Thread: You are in command!

This is my idea, I trust our military experts can correct any mistakes I have made. I don't claim to be a general, and in this situation I would want my men and their "hostage" families at home (including my own) to survive the war.

Arrange for a prearranged complete internal communications blackout to start with a prearranged signal to hand picked, preselected and trusted units, the assasination of all loyal political commizars would be carried out as soon as the order was given - to prevent any info from reaching your HQ. Prior to the engagement, negotiate and coordinate with the Coalation commander in secret to have a disinformation campaign feed to the media, describing a tremendous fight to the death, while secretly arranging for your forces to be captured with little resistance (some lower level commanders might not cooperate and put up a fight, but with some "supply problems", this could be reduced). The purpose being to prevent your high command from punishing the families of the commanders and troops. Your HQ needs to believe you are all dying in battle (your field HQ was completely wiped out, communications were cut and jammed - both occured immediately, the US had secret weapons, and additional divisions and assests that mowed down your divisions. Though the divisions put up a ferrocious fight and took a substantial but believable toll on the attackers), they were unable to reach HQ with any comms. While your HQ is convinced that your forces are putting up a galliant fight for Sadam, with the media announcing significant losses for the coalition. In fact your divisions are being secretly being disarmed and interred incommunicado, in a hidden, highly secure location with very comfortable POW accomodations and healthcare (fix their teeth, let them worship (provide coalition clerics), offer classes in English or general studies and give them plenty of good food - perhaps offering confidential financial "resettlement" incentives to those who are interested), outside prying eyes. It will be necessary to arrange a global satellite blackout of the battlefield. Use a very secure desert camp, with several no man's land perimeters in depth, to avoid any escapes or information leaks, use only carefully vetted hand picked US soldiers to guard them. It shouldn't take too long before the safety of your troop's and your own families can be secured.

Originally Posted by USSWisconsin

This is my idea, I trust our military experts can correct any mistakes I have made. I don't claim to be a general, and in this situation I would want my men and their "hostage" families at home (including my own) to survive the war.....

They thought they were not only going to survive but win. They felt about us before that battle what many feel about them afterwards. The RG was not the INA, it was a professional and loyal force officered by members of the Tikriti clan (Saddam's clan). They knew the Americans had some aces, but they thought they had more of them.

Originally Posted by zraver

They thought they were not only going to survive but win. They felt about us before that battle what many feel about them afterwards. The RG was not the INA, it was a professional and loyal force officered by members of the Tikriti clan (Saddam's clan). They knew the Americans had some aces, but they thought they had more of them.

Ok, well my answer clears up any other "surrender without bringing the executioner home to meet your family" ideas from the options available. Given what we know today, IMO, this commander would have to be very good, and very lucky to have it end well.

Jason,

I disagree. 73 Easting was a hasty defence.The RG was both physically and psychologically oriented the wrong way (south) and it took some doing to re-orient themselves (west) and as such, they lost all contacts between brigades and divisions.

Also, Al Khaji shown just how poor their armour were and nothing the Iraqis did at the border meant damned squat, meaning the earthworks they were employing might as well be paper shields. Also, the battle of Kuwait City Airport showed just how mismatched they were.

The Iraqis were still trying to re-establish communications when the Americans smashed into them. Unless, the Iraqis figured out the axis of attack, then I don't see how they could have expected victory.

That is kind of the point. A lot of people claim the Iraqi Republican Guard were beaten only because they were so tactically inept that a troop of boy scouts armed with sporks could have beaten them. I feel this runs counter to the facts and dishonors both the US/UK forces and the Iraqis. Thus my challenge to all and sundry to show how the RG as it existed, and thought of itself in 1990/91 could have puled even a draw from the match up.

Originally Posted by Officer of Engineers

Jason,

I disagree. 73 Easting was a hasty defence.The RG was both physically and psychologically oriented the wrong way (south) and it took some doing to re-orient themselves (west) and as such, they lost all contacts between brigades and divisions.

Sir that may have bene truly for some sub units but the bulk of the RG 1st Corps was facing the right direction for its blocking mission.

Also, Al Khaji shown just how poor their armour were and nothing the Iraqis did at the border meant damned squat, meaning the earthworks they were employing might as well be paper shields. Also, the battle of Kuwait City Airport showed just how mismatched they were.

Yes sir, 100% agree, but that is all post battle 20/20. Pre-battle the Iraqis didn't know that, neither did we.

The Iraqis were still trying to re-establish communications when the Americans smashed into them. Unless, the Iraqis figured out the axis of attack, then I don't see how they could have expected victory.

For the most part the Iraqis were facing the right direction and knew the Axis of attack, if not its scope.

Jason,

You have the same reference as I

The Last Stand Of The Tawakalna

What was clear was that communications between brigades and division hq was non-existing and while it is speculation that the TAWAKALNA CO was killed travelling between brigades, what was clear is that division control was lacking.

Also, the reason why I stated that it's a hasty defence, it is clear that the front battalions have no access to artillery nor any other support. They were in the right place. Just not established.

But all indications were that as soon as the Americans began the HAIL MARY pass, the Iraqi General knew he lost the reccee battle and never recovered from that point.

What we do know and they should have known is that concealment is not cover.Also we know that making big piles of sand here and there on a regular pattern tends to indicate there was some serious digging going on in those particular places.So it's not even real concealment,but a childish one.We also know that tank shells can penetrate that particular pile of sand.

We also know that establishing a security perimeter tends to prevent surprises.We do that even if there is no war going,as a matter of habit.We also tend from time to time to ask those chaps about what's going on and we tend to get worried if they don't talk back.

The Iraqis had time to plant AP mines.I don't know why they didn't established AT minefields and other counter-mobility preparations.But we'd try to do that as well.

Lastly,when attacking/counter-atacking,we'd set a base of fire to support the assault element.We'll pop smoke,try to coordinate with mortars&arty.

I'm too lazy to search how many vehicles were destroyed with no crews to man them.They thought it was an air attack.Ohh,the wonders of a couple of chaps with binoculars and radios.


Brave they were,no doubt about it.They were also used to victory.Experienced they were as well.But they had a weak mind, that's all to common in this sport.One that likes comfort and dislikes adapting to new conditions.

Originally Posted by Officer of Engineers

Jason,

You have the same reference as I

The Last Stand Of The Tawakalna

What was clear was that communications between brigades and division hq was non-existing and while it is speculation that the TAWAKALNA CO was killed travelling between brigades, what was clear is that division control was lacking.

Not disagreeing there, but the friction that caused similar losses of coheasion among other nations divisions. Not a real good barometer of the competence of the Iraqis.

Also, the reason why I stated that it's a hasty defence, it is clear that the front battalions have no access to artillery nor any other support. They were in the right place. Just not established.

Ahh OK, gothca now.

But all indications were that as soon as the Americans began the HAIL MARY pass, the Iraqi General knew he lost the reccee battle and never recovered from that point.

Out teched, out thought and out trained for that most important of armored moves. That was a lesson drilled into us at NTC. Every time the OPFOR punched out the Bn or Bgd scouts we lost.

Mihais, your assertions are for the most part bogus.

[quote]What we do know and they should have known is that concealment is not cover.[/qute]

Sorry, hull down is cover. You should research what cover is.

Also we know that making big piles of sand here and there on a regular pattern tends to indicate there was some serious digging going on in those particular places.So it's not even real concealment,but a childish one.

I dare you to spot a a hull down tank's tank berm at 3500m without using thermal to spot the tank itself.

We also know that tank shells can penetrate that particular pile of sand.

You mean we as in the West, but no most of us didn't. Iraq obviously had no idea at all on the performance of modern US ammunition.

We also know that establishing a security perimeter tends to prevent surprises.We do that even if there is no war going,as a matter of habit.We also tend from time to time to ask those chaps about what's going on and we tend to get worried if they don't talk back.

The Iraqis had pushed security elements as far forward as 50 Easting

Lastly,when attacking/counter-atacking,we'd set a base of fire to support the assault element.We'll pop smoke,try to coordinate with mortars&arty.

By "we this time", I assume you mean the Romanian Army not the US. If you read the accounts of the battle, the US Army did not stop forward progress to set up a base of fire. The only deliberate attack was by 1ID after their initial thrust got blunted.

Originally Posted by zraver

Not disagreeing there, but the friction that caused similar losses of coheasion among other nations divisions. Not a real good barometer of the competence of the Iraqis.

Ahh OK, gothca now.

Out teched, out thought and out trained for that most important of armored moves. That was a lesson drilled into us at NTC. Every time the OPFOR punched out the Bn or Bgd scouts we lost.

Jason, I think we can agree that the Iraqis lost 73 Easting long before the M1s and the T-72s saw each other.

Originally Posted by zraver

On paper one of the most powerful armored formations in the world. Your even confident that with your mix of Soviet and Western tech and combat experience you could beat a Soviet divisions- known to be much more effective in the attack than the Americans.

I really have a problem with that. Nothing the Iraqis ever did even come close to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. And by the Kuwait War, T-80s were being fielded.

Originally Posted by Officer of Engineers

Jason, I think we can agree that the Iraqis lost 73 Easting long before the M1s and the T-72s saw each other.

They were beat the day Cheney announced the transfer of VII Corps from Germany....

I really have a problem with that. Nothing the Iraqis ever did even come close to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. And by the Kuwait War, T-80s were being fielded.

Sir I was referring to the RG armored divisions vs standard Soviet divisions which were still mainly T-72.

You die....simple.

The Colonel has laid out the case that the Iraqis were screwed by doctrine, organization, discipline, training and training.

They were going up against an army which was like a coiled spring to battle to the death the Soviet Union. It was almost cathartic for the US military to have this fight. It cleansed the self doubt of Viet Nam, Myaguez, Desert One, Grenada and Panama (which was successful in spite of ourselves.) It validated the hard work by everyone of over a decade. I don't care who was in command of the Iraqis...at the end of the day it was a corps versus a regiment....and the corps got its ass kicked.

Originally Posted by zraver

They were beat the day Cheney announced the transfer of VII Corps from Germany....

Then why did you post this what-if when you knew there was no way around it?