Thread: "Thank God for the Atom Bomb"

armchairgeneral,

I've encountered some reports recently that cast doubt on how willing Japan was to fight it out to the end. Read a few quotes from Eisenhower and others indicating that Japan was actually at the end of its rope before the bomb. Anyone know how well those claims stand up?

to put it this way, the last battle of WWII was fought between the emperor's loyalists and rebels who thought that the doctrine of "protecting the emperor" could be extended to "protecting the IDEA of the emperor, even if the emperor orders against it." and this was AFTER the peace faction won and convinced the emperor to go on their side.

the only reason why the peace faction won was not because the atomic bombs killed so many people, but because of the impression that with the atomic bombs, the US could annihilate all of japan without the japanese being able to even fight back.

so if the US was willing to slug it out mano-a-mano, the japanese would have eagerly obliged. the propaganda in japan at the time was the "Glorious Death of 100 Million."

Originally Posted by astralis

armchairgeneral,



to put it this way, the last battle of WWII was fought between the emperor's loyalists and rebels who thought that the doctrine of "protecting the emperor" could be extended to "protecting the IDEA of the emperor, even if the emperor orders against it." and this was AFTER the peace faction won and convinced the emperor to go on their side.

the only reason why the peace faction won was not because the atomic bombs killed so many people, but because of the impression that with the atomic bombs, the US could annihilate all of japan without the japanese being able to even fight back.

so if the US was willing to slug it out mano-a-mano, the japanese would have eagerly obliged. the propaganda in japan at the time was the "Glorious Death of 100 Million."

Here's some quotes I found:

“"It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were almost defeated and ready to surrender...in being the first to use it, we...adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages."

-Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy

"The war would have been over in two weeks without the Russians entering and without the atomic bomb . . . the atomic bomb had nothing to do with the end of the war at all."

-Curtis LeMay

"I had been conscious of depression and so I voiced to (Sec. Of War Stimson) my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was, at this very moment, seeking a way to surrender with a minimum loss of 'face.' "

- General Dwight D. Eisenhower

I'm just curious how significant these statements are, and what the historical consensus (if any) is.

armchairgeneral,

“"It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were almost defeated and ready to surrender...in being the first to use it, we...adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages."

-Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy

"The war would have been over in two weeks without the Russians entering and without the atomic bomb . . . the atomic bomb had nothing to do with the end of the war at all."

-Curtis LeMay

"I had been conscious of depression and so I voiced to (Sec. Of War Stimson) my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was, at this very moment, seeking a way to surrender with a minimum loss of 'face.' "

- General Dwight D. Eisenhower

all of those statements, IIRC, were made after the japanese surrender (and after the US started a campaign to rehabilitate the japanese in the looking fight against communism). that sure as hell wasn't what they were saying at the time. curtis le may was quite ready to use regular bombs to kill every last living thing in japan, for one.

as for what eisenhower and leahy said, simply those statements are, at best, twisted versions of the truth. yes, japan was ready to surrender by fall of 1945. however, the militarists, this surrender meant:

1. no occupation
2. japan/US negotiation over reduction of japanese forces
3. japanese retreat to 1937 boundaries (or 1931 or 1895 boundaries, depending on 'pacifist' the militarist in question was).
4. guarantee that the emperor would emerge untouched
5. no war crime trials.

in other words, had the allies gone for such a negotiated surrender, then yeah, sure, the japanese were ready to surrender without having the bomb thrown at them.

as it was, the allies had to give them something close to a negotiated surrender anyways. had the allies not made remarks stating that the emperor did not necessarily have to be removed, then there is no doubt in my mind that they would continued fighting.

Some say that the atomic bombings were done to send Russia a message...

I recently mailed this file to the LCI 450 crew and honorary members.

