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Old 02-26-2007, 00:46 AM   #16 (permalink)
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Sir,

It's the curvature of the earth. Czech and Poland are in a direct line vis-a-vi Iran when the curvature is taken into consideration. Radars in the Czech Republic would be able to see over-the-horizon into Iran and thus would have launch detection that would not be available anywhere else available to the US. That early detection is what would allow interceptors in Poland to have the optimal interception vectors.
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Old 02-26-2007, 01:10 AM   #17 (permalink)
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But radars and interceptors do not represent offensive capabilities.[/b]
Well interceptors will still prevent the US aircrafts from over-flying Cuba at its whim and will.So that is a threat to the US.
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Old 02-26-2007, 01:13 AM   #18 (permalink)
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Where do the US need to place ABM if say they want to defend from China?
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Old 02-26-2007, 02:56 AM   #19 (permalink)
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If the ABM is ineffective, why set it up?
As I am sure I quite clearly said, it's ineffective against a Russian attack, which would overwhelm the system. Against a rogue state without a massive arsenal, it would offer some degree of protection.
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Since you are aware of the finer issues of the ABM workings, do explain as to why Poland is ideal for Interceptors and Czech Republic for radars?
As the Colonel already mentioned, it's a matter of geography. The tracking radar needs to be stationed in front of the missiles along the flight path. SBIR sats will detect the launch and cue the radar. The objective is to perform the intercept at the apogee of the target missile trajectory, outside the atmosphere. The KV needs about 1400 miles between it and the target missile at the time of separation from the third stage of the launch vehicle. The radar guides the kill vehicle, which is why it needs to be closer to the target than the interceptor base.
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Again, so that I might benefit from your deep knowledge of this ABM system, could you give the technical parameters? (Of course, now state that they are highly classified). If they are classified, highly or otherwise, you know of the technical parameters as much as I do.
What would you like to know? There is much available information from the MDA. There are two different launch vehicles, both are 3 stage rockets plus the KV. Maximum speed is 3.4 or 3.7 miles per second, depending on which launch vehicle is used. Flight time is ~3 minutes till KV separation.

As I already said, the KV needs about 1400 miles to do it's thing. Total distance from the target missile launch site to the interceptor missile launch site is on the order of 4,800+ miles. This is another reason why the interceptors in Poland are useless against Russian missiles, and Putin knows this full well. To defend Europe against Russian missiles requires THAAD/Patriot.
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Notwithstanding, when will the radars detect the launch of the hostile missile and when will the interceptor missile be effective (in time and distance)?
SBIR sats detect the launch and cue the early warning radars. The early warning radars will pick up the missile when it passes the radar horizon, so that range is dependent on the distance and target altitude. I have already given you the flight times and parameters for KV separation. The targeting radars guide the kill vehicle until about 100 seconds before the collision, when onboard IR guidance takes over.
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I am postulating of offensive missiles deployment because one just doesn't just merely stop a hostile missile and sit back and twiddle his thumb!
Of course not, but that doesn't mean the counterstrike has to come from European soil, as I already stated. There is no need for any new offensive missiles in Europe. The counterstrike would most likely be launched from a submarine.
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Are these sophisticated radars signatured solely for missile having the Iranian signature? If so, how?
Of course not. They will detect whatever is up there.
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Is this ABM merely on a stand alone mode and has no linkage with the satellite detection capabilities? If it does have a interconnectivity, does the ABM not become a 'force multiplier'?
It has interconnectivity with the SBIR network, as I already said. As to the effectiveness as a "force multiplier" vis a vis Russia, no, since they wouldn't be able to intercept a Russian missile aimed at Europe (not enough range separation) or the US (polar trajectory).
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The ABM does alter the deterrence quotient! Putin think so, even if you don't.
I don't believe for one second that Putin believes what he is saying publicly. If he does believe it, he is totally ignorant of the capabilities of the system. I have a little difficulty with this assumption.
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The ABM is for the protection of Europe and not the US.
No, it is for protection of Europe and the Eastern US.
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Likewise, my hypothetical example pertains to 'protection of Cuba and Mexico' and not Russia.
Lol. Sure thing....
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Then why install it in Europe?

Let the interceptors be in Turkey (quicker reaction) and the radars in Greece.

But then I am sure you will explain why Poland and the Czech Republic are ideal.
Turkey and Greece are too close to Iran geographically. To have a decent chance of success, you need range separation. The interceptor needs that 3 minutes to place the KV on it's proper trajectory.

