a lack of reserves. Had even another two armies been available as reserves, it could have been enough.

7) Sortieing the High Seas Fleet (this is a long shot). The German fleet was never used, save for an abortive lunge at Jutland. Either aggressively seeking battle with the British fleet, or scattering to raid convoys could have severely disrupted France's supply lines had enough German ships made it through. France's industry was very reliant upon imported goods at all levels, as was Britain. Large portions of Germany's surface fleet in the convoy routes at the middle or later portions of the war could have made a big difference. At the very least, it would have let the German navy do something more than rot at anchor.

These are just the ones I can think of off the top of my head.

Belgium was a calculated risk, so in that sense it's really only hindsight that leads one to conclude it was a mistake. Without going through Belgium, there's no chance of a knockout blow against France. There might have been some interesting possibilities from an East First strategy. However, they were concerned that the Russians would simply pull back and draw them ever deeper into Russia. IMHO the Germans made the right call in going after France first, via Belgium. Further, after years of a naval arms race with the Germans, the Brits were pretty well opposed to Germany. Although they didn't have a treaty which 'automatically' committed them, they likely would have gone in anyway. If not Belgium, another excuse would have been found, Belgium just made the inevitable a bit easier.

Originally Posted by deadkenny

Belgium was a calculated risk, so in that sense it's really only hindsight that leads one to conclude it was a mistake. Without going through Belgium, there's no chance of a knockout blow against France. There might have been some interesting possibilities from an East First strategy. However, they were concerned that the Russians would simply pull back and draw them ever deeper into Russia. IMHO the Germans made the right call in going after France first, via Belgium.

Nope. They were only correct if they were willing to risk it all, and Moltke wasn't able or willing to do that. A half measure was worse than doing nothing at all. I do understand the reasons behind the hook through Belgium, however the political cost was too high unless it succeeded. Since it didn't succeed (largely through indeciveness before and during the operation... all of which could have been avoided), it was not justified.

Further, after years of a naval arms race with the Germans, the Brits were pretty well opposed to Germany. Although they didn't have a treaty which 'automatically' committed them, they likely would have gone in anyway. If not Belgium, another excuse would have been found, Belgium just made the inevitable a bit easier.

Disagree, for two reasons. First, the British were largely still on the fence, and reluctant to enter a war that would require the full mobilization of their laissez-faire society (the Crimean War was hard enough... Germany would be much more difficult). The British public needed something to sell the war to them, and poor little Belgium was just the cause that was required... but it wouldn't come again. Second, the British had no concept of what they were getting into when they declared war, as they entered before any serious fighting began. Once the British public began to hear about what a meat grinder the French thrust into Alsace-Lorraine turned into, I doubt anything the Germans did short of directly clashing with England would have brought the British into things. Public opinion was not behind entering a conflict that would inflict hundreds of thousands of casualties without a clear good reason (just look at the problems they had with support for the Crimean War, or the Boer War).

Well, we can agree to disagree I suppose.

The Brits were clearly anti-German by this point. They would have been about as neutral as the US in WWII, in other words clearly pro-French. Belgium was the convenient 'excuse', and I agree it made it easy to sell to the public. Still, Britain was clear NOT truly democratic, the rich and nobility still had much more control than the 'masses'. The 'ruling elite' could have dragged Britain in if they had decided to, and would have be much less retrained by 'public opinion' than FDR was in WWII.

I totally disagree with your 20-20 hindsight view of a 'calculated risk'. To say it's only justified if successful just doesn't make sense. That's the risk part of it. I agree it was poorly executed, and the point of the plan was probably poorly understood by the German military leaders in charge (as I mentioned before - reinforcing the left at the expense of the right was counterproductive on both fronts - the key to the plan was to allow the French to advance against the German left while the right swung around behind them).

Originally Posted by deadkenny

Well, we can agree to disagree I suppose.

I suppose.

