Ray

__________________


"Some have learnt many Tricks of sly Evasion, Instead of Truth they use Equivocation, And eke it out with mental Reservation, Which is to good Men an Abomination."

I don't have to attend every argument I'm invited to.

HAKUNA MATATA

Shek

Sir,
I have no contention with your points about going into mainland China. I don't see that as bonafide option without a full mobilization of the nation, and I am stretched to see a scenario under which that would occur.

__________________
"So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

Officer of Engineers

Sir,

I second the good Captain's opinion that we are not ready, both psychologically and physically to go into mainland China.

The only possible land war scenario that I can envision right now would be a repeat of the Korean War in which case, the Koreans would be a much bigger force picture than either the US or the PRC.

__________________
Chimo

dalem

Well I think it has been enumerated very well for me here in this thread (and others). I have little to add to the comments of Shek and OoE, but here is my list. Maybe the fact that I am a layman and they are professionals might make my agreement with them more significant. Or less. Dunno. Anyway.

1) Economics:

Japan was/is a robust and modern industrial society that was beating us at our own game until they ran smack into the reality of R&D, investment, and pension plan funding.

China is nothing of the sort - she is on that easy part of the economic growth curve. Moving parts of a society from essentially pre-Industrial Age into and through the Industrial Age towards the Information Age, which is what is happaneing there, in its initial stages looks very explosive.

But that curve is not linear, and when China hits the flatter parts she will find that it takes a lot more Oomph to go from 60 to 70 than it did to go from zero to 10. Meanwhile we are still going to be chugging away moving from 90 to 90.1, which is what we do every year or so.

2. Military:

Some of the panicmongers in the 80s were indeed worried about Japan's potential military threat. They were idiots, but they were worried.

People that worry about China's potential military threat are not idiots, but I do think they are worrying needlessly. As OoE points out, China is not geared for expeditionary militarism and it would take decades of doctrinal evolution and huge monetary expenditure for them to make that switch. And they don't have the inclination to make those changes, nor the money to spend on them.

3. Culture:

Japan was able to partially fuel its own growth by adopting some American cultural ideas, even while America was having a crush on some Japanese cultural ideas. In the end, we've both absorbed a little of the other.

China is a very insular culture and historically has always solved most of its problems by relying on "being more Chinese". She will not be able to compete successfully with America unless she becomes more like America.

-dale

dalem

It's still a major win for us, because we'll be around to rebuild those 25 cities, and the Chinese won't.

-dale

TopHatter

I certainly agree that the Chinese won't be around to rebuild.

But I also don't want to be here in the United States after 25 cities are immolated.

__________________
If your actions inspire others to dream more, learn more, do more and become more, you are a leader.
~John Quincy Adams

dalem

That's not my point. 1,000 nukes vs. 1000 nukes, hard to claim anyone can emerge a winner. But 1,000 nukes vs. 25? You can win that one.

-dale

Bulgaroctonus

Well, it's good we've gotten off to such cordial relations!
However, hasn't China gained in modernization and training since the Cold War? I mean, is their former inferiority still the case? It seems to me, and correct me if I'm wrong, that China has made significant military advances. Their disclosed defense budget has been increasing very rapidly for at least a decade.

If the above is true, that's very encouraging. However, it seems that the Chinese nuclear policy is nonsensical. Why would they leave their warheads and missiles separate? What is the advange of that?

Also, why is their nuclear system only retaliatory? Doesn't that leave them open to destruction? I thought the whole point of a nuclear defense was Mutually Assured Destruction. The Chinese are certainly not assuring the destruction of the U.S. if the have their missiles and warheads separate.

Another thing, won't the Chinese immediately detect any nuclear salvo coming from the U.S? Would not they launch their nuclear warheads at that point, provided they had assembled equipment?

It seems like the Chinese nuclear policy that you have outlined doesn't make much sense. That doesn't mean that it is incorrect. Also, could you give me some sources for Chinese nuclear policy? I want to find more information about that.

I wrote 25 American cities because you had posted that the Chinese had 25 nuclear weapons aimed at the U.S. I assumed that in a nuclear war they would launch all of those and hit the targets, assuming no errors in trajectory. Of course, you have written that the U.S. would be able to destroy the Chinese nuclear capabilities in a first strike. I don't know if this is true.

However, let us assume that the Chinese were able to fire those 25 missiles. How could the U.S. stop them? I am not aware of any anti-missile system in place.

First, I am not trying to impress anyone. That is a silly motivation on a online forum since I can never reap any benefits of people being impressed. That is, impressing all of you doesn't really matter since I don't have any interaction with the people on this board offline. Perhaps if you were all teachers of mine, I would try to impress you.

Moving on, I don't understand why you are so immediately hostile? What did I say? I'm just expressing some of my fears about China. I'm not ripping apart your posts or calling you an idiot.



What did I write that demonstrated an ignorance of Chinese history?

I am familiar with all of these Roman defeats and the eventual sack of Rome. Yes, Rome eventually fell, and it did suffer horrible defeats in its time. However, I can cite just as many victories and conquests, plus the enormous longevity of the Empire. Is this to be a debate about the greatness of Rome? What is your point?

Anon

"I wrote 25 American cities because you had posted that the Chinese had 25 nuclear weapons aimed at the U.S. I assumed that in a nuclear war they would launch all of those and hit the targets, assuming no errors in trajectory. Of course, you have written that the U.S. would be able to destroy the Chinese nuclear capabilities in a first strike. I don't know if this is true.

However, let us assume that the Chinese were able to fire those 25 missiles. How could the U.S. stop them? I am not aware of any anti-missile system in place."

First of all, you should read the news more often. The US ABM system has achieved a state of limited operational readiness.

Second, the failure rate of the PRC missiles is likely to be AT LEAST 20%....meaning that of 25 weapons only 20 will function properly.(this is so even for the US and USSR.)

You know what 20 warheads will get the PRC?

Completely anhillated...

Bulgaroctonus

Dale, you raised some good points.
This is a very interesting point, I have never thought about it that way. It does indeed seem that China is enjoying somewhat of the 'Industrial Revolution' stage where they simply build and build. Also, their serious environmental problems caused by industry could really complicate things.

I don't know enough about the Chinese military (Ehem...as OoE has so kindly pointed out) to comment with force about these assertions. However, I can say the Chinese are flush with money, enjoying a nice budget surplus. For example from the BBC:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4424502.stm

Another interesting perspective. China is indeed more insular than modern Japan. However, they have become more American in that their economy has become less rigidly communist in the past 15 years, largely a result of Deng Xiaopeng's reforms.

It will be interesting to see how this cultural rift will play out.

Bulgaroctonus

I'll second that as well.

What kind of Korean War? U.S. and South Korea against the North and China? How do think that will play out?

Bulgaroctonus

Yes, they would suffer significantly. However, they produce so many of the goods that end up in American markets that we would also suffer.

Bulgaroctonus

The Viet Cong and NVA were one thing, but there is another thing to consider. Wasn't one of the implicit reasons we could never close out Vietnam the fact that we risked war with the USSR if we did?

Shek

1. What does "close out" Vietnam mean? If it means defeat the PLF (Viet Cong) and PAVN (NVA), resulting in a South and North Vietnam, with all PAVN forces evicted from South Vietnam and a two Koreas-like status quo, then no, we didn't risk war with the USSR. If it means defeat the PLF, PAVN, and unify Vietnam under a non-communist government, then we would have risked war with the USSR. The Brezhnev Doctrine would be the source of the Soviet doctrinal response.

2. We defeated the PLF. It self-impaled itself during the Tet Offensive, allowing the US/SVN to take the initiative in pacifying the countryside and eliminating the VCI (Viet Cong infrastructure) so it couldn't regenerate. NVN tried to refill the ranks by sending folks south, but it didn't work.

3. We defeated three NVA offensives and the SVN w/US advisory and airpower helped to defeat a fourth NVA offensive, although some ground was lost near the DMZ.

4. It was a combination of the witdrawal of US aid, some weak generals that hadn't been weeded out due to the compressed schedule of Vietnamization/difficulties in maintaining a balance between support for Thieu, and the inability to stem infiltration of supplies through Laos and Cambodia that eventually did in South Vietnam. All three of these could have been remedied through continued US support a la Korea, but the strategy of attrition pursued by Westmoreland resulted in a failure that spent domestic support for the war so that by the time Abrams, Bunker, and Colby had put the US in a position where it should have won (meaning a sustainable South Vietnamese independence) , there wasn't any political spine left to consummate this position.

Some recommended books to read on this subject. As always, this is a recommendation, so I'm not expecting you to read these and give your thoughts. However, I would offer a piece of advice - if you ever receive recommended books in areas that you enjoy, write them down so you have a menu of books to choose from/search for when the time does present itself. It's a much better strategy than trying to judge a book by its cover and then find out you've wasted your time reading crap and also being out the money it cost to buy it.

A Better War by COL Lewis Sorely - examines in detail post-Tet Vietnam and how we were so close to winning

The Army and Vietnam by COL Andrew Krepinevich - examines our failed strategy of fighting a conventional war pre-Tet instead of a counterinsurgency

In Confidence by Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador to the US for six presidents - presents the behind the scenes diplomacy, to include the era of realpolitik and detente with the Nixon Administration

Diplomacy by Dr. Henry Kissinger - presents the modern history of diplomacy with realist commentary interwoven, to include diplomacy over Vietnam

Anoop C

I have some ill-formed thoughts on the Chinese doctrine and I hope to receive some feedback to help sort them out.

1. The Colonel's analysis of Chinese doctrine has emphasized one point throughout -"A miracle happens" - to justify the ability of the PLA to isolate a small enemy force from the main enemy force, fight a war of annihilation with the isolated enemy and then go home, having declared victory - in other words, war termination is an integral part of their doctrine.

While that is seemingly executable with all of China's land neighbours except Russia and possibly India, how does that apply to Japan and more importantly, Taiwan? Firstly, can they isolate such a small enemy force given the lack of Taiwan's and Japan's depths (i.e. Taiwan's and Japan's main force = fighting force) and early warning capability of Taiwan and Japan? Second, if it comes to blows, can the PLA declare victory against Taiwan unilaterally and walk away, leaving unfinished business? They could do that against India in 1962, but Taiwan's political significance is altogether different. Will it not be construed as the inability of China to retake Taiwan militarily?

2. If we are to intepret the "A miracle happens" statement in a broader sense, it is consistent with China's doctrine of avoiding conflict except when it suits them best. As an example, their rhetoric on the issue of Taiwan declaring independence has been successful since it is not clear (to Taiwan at least) that the US will intervene militarily to defend Taiwan. The other half of the conflict avoidance strategy is to not make any moves that might tempt Taiwan or the US to force the issue. This ambiguity suits China more than Taiwan since they have time, size and a growing economy in their favor to push for a peaceful reconciliation.

Am I on the right track here?