The USS LCI (L) 450 sailed from San Diego for Pearl Harbor 6 January 1944. The ships four officers were Lt. (jg) Thomas F Kennedy – Capt. Ens. Gerald M Conners – Exec Officer, Ens. Robert V Main – Eng Officer, and Ens Wallace A Brady - Supply Officer. After the Marshall Is. Kwajalein Atoll invasion, she participated in the Mariana campaigns, Guam, Tinian and others. On 17 February 1945, LCI 450 was part of LCI Group 8 ordered to give covering fire for the Underwater Demolition Teams reconnoitering Iwo Jima’s beaches on D-2 for the invasion two days later.
This material is excerpted from Dick Camp’s “Iwo Jima Recon” recounting the roll the US Navy had in planning and leading the invasion of Iwo Jima.
This excerpt starts the day of the attack as the LCI’s were underway towards Iwo Jima’s beaches.
“We are headed into the beach now” George Kern wrote.” Our planes are dive bombing all over the island.” LCI (G) 450 commanded by Lt. (jg) W A Brady passed destroyers Capps, Luetze, and Henley, and headed for Red Beach one at 8 knots. LCPR’s carrying members of UDT 12 were astern, waiting for Roger Hour. At 10:50, she opened up with her guns and prepared to bombard the beach. “We were all set to let go with our rockets, “ George Kern wrote, “but just before we did, all hell broke loose! My God, I never saw so much enemy fire in all my life. First we got an 8-inch shell in the bow, then we another one in the center of the ship – and a third in the bow again. Two large mortars hit our well deck and knocked all our rocket launchers off. Finally we got another 8-inch shell amidships. That gave us four holes, all at least 3-feet across.”
Brady wrote, “At 10:55 the ship was hit with two large caliber projectiles on the starboard bow, opening a large hole 5 foot by one foot in diameter. Two crewmen were wounded.”
Two minutes later another hit by a large projectile on the port bow started a fire in the forward compartment. Ensign R C Haines found time for humor in the grave situation. “The last hit gave the ship the distinction of being the first United States ship to drop anchor at Iwo Jima since Admiral Perry visited the island. The only difference was that Perry dropped his and ours had her anchor shot off.”
Despite the damage, LCI (G) 450 unleashed its rockets, blanketing the beach with high explosives. Ensign Charles King led a firefighting party forward. Two men just ahead of him disappeared in a shell explosion. He reached for a telephone, and it was shot out of his hand. He grabbed for a fire hose and a shell clipped it, two inches from the nozzle. Three more crewmen went down under a hail of shrapnel. “Someone yelled that number one compartment was on fire,” George Kern vividly recalled. “Just as the fellows started to go up to put the fire out, we got another mortar amidship. This hit the first fellow out of the door and blew off both of his hands and the biggest part of his left shoulder. Two of his buddies picked him up and got him out of the way. The rest went to work on the fire – or tried to. When they picked up the hoses, they were all burnt and blown to hell! Here we were with a fire in the same compartment as our ammo and no water.”
Lt. (jg) Brady wrote, “The fire was threatening to explode ammunition lying on the deck near the 40mm gun over the compartment.” At this time the ship was backing full astern from the beach. Enemy fire was coming from every part of the beach. At 11:10 a shell exploded a 20mm ready box on the well deck, starting a fire. The damage control party quickly extinguished the small blaze. Two minutes later a mortar dropped on the port ramp among the rocket launchers and exploded several rockets which had misfired. The damage control party reported the fire was threatening the forward magazine. I ordered it flooded. The gun crew on the deck above the fire was throwing ammunition over the side to keep it from exploding from the heat. George Kern saw “several rockets explode when they were hit by a mortar shell, ruining several launchers and making the ship look more like a sieve. We took several more hits and lost another man. This fellow got it right in the chest. I can’t tell you how many hits because I could never count them. We took several 3- inch shells and God only knows how much machine gun fire.”
Brady received permission to leave the gun line to put out the fire and transfer two seriously wounded crewmen to the APD-11 for treatment. “After casting off, we moved beyond the capital ship line and stood by for further orders,” Brady remembered. “No further orders were received until 19:20, when we got the word for night disposition.” Brady received the Navy Cross, while Ensign Charles King, Thomas W Elmore S2/c, John L Manuel S1/c, Allen L Johnson CBM, and N Neil Pinkston F1/c all received the Bronze Star for jettisoning ammunition and for quickly bringing the fire under control.
George Kern off the 450 wrote, “Dear Mom, out of the twelve of us LCI’s that left Guam a few days ago there is only one that is in condition to make another run. I want you to know that this all happened in about a half an hour or less, so you can see how fast things happen. I also want you to know that there were many a Mother's prayer answered today or a lot more of us would not be here to tell about it. It is almost time to go off watch now. I have had a busy day so I think I had better close. Tomorrow will be another long day so I will say so long and saying extra prayer for the boys we lost today. Don't forget me either. Love to all, George.
End of LCI (G) 450 excerpt.

