Amled

Japan Declares War on Russia December 1941

Would the outcome on the Central Front (Moscow) and the Northern (Leningrad) in the winter of ’41-’42 have been altered if Zhukov had been unable to throw the tough battle hardened Siberian divisions into the counterattack.
It’s true that the Kwantung Army was no match for USSR’s Siberian Divisions, as had been proved during the Nomonhan Incursion.
Yet all it (Kwantung) had to do was take an aggressive stand along the demarcation line to prevent the withdrawal of these key divisions.
Most of the writings I have read on this period, are of the opinion that these Siberian Divisions were the linchpin of Zhukov's strategy.

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When we blindly adopt a religion, a political system, a literary dogma, we become automatons. We cease to grow. - Anais Nin

cape_royds

Going to war with the USSR wouldn't have solved Japan's main strategic problem, which was the embargo placed upon Japan's raw material imports by the Western powers.

Once that embargo was in place, the Japanese had less than two years in which to fight and win a war to get access to oil, rubber, and tin. In other words, they either had to fight a war that would get them those raw materials, or in two years, they would find themselves unable to fight anybody.

There was little in Eastern Siberia that could meet Japan's most pressing needs.

The US, British, and Dutch conditions for lifting their embargo were harsh: they demanded that the Japanese withdraw from both China and Indo-China. Japan was unwilling to do so without trying a war first, and that war more or less had to be waged upon the Western colonial empires in Asia: esp. Malaya and the Dutch East Indies.

Now Japan was aware that in the long run the USSR was a major regional rival. Japan's preference was always to be allied with Britain, but for a variety of reasons that alliance fell apart after World War One. Note that after WWII the Japanese were happy enough to have an alliance with a Western power against both Russia and China, and like the Germans, they felt somewhat vindicated by that arrangement.

The Japanese had a certain amount of respect for the Russian army, owing not only from the reverses they suffered in the border wars of the 1930's, but also dating from the Russo-Japanese war. The Japanese had won that war, but even then they regarded the Russians as dogged opponents on land.

But in the situation of 1941, Japan didn't really have a feasible option to invade the USSR. They weren't keen on starting a possible long war with Russia at the same time as they were cut off from vital raw materials.

dalem

I would think that, yes, having to keep most (or all) of the Siberian divisions busy with the Japanese would have probably made the difference in taking Moscow in 1941. After that, who knows?

-dale

Officer of Engineers

And Japan would lost the war right there and then. The IJA would have nothing left to keep China and Korea.

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Chimo

Parihaka

I've never actually understood Japans need to attack China in the first place, can anyone fill me in?

Officer of Engineers

Greed. And control of the Chinese Empire. As poor as it was, it was still a rice bowl as well as abundance of raw materials.

astralis

also, the japanese could never get away from the "buffer" mentality. they felt the need to seize korea as a buffer ("korea is the dagger at the heart of japan"), then they felt the need to seize manchuria as the buffer to korea, then that included more and more of china...

on and on. also, japanese industry was salivating at the chance to force unequal terms of trade and industry on the chinese.

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Fortudinae

Bingo.

The most compelling argument I've seen is the IJ fear of communist insurrection, and that it was the driving force behind gekocujo. Hence they invaded mainland Asia to quell communism.
They didn't particularly care how the Russians screwed their country up, and knew they could beat the tar out of the Chinese and Russians at sea.
Their entire focus was on China - they had no interest in Siberia at all.
Manchukuo was a buffer state against Mother Russia.
Consider that in the main the IJN was opposed to war while the IJA wanted it; hence Yamamoto and Tojo were enemies.
Tojo was making a fiery pro-war speech once - when he finished and sat down he fell flat on his sit sack - Yamamoto had pulled his chair back.
LOL
The IJN could have protected Japan without need of the gekocujo invasion. Unfortunately Tojo prevailed over the wiser Yamamoto.
Too bad.

Amled

The point that I was trying to make was that the IJA’s Kwantung Army then already in place should take an aggressive stance along the common border with the USSR, NOT invade as they were too weak and insufficiently equipped to even think about an invasion of Siberia.
Using the Declaration of war as a tactical ploy and the Kwantung to pin the Siberian divisions that were needed for the real theatre of operations at that time, namely the Battle for Moscow and Lenningrad.
Once Moscow and Leningrad fell it would have been an entirely new ballgame, and as Dale said: What then?

Officer of Engineers

Or Stalin could've decided to finish his Japanese problem once and for all. Again, war over right there and then. What could the IJA have moved without jeapordizing their holdings? Not very much and certainly, not enough to threaten Stalin. If he did, don't you think Stalin would've reacted like he typically would?

Triple C

The Japanese tried to invade the Soviets from '38-39. It went none to well, and it is my understanding that the Japanese leadership decided that they should never, EVER, mess with the Ruskies again. The reason Stalin was able to move those Siberian troops at '41 was that he was absolutely sure that the Japanese would not touch him.

Amled

OoE, what you and Patron say is probably correct, but in this scenario would Stalin; not the most rational person at the best of times, have settled for a walk-over in the east while loosing most of Russia west of the Urals; the bread basket, natural resources and the production facilities therein, to what was the main and most powerful Axis enemy: the Nazi’s?

Officer of Engineers

Stalin couldn't wait 10 days?

Fortudinae

LOL - droll

The entire Manchurian adventure was an adlib by lower ranking officers freelancing, as only the peculiar institution of the 30s' IJA could do. Very undisciplined.

Being shot through with Soviet spies, their every move was probably known to Stalin, and they probably knew he knew they knew he knew.

It was a truly oddball dance in the upper East Orient; the Russians pretending the IJ were not at war with their largest ally, and the IJ pretending Stalin was a really nice guy; while ignoring German pleas for a second front themselves. The Americans especially wanted a second front in Siberia - the IJ wasn't about to give it to them.

A move on Stalin would have been a disaster, because the Kwantung was the dumping bin for every gekocujo officer in the IJA (which was probably only slightly better known to IJ than to Stalin). Yamamoto knew what a bunch of homicidal idiots these guys were.

Witness how quickly it crumbled at the first Soviet assault. It sounds good on paper though it would have been a disaster for Japan. B17's bombing Japan from Siberia.

zraver

I don't kinow if its true But I heard soviet and American merchentmen (flagged under the soviet flag) freely sailed between the US and USSR pacific coasts during the war.

Japan could have achieved Hitlers goals (he is the only one who would ahve benifitted) simply by not signing a non-agresson pact until the spring of 42.