The Brits were clearly anti-German by this point. They would have been about as neutral as the US in WWII, in other words clearly pro-French. Belgium was the convenient 'excuse', and I agree it made it easy to sell to the public. Still, Britain was clear NOT truly democratic, the rich and nobility still had much more control than the 'masses'. The 'ruling elite' could have dragged Britain in if they had decided to, and would have be much less retrained by 'public opinion' than FDR was in WWII.

Perhaps, but World War I was a total war, and Britain would have been incapable of fighting it with the majority of it's public opposing the conflict. While I agree with you that the Brits probably would have been pro-French, that would have only extended to loans and sales of munitions/weapons to the French and Russians. That would not have saved them. And once reports started coming back from the front (and they would have), there is no way that the "elite" would have risked bringing in the British people unwillingly into a general war on the continent (always frowned upon). The British people only agreed to war because it was necessary to protect little Belgium, and even then they thought it would be over by Christmas. When Britain joined, there was no understanding that they would need to create a mass conscript army on continental lines... had the British entry been delayed, that would have become evident. Public opinion is still important in this era, especially as it tended to vent itself through revolution. The ruling classes were wary of this, and even the much more authoritarian Germany still understood the need to keep the masses placated..

I totally disagree with your 20-20 hindsight view of a 'calculated risk'. To say it's only justified if successful just doesn't make sense. That's the risk part of it. I agree it was poorly executed, and the point of the plan was probably poorly understood by the German military leaders in charge (as I mentioned before - reinforcing the left at the expense of the right was counterproductive on both fronts - the key to the plan was to allow the French to advance against the German left while the right swung around behind them).

Moltke opted to wage a "safe" war. He should have done it correctly. It was very clear, even at the time, that his revised plan was a half-measure, and in war a half measure is often worse than none at all. If he was truly to wage a safe war, Moltke should have focused on Russia initially, as their capacity to sustain a war was far less. Serbia could be picked off, the French fleet could have been defeated, and their trade lanes severely disrupted. Once the French had bled themselves white against the German lines, and the regular Russian army had been decimated, then the French could have been crushed. A safe war. It is a matter of hind sight, but it was also something that could have been seen at the time as well.

Originally Posted by lwarmonger

Perhaps, but World War I was a total war, and Britain would have been incapable of fighting it with the majority of it's public opposing the conflict. While I agree with you that the Brits probably would have been pro-French, that would have only extended to loans and sales of munitions/weapons to the French and Russians. That would not have saved them. And once reports started coming back from the front (and they would have), there is no way that the "elite" would have risked bringing in the British people unwillingly into a general war on the continent (always frowned upon). The British people only agreed to war because it was necessary to protect little Belgium, and even then they thought it would be over by Christmas. When Britain joined, there was no understanding that they would need to create a mass conscript army on continental lines... had the British entry been delayed, that would have become evident. Public opinion is still important in this era, especially as it tended to vent itself through revolution. The ruling classes were wary of this, and even the much more authoritarian Germany still understood the need to keep the masses placated...

I think you're underestimating the animosity towards Germany in Britain before the war started. Belgium may have been the convenient 'reason' in the first place. But in the end, Britain was not pouring out their treasure, and their lives, because of Belgium. It was because Germany had become a threat to Britain's position in the world. Any view that it was truly sympathy for Belgium that motivated Britain's commitment is mistaking wartime propaganda for fact. As for Fance's survivability, I agree France would be hard pressed without immediate direct aid from Britain. However, keep in mind that in the scenario being discussed Germany isn't going through Belgium. A direct attack through the narrow Franco-German border, into France's fortified zone, would be much easier for France to contain.

Originally Posted by lwarmonger

Moltke opted to wage a "safe" war. He should have done it correctly. It was very clear, even at the time, that his revised plan was a half-measure, and in war a half measure is often worse than none at all. If he was truly to wage a safe war, Moltke should have focused on Russia initially, as their capacity to sustain a war was far less. Serbia could be picked off, the French fleet could have been defeated, and their trade lanes severely disrupted. Once the French had bled themselves white against the German lines, and the regular Russian army had been decimated, then the French could have been crushed. A safe war. It is a matter of hind sight, but it was also something that could have been seen at the time as well.

Perhaps our opinions are not so different on this after all. My point was that the idea of invading France via Belgium was not itself a flawed concept, even at the price of bringing in Britain. It was the execution that sucked. In particular, the left was repeatedly reinforced at the expense of the right. Then forces were taken from the right to go east. The entire point of the attack was not just making the right strong - part of it was also making the left weak. The idea was not just to swing around the French flank, but to actually draw them forward at the same time. By strengthening the left, the effect was actually to push the French out of the trap at the same time as the right's capacity to 'close' the trap was diminished.

Originally Posted by deadkenny

I think you're underestimating the animosity towards Germany in Britain before the war started. Belgium may have been the convenient 'reason' in the first place. But in the end, Britain was not pouring out their treasure, and their lives, because of Belgium. It was because Germany had become a threat to Britain's position in the world. Any view that it was truly sympathy for Belgium that motivated Britain's commitment is mistaking wartime propaganda for fact. As for Fance's survivability, I agree France would be hard pressed without immediate direct aid from Britain. However, keep in mind that in the scenario being discussed Germany isn't going through Belgium. A direct attack through the narrow Franco-German border, into France's fortified zone, would be much easier for France to contain.

I disagree. The alliance system had never really been set, previous to this. While there had been a naval race between Britain and Germany, most of the prewar jingoism had been confined to the continent. The British population was initially enthusiastic for war, but they also thought it would be quick and bloodless. Once they lost that illusion... well the memories of the Boer war, infinitely smaller in scope, would have resurfaced. The Brits might not have stayed out of the war for exceptionally long, but Russia and France would have been far worse off. And while it is true that an attack into France's fortified zone would have been more difficult, that would only have been true if the French utilized those fortifications. The French were unwilling to do anything other than attack at the beginning of the war (superior moral will overcome a lack of machine guns, and heavy artillery... at least that is what they thought). Germany could have crushed the Russian armies, then smashed through the French divisions shattered because of Plan XVII. Without the BEF, and the unwillingness of the French to use reserves in frontline fighting, that was most likely to succeed, just as it had in 1870.

Perhaps our opinions are not so different on this after all. My point was that the idea of invading France via Belgium was not itself a flawed concept, even at the price of bringing in Britain. It was the execution that sucked. In particular, the left was repeatedly reinforced at the expense of the right. Then forces were taken from the right to go east. The entire point of the attack was not just making the right strong - part of it was also making the left weak. The idea was not just to swing around the French flank, but to actually draw them forward at the same time. By strengthening the left, the effect was actually to push the French out of the trap at the same time as the right's capacity to 'close' the trap was diminished.

I agree with you. What I am saying was that the half-measure was worse than trying something completely different. If they weren't willing to accept the risks inherant with the original plan, they should have tried something else, that was designed to be safe and effective.

Originally Posted by lwarmonger

I disagree. The alliance system had never really been set, previous to this. While there had been a naval race between Britain and Germany, most of the prewar jingoism had been confined to the continent. The British population was initially enthusiastic for war, but they also thought it would be quick and bloodless. Once they lost that illusion... well the memories of the Boer war, infinitely smaller in scope, would have resurfaced. The Brits might not have stayed out of the war for exceptionally long, but Russia and France would have been far worse off. And while it is true that an attack into France's fortified zone would have been more difficult, that would only have been true if the French utilized those fortifications. The French were unwilling to do anything other than attack at the beginning of the war (superior moral will overcome a lack of machine guns, and heavy artillery... at least that is what they thought). Germany could have crushed the Russian armies, then smashed through the French divisions shattered because of Plan XVII. Without the BEF, and the unwillingness of the French to use reserves in frontline fighting, that was most likely to succeed, just as it had in 1870.

Once again, agree to disagree. Germany's sabre rattling did impact views in Britain. The enthusiasm for the war at the start was not because they were going to 'save' Belgium. It was because they were going to fight Germany, whom they had seen as the 'enemy' for many years. Britain had a tradition of not signing treaties that in effect took the decision to go to war out of their hands (i.e. provisions for automatic commitment under specified conditions). However, the Entente was about as far as they were willing to go. Still - many leaders in Britain felt that was a 'moral' obligation to aid France, and their real concern was that any German victory would be a direct threat to Britain itself (Napoleon was still not too distant history for them). Once you postulate a war with Britain on the side lines and Germany not invading Belgium, you're quickly into the realm of pure speculation. If Germany goes East first then France isn't immediately threatened. Plan 17 is probably the same disaster it was historically, but probably no worse either, and the French don't have to worry about the sweep through Belgium immediately after the disasterous 'Battle of the Frontiers'. If Russia is immediately invaded big time, then they probably follow their historical approach and retreat into the interior. That might actually end up working in their favour in a twisted way. It was exactly because France was historically invaded first, and called on the Russians to launch a hasty attack, that the Russians started off so badly. It was the heavy losses in battles near the frontier, and the obvious stupidity of Russian commanders that destroy Russian morale so quickly. An invasion of Russia from the start might have allowed the regime to call upon history (Charles and Napoleon) to boost morale. If you end up with a 'Barbarossa' without Panzers, I'm not sure how that turns out. It's far from obvious to me that it's a German romp in any case.

Originally Posted by lwarmonger

I agree with you. What I am saying was that the half-measure was worse than trying something completely different. If they weren't willing to accept the risks inherant with the original plan, they should have tried something else, that was designed to be safe and effective.

Yes, apparently we do agree. The key from my perspective though is that the German military leaders in charge didn't understand the plan well enough to realize how they were compromising it with their 'minor changes'. It was critical to land a knockout blow against France, and necessary to take some risks in order to do so. Again, I agree, if not willing to go all out then they should have gone East first or some other alternative.

Originally Posted by deadkenny

That might actually end up working in their favour in a twisted way. It was exactly because France was historically invaded first, and called on the Russians to launch a hasty attack, that the Russians started off so badly. It was the heavy losses in battles near the frontier, and the obvious stupidity of Russian commanders that destroy Russian morale so quickly. An invasion of Russia from the start might have allowed the regime to call upon history (Charles and Napoleon) to boost morale. If you end up with a 'Barbarossa' without Panzers, I'm not sure how that turns out. It's far from obvious to me that it's a German romp in any case.

I'm afraid I must disagree with you here as well. France pushed for Russia to invade Germany rapidly for long before the war, and most of the French financial assitance was contingent upon Russia being prepared for a quick strike westward. Therefore, the Russians are attacking, whether the French are hit hard or not. Once of Russia's biggest problems was also the lack of reserves (while possessing a large standing army, they were extremely short on reservists) and an inability to replace equipment losses. These were difficulties that did not plague Russia in 1812 or 1941.

Also, the Germans showed a willingness to wage a political war during their fight with Russia, that neither Napoleon nor Hitler was prepared to do. As the Revolution of 1905 showed, the Czar was on shaky ground already, and a couple of good pushes could truly have toppled the regime.

Originally Posted by lwarmonger

I'm afraid I must disagree with you here as well. France pushed for Russia to invade Germany rapidly for long before the war, and most of the French financial assitance was contingent upon Russia being prepared for a quick strike westward. Therefore, the Russians are attacking, whether the French are hit hard or not. Once of Russia's biggest problems was also the lack of reserves (while possessing a large standing army, they were extremely short on reservists) and an inability to replace equipment losses. These were difficulties that did not plague Russia in 1812 or 1941.