This excerpt pertains to Ens. Gerald Conners who was the LCI 450 Exec. Officer and later assigned as Captain of the USS LCI (G) 469 when she and Group 8 LCI’s covered the UDT groups when reconnoitering Iwo Jima’s beaches 17 February 1945.
“Lt. (jg) G M Conners watched as the Japanese shore batteries pounded his outgunned shipmates. His LCI (G) 469 was in reserve, 300 yards astern of the destroyer line. The two nearest destroyers Bryant and Hall were firing as fast as they could – but it didn’t seem to have any effect on the Japanese guns. The water around the landing craft seemed alive with bursting shells. At 10:53 Lt. Conners received orders over the SCR 610 (radio) to relieve LCI (G) 449. Two of the 469 ships participants, Lt. Conners and the ships medical officer describe the action.
Medical Officer: “We hadn’t been at our battle stations, in the crews mess hall, long when word was passed that we were going into the line of fire.”
Conners: “We opened fire on the edge of the beach with all three 40mm guns as we maneuvered at various speeds near the center line of the beaches, attempting to have our guns cover as much of the beach as possible. It appeared that we were drawing fire from all sections of the beach.”
Medical Officer: “Shortly after our own 40’s begun to fire, a seaman came into the mess hall yelling “I can’t stand it out there!” No sooner than he was taken care of - - we were hit astern. We were told to crouch alongside te port bulkhead.”
Conners: “At 11:15 we were hit astern, which caused a fire on the fantail. One minute later the bow 40mm was reported out of action, followed almost immediately by a report another 40mm on the gundeck couldn’t fire. At 11:18 we received hits in the radio shack, the captains cabin amidships, officer’s head, crews head and on the stern.”
Medical Officer: “There were a group of hits that seemed to begin at the radio shack and continue astern along our port side. Immediately MoM3/c Leroy H Tolly staggered in, bleeding severely. He had multiple shrapnel wounds in his shoulder, flank, and hands. A mess table was broken out and he was placed on it and his wounds were treated with Merthiolate and Sulfanilamide powder. He was given ½ grain of morphine, two full units of plasma, and two ounces of brandy. During this time, hoses were stretched out and a Co2 extinguisher was sprayed into the radio shack. Another shot passed through into the galley and spattered lead into S1/c Euel D Thompson’s face.”
Conners: “Battle dressing station in the crews mess was notified there were wounded men on the fantail and aft 20mm gun.”
Medical Officer: “A call came over the phone that S1/c Delmas M Martin was wounded at the aft starboard 29mm gun. Hennessy, the Pharmacist mate, went to the wounded man.”
Conners: “We received hits on the gundeck and port forward compartment on main deck. Ensign James C Nicholson, who was gunnery officer at number two and number three 40mm on the gun deck, was seriously wounded.”
Medical Officer: “Ensign Nicholson stumbled in with a large wound in his shoulder. He was placed on a blanket on the deck, his shirt cut off and treatment started. At this time Hennessy returned with Martin who had shrapnel wounds in his left leg. I was called away to the pilothouse to treat another wounded man, while Hennessy took over.
Lee H Jordan S2/c, had a few small pieces of shrapnel in both hands. I told him to stay at his station and get treatment later. I returned to my battle station to work on Martin and Mr. Nicholson.”
Conners: “At 11:28 we received two hits in number four compartment, starboard side and we started ti take on water. I sent a message to Captain Hanlon, ‘We have received several hits and are taking on water in number four hold’. He responded with proceed out to capitol ship line.’ The crew patched the holes so that we were no longer taking on water. I requested to ‘return to the firing line’. Almost immediately we took three more hits, which started a fire in
the pilothouse. We were ordered to standby to assist LCI (G) 441, whose engines had been knocked out. We remained in position about 2500 yards from the beach, inboard of the destroyer line, until ordered to go alongside USS Terror to transfer our doctor and wounded to her.”
Medical Officer: “Word was passed that I was to go aboard the Terror. I left instructions with my pharmacist mate about transferring our casualties.” In the time between 10:53 and 12:05, LCI (G) 469 expended 1,968 rounds of 40mm and 540 rounds of 20mm. In turn the Japanese scored twenty 25mm and ten 37mm hits, which thoroughly perforated the landing craft, knocking out equipment and cutting electrical lines. Fortunately, only seven crewmen were wounded. End of excerpt.

