Thread: What if the Confederates had Gatling guns?

Originally Posted by astralis

that last description makes me curious. assuming the final assault had succeeded, what would have happened?

Have to ask a question? Is it a local success as at Petersburg in June 64 or is it a total breakthrough as at Petersburg in April 65? If it is a local and Lee can stabilize his lines by pulling back westward over Boatswain's Creek (a la Beauregard an Harrison's Creek at Petersburg) he can save his army and pull back to Richmond defenses. However, if it is a full breakthrough followed up with Sheridan's Cavalry and the ANV gets pinned against the Chickahominy River? Well, lets just say that Sherman is going to get some help from a couple of AOP corps in his attack on Atlanta because the ANV would have to surrender if pinned against the Chickahominy. Lee may have bee able to save some of his infantry but he would not be able to get his guns out and the ANV would be in a shambles.

Originally Posted by Shek

1. AoP casualties for the 3 June assault are 3500. Total casualties for the day are 4500. Both of these figures are lower than your cited 5800+, which inflates the numbers by 30-70%.

Rhea lists AOP casualties at 3500-4000, others cite higher numbers, Rhea also claims ANV losses of around 1500 which is 5500 if I wrote 5800 it was a typo but still with in earlier estimates.

2. You cited examples of “killing fields” are the exception that proves the rule. In fact, only 3 of 5 corps participated in the assault. In these 3 corps, only 11 of 27 brigades actually attempted a significant advance (so, 11 of 48 brigades available to the Union participated with any significant attempt at an advance).

Hancock saw 7 brigades advance – as I cited earlier, Hancock saw some initial success, and it was the counterattack that caused the lion’s share of casualties. The terrain here didn’t provide clear fields of fire to where a Gatling would provide any significant advantage over the weaponry the ANV employed here. In fact, if you add in the assumption that the Gatlings did have the fields of fire, then you stop the assault before it becomes ensnarled on the lines, and then the casualties are at worst the same, but more likely than not, they become less.

Wright only had one brigade advance, so you aren’t adding many casualties there, if any at all.

Smith saw three brigades advance and suffered the worst percentage of casualties, and this is the example that you cite. However, the attack formation was divisions in column through a ravine – not terrain well suited to high casualty producing grazing fire. Instead, you’re left with restricted plunging fires that I’d be hard pressed to believe that they would be more effective than double shotted canister, which will cut a larger swath and compensate for any high firing that machine gun firing is prone to.

Additionally, the units most heavily hit are the converted heavies that still had not learned to better use concealment and cover like the veteran regiments – add in any effective machine gun fire, and you’re likely to stop their advance more quickly, reducing their exposure time and limiting potential casualties.

if not Cold Harbor becuase of terrain the basic premise of unveiling the weapon where it could achieve maximum effect remains valid. That beign said the Gatlings would have been more effective than canister due to range and rate of fire which translates into sustained fire

In the end, your scenario still continues to fail. I understand that were doing a what-if drill, but you’re adding so many conditions to it even after assuming away the challenges of logistics, that it’s unrealistic. You want it to be unveiled on the field of battle, you have chosen terrain that doesn’t play to the strengths of machine guns (i.e., why would you choose to employ them at ravines), you’re assuming that they get the tactics, techniques, and procedures for employing them as part of a defense from the get go (i.e., no trial and error to get there in terms of employment), and are assuming that they create carriage technology to match the TTPs that they just pull out of their a$$ and get it right the first time.

JFC Fuller and other earlier British tankers were calling for an armored fist used enmasse well before Cambrai in WWI. Getting it right the first time is as often as not a matter of senior leadership being willing to listen and make the correct call, Lee wasn't infallible but neither was he a dummy and he had numerous good officers under him. its not much of a stretch at all to think the ANV would have gotten it right enough

In the end, even if you do assume everything in that scenario, casualties are the same or less, and Grant still sidles right.

I just don't buy it, that type of thinking didn't defeat the machine gun in WWI

I think it’s appropriate now to quote from the Book or Rhea, 4th book, 10th chapter, “Stories of fields littered with blue-clad corpses convey distorted pictures of what really happened. A few sectors saw tremendous slaughter, but along much of the battle line Union loses were minor, and many Confederates had no idea that an offensive had even been attempted. The popular image of a massive Union onslaught at Cold Harbor belongs more to the dustbin of Civil War mythology than to real history.” Your scenario tries to play off of that mythology.

No, Rhea tries to down play the historical impact, even Grant regretted the assaults. It wasn't the bloodiest day of the war but it was the bloodiest predicted day of the war. The heat and bad troop handling left the AoP with a temporary 25% deficit in combat power as wrecked brigades and regiments recovered and a permanent loss of combat power on a lesser scale until the wrecked brigades got replacements.

AR,

Generally I bow to your much superior knowledge of the ACW, but here I think you might want to take a look at the battle of the Somme where the British tried the self same tactics your talking about to no avail. As for the smoke, blackpowder is smoky and is a condition of battle well understood by the commanders of the time. A fixed fire box that is swept by a gatling will not be much impeded by smoke. But the smoke will make accruate counter-battery fire difficult. The ANV only has to sweep an area while the Union artillery has to hit an obscured target.

Z,

I am also well versed blackpowder since I have shot a Remington New Army for about 30 years.

But how long can the Gatlings keep up fire until they jam...a very large problem when they heated up in the early days. This was not remedied for about a decade after their introduction.

But you still under estimate the ability to counterbattery fropm 20 pound Parrotts.

If the Gatlings had shown themselves on the 1st the 20 pounders would have been there on the 3rd.

They Gatling would have helped but in and of itself was not a game changer.

And as Shek points out and having personnaly walked the ground many times myself I could show you ample approach routes which could have been taken which would have minimized casualties.

I think the problem of Cold Harbor was less the weapons and the ANV as much as it was the AOP was exhausted and its best tactical leaders lay dead and wounded after a month of hard fighting. And as the calendar entered June some of those units realized their 3 year enlistments were up soon. This had more to do with the morale and combat effectiveness of the AOP than anything in late spring and summer 1864.

Originally Posted by astralis

that last description makes me curious. assuming the final assault had succeeded, what would have happened?

Once again quoting from the book of Rhea, fourth book, final chapter:

Grant has been roundly criticized for assailing Lee’s line the morning of June 3. Viewed in the campaign’s larger context, the decision made sense. Recently reinforced by the 18th Corps, the Army of the Potomac was stronger than ever. Grant believed that the Confederates were on their last legs, and everything that had happened since crossing the Pamunkey, from Early’s botched assault at Bethesda Church to Wright’s and Smith’s breakthrough on June 1, supported him in that conclusion. Lee now stood a mere seven miles from Richmond, his back to a river. Delay, Grant determined, would serve no purpose, and further maneuvering would be difficult and uncertain in outcome. A successful assault at this juncture stood to wreck the Confederate army, capture Richmond, and bring the war to a speedy conclusion. What better gift could Grant offer President Lincoln on the eve of the Republican convention? Aggressive by nature and accustomed to taking risks, Grant seized the moment. If the offensive worked, the rewards would be tremendous. If it failed, he would simply treat the reverse as he had his earlier disappointments at the Wilderness, Spotsylvania Court House, and North Anna River and try another tack. In short, the consequences of not assaulting, thereby forfeiting the chance for quick victory and extending the war, seemed worse than those of attacking and failing. “Could we succeed by a general assault in breaking [Lee’s] lines, the annihilation of his army was certain, as he would be driven back into the Chickahominy, whence escape was impossible,” was how a Union engineer put the case for attacking. “The hazard was great but General Grant concluded to take the chance.”

Originally Posted by Albany Rifles

Z,

I am also well versed blackpowder since I have shot a Remington New Army for about 30 years.

But how long can the Gatlings keep up fire until they jam...a very large problem when they heated up in the early days. This was not remedied for about a decade after their introduction.

Don't know, we never discussed how the South got them either through a raid, copy or independent invention.

But you still under estimate the ability to counterbattery fropm 20 pound Parrotts.