In last September's test of an operationally configured GBI missile, the target missile was launched from Kodiak Alaska. 17 minutes later, the interceptor was lauched from Vandenberg AFB. Roughly 5 minutes later, the intercept took place. You're not going to have that kind of time if the interceptor is located in Turkey.
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Honestly, please do explain the technical parameters as also the conduct and operation of this ABM system. Whatever details I have is too elementary.
Well, I have explained some, what more would you like to know?
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Old 02-26-2007, 09:48 AM   #20 (permalink)
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I don't believe for one second that Putin believes what he is saying publicly. If he does believe it, he is totally ignorant of the capabilities of the system. I have a little difficulty with this assumption.
No, it is for protection of Europe and the Eastern US.
It does call into question the usefulness of the Russian nuclear umbrella which would be detrimental to Russian security apparatus.
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Old 02-26-2007, 11:03 AM   #21 (permalink)
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HIghseas,

The post giving technical details makes the issue Interesting. Thank you.

What is MDA which has publications on the subject? If it is Missile Defence Agency, then it is like the home page of Washington Post! Be specific.

Some questions and observations:

1. Poland is nowhere in the optimal flight of the missile to Europe. It is to the northern flank of the missile path if the centre is taken into consideration. If London is the criteria to be saved, then also the flight path would be Romania, Czech Republic. Germany, UK, taking Tehran to be the launch site of the hostile missile.

2. If the KV requires 1400 miles, then it should be effective in the Southern Eastern Extreme of the Black Sea. Will the epogee of the Iranian missile be reached at the southern eastern tip of the Black Sea?

3. You state "The tracking radar needs to be stationed in front of the missiles along the flight path. " But the Pentagon wants to site a radar station in the Czech Republic, which would work in tandem with a silo of 10 interceptor weapons in neighbouring Poland.
From the map, Poland with its interceptor silos is to the Northern Flank and the Czech Republic with its radars is to the SW of Poland and hence behind. Clarify, please.

Also comment on this

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First, the American ABM deployment area in Europe will have to be protected from the air, at least against terrorist attacks. In practical terms, it means that NATO's air force can move to the borders of Russia's ally, Belarus. Secondly, this area will require radars, which, in turn, will have to be thoroughly guarded as well.

Deputy head of the Main Department of International Military Cooperation Lt.-Gen. Buzhinsky believes that "NATO will build new facilities in the European deployment area under the pretext that they are required for the functioning of the ABM system. It will need other forces, such as the navy, air defense, aviation, and ground-based troops in order to protect the security of these facilities."

Moreover, Europe-based military installations may be used for other purposes. If need be, NATO could install attack missiles in silos after minor adjustments. Neither Russia, nor its CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) allies, Belarus in particular, can ignore these plans.

Indicatively, NATO has not yet made a decision on the ABM scale and structure, and for this reason the system will not be integrated into NATO's command network. Declarations about defense of the NATO countries by the ABM system mean that NATO will have to pay at least some of the expenses involved in maintaining its infrastructure. But at the same time, the residents of the countries with ABM deployment areas will risk being hit by the fragments of intercepted ballistic missiles and interceptor missiles, whereas decisions on launching anti-missiles will be made thousands of miles away from Europe.

Until recently, the Europeans believed that instead of building an ABM system with long-range interceptors, it makes sense to upgrade the existing air defense systems capable of intercepting ballistic missiles in Europe. It was not ruled out that Russian and Western systems could be used together for the protection of peacemaking operations. This idea was sealed in the declaration on new NATO-Russia relations, which was adopted in Rome in 2002.

After talks with his Polish counterpart Anna Fotyga, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov made this statement on the reconfiguration of the U.S. military presence in Europe in general, and the third advanced ABM deployment there (after the U.S. and the Far East) in particular: "Let's not forget that NATO is discussing the building of its ABM system. In this context reconfiguration may question strategic stability. I've told my counterpart that we are interested in these processes being transparent and understandable for us. Of course, we will take them into account while planning our own measures to ensure global strategic stability and Russia's national security."