USS LCI (G) 471 excerpt
Lt. (jg) Charles Crandall, the Engineering Officer, watched as the LCI’s headed for the beach. “ I saw huge splashes alongside them, some higher than the ships. I wondered ‘for Gods sake, what’s that!’ – and then I thought our own ships were firing short. But it wasn’t them; the Japanese were giving us a tremendous reception!” Lieutenant (jg) Robert
Hudgins, the Commanding Officer, was closely monitoring the radio net. It was jammed with damage reports and calls for help.
“473 – Is sinking rapidly and will have to be towed off the beach”
“438 – “Bow gun is knocked out.”
“457 – We are taking on water”
"469. We have several hits. We are taking [on) water."
"449. Request doctor as [we) have injured aboard."
"457. We are sinking."
"469. We are taking on water fast."
"441. Our engines are out."
"471. We need medical assistance in a hurry. Where do we go?"
It was only a matter of time until it was the 471's turn to face the Japanese fire; the landing craft was in reserve and was standing by to relieve one of the ships on the firing line. At 11:04 Hudgins' received orders to relieve LC1(G) 438, which was limping seaward and barely making headway. Crandall crouched on the deck, watching as the ship "fired everything we had while zigzagging to avoid being hit." As the 471 took station off Yellow One, she "drew heavy enemy fire," and at 11:20 received a direct hit on the well deck. The shell passed through the number two magazine, which was crammed with 40mm ammunition, but didn't explode until it entered the next compartment, starting a slight fire. Crandall remembered that several shells passed right through the quarter-inch plate and exploded in the water alongside. Lieutenant Hudgins withdrew from station to put out the fire and check the damage.
At 11:25 the ship headed back toward the beach, three minutes later she received a hit on the forecastle that knocked out number one 40mm, killing nine seamen, and wounding six, and starting a fire. Crandall whose additional duties included damage control, moved around the ship trying to put out fires and control flooding. He tried to assist with the wounded but could not stop to help because of the ships condition. “I left that to our ‘Doc’ [Pharmacist Mate]. He did the heavy work. Treating the severely wounded from the heavy caliber shells.” At one point he had to go through the well deck. “I couldn’t run; it was too slippery. There was a quarter inch of blood on the deck and I had to crawl through it”. Crandall further recalled, “I saw Draper Kauffman come aboard right in the middle of the action. He climbed to the conning tower and stood there peering through his binoculars, like nothing was going on. I couldn’t believe anyone could do that.
Lt. Hudgins conned the ship as shells exploded below him. Crandall said, “The pumps were working and the engines were OK – we stayed in there. The ships action report noted:
11:29 – Received another hit, which tore a large hole in the starboard ramp.
11:32 – Retiring from beach on orders.
11:33 – Fire in number two compartment broke
out again.
11:40 – Fire in forecastle extinguished.
11:45 – Fire in number two extinguished.
12:08 – Moored starboard side of USS
Tennessee.
12:13 – Commenced transferring wounded men to the Tennessee for treatment.
13:04 – cast off all lines, proceeding seaward
to join other LCI’s.
13:50 – Gunnery department reports one 40mm
and one 20mm out of action.
16:47 Commenced burying our dead, Ensign
L M Hermes acting as Chaplain.
12:42 – Completed bural of our dead at sea.
After pulling out of line, Crandall stuffed a
Canvas bag full of shrapnel: he commandeered
A boat and took them to the command ship
Estes. “I was ushered into a large compartment
Filled with brass. My clothes were covered in
Blood but no one seemed to mind. I spread
The metal out on the table where the high
Ranking officers inspected the shell fragments.
Finally I was ushered out and returned to my
Ship.” About an hour after he returned, “Mad Mike Malanaphy came aboard. He asked which one was Crandall. I stepped forward and he said, your Commanding the flagship.’ I replied, “Sir, I’m an engineering officer.’ Malanaphy coolly replied, ‘We’ll handle that.’ I took over as the commanding officer of the 457.”
The heavy guns of the big boys - Nevada, Tennessee, and Idaho - covered the gunboats as they limped out to sea. Admiral Blandy signaled them. "Greatly admire magnificent courage your valiant personnel. " Captain Malanaphy reported back: "LCI 474 sunk: LCI’s 441 and 473 require towing: LCI’s 438, 449, 457, 466, and 471 require extensive repairs to hull and armament; 450 and 469 can be operated after above-water damage is repaired; 346, 348, and 627 operative." LCI 438 was the only LCI of the initial twelve used for gunfire support that was not hit.
Captain Hanlon recommended that LCI(G) Flotilla Three be awarded the Presidential Unit Citation. "This command is very conscious of the high value of the Presidential Unit Citation, and realizes that to retain its present high position, this award must only be given under extreme circumstances. However, this command and all of the personnel of the demolition teams feel that naval tradition of a high order was written by these little gunboats on the morning of 17 February 1945 off the island of Iwo Jima. It feels that the Navy can place the phrase 'I request permission to return to the line' alongside the inspirational phrases of its famous admirals." Kauffman spoke for all the UDT swimmers when he said, "I don't mind telling you they showed really extraordinary heroism-and I know that's a strong word, but I'll use it anyway-of the LCI(G) skippers and their crews. They kept coming back onto the line, no matter how badly beaten up they were. As long as they had a gun to fire, they would come back on line. It was really a darned inspiring thing to see."
The Secretary of the Navy presented the Presidential Unit Citation in the name of the President.

I would like to add that that as a former Aviation Ordnancemen I wish nukes had never been invented. However if the situation arises where I can save my country men's lives and end a war by using a nuke consider the frag received, aircraft loaded, on the hot pad with pins pulled, and in the hands of some one else.
I would be at peace with the knowledge that I saved lives, even the lives of some of the enemy.
Weather anyone else likes it or not we have them and we can't uninvent them and we can't trust each other to get rid of them. For that matter once the discovery of the nuclear chain reaction was made and published in 1938, The use of Nukes became our destiny. If you want to point the finger of blame try an Italian named Enrico Fermi who published his findings in 1938. He emigrated to the USA to save his wife, who was Jewish. Funny how saving one Jewish life allowed the USA and Britain to get the first nuke.
Enrico Fermi - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia