Thread: What if Lee had accepted command of federal forces?

Originally Posted by JAD_333

He sure seemed like a bigot when he banned Jewish merchants from his camps. He was under the mistaken impression that the hoards of profiteers of profiteers who went South to make money were Jews. He was wrong. Perhaps to make up for it he socialized with Jews and put them into major offices when he was president.

It was very true he tried very hard to overcome the disasterous GO #11. In fact he offered the SEC TREAS to Joseph Seligman, a leading Jewish banker and major financier for the Union during the Civil War.

Grant's attitude matched the attitude of most Americans at the time regarding Jews. Recall also that Catholics were discriminated against, in a large part because they were immigrants.

Remember they were products of a time which saw the rise of the Know Nothings as a political party. Know Nothing - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

[QUOTE=Albany Rifles;849167]1.

"...poor coordination by his commanders." There's that poor staff work again!

I meant Loring's officers. Lee worked through Loring who was the nominal commander.

2. Scott had no authority to extend the tours of the militia regiments and could not ask for it. The 90 day regiments terms of service started expiring on 1 AUG. That authority did not exist until the passage of the Militia Act of 1862.

You mean they couldn't volunteer? Anyway, I was thinking of Lee making the pitch, not Scott.

3. "..failed to communicate troop dispositions to other commanders and led from the front, all of which contributed his defeat. Lee makes none of these mistakes and win." compare to "He laid out his plan and 'suggested' ways his commanders could carry it out, but he let them do it their way." They both are guilty of the same. And Lee would show that consistently throughout the war. His poor staff work and lack of decisiveness allowed McClellan to esacape on the Peninsula...he essentially leaned on McClellan and McClellan lost his nerve.

His way of suggesting instead of ordering seems to have worked well for the most part. Even a full hand's on commander is going to make mistakes.

In both cases we are talking of both men early in their combat career...and they were both guilty of the same mistakes.

In a sense, all commanders have to rely on their lieutenant's discretion, whether they issue direct orders or not. Lee didn't just turn and walk away; he had to know his commanders intentions and sometimes he suggested changes or pointed out problems. Anyway, no matter their methodology of communicating orders, the plans they devised and their execution are what matters.

4. Lee's aggressiveness at Malvern Hill coupled with his poor troop handling led to the mauling of Armistead's, Magruder's and DH Hill's forces. He actually was caught off guard by both Ambrose Brunside at Fredericksburg & Chancellorsville. In each case Union dithering allowed him to concentrate forces. He was able to hold the line at Fredericksburg but the cream of his army was gutted at Chancellorsville.

Isn't that what we're talking about? The Union forces were badly led. The NVA was better led. McClellan, Burnside, Pope, Hooker were out-generaled by Lee.

Yes, Malvern Hill turned out to be a mistake. But it was just one action of six fought in seven days as part of a master plan. Overall, he got what he wanted: McCellan's retreat. Correct me if I'm wrong, but didn't he order pursuit and didn't the pursuit bog down in the rain and then get blocked flood waters?

As for the gutting of his army, gutting is what both sides did, except the North could replace their men easily, whereas the South lacked manpower to make up for attrition. There was no way Lee was going to end the war without sustaining large losses. Same for the North.

And Gettysburg shredded what was left of his operational offensive capabilities.

Without a doubt, but remember the proposition is what would be different if Lee had commanded US forces.

Originally Posted by Albany Rifles

It was very true he tried very hard to overcome the disasterous GO #11. In fact he offered the SEC TREAS to Joseph Seligman, a leading Jewish banker and major financier for the Union during the Civil War.

Grant's attitude matched the attitude of most Americans at the time regarding Jews. Recall also that Catholics were discriminated against, in a large part because they were immigrants.

Remember they were products of a time which saw the rise of the Know Nothings as a political party. Know Nothing - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

I agree with everything you're saying (wasn't it Secty of Defense ). I sometimes have a hard time getting young people, and adults too, to see things from the perspective of people who lived in the 1800s. The tendency is to judge them by today's standards. I am sure a history teacher like yourself runs into that all the time.

But did the Confederacy have to go on the strategic offensive to win? It made more sense with limited resources to play the startegic defensive with limited offensive movements.

Asking troops to "just volunteer" is not a valid way to run and organize the army. It's kind of like hope being a viable means of contraception! By what authority would militia officers hold their rank once the time was up? How could the Articles of War be enforced with no standing in law? How would they be paid? What is the authority to expend funds from the federal accounts to acquire arms, ammunition and supplies? All fo these issues had to be worked out in the wake of Manassas when Congress authorized the President to raise the 3 year regiments. All of these issues were dealt with in that legislation. It didn't exist at the the time. And Lee make the pitch? Who was Lee to these guys? Just some general. Winfield Scott, Old Fuss And Feathers...The Hero of Mexico City, the man Wellington called the greatest soldier of his time, the Hero of Chippewa, the man who had been a general longer than most of them had been alive!!! If he couldn't get them to volunteer to stay on, given the conditions I mentioned above, what makes you think Lee, a reletive unknown, would could?

Lee ignored his subordinates imploring him to conduct a flank attack at malvern and ordered his troops into Henry Hunt's slaughter pen. Others saw it but Lee didn't.


You seem willing to overlook Lee's failings....I am not.

He was a very good commander...I have conceded that. And I believe he would have been succesful if given overall command...but that is if he could stay in command and sucumb to the enormous pressures which Washington was bringing to bear. I do not think he would have ended the war quickly...his own track record combined with the lack of expertise of his army almost would have meant a protracted fight.

McClellan's organizational abilities built the framework on which the AOP could be built and sustained. I do not think Lee could have matched that.

Originally Posted by Albany Rifles

But did the Confederacy have to go on the strategic offensive to win? It made more sense with limited resources to play the startegic defensive with limited offensive movements.

That's a tough question. A military question, even today. I think of McClellan moving relentlessly on Richmond during the Peninsula campaign with superior numbers and Johnston falling back to take up defensive positions. Richmond was in a mini-panic. The government was ready to leave town. Then Johnston is wounded and Lee is rushed to the field, he disengages quietly from Seven Pines and quickly puts together a plan to outflank McClellan in a series of movements over the course of a week. He succeeds; McClellan retreats; Richmond is saved.

Should Lee have stayed on the defensive? I think that is what McClellan wanted so he could blast the rebels with his vast artillery. The defensive is fine in certain situations, but you can't win a war sitting still

Lee ignored his subordinates imploring him to conduct a flank attack at malvern and ordered his troops into Henry Hunt's slaughter pen. Others saw it but Lee didn't.

Malvern was the last of those six movements; and as you say, a costly one for Lee and the CSA.

I read somewhere that the Union army was already in full retreat and that Union troops and artillery had gathered on Malvern Hill to slow Lee so the Union army could get across the James. The night before, Lee got reports they were moving off the hill under darkness and that only a small force remained behind by morning to cover the retreat. To continue his pursuit he has to push those forces off the hill. He attacks, but the reports turn out to wrong. Union troops and artillery are still there in full force. When did he realize it? I can see why he chose at first to go at them with a frontal attack versus a flanking movement. It's quicker and potentially more lucrative. But once he learned the reports were wrong, why didn't he stay in position or change plans? Did he fear McClellan would stop his retreat if he didn't take the hill? Or did he calculate that the only way to take up the pursuit of McClellan was to clear the hill at any cost? The only thing I can say in his defense is that no one knows the outcome of a battle before it begins, but from there somebody else who has more intimate knowledge with the battle and Lee's thinking will have to defend him. I can't.

Supposedly there was some high ground where Lee's artillery could have caused a lot damage to McClellan's army while it retreated down the James, but Stuart got there first with some cavalry and an artillery piece. Stuart opened fire on McClellan boats doing little damage. Realizing the threat of the heights to them, Union troops cleared them before Lee could get there and held them long enough to complete their retreat.

Asking troops to "just volunteer" is not a valid way to run and organize the army. It's kind of like hope being a viable means of contraception! By what authority would militia officers hold their rank once the time was up? How could the Articles of War be enforced with no standing in law? How would they be paid? What is the authority to expend funds from the federal accounts to acquire arms, ammunition and supplies? All fo these issues had to be worked out in the wake of Manassas when Congress authorized the President to raise the 3 year regiments. All of these issues were dealt with in that legislation. It didn't exist at the the time. And Lee make the pitch? Who was Lee to these guys? Just some general. Winfield Scott, Old Fuss And Feathers...The Hero of Mexico City, the man Wellington called the greatest soldier of his time, the Hero of Chippewa, the man who had been a general longer than most of them had been alive!!! If he couldn't get them to volunteer to stay on, given the conditions I mentioned above, what makes you think Lee, a reletive unknown, would could?

Please. You have me in tears. Funds for a simple extension could have been approved by Congress in days. The president also had war powers. Lee was better known than McDowell from his role in the John Brown affair. He also had a commanding presence and charisma. Ok, maybe Scott does the honors. Or maybe neither of them do. Obstacles there were, but no one can be sure today that they were insurmountable at the time. Hypothetically, we can.

You seem willing to overlook Lee's failings....I am not.

That's your side of the debate. I can go either way. Old collegiate debater. I had to do the con one week and pro the next. Can't take yourself too seriously.

He was a very good commander...I have conceded that. And I believe he would have been succesful if given overall command...but that is if he could stay in command and sucumb to the enormous pressures which Washington was bringing to bear. I do not think he would have ended the war quickly...his own track record combined with the lack of expertise of his army almost would have meant a protracted fight.

I think he and Lincoln would have gotten along famously. Scott would have backed him for as long as he could. If he won battles, that together with his unique persona and genuine sense of honor would have made him popular in the North. On the other hand, he was distant to people he didn't know, avoided personal conflict, avoided public speaking, and near the end would suffer poor health. Too many bad carbs.

McClellan's organizational abilities built the framework on which the AOP could be built and sustained. I do not think Lee could have matched that.

Recall that in the very beginning the gov of VA prevailed on Lee to take command of Virginia's practically non-existent army. He moved very fast and was making good progress. Then his entire force was swallowed by the CSA and rolled into the army of Eatern Virginia. Johnston had been senior to him in rank in the old Army and took command. Then he went to work for Davis and became a sort of facilitator and a sometime commander (the Loring episode; the Savannah defenses; etc). So, I think he could have put together an effective fighting force given the same resources McClellan was given. Maybe he wouldn't have been as slick and showy as McClellan, but he would have fought as soon as he could take the field, not dawdled while the CSA built up strength.

McClellan was a good general and a good organizer, but he was soft when he should have been hard. He felt for his men; hated to see them bloodied, and so held back when he should have gone forward. Those sensibilities are a good thing in a person, but not in a general in wartime. His disrespect for Lincoln, the gawky interferer, was uncalled for. He later created political problems for Lincoln by running for president. He was not an Union man.

I figure you'll be delivering the coup de grace pretty soon with your superior historical knowledge, but I've enjoyed the give and take.

JAD,

Should Lee have stayed on the defensive? I think that is what McClellan wanted so he could blast the rebels with his vast artillery. The defensive is fine in certain situations, but you can't win a war sitting still

i think lee had the right idea in the first place: fortifications up the yingyang. fortifications were the only thing that kept the ANV alive from late fall 1864 to spring 1865.

now imagine if they had started doing that in 1861 instead, with far fresher troops.

of course, that might not have been politically possible with Davis breathing down Lee's back, and may have caused a lot of morale problems (Granny Lee/King of Spades).

but i think after the first lopsided battle where the union is slaughtered charging the trenches people would change their tune.

JAD,

I look at this entire discussion from my experience as a soldier as well as a historian.

As I mentioned, I don't do well on the “what ifs”....

I look at Lee's generalship (and everyone else’s) based on his accomplishments at the tactical, operational & strategic levels...in other words in this battle, in how this battle influences the battles elsewhere in this theater (campaign) and finally how these battles and events work towards a national objective in conjunction with campaigns in other theaters.

Lee did well in the first, passable at the second and was mediocre at the third.

McClellan did mediocre at the first, passable at the second and well at the third.

I understand your fixation on the 7 Days...but was that a campaign that Lee won or McClellan lost? I am not just being argumentative here.

After Oak Grove, McClellan decided to withdraw...he had made up his mind. He, advised by Pinkerton, grossly overestimated the size of Lee's army and underestimated the abilities and tenacity of the AOP. Of the following 6 battles, the Federals actually won 2 of them (Beaver Dam Creek & Malvern Hill), the Confederates 2 of them (Gaines Mills & Savages Station) and the other 2 were a draw at best (Glendale & White Oak Swamp). Despite being on the home turf with a very friendly local populace for guides, Confederate forces regularly were unable to coordinate their movements effectively. That’s a sign of poor staff work.

Union forces did a much better job of coordinating movements despite being the away team.

Lee’s attack at Malvern Hill was poorly managed start to finish. Fitzjohn Porter had set up a deliberate defense anchored on a huge line of artillery. The logical thing to do was to leave it alone and observe. Porter’s mission was to conduct a rear guard so the AOP could move into Harrison’s Landing unopposed. Lee did not need to attack. But just like at Gettysburg, his blood was up due to the failure of his army to destroy the AOP so he decided to attack. And his attack was about as unimaginative as you could come up with…a straight ahead attack into the teeth of a cauldron of artillery. Henry Hunt’s gunners had a field day. There was ample proof that an attack on either flank could have unhinged the position but Lee would not listen to his subordinates.

The overall results of the Seven Days:

Union Casualties
15,855
(1,734 killed
8,066 wounded
6,055 missing/captured)

Confederate Casualties
20,204
(3,494 killed
15,758 wounded
952 missing/captured)

Lee took 33% more casualties and an incredible number of wounded…and a lot of the Union POWs were later exchanged and got back into the fight.

I recommend you read Sears excellent account of the campaign.

Sears, Stephen W. To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign

Okay, all of that said, JAD, you are suffering the typical myopia of most denizens of the Old Dominion. When I say the Confederacy should have fought on a strategic defensive with a deep defense, I consider VA to be the front lines. The Confederate capitol never should have been located that close to Washington. A Confederate national plan, which never really existed, would have placed the capitol in a much more defensible position (Atlanta, Chattanooga, etc) deep within the Confederacy.

And this same Virginia myopia effected Lee and his staff for the entire war. On one occasion Lee actually thought and acted in a strategic manner…when he sent Longstreet’s corps to Georgia in time for Chickamauga. The rest of the war he allowed himself to focus solely on VA.

So, all of that said, Lee was a very good battlefield commander but he was lacking as an administrator (Longstreet was actually much better than Lee in that regard as was Bragg). He would have been effective if he had stayed loyal and fought for his country (See Thomas, George as an example) but he would have still needed a McClellan type to conduct the organization of that army. Lee’s organization of the Virginia state troops was pretty good but much was left to be desired (Bob Krick and Bud Robinson both fault him some on this). McClellan’s organization of the AOP was only matched by the organization and mobilization of the US Army in World War 2…that is how good of a job he did.

As I said, the best of the lot who was senior enough probably would have been Meade…but he was too junior at the outbreak of the war to be considered.


Your turn!

Originally Posted by JAD_333

Isn't that what we're talking about? The Union forces were badly led. The NVA was better led.

Holy sh!t . . . this alternate history is starting to get wierd. McDowell vs. Giap?

[QUOTE=Albany Rifles;849392]

Originally Posted by Albany Rifles

Your turn!

Thank you. It won't be much of a turn since I admit to being far less versed on the subject than you.

As I mentioned, I don't do well on the “what ifs”....

No worse than me. It is not easy to focus only on the talents and abilities of the commanders involved and clear our minds of all else.

Thanks for the book suggestion. I'll try to find a copy.

I agree Malvern Hill was badly fought, but having read a few of the reports on both sides I'm keeping an open mind as to who and what was to blame.

Richmond does seem a poor choice for the capitol. But back in those days the distance from Washington to Richmond must have seemed farther than it does today: 5 days march versus a 1 1/2 hr drive. Also, before transcontinental railroads the eastern half of the US economic sphere ended at Virginia's border.

In the realm of what-ifs, if Lee takes command of the US Army in 1861 and is successful, there is no panoply of failed commanders, no McDowell, McClellan, Pope, Hooker or Burnside. And no Lee leading southern forces. McClellan is perhaps tapped by Lee to create a fighting force and who knows which officers he chooses to command his corps and divisions--Grant, McClellan, Sherman...

We'll never how things would have turned out. Of all the generals who eventually led Union forces in the east, I think Lee in 1861 is the best choice. His resume as of 1861 is credible; Scott thinks he is the best soldier in the army; he's a doer, a problem solver, and man of character.

Over to you.

Originally Posted by astralis

JAD,


i think lee had the right idea in the first place: fortifications up the yingyang. fortifications were the only thing that kept the ANV alive from late fall 1864 to spring 1865.

Asty:

Lee built those defenses to protect principal cities, but they had nothing to do with strategy.

I'm no general, but I know you can't win a war sitting behind static defenses.

He was a Scott man; he saw how effective Scott was in seizing the offensive during the US-Mexican war. That is not to say that fighting from a defensive position is wrong per se. By operating on the offensive, Lee was able to keep the enemy off balance and unsure of his next move. His goal was to demoralize the north so that it would throw in the towel. You can't do that from behind a wall of dirt.

JAD,

I'm no general, but I know you can't win a war sitting behind static defenses.

the South was fighting an insurgency-- the North had fairly limited political will. the South merely had to hang on-- the North had to comprehensively beat the South.

which meant that losing large numbers of men at any given engagement was going to be a default win for the North.

thus battles such as Chancellorsville can be seen as tactical, even operational victories for the South-- but strategically, losses.

Holy sh!t . . . this alternate history is starting to get wierd. McDowell vs. Giap?

obviously patton wins!