In late August, replying to the proposal of his American colleague to replace nuclear warheads on strategic missiles with high-precision re-entry vehicles to fight terrorists, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov suggested considering withdrawal from the treaty on medium-range missiles. Former Air Force Commander Anatoly Kornukov mentioned Kaliningrad as a possible site for the deployment of C-400 air defense missile systems with a range of up to 400 km.
RIA Novosti - Opinion & analysis - Who can Europe-based missiles threaten?
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Old 02-26-2007, 11:55 AM   #22 (permalink)
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Highseas,

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BRIEFING SERIES

U.S.-NATO Relations Regarding Missile Defenses: Concepts, Architectures, and Perspectives
June 15, 2001



In order for the idea of missile defense to be effective, Europe must be defended, otherwise vulnerability will simply shift from the United States to Europe.

CNS - DC: Briefing Series
This indicates that for ABM to be effective, Europe must be defended!

It does mean that ABM without fortifying adequately is of no use! Hence, boosting is essential.

Therefore, one of the cause of Russian concern and change of power balance.
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Old 02-26-2007, 12:08 PM   #23 (permalink)
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HIghseas,

The post giving technical details makes the issue Interesting. Thank you.
You're welcome.

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What is MDA which has publications on the subject? If it is Missile Defence Agency, then it is like the home page of Washington Post! Be specific.
Yes, the Missile Defense Agency. I don't know what you mean that it's like the "Home Page of the Wa Post". The MDA site doesn't change it's content every day! Check it out, and if there's something you feel is missing, ask away.

http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/html/mdalink.html

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Some questions and observations:

1. Poland is nowhere in the optimal flight of the missile to Europe. It is to the northern flank of the missile path if the centre is taken into consideration. If London is the criteria to be saved, then also the flight path would be Romania, Czech Republic. Germany, UK, taking Tehran to be the launch site of the hostile missile.
Use a globe, not a map. The hostile missile will take a great circle course. Also include New York and Washington as potential destinations for the hostile missile when you make your plot. I think you will get a diffferent perspective.
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2. If the KV requires 1400 miles, then it should be effective in the Southern Eastern Extreme of the Black Sea. Will the epogee of the Iranian missile be reached at the southern eastern tip of the Black Sea?
It would depend on the missile. I really don't know the parameters of Iran's long range missiles. But further away is better, since the time frame is a factor.
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3. You state "The tracking radar needs to be stationed in front of the missiles along the flight path. " But the Pentagon wants to site a radar station in the Czech Republic, which would work in tandem with a silo of 10 interceptor weapons in neighbouring Poland.
From the map, Poland with its interceptor silos is to the Northern Flank and the Czech Republic with its radars is to the SW of Poland and hence behind. Clarify, please.
Again, you have to look at a globe rather than a flat map to get proper perspective. You don't need to be directly ahead on a perfect line. In the Alaska test, the interceptor was launched from VAFB, the radar was at Beale (Northern California). The intercept took place over the Pacific Ocean.
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Also comment on this
Let me get back to this later, I am getting ready for work.
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Old 02-26-2007, 12:30 PM   #24 (permalink)
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This ABM is for Europe and not the US.

Iranian missiles details

The Iranian Shahab-3 is a single-stage, liquid-fueled, road-mobile, medium-range ballistic missile with a range of approximately 800 miles (1,280 km). A MRBM variant, sometimes called Shahab-4, has a range of more than 1,200 miles (1,930 km).

Shahab-3 is capable of carrying a 1,000-760 kilogram warhead. Fewer than 20 launchers were deployed as of March 2006, according to Air Force Intelligence. The variant was not deployed at the time.

Shahab-3 means Meteor-3 or Shooting Star-3 in Farsi [alternatively designated Zelzal (Earthquake)] is derivative from the 1,300-1,500 kilometer range North Korean No-dong missile.

Shahab-4

Technical Details

Range (km) 2,200-2,896
CEP (m) unknown
Diam. (m) 1.3/.88
Height (m) 25
Launch Weight Mass (kg) 22,000
Thrust (Kg f) 26,000
Burn time (sec.) 293
Thrust Chamb. 1, 1, 1
Stages 2, 3
Fuel Heptyl
Oxidizer IRFNA
Third Stage Solid Motor*
Type IRBM

* May have been derived from existing Chinese designs.

The Iranian Shahab-4 missile is believed to be a derivation of the 1,350-1,500 kilometer range North Korean No-dong missile delivering a 1,000-760 kg warhead and the follow on Taep'o-dong-1/Paeutusan-1 launch vehicles. The first indications of the development of the Shahab-4 came in The Washington Times on September 11, 1997 when it stated the following: "The Shahab-3 and 4 programs appear to be getting considerable assistance from China and Russia."(1)

Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 missile programs are discussed in this article. Shahab-3, is credited with 930 miles (1,496 kilometers) range while the Shahab-4 is credited with 1,240 miles (1,995km) whose prototype appearance is believed to be 2-3 years (1999-2000) away. It also stated an Iranian Diplomat was arrested in Moscow, Russia in 1997 as he was trying to buy missile blue prints.

The earliest suggestion that the SS-4 engines or missile airframe could be a part of the Shahab program came from, The LA Times, on February 12, 1997 when it republished the first reports initially released in the Israeli press during January 1997. The Technology transfer from Russia involved " detailed instructions on how to construct the weapon delivery system, U.S. Sources said." There is also some indication that some parts of the SS-4 were transferred. (2) The Washington Times, February 13, 1997 reported that some of the guidance systems components and detailed plans to build the SS-4 was what was transferred to Iran. (3) It is critical to point out this did not necessarily give the Iranians detailed design drawings of the SS-4 missile airframe, and its RD-214 rocket engine or the associated documentation on the hardware. Nor did it give them copies of the actual hardware much less the precise engineering drawings of each part or the materials and technology to produce and duplicate that technology. This transfer only provided them with the detailed plans on how to produce the launch vehicle.

The only application where the Iranian's could apply this acquired production technology is in the Shahab-5 and Shahab-6 boosters programs. However this assumes the Iranians can or desire to duplicate that technology. Certainly this production technology could take three to five years under the most optimal of conditions to duplicate assuming it has the political will, economic vitality, facilities infrastructure, materials, in addition to the trained, educated and experienced personnel to support an expensive effort of this magnitude. However, to assimilate that production technology it may take Tehran years beyond their intended design development cycle for those launch vehicles presently under development or planned. Therefore, they are left with no other alternative but to work with the in hand existing North Korean launch vehicle technology, that they currently possess, and their rework of it to create the Shahab-4 and Shahab-5 programs in cooperation with North Korea. If there is anything the Iranian's have learned from the SS-4 engine and or its rocket body production information it is how to apply it to the design they are developing for the Taep'o-dong-2/Shahab-5 and 6 boosters first stage which was already well along in development. Clearly the transfer of technology limits imposed on the Iranians is having a serious affect on their progress as is evident in the Shahab-3 program.

All the existing 149, SS-4's were scrapped or placed in school laboratories or put on display in museums in 1991 because of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force Treaty, (INF). However the SS-4 warheads, guidance system, engines along with other instruments and useful components were not destroyed. Those components were either sent back to the manufactures for use in other programs or were sent to other specialized destruction centers.

By October 18, 1997 it was stated in the Washington Times that: "Iran was just three years (2000) from fielding the first of two versions of the North Korean, No-dong missile called the Shehab-3 and 4... ."(4) On July 29, 1998 The Washington Times stated that the Iranian Shahab-4, (the North Korean Taep'o-dong-1/NKSL-1) which has a range of 1,240 miles (1,995.16 km) will require 2-5 years (2000-2003) to appear.(5)

The Shahab-4 is projected to include improved guidance components, a two stage version would have a range of 2,000-2,200 kilometers while the three stages Shahab-4 could potentially have a range of 2,672-2,896 kilometers range with a warhead weight on the order of 1,000-760 kilograms. The Shahab-4 would be capable of hitting targets as far away as Germany and Western China. The Iranian Zelzal project provided for the rework development of the North Korean No-dong missile with a 1,350-1,500 kilometer range.

Israeli sources claimed that Russia provided Iran technology from the SS-4, which has a known maximum range of 2,000 kilometers (which is more than sufficient to reach Israel). Iran's Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani's quoted in the February 8, 1998, issue of Florida Today, that the "Shahab-4 rocket now in development would be used to carry satellites into space--- not for military purposes. The Shahab-3 missile is the last military missile Iran will produce,…. We have no plans for another war missile."

However in November of 1997 he had previously said that, "Iran was developing a missile with a greater range than the Shahab-3... ." (6)

The Washington Times provided supplemental information on March 2, 1999 quoting from the Iranian defense minister's Ali Shamkani, press conference of February 7, 1999, "that the engine tests of the longer-range Shahab-4 will begin soon." (7)

On July 16, 1999, The Washington Times noted According to Kenneth R. Timmerman, President of Middle East Data Project, Inc. that new booster testing activities was observed at the Iranian Missile test center "near Shahroud East of Tehran in late April". "We've seen them stack stages, then taking them down over the past six weeks," (April May and early June 1999) one analyst said. "This strongly suggests they will be launching a multi-stage missile.". (8)

It was suggested in the above noted report that the Iranians have stacked and un-stacked this apparent Shehab-4 class multi-staged missile during a six week period of May through July 1999. This published report fails to clarify whether the missile in question was the Taep'o-dong-1 or the new Taep'odong-2 or an Iranian derivation on those designs possibly utilizing solid motor upper stages. Whether this was a build up to a flight test of the Shahab-4/NKSL-1/Taep'o-dong-1 or Kosar (See Shahab-5 & 6) an IRIS booster or more ground testing and or an Iranian evaluation of North Korean technology is unclear. The passage of over two years from this event with the lack of a successful launch appearance of the Shahab-4 or IRIS booster would tend to suggest that this series of tests was an evaluation that portended the at least temporary shelving of the Shahab-4 program. This would have been done in favor of the primary follow on goal of the development of the Shahab-5, and 6 program which could ultimately occur in 2001 or later in 2002-2003.

If the rocket in question is an SS-4 rocket body or SS-4 engine based satellite launcher it would have been erected not stacked on the pad as is done with the Taep'o-dong-1/NKSL-1 class booster rocket. This in itself probably means that the Shahab-4 is indeed based on the Taep'o-dong-1 ballistic missile technology with Iranian indigenous redesign refinements being added to the design. The SS-4 class technology can only be applied to the Taep'o-dong-2/Shahab-5 and 6 class booster since the Taep'o-dong-1 is known to be based on the No-dong and Scud-B technology. Further observations are required to determine the origin and nature of the Shahab-4.

The Shahab-4 satellite launch vehicle as well as the Shahab-5/LRICBM/Kosar and Shahab-6.htm"> potential satellite launch vehicle/LRICBM have now been identified as being an apparent Iranian variant of the North Korean Taep'o-dong 1 and 2 missile series by the National Air Intelligence Center (NAIC). Alternatively NAIC also suggested that the Iranians may be using solid propellant upper stages based on acquired Russian technology and or requested purchase of assistance from China. (9)

During the spring of 2000 it was unclear which variant of North Korean hardware was being developed by Iran for the Shahab-4/NKSL-1/Taep'o-dong-1 and Shahab-5/Kosar/IRIS, and or Shahab-6 launch vehicles.

The first launch of the Shahab-4 may be less than a year away once the technical issues if any or political issues holding up the flight are resolved. It has also been suggested that Iran will deploy the Taep'o-dong-1 as a ballistic missile with out flight testing it based on the North Korean test flight. This as we shall see is highly questionable.
Has Iran Redirected Its Launch Vehicle Development Program?

To answer this question a basic analysis process must be used in order to be reasonable certain of the results. This process is to define what they have said or published as compared with what they are building verses what they are doing with what they are building as compared to what they have said. If there is a clear lack of information on something except for small hints then this is a major flag that something is indeed going on that needs to be closely examined. What follows is a continuation of that analysis process.

There is also the possibility that Iran may simply forgo the Shahab-4 since it is ultimately only a test bed pathfinder program for the larger launch vehicle the Shahab-5 and Shahab-6 programs. How Iran intends to carry out the flight testing of the Shahab-4 remains to be seen if at all. Iran will in all probability follow the testing program conducted by North Korea launching a satellite with the Shahab-4 derived from the Taep'o-dong-1/Paeutusan-1 launch vehicle design as suggested by Iran's Defense minister.

However, this does not make sense since North Korea has already scrapped the launch pad and gantry umbilical tower used in the Taep'o-dong-1 flight test program. They have built in place of that facility a new replacement launch pad and gantry umbilical tower to accommodate the Taep'o-dong-2 and follow on satellite launch vehicle systems. This confirms that the Taep'o-dong-1 class booster was purely a flight test bed pathfinder launch vehicle program for the follow on Taep'o-dong-2/Shahab-5 class launch vehicle design.

