The failings of 'the army you have'

Ray · 03-14-2005, 04:58 AM

Quote:

The failings of 'the army you have'
By Michael Schwartz

The latest US theory about the Iraqi resistance
In early February, a Newsweek team led by Rod Nordland produced a detailed account of current theorizing among US and Iraqi officials about the structure of the Iraqi resistance.

Here, in brief, is what these officials told Newsweek: The initial United States assault on Iraq was so successful that Saddam Hussein's plan for systematic resistance fell apart almost immediately, leaving a dispersed, unruly guerrilla movement with little or no coherent leadership. In the two subsequent years, however, the Saddamists formed a wealthy and savvy leadership group in Syria. In the meantime Abu Massab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian terrorist with ties to al-Qaeda, asserted his domination over the on-the-ground resistance. Pressure from recent US offensives drove the two groupings into an increasingly comfortable alliance. Here is how Newsweek described developments since last summer, based on an interview with Barham Salih, the Iraqi deputy prime minister:

"According to Salih, 'The Ba'athists regrouped and, in the last six or seven months, reorganized. Plus they had significant amounts of money, in Iraq and in Syria.' Those contacts and networks that Saddam's key cronies began developing months before the invasion now paid off. An understanding was found with the Islamic fanatics, and the well-funded Ba'athists appear to have made Syria a protected base of operations. 'The Iraqi resistance is a monster with its head in Syria and its body in Iraq' is the colorful description given by a top Iraqi police official ... Zarqawi's people supply the bombers, the Ba'athists provide the money and strategy."

The current situation was succinctly summarized for Newsweek by Brigadier-General Hussein Ali Kamal, the deputy minister of the interior: "Now between the Zarqawi group and the Ba'athists there is full cooperation and coordination."

This portrait has been further fleshed out in other accounts, including a New York Times report in which US Commanding General George W Casey declared that the Ba'ath Party in Syria was "providing direction and financing for the insurgency in Iraq".

This new theory about the nature of the Iraqi resistance helps to illuminate the renewed US saber-rattling against the Syrians, which began even before the assassination of the former Lebanese prime minister. On January 25, for example, former secretaries of state Henry Kissinger and George Shultz, writing together for the first time, made the connection explicit in a Washington Post op-ed. They asserted that the administration of President George W Bush must have a "strategy for eliminating the sanctuaries in Syria and Iran from which the enemy can be instructed, supplied, and given refuge in time to regroup". The new theory may also help to explain why (according to such diverse sources as Newsweek and former US weapons inspector Scott Ritter) the US is considering using assassination squads to eliminate enemies. One whole category of targets for these squads (if formed) would certainly be the Syrian-based leadership of the resistance.

And then, at the end of February, came news of the first fruits of US operations based on this new insight, the capture in Syria of Sabawi Ibrahim Hassan, a half-brother and political lieutenant of Saddam, and one of only 11 of the original "deck of cards" Saddamist leaders who still remained at large. The capture vindicated the saber-rattling as well, since high-level Iraqi officials told reporters on February 28 that the "capture was a goodwill gesture by the Syrians to show that they are cooperating" with the new US campaign to decapitate the insurgency by removing its Syrian-based leadership.

Problems with the new theory
This new portrait of the Iraqi resistance may be an accurate description of one aspect of the ongoing war; and its key new element - a working alliance between Saddamist exiles and Zarqawi's fighters inside Iraq - may be an important new development. But the foundation upon which these descriptions are built - that these forces now dominate the resistance, supply its leadership, or provide the bulk of its resources - is likely to prove profoundly inaccurate.

This is most easily seen by consulting - of all sources - the US Central Intelligence Agency, which issued a contrary report around the time the Newsweek article appeared. According to the CIA, the Zarqawi faction and his Saddamist allies were "lesser elements" in the resistance, which was increasingly dominated by "newly radicalized Sunni Iraqis, nationalists offended by the occupying force, and others disenchanted by the economic turmoil and destruction caused by the fighting". There is, in fact, a vast body of publicly available evidence in support of the CIA's perspective, including, for example, most first-hand accounts of the resistance in Fallujah and other cities in the Sunni triangle.