If the Gatlings had shown themselves on the 1st the 20 pounders would have been there on the 3rd.

They Gatling would have helped but in and of itself was not a game changer.

Slight correction, the parrots would have been where the Gatlings where thought to be 2 days earlier.

[quote]And as Shek points out and having personnaly walked the ground many times myself I could show you ample approach routes which could have been taken which would have minimized casualties.[/quoe]

I freely concede that Cold Harbor might not be the ideal introduction of the weapon, where would you have unveiled it?

Originally Posted by zraver

I freely concede that Cold Harbor might not be the ideal introduction of the weapon, where would you have unveiled it?

Z,
My point was that at Cold Harbor, the terrain that created the casualties was suboptimal for Gatling employment. AR's point is broader in that where you have terrain that is better suited for the Gatlings, with open fields of fire suitable to grazing fire, is also better suited for artillery employment and specifically counterbattery fire. Given that the artillery would have stand-off from the Gatlings, this terrain then becomes unsuitable. This wouldn't preclude the occasional local advantage where reverse slope and the right intervisibility lines could tip the scales to the Gatlins, but given the central employment of artillery by Henry Hunt, reacting to such a local advantage to negate it would mean that the Confederates wouldn't be able to turn a tactical advantage into an event that would have a strategic impact. It could constrain operational choices, but not choke them. It took improvements to rates of fire and range to exploit the potential advantages of machine gun fire, something not available to the Gatling.

Shek has walked FPF lines and done range cards a lot more recently than I have an he fairly nailed.

My point all along has been that teh Gatling would not win the war for the Confederates regardless....it was an immature technology with lengthy logistics requirements and many countering technologies superior to it. Cold Harbor may have been the only place where it could have a big impact but it would not mattered that greatly. And what finally beat Lee was Grant's ability to continuously extend the his left and overstretch Lee's right. Gatlings were not going to stop that.

Originally Posted by Shek

Z,
My point was that at Cold Harbor, the terrain that created the casualties was suboptimal for Gatling employment. AR's point is broader in that where you have terrain that is better suited for the Gatlings, with open fields of fire suitable to grazing fire, is also better suited for artillery employment and specifically counterbattery fire. Given that the artillery would have stand-off from the Gatlings, this terrain then becomes unsuitable. This wouldn't preclude the occasional local advantage where reverse slope and the right intervisibility lines could tip the scales to the Gatlins, but given the central employment of artillery by Henry Hunt, reacting to such a local advantage to negate it would mean that the Confederates wouldn't be able to turn a tactical advantage into an event that would have a strategic impact. It could constrain operational choices, but not choke them. It took improvements to rates of fire and range to exploit the potential advantages of machine gun fire, something not available to the Gatling.

Originally Posted by Shek

Z,
My point was that at Cold Harbor, the terrain that created the casualties was suboptimal for Gatling employment. AR's point is broader in that where you have terrain that is better suited for the Gatlings, with open fields of fire suitable to grazing fire, is also better suited for artillery employment and specifically counterbattery fire. Given that the artillery would have stand-off from the Gatlings, this terrain then becomes unsuitable. This wouldn't preclude the occasional local advantage where reverse slope and the right intervisibility lines could tip the scales to the Gatlins, but given the central employment of artillery by Henry Hunt, reacting to such a local advantage to negate it would mean that the Confederates wouldn't be able to turn a tactical advantage into an event that would have a strategic impact. It could constrain operational choices, but not choke them. It took improvements to rates of fire and range to exploit the potential advantages of machine gun fire, something not available to the Gatling.

First I reject the idea that the artillery out-ranges the Gatling and is an effective counter-battery weapon against it. It might be where the Union forces are up slope with fields of fire to allow such, but not all battlefields will be so nicely configured for the Union artillery. If the artillery is having to fire over the heads of advancing troops accuracy will suffer, likewise a battlefield with terrain sight lines 500 yards or less removes the artillery range advantage. Its a question of employment based on terrain. Hunt's super batteries depends on terrain to achieve massed fire. Plus every gun he devotes for suppressing the Gatlings is one less used to suppress ANV artillery lessening the union advantage there.

Then things like mist or fog and eventually smoke will play roles as well in masking the gatlings from CBF. While it did indeed take smokeless powder to make full use of high rates of fire, that is against industrial armies. The AoP is at best semi-industrial and still relies on tactics and principles developed over the previous 200 years. Even the armies of 1914-15 still suffered from the failure of tactical and operational thinking to keep pace with technology.

AR

And what finally beat Lee was Grant's ability to continuously extend the his left and overstretch Lee's right. Gatlings were not going to stop that.

I disagree, while the Gatling's could not physically stop the slide, a large slaughter in an election year could have stopped Grant in two ways. First, if Lincoln felt enough pressure, he would be out. Second if Lincoln lost the war would be over. The potential impact of the gatling in this discussion is not the number of troops it could kill, but the political impact it could have.

Doing some research leaves me distinctly unimpressed with the 20lb parrot rifle. With a maximum direct fire range of 2000 yards it surely out ranged the gatling, it even had near rifle like accuracy able to hit a sheet of plywood more times than not at range. But direct fire suppression to cover assaulting Union troops is a rather tricky problem to solve. Max range with elevation id 4400 yards but accuracy suffers.

Both suffer from the curse of black powder and its rapid loss of energy so engaging at range has a huge bearing on defeating defensive works. Direct fire or indirect the guns also had serious recoil issues and a slow rate of fire. The 20lb parrot rifle firing with a 2lb black powder charge recoiled 10' For accurate suppression the gun has to be re-laid after every firing.

Moving the guns closer increases their effectiveness against defensive works, but increases the risk to the gun crews and decreases the number of guns that can be brought to bear

Okay, Z.....you win. You aren't impressed with the artillery of the AOP in general and the 20 pound Parrott in particular.

FYI, they scared the hell out of the soldiers and leaders of the ANV.

Originally Posted by Albany Rifles

Okay, Z.....you win. You aren't impressed with the artillery of the AOP in general and the 20 pound Parrott in particular.

FYI, they scared the hell out of the soldiers and leaders of the ANV.

My apologies, AR my only frame of reference is smokeless powder in WWI. Guns like the British 18lb QF guns (20lb) and 13lb QF (10 pd).

Originally Posted by zraver

My apologies, AR my only frame of reference is smokeless powder in WWI. Guns like the British 18lb QF guns (20lb) and 13lb QF (10 pd).

Z,

No worries. No need for apologies.

The analogy you were making was starting to sound like well the Germans had MG-42s and Tigers and FW-190s so they should have beaten the Soviets because the had better gear.

As for the casualties...the real 55,000 casualties of the Overland Campaign coupled with the 35,000 for the Atlanta Campaign did not preclude Lincoln winning. It was because those casualties were starting to show results.

And the vote came from soldiers and veterans, the very ones doing the bleeding.

Originally Posted by Albany Rifles

Z,

No worries. No need for apologies.

The analogy you were making was starting to sound like well the Germans had MG-42s and Tigers and FW-190s so they should have beaten the Soviets because the had better gear.

As for the casualties...the real 55,000 casualties of the Overland Campaign coupled with the 35,000 for the Atlanta Campaign did not preclude Lincoln winning. It was because those casualties were starting to show results.

And the vote came from soldiers and veterans, the very ones doing the bleeding.

AR, heres my thinking and like I said its based in large part on either WWI or on Lincoln's prior actions.


The 20lb parrot rifle had a maximum range of 4400 yards with a flight time of 17.7 seconds. It out-ranged the Gatling by 4-5x, but if the Gatling was dug in into a defiladed position the shells black powder explosive charge might not be enough to do the job. Black powder cannon high high muzzle velocities but this dropped off rapidly. Against infantry this isn't really a problem, troops can only advance so fast so the slow speed doesn't matter. However that speed is also an expression of kinetic energy, at at the far end of its range the shell doesn't have any. Kinetic energy is a big part of busting up defensive works. In 1916 the British used a huge number of fragmentation shells that did not penetrate deeply into the earth and as a result we got the Battle of the Somme slaughter.
To bring the kinetic energy up the weapon has to be closer. While it will still out range the Gatling, I am guessing it will now be under the guns of Confederate Napoleons.

The parrot rifle was fairly flat firing with a maximum elevation of 15 degrees. This meant there was a substantial dead-spot directly in front any assault troops the weapon was supporting unless it was firing from enfilade. This also meant the parrots one big advantage- accuracy was wasted. One obvious solution is to fire downhill, this greatly reduces the dead-spot. It also allows the guns to shoot flatter and make use of the guns accuracy- at least until the battlefield is washed out in smoke.

This accuracy was the compensation for the weapons slow rate of fire. Parrot rifles were much heavier than its contemporaries due to that wrought iron band. They also had significant recoil travel. The result was a very slow rate of fire. If the terrain did not permit the guns an extended firing window the number of rounds the gun could effectively fire might well be incredibly low.

Finally, I know that if possible the Union will try to bring battle on ground that is favorable to it. However as we both know, lacking the favorable terrain did not stop AoP from attacking. In fact depending on how intuitive the ANV commanders are in using the Gatling, the ANV might well seek out areas to fight in that remove the range advantage.

How the South employs the weapon is a critical part of the debate. Without using handwavium, ie restricting the discussion to only what was feasible at the time there remains a number of options/ The weapon in Federal service used an artillery carriage for a couple of reasons- artillery carriages were available and the carriages provided good mobility. But they left the crews exposed. The South does not have to use artillery carriages, the Gatling can be dismounted and emplaced (it was emplaced on ships). They can also use a modified carriage such as the carriage/sled used for the Maxim machine gun. Although the Maxim is forward in time the technology isn't. Again ships used low mounts, although a ship carriage is not at all suitable the idea of a low carriage is not a new one.

The real key for the South is who is given command of using the Gatlings, how politically astute they are, and the influence they have on Lee. IIRC the Southern strategy late war was to inflict as many losses upon the Union as possible for as little loss as possible in order to influence the 1864 election in such a way as to get McClellan elected. I think in principle this is sound. It failed because Grant and Sherman denied the South its designs through the defeat of Southern arms.

Also of note is what type of Gatling the South has. If its pre-1861 with the paper cartridges the rate of fire on paper will not match the field due to jams. If they are post-1861 brass cartridge fed models the jamming wont be much of an issue. Ammunition might be, but at least for a single battle the South can likely find the shells.

If the South can get the Gatling in to action and protect them from Union artillery through handling (either side) and terrain and catch the Federal infantry on the assault to create an American Somme- lets say 8000 dead ad 11,000 wounded over a two day period before the Union commanders figure it out- what happens. AR as you point out Lincoln won the veteran vote beating a former General to do it despite 85,000 casualties. However, this is becuase the Union was winning, the troops knew they were winning etc. However if you reduce the AoP by a a couple of divisions and put the survivors into a state of shock due to enemy fire with no gain to show for it this Veteran vote is a lot less solid.

Even more importantly is how the news of the loss will affect the North and Lincoln. Despite everything, if Grant stopped producing victories his postilion is not secure. Lincoln fired a lot of generals during the course of the war. A severe defeat in an election year and even if Lincoln was personally disposed to keep him, political pressure may force his hand. At the end of the day, (dis)Honest Abe was only loyal to 2 things- Mary and the Union (but strangely not the constitution).

This is a lot of speculation, but we know the way it really happened so the debate is about what else the South might have done, or what they might have done with a few new toys.

In counter battery missions rifled cannon used bolts....and at 2000 yards could and did hit gun carriages. Still outside range....not to mention you could protect the gun crews with sap rollers.

So here is how I defeat the Gatlings.

I keep reinforcing my line and extend Lee's flank so he has to spread out his forces over many miles. I then form a corps into a dense assault column and commence an attack at 0400 when you can not see the assault forces in enough time to stop them. And you turn and assault along the trenches in both directions.

See VIth Corps on 2 April 1865.

As Shek pointed out there are TTPs commanders learn to overmatch weapons.