North Korea agreed to a moratorium on missile testing in exchange for aid from the United States and other nations. In the meanwhile, modifications to the Taepo'dong-1 launch facility were completed in the fall of 1998 and spring 1999 to make it capable of accommodating flight testing of the Taep'o-dong-2. These modifications are the primary reason why the U.S. intelligence community stated in the spring of 1999 that North Korea was ready to flight test the Taep'o-dong-2. It has been suggested that the Shahab-4 missile is based on the Russian/Soviet SS-4 IRBM and its open cycle RD-214 rocket engine. However this is questionable because of INF and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) requirements. The design of the Shahab-4, Shahab-5 and Shahab-6 are not at all that well understood based on the available public information. However based on the trends seen in Iran's missile development programs to date it must be assumed that they will not try and reinvent the wheel at this time until they have gained much more experience in managing these high technology programs. Therefore Iran can be expect to utilize continued North Korean missile technology development regardless of the suggested Russian missile design and engine technology transfer.
Potential Intelligence Limits

What may be creating the confusion for the U.S. Intelligence community is the first stage propulsion system of the Shahab-3 and 4 verses what is to be used in the Shahab-5 and 6 program. All of these launch vehicles are expected to use the same propellants used on the Shahab-3 and Taep'o-dong-1 boosters. The Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 launch vehicles are powered by a single thrust chamber open cycle No-dong engine, that is based on circumstantial evidence derived from a Russian Isayev engine. Iran had two choices it had to decide on for its chosen propulsion system for the Shahab-5 and 6 first stage. In both cases it would use a total of four thrust chambers but there the difference divides. They could use four No-dong engines in a cluster, which would be difficult to fit in the already specified missile body diameter. Otherwise they had to develop a new turbo-pump for the four No-dong thrust chambers. Clearly Iran's Designer General chose to try and develop a new turbo-pump with foreign assistance. Fortunately the initial Iranian effort to acquire that kind of hardware from Russia was cut off by the Russia industry government cooperation before it got started. What they did after that is any bodies guess but can be surmised circumstantially from the fact that certain schools in Russia and China may have provided the education "Know How" to finish the job over time. It is also presumed that with China's help North Korea may have completed that effort for both itself and Iran. It is presumed here that Iran may have worked together with the North Koreans as well as provided the financial backing to move the effort along in-spite of the flight test moratorium by North Korea.

The static test firings of the Shahab-3 and 4 missile would have only shown the single thrust chamber static test firing to the U. S. Intelligence community. But if they observed a cluster firing of four thrust chambers they probably could have been confused as to whether this was a No-dong thrust chamber cluster firing or a SS-4, RD-214 engine thrust chamber cluster firing. Imagery wise they probably could not tell the difference even though the No-dong cluster would be smaller than the SS-4 cluster size but the image signature would have been very similar in shape. The flame signature would have identified the identical known propellants as being used.
NPO Trud Information Implications

What has not been said on the SS-4 issue is very revealing. The SS-4 uses TM-185 a hydrocarbon based fuel and AK-27I Nitric Oxide oxidizer propellants which NPO Trud has never had the experience of working with. The actual engine used in the SS-4 single stage missile is the RD-214 engine that was developed by NPO Energomash - Gas Dynamics Laboratories. In all of the various accusations suggested not once has Energomash's name come up for discussion since they were the designers and developers and producers of the engine. In fact the engine's from the SS-4's were to be returned from Lesnaya in the Former Soviet Union to Energomash for use in civil space boosters when the 149 deployed SS-4's were scrapped into sections in 1991 under the INF treaty documented requirements. The warheads were separated and sent to appropriate recycling facilities while the engines, guidance systems and other useful components were saved and warehoused in Russia. NPO Yuzhnoy the Yangel SKB Yuzhnoy Design Bureau and Dedicated Factory located in Dnipropetrovsk the Ukrain originally designed and produced the SS-4. Its production for field deployment was later taken over by NPO Yuzhnoy's dedicated factory SKB Polyut Production Association - which has not produced the SS-4 in many years. In both cases neither organization has come up in the suggested discussions on the SS-4 and SS-5 issue. SKB Polyut does still produce the C-1/ SL-8/Kosmos, SS-5 derived space booster with it's RD-216 two engine clustered first stage. There simply is no certain answer in the public realm on whether the SS-4 or the Taep'o-dong-1/NKSL-1 booster are the basis of the Shahab-4 or the Shahab-5/Kosar satellite launch vehicles with this update except for the strong circumstantial evidence. The fact that NAIC seems along with the rest of the