Also, the Germans showed a willingness to wage a political war during their fight with Russia, that neither Napoleon nor Hitler was prepared to do. As the Revolution of 1905 showed, the Czar was on shaky ground already, and a couple of good pushes could truly have toppled the regime.

Sure, not surprizing that we disagree on this point, since once you start to change the course of the war to that extent you're in the realm of pure speculation anyway. Sure the French pushed for Russian offensives on a number of occasions, and the Russians were very willing to oblige(perhaps too much so for their own good). However, it might have been a very different story if the Russians had been facing the bulk of the German army from the start. Sure, the Russians may very well have launched attacks from the start. These may very well have turned out as badly, or worse, than the historical opening offensive. However, an initial defeat on the frontier would almost certainly have been followed by a retreat into the interior.

As for the German willingness to play a 'political' game - that may have been due to the German view of the western front as the 'main' front. If the initial attack had been on the eastern front, the Germans might have been more interested in 'crushing' the enemy in a military sense, and less 'clever' about the political side of things. The Russian 'shortcomings' regarding equipment etc. would have been offset, to some extent, by German logistical problems in trying to drive deep into Russia. Keep in mind the logisitical limitations of the time. The Germans were fortunate to some extent that the bulk of the fighting on the eastern front was relatively close to the border - in the Baltic states, Poland and Rumania / western Ukraine. It's hard to imagine how the Germans could have logistically managed a penetration as deep as that in WWII.

Originally Posted by deadkenny

Sure, not surprizing that we disagree on this point, since once you start to change the course of the war to that extent you're in the realm of pure speculation anyway. Sure the French pushed for Russian offensives on a number of occasions, and the Russians were very willing to oblige(perhaps too much so for their own good).

You understate (are you perhaps British?)! Never before has there been a great power so willing to subordinate it's own interests to that of it's ally.

However, an initial defeat on the frontier would almost certainly have been followed by a retreat into the interior.

Less than an effective tactic, given how rocky support for the regime was. Germany never really wished to conquer Russia, just knock it out of the war, because France was always the main enemy. Hence Germany's foriegn policy focused on keeping France isolated. This would merely be a military extension to that policy (knock out France's allies first, to keep it relatively isolated, then crush it with numbers).

As for the German willingness to play a 'political' game - that may have been due to the German view of the western front as the 'main' front. If the initial attack had been on the eastern front, the Germans might have been more interested in 'crushing' the enemy in a military sense, and less 'clever' about the political side of things.

I don't believe so. The French were always the main enemy. Any attack on Russia would be to crush them so that all of Germany's might could be turned on France. But knocking Russia out of the war would be the objective, not conquering it. Russia only became the main enemy during Hitler's time.

Originally Posted by lwarmonger

You understate (are you perhaps British?)! Never before has there been a great power so willing to subordinate it's own interests to that of it's ally.

Canadian actually, perhaps close enough.

Originally Posted by lwarmonger

Less than an effective tactic, given how rocky support for the regime was. Germany never really wished to conquer Russia, just knock it out of the war, because France was always the main enemy. Hence Germany's foriegn policy focused on keeping France isolated. This would merely be a military extension to that policy (knock out France's allies first, to keep it relatively isolated, then crush it with numbers).

Funny thing in war, adversity can actually rally support for the regime. It was to some extent because Russia wasn't the main target from the start, and the fighting was mostly at the 'fringes' of the empire, that support started to erode. Sure it's possible that if the main German thrust had been on that front the collapse of the regime would have been accelerated, but then again the dymanics are hard to predict.

Originally Posted by lwarmonger

I don't believe so. The French were always the main enemy. Any attack on Russia would be to crush them so that all of Germany's might could be turned on France. But knocking Russia out of the war would be the objective, not conquering it. Russia only became the main enemy during Hitler's time.

Regarding German dreams of conquest - they may not have started out with such intentions, but the annexations in the treaty of Brest-Litovsk would appear to indicate that the Germans developed such intentions. Such would only have been accelerated if the main thrust had been eastward from the start.