In the short, dreary history of America's Iraq war, US leaders have repeatedly acted on gross misconceptions about whom they were fighting - sometimes based on faulty intelligence, but sometimes in the face of perfectly accurate intelligence. This is, in all likelihood, another instance where they believe their own distortions, and it is worthwhile attempting to understand the underlying pattern that produces this almost predictable error.

One way to characterize this propensity to mis-analyze the resistance is to see that all the portraits thus far generated of the Iraqi resistance have been based on the assumption that it is organized into a familiar hierarchical form in which the leadership exercises strategic and day-to-day control over a pyramid-shaped organization. Such a structure is described by both military strategists and organizational sociologists as a "command and control" structure. After the battle of Fallujah, US Air Force Lieutenant-General Lance Smith even used this phrase to characterize Zarqawi's operation: "Zarqawi ... no doubt ... is able to maintain some level of command and control over the disparate operations."

This command-and-control image applies well to a large bureaucracy or a conventional army, but invariably provides a poor picture of a guerrilla army, which helps explain US military failures in Iraq. Whether or not Zarqawi maintains command and control over his forces (who are, as far as we can tell, not guerrillas) no one exercises such control over the forces that fought against the Americans in Fallujah or Sadr City and those that are currently fighting a guerrilla war in Ramadi and other Sunni cities that boycotted the recent elections.

Guerrilla wars violate the command-and-control portrait in two important ways: local units must, by and large, supply themselves (since an occupation army would be likely to interdict any regular shipments of supplies); and they are likely to have substantial autonomy (since hit-and-melt tactics do not lend themselves well to central decision-making).

This lack of command and control is a curse and a blessing. On the negative side, lack of central coordination means that guerrilla armies are normally doomed to small, disconnected actions - a severe limitation if the goal is to drive an enemy out of your country. On the positive side, they are less vulnerable to attacks on supply lines and to the targeting of commanding officers - two key strategies of conventional warfare.

The resistance in Iraq reflects this dialectic of guerrilla war. The mujahideen in Fallujah, for example, seem to have been notoriously decentralized; even local clerical leadership reportedly achieved only a tenuous discipline over the troops. This same lack of discipline, however, made it impossible for the US to identify and eliminate key leaders. During the second battle for the city in November, their hit-and-run tactics allowed them to hold out for more than a month against a force with overwhelming technological and numerical superiority.

The command-and-control portrait is not a useful tool when it comes to analyzing a large component of the Iraqi resistance, and it is of little use if it is applied to the movement as a whole.

The drumbeat of command and control
Nevertheless, the US military has assumed such a structure at every juncture in the war.

In the autumn of 2003, when the resistance first began to trouble the occupation, US military strategy was based on the conviction that the resistance was led by Saddam Hussein and the "deck of cards" leadership. Here we see command-and-control logic applied for the first time.

By mid-December 2003, the occupation forces had arrested or killed the vast majority of the men on that deck of cards, while Saddam's sons Uday and Qusay Hussein had died in a spectacular gun battle, and Saddam himself had just been captured in a dirt dugout. Occupation authorities confidently predicted that the Ba'athist "bitter enders" were done for and the resistance would subside, since without its leaders, local fighters were expected to be rudderless and ineffective.

Instead the disparate parts of the resistance became stronger, and in April 2004 emerged with a victory in Fallujah - after a siege of the city, the marines pulled back without taking it - and a bloody standoff in Najaf. By then, US intelligence had discovered Abu Massab al-Zarqawi and declared that he was actually the linchpin of the resistance.

Once again, a command-and-control portrait of the enemy remained dominant, and the second battle of Fallujah was fought in good part on the basis of that theory: to disrupt or destroy the Zarqawi leadership group. But despite the expulsion of the guerrillas (and just about the entire population of Fallujans) from the city, the rebellion quickly spread to other cities and intensified, refuting the claim that the decapitation of the movement would be incapacitating.

The command-and-control theory has, in fact, turned out to be as resilient as the resistance itself. US commander Lieutenant-General Thomas F Metz, for instance, explained the post-Fallujah battle of Mosul to the New York Times by saying that Zarqawi and/or his leadership team had moved to that city and fomented the uprising, ignoring the indigenous character of the mujahideen who were fighting there. Later, it would be announced that Zarqawi had set up a new "nerve center" south of Baghdad and a major new search-and-destroy operation would be mounted there.

Even after these actions failed to quell the fighting, the occupation forces clung to command-and-control logic. General Kamal, for example, told Newsweek, "Even if Zarqawi continues to elude capture, nailing al-Kurdi [one of Zarqawi's lieutenants] was a critical score. It might - just might - eventually help change the course of this war." Similar statements were made a month later when Saddam's half-brother, identified as a key leader and funder of the insurgency, was captured in Syria.

Evident in all of this is the faith that US military leaders have in a strategy of identifying and targeting the supposed leaders of the insurgency. Despite the direct evidence of an increasingly ferocious movement, the capture of a key leader, it has repeatedly been claimed, could "change the course of the war".

Why the US military can't abandon 'command and control' logic
So why does the US military relentlessly build its anti-insurgency strategy around the idea of decapitating the leadership of the Iraqi resistance? The answer lies just beneath the surface of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's now-infamous statement, "You go to war with the army you have."

This is a comment pregnant with meaning for organizational sociologists, because it illustrates a familiar pattern of organizational problem-solving. If a product is not selling well, for example, an engineering organization might conclude that better engineering of the product was in order; a manufacturing firm, that more efficient production technology was needed; and a marketing company, that better advertising would do the trick. This sort of organizational idee fixe has led to some truly horrendous failures in business - and military - history. For example, when a flood of automobile buyers began to demand fuel-efficient cars during the first oil crisis in the early 1970s, the US automobile industry did not have the capacity to produce such vehicles. Instead of investing vast resources in developing that capacity, it tried to use its superior marketing skills to win Americans back to luxurious gas-guzzlers. That is, the Big Three auto makers "went to war with the army they had" and convinced themselves that they were facing a marketing problem. The results: a permanent crisis at General Motors (during which it lost world leadership in the industry), a fundamental restructuring of Ford, and the demise of Chrysler.

Or take the French in World War II. They knew about the new German tanks that had made World War I trench warfare obsolete, but the French army was only equipped to fight in the trenches. So they "went to war with the army they had", devising a trench-war strategy that they managed to convince themselves would contain the German Panzer divisions. They lost the war in three weeks.

The US is also fighting with the army it has. This army is the best equipped in the world for advanced conventional warfare - with tanks, artillery, air power, missile power, battlefield surveillance power, and satellite imaging to support highly mobile, well-equipped and superbly trained soldiers. No supply route is safe from its firepower, and no conventional army would be likely to hold its ground long against a US assault. But the most intractable part of the resistance in Iraq is fighting a guerrilla war: they do not have long supply lines and they rarely try to hold their ground.

Guerrilla armies hide by melting into the local population. (Everyone knows this, including, of course, US military men.) To defeat them, an occupying force must have the intelligence to identify guerrillas who can disappear into the civilian world; and it must station troops throughout resistance strongholds in order to pounce upon guerrillas when they emerge from hiding to mount an attack. US military strategists know this, too. But these lessons - painfully drawn from Vietnam - can't be implemented by the army that Donald Rumsfeld sent to war.

The Americans, in fact, have neither of these resources. Anti-guerrilla intelligence, after all, requires the cooperation of the local population, which, at least in the Sunni-dominated areas of Iraq, the US has definitively alienated, largely through its use of blunt-edged conventional army attacks on communities that harbor guerrillas. And it cannot station enough troops in key locations because too small an occupation force is spread far too thinly over contested parts of the country. Estimates for the size of an army needed to pacify Iraq range upward from General Eric Shinseki's prewar call for "several hundred thousand" troops.

The US military simply lacks the tools it needs to fight the guerrillas, just as in the 1970s the Big Three auto makers lacked the production system needed to produced fuel-efficient automobiles, and the French army lacked the technology it needed to defeat German tanks in 1940. In response, military leaders are doing exactly what their organizational forebears did: They continue to develop theories about how to win the war "with the army they have". This backward logic leads inevitably to imagining an enemy that might be far more susceptible to defeat with the tools at hand; that is, an opponent with long supply lines (from Syria, for example) and a command-and-control leadership (Zarqawi and his Saddamist allies, for example) capable of being "decapitated". This portrait of the enemy then justifies a military strategy that seeks, above all, to kill or capture the theorized leaders. Such tactics almost always fail (even when leaders are captured); and in the process of failing, only alienate further the Iraqi population, producing an ever larger, more resourceful enemy.

The newest portrait of the resistance as a Zarqawi-Saddamist led amalgam will sooner or later die a lonely death - in all likelihood to be replaced by yet another command-and-control portrait of the insurgency whose features are as yet unknown. As long as the US continues to fight "with the army it has", it will also continue to generate - and act on - distorted (sometimes ludicrous) descriptions of the nature of the rebellion it faces.

Michael Schwartz, professor of sociology at the State University of New York at Stony Brook, has written extensively on popular protest and insurgency, and on US business and government dynamics. His work on Iraq has appeared on the Internet at numerous sites including TomDispatch, Asia Times Online, MotherJones, and ZNet; and in print at Contexts and Z magazine. His books include Radical Politics and Social Structure, The Power Structure of American Business (with Beth Mintz), and Social Policy and the Conservative Agenda (edited, with Clarence Lo)

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/GC10Ak01.html

This is a thought provoking article.

It would be very educative if those in the know can dissect it for what it is worth.

Blademaster · 03-19-2005, 13:16 PM

This is merely nothing but darwinism forces at work.

But still it is not enough because you need an army to retake a country. Insurgencies never really put "real" pressure to surrender a country. There's a proverb, "A country without an army is not a country. An army without a country is still an army."

I see this as nothing but a requirement for para-military forces. This is the kind of problem that US is having because US lacked para-military forces or did away with it. If you look at US history, during the Indian wars, US had tremendous para-military experience but understandably US let those experiences, trainings, and lessons die during the 20th century. They dealt differently with insurgencies from regular military forces would do. Now US is waking up with the lesson of requiring a para-military force that would deal with COIN ops. What's new about it is that they will be projected outside of US territories into other parts of the world. I don't recall any country projecting their para-military forces anywhere in the world outside of their homeland.

Even during Vietname, US never really did COIN. I think they left the COIN to the South Vietnamese forces and US forces tackled the NVA and killed the VietCong during the Tet offensive which was not really a COIN op but a sort of jungle warfare mixed with a bit of dose of urban warfare.

dalem · 03-19-2005, 14:17 PM

Max Boot's "The Savage Wars of Peace" has an interesting take on the subject as far as American COIN involvement and success over the last 200 years.

Fascinating read.

-dale

troung · 03-20-2005, 15:41 PM

"Even during Vietname, US never really did COIN. I think they left the COIN to the South Vietnamese forces and US forces tackled the NVA and killed the VietCong during the Tet offensive which was not really a COIN op but a sort of jungle warfare mixed with a bit of dose of urban warfare."

Vietnam when the USA showed up was less and less a COIN conflict and more and more a direct invasion.

"But still it is not enough because you need an army to retake a country. Insurgencies never really put "real" pressure to surrender a country. There's a proverb, "A country without an army is not a country. An army without a country is still an army.""

If a nation lacks the power to keep the guerillas down they will face pressure to surrender a nation. Guerilla wars are fought in stages as the guerillas get more and more territory and make "safe zones" and then expand on those until hopefully (for them) they are able to force people more or less out. Often times they can "win" without forcing a state out but through inflicting losses and making the other side spend a lot of money to fight them. But the plan/hope is to be able to force them out.

Ray · 03-20-2005, 23:47 PM

As per Mao, Guerilla Warfare encompasses:

1. Arousing and organizing the people.
2. Achieving internal unification politically.
3. Establishing bases.
4. Equipping forces.
5. Recovering national strength.
6. Destroying enemy's national strength.
7. Regaining lost territories.

I wonder if this applied in VN.

lemontree · 03-21-2005, 00:24 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Ray

I wonder if this applied in VN.

Sir,
In Vietnam the Vietcong applied a concept known as "Cyclic guerilla warfare". That is gaining of the national aim (i.e unification) in stages that are repeated in other occupied areas, when regions/zones get formally liberated.
First the north was liberated then the same tactics and political strategy was applied for the south.

troung · 03-21-2005, 00:38 AM

That was more true in the First Indochina War with the French. The "VM" started from a small group and over time with massive Chinese aid, capurted French equipment and such turned into a regular force. There were still paristan forces operating around the nations (the war did go into Laos) but the victory was "won" by a set piece battle with French units. Even before that there were many large scale battles with Giaps regular forces in Laos and all over Vietnam. They had built up zones of control and expanded on them.

The Second Indochna War was far more an actual invasion by a regular and army then a guerilla force which built itself into a regular army through establishing safe zones. Guerillas did not win the war but a regular army with tanks, lots of artillery and heavy AAA took control of the South.

The Third Indochina War was also a guerilla conflict and was rather similar to Afghanistan which was going on at the same time (1980s). The Vietnamese Army crushed the Khmer Rouge and then faced not only the Khmer Rouge but other groups such as the ANS. The paritsans/guerillas recieved support from China, Thailand and possibly others...

But I digress..

Yes the "VC" did operate as a guerilla force but with influx of equipment and soldiers from the North turned into a regular force rather quickly. There were bands of guerilla/paristans during the war fighting the ARVN and friends but the biggest force in the conflict from about 1964 or so on was uniformed soldiers mostly from the North. North Vietnam sent in entire Divisions to the fight.

And despite propganda the "VC" was actually totally under control of the North and not some snap movement which popped up and many "VC" guys ended up in the same camps after the war with ARVN soldiers. Many of the cadres came down from the North in the early 1960s to form units.

The guerillas then provided a fig leaf for the North to move in Regiments and Divisions to the South and call them guerillas as well....

----

And yet is is rather uncommon for guerillas to build up to the point of fighting for ground without some sort of external help... during a guerilla war the best side to be on is to be the people funding it...

Blademaster · 03-21-2005, 10:06 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by troung

If a nation lacks the power to keep the guerillas down they will face pressure to surrender a nation. Guerilla wars are fought in stages as the guerillas get more and more territory and make "safe zones" and then expand on those until hopefully (for them) they are able to force people more or less out. Often times they can "win" without forcing a state out but through inflicting losses and making the other side spend a lot of money to fight them. But the plan/hope is to be able to force them out.

Right if you can outbleed them, but that usually only works for an outside occupying force whose internal forces cannot stomach the bleeding in outside soil unless there's really a good reason for it. A state is willing to tolerate bleeding if they're fighting on the homefront because the danger is so real and close up and they're fighting for their families, homes, and assets whereas at faraway shores, they're just fighting for their country's ideologies or national interests which hold less sway than personal reasons.

troung · 03-21-2005, 19:26 PM

"Right if you can outbleed them, but that usually only works for an outside occupying force whose internal forces cannot stomach the bleeding in outside soil unless there's really a good reason for it. A state is willing to tolerate bleeding if they're fighting on the homefront because the danger is so real and close up and they're fighting for their families, homes, and assets whereas at faraway shores, they're just fighting for their country's ideologies or national interests which hold less sway than personal reasons."

Well it all depends how strong the rebels and the army they are fighting is. If they are down to the level of being mere bandits without popular support (or in a multi ethinic nation support from a very small part of the population) facing a large well finaced, trained, led and equipped military then I doubt the nation state would cave in if it is an internal issue even if a nieghbor decides to send in trickles of money/arms and sheep dip small numbers of their own soldiers....

antelope · 03-21-2005, 21:21 PM

The insurgency in Vietnam was pretty much destroyed during the Tet offensive. In general insurgencies seldom win except in the rare times they have the advantages of massive popular support, foreign funding, and advantageous terrain. Vietnam was simple a conventional war that America failed to prosecute to its end. After America withdrew and failed to supply South Vietnam with adequate logistical support North Vietnam in a conventional invasion defeated the South.

The insurgency in Iraq does not have popular support and since it is urban in nature has little to no terrain advantages. The only reason it has raged as long as it has was because the initial American occupation force was far too small and basically allowed large swaths of the country descend into anarchy and warlordism. The forces that took advantage of this vacuum were anti-American and wanted a U.S. withdrawal.

In addition the U.S. failed to rapidly train and field an adaquate Iraqi force to make up for the occupation shortfall.

With these two issues and the American election restricting offensive operations the insurgency was allowed to fester. Since the end of the U.S. election we have seen America take firm offensive action. The Iraqi military is now coming on line in strength that is having real impact. From what I read the money support is also starting to dry up. If things continue as they are doing now the insurgency should peter out and become little more than an occasional annoyance like the Basque ETA situation in Spain.

03-21-2005, 00:38 AM	#7 (permalink)
troung A Self Important *Senior Contributor* Join Date: 08-03-03 Posts: 4,236 Country:	That was more true in the First Indochina War with the French. The "VM" started from a small group and over time with massive Chinese aid, capurted French equipment and such turned into a regular force. There were still paristan forces operating around the nations (the war did go into Laos) but the victory was "won" by a set piece battle with French units. Even before that there were many large scale battles with Giaps regular forces in Laos and all over Vietnam. They had built up zones of control and expanded on them. The Second Indochna War was far more an actual invasion by a regular and army then a guerilla force which built itself into a regular army through establishing safe zones. Guerillas did not win the war but a regular army with tanks, lots of artillery and heavy AAA took control of the South. The Third Indochina War was also a guerilla conflict and was rather similar to Afghanistan which was going on at the same time (1980s). The Vietnamese Army crushed the Khmer Rouge and then faced not only the Khmer Rouge but other groups such as the ANS. The paritsans/guerillas recieved support from China, Thailand and possibly others... But I digress.. Yes the "VC" did operate as a guerilla force but with influx of equipment and soldiers from the North turned into a regular force rather quickly. There were bands of guerilla/paristans during the war fighting the ARVN and friends but the biggest force in the conflict from about 1964 or so on was uniformed soldiers mostly from the North. North Vietnam sent in entire Divisions to the fight. And despite propganda the "VC" was actually totally under control of the North and not some snap movement which popped up and many "VC" guys ended up in the same camps after the war with ARVN soldiers. Many of the cadres came down from the North in the early 1960s to form units. The guerillas then provided a fig leaf for the North to move in Regiments and Divisions to the South and call them guerillas as well.... ---- And yet is is rather uncommon for guerillas to build up to the point of fighting for ground without some sort of external help... during a guerilla war the best side to be on is to be the people funding it... Last edited by troung : 03-21-2005 at 00:40 AM.

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03-19-2005, 13:16 PM	#2 (permalink)
Blademaster Military Enthusiast *Senior Contributor* Join Date: 08-15-03 Posts: 3,050	This is merely nothing but darwinism forces at work. But still it is not enough because you need an army to retake a country. Insurgencies never really put "real" pressure to surrender a country. There's a proverb, "A country without an army is not a country. An army without a country is still an army." I see this as nothing but a requirement for para-military forces. This is the kind of problem that US is having because US lacked para-military forces or did away with it. If you look at US history, during the Indian wars, US had tremendous para-military experience but understandably US let those experiences, trainings, and lessons die during the 20th century. They dealt differently with insurgencies from regular military forces would do. Now US is waking up with the lesson of requiring a para-military force that would deal with COIN ops. What's new about it is that they will be projected outside of US territories into other parts of the world. I don't recall any country projecting their para-military forces anywhere in the world outside of their homeland. Even during Vietname, US never really did COIN. I think they left the COIN to the South Vietnamese forces and US forces tackled the NVA and killed the VietCong during the Tet offensive which was not really a COIN op but a sort of jungle warfare mixed with a bit of dose of urban warfare.

03-19-2005, 14:17 PM	#3 (permalink)
dalem Lord High Hullabalooster *Senior Contributor* Join Date: 11-23-04 Location: Columbia Heights, MN Posts: 8,323 Country:	Max Boot's "The Savage Wars of Peace" has an interesting take on the subject as far as American COIN involvement and success over the last 200 years. Fascinating read. -dale

03-20-2005, 15:41 PM	#4 (permalink)
troung A Self Important *Senior Contributor* Join Date: 08-03-03 Posts: 4,236 Country:	"Even during Vietname, US never really did COIN. I think they left the COIN to the South Vietnamese forces and US forces tackled the NVA and killed the VietCong during the Tet offensive which was not really a COIN op but a sort of jungle warfare mixed with a bit of dose of urban warfare." Vietnam when the USA showed up was less and less a COIN conflict and more and more a direct invasion. "But still it is not enough because you need an army to retake a country. Insurgencies never really put "real" pressure to surrender a country. There's a proverb, "A country without an army is not a country. An army without a country is still an army."" If a nation lacks the power to keep the guerillas down they will face pressure to surrender a nation. Guerilla wars are fought in stages as the guerillas get more and more territory and make "safe zones" and then expand on those until hopefully (for them) they are able to force people more or less out. Often times they can "win" without forcing a state out but through inflicting losses and making the other side spend a lot of money to fight them. But the plan/hope is to be able to force them out.

03-20-2005, 23:47 PM	#5 (permalink)
Ray Postmaster General *Military Professional* Join Date: 08-20-03 Posts: 26,144 Country:	As per Mao, Guerilla Warfare encompasses: 1. Arousing and organizing the people. 2. Achieving internal unification politically. 3. Establishing bases. 4. Equipping forces. 5. Recovering national strength. 6. Destroying enemy's national strength. 7. Regaining lost territories. I wonder if this applied in VN.

03-21-2005, 19:26 PM	#9 (permalink)
troung A Self Important *Senior Contributor* Join Date: 08-03-03 Posts: 4,236 Country:	"Right if you can outbleed them, but that usually only works for an outside occupying force whose internal forces cannot stomach the bleeding in outside soil unless there's really a good reason for it. A state is willing to tolerate bleeding if they're fighting on the homefront because the danger is so real and close up and they're fighting for their families, homes, and assets whereas at faraway shores, they're just fighting for their country's ideologies or national interests which hold less sway than personal reasons." Well it all depends how strong the rebels and the army they are fighting is. If they are down to the level of being mere bandits without popular support (or in a multi ethinic nation support from a very small part of the population) facing a large well finaced, trained, led and equipped military then I doubt the nation state would cave in if it is an internal issue even if a nieghbor decides to send in trickles of money/arms and sheep dip small numbers of their own soldiers....

03-21-2005, 21:21 PM	#10 (permalink)
antelope Regular Join Date: 12-27-04 Posts: 99	The insurgency in Vietnam was pretty much destroyed during the Tet offensive. In general insurgencies seldom win except in the rare times they have the advantages of massive popular support, foreign funding, and advantageous terrain. Vietnam was simple a conventional war that America failed to prosecute to its end. After America withdrew and failed to supply South Vietnam with adequate logistical support North Vietnam in a conventional invasion defeated the South. The insurgency in Iraq does not have popular support and since it is urban in nature has little to no terrain advantages. The only reason it has raged as long as it has was because the initial American occupation force was far too small and basically allowed large swaths of the country descend into anarchy and warlordism. The forces that took advantage of this vacuum were anti-American and wanted a U.S. withdrawal. In addition the U.S. failed to rapidly train and field an adaquate Iraqi force to make up for the occupation shortfall. With these two issues and the American election restricting offensive operations the insurgency was allowed to fester. Since the end of the U.S. election we have seen America take firm offensive action. The Iraqi military is now coming on line in strength that is having real impact. From what I read the money support is also starting to dry up. If things continue as they are doing now the insurgency should peter out and become little more than an occasional annoyance like the Basque ETA situation in Spain.

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