Thread: What if Lee had accepted command of federal forces?

Originally Posted by Albany Rifles

I started to bite on that but decided against it....nice shooting, though!

Snickering at the poor fella who just doesn't get it, are we.

I agree Malvern Hill was badly fought, but having read a few of the reports on both sides I'm keeping an open mind as to who and what was to blame.

I've read enough and walked the ground enough times....I'm sold!

That's how I'd like to come to an opinion, not that I reject your assessment.

Richmond does seem a poor choice for the capitol. But back in those days the distance from Washington to Richmond must have seemed farther than it does today: 5 days march versus a 1 1/2 hr drive. Also, before transcontinental railroads the eastern half of the US economic sphere ended at Virginia's border.

Richmond was selected for political reasons. It was seen as a way to reinforce Virginia's late entry into the Confederacy; remember, there were those rambunctious western counties that were to soon go their own way. It was also a way to make sure Virginia was all in and stayed all in.

I understand that it was political. I was just throwing in some thoughts on why they didn't think it was particularly vulnerable.

But as for distance? In 1861 the 135 miles was operational depth...it was not strategic depth. A 5 day march ws not considered a great distance in the day. It sat on a river navigable all of the way to the ocean. Richmond stood for as long as it did more from incompetency rather than from any great strategic play on the part of the Confederacy.

Operational vs strategic depth, excellent point, though I admit to not being greatly familiar with those concepts as they applied at the time. I wonder if they thought the river to the sea was a positive rather than a negative, since water transport was more important in the day. In any case, it does seem an odd location for the capitol. Hubris maybe.

The Confederate capitol should have been no farther north than Raleigh and not too close to the Eastern seaboard.

That was my next question.

As has been suggested, from a strategic perspective, Atlanta made more sense.

Was it ever under serious consideration at the time? This old booster editorial cites a number of perceived advantages Richmond offered, but strategic location is never mentioned. Richmond Dispatch, 5/11/1861

Regarding the original topic, I never expected there to be any winners and losers among us. Starting in 1861 and putting Lee in command of Union forces, the hypothetical exercise had to begin with eliminating some of what we know actually happened, namely the slate of commanders who actually commanded the Union army from McDowell onward. Then we had to look at Lee's abilities and thinking re war fighting. To do this we had to look ahead in real time at Lee's actual record as a CSA commander in various battles and then judge how that might have affected his performance had he been instead the Union commander. That led to several necessary and unnecessary diversions from the topic. Bottom line, we will never know. But as to the what-if topic, I think his qualities make him a better commander than McDowell and probably McClellan and certainly better than Hooker, Pope and Burnside. As for Grant and Meade, in 1861 they had not yet appeared on the radar of the powers to be.

Anyway, an interesting topic and I learned a lot from it. What's next?

Originally Posted by astralis

JAD,



the South was fighting an insurgency-- the North had fairly limited political will. the South merely had to hang on-- the North had to comprehensively beat the South.

Maybe it doesn't affect your point, but it was not an insurgency in the sense we use the word today.

"Where a revolt takes the form of armed rebellion, it may not be viewed as an insurgency if a state of belligerency exists between one or more sovereign states and rebel forces. For example, during the American Civil War, the Confederate States of America was not recognized as a sovereign state, but it was recognized as a belligerent power, and thus Confederate warships were given the same rights as United States warships in foreign ports.[4][5][6]"

"Hall, Kermit L. The Oxford Guide to United States Supreme Court Decisions, Oxford University Press US, 2001 ISBN 0-19-513924-0, 9780195139242 p. 246 "In supporting Lincoln on this issue, the Supreme Court upheld his theory of the Civil War as an insurrection against the United States government that could be suppressed according to the rules of war. In this way the United States was able to fight the war as if it were an international war, without actually having to recognize the de jure existence of the Confederate government.""

... battles such as Chancellorsville can be seen as tactical, even operational victories for the South-- but strategically, losses.

If the strategy is to defeat the north and subjugate it, you are right. But the strategy was to break the will of the North to continue the war and force it to recognize the CSA. In that context, Lee's actions do conform to a strategy.

Anyway, an interesting topic and I learned a lot from it. What's next?

I am not sure...but I sure have swept out some cobwebs.

Give me some time to think....but I would bet it won't be the hypothetical kind of topic.

What I am intrigued about now is the current interpretation of Civil War symbols and their cooption.

I am forming a thread...let me mull on it.

My uncle owned a hard scrabble farm back in the hills near Hancock, Md. It had an authentic log home and log barn. We'd go out everyday during the summer--I was 13 at the time--to clear pines and saplings from the fields. One day, I was poking around in some woods and came across a little cemetery, 5-6 graves, one had a cast iron cross like the one in the picture below. It's probably still there.



Not far from there my buddy and I found the badly rusted hilt of a broken sabre. I'd put the exact location at 8 miles northeast of Clear Spring.

By the way, a client of mine in Middletown showed me a 5lb coffee can full of stuff his father found when he used to plow the fields where the Battle of Cedar Creek was fought. Mostly bullets, but some pieces of shot, buckles, buttons and even a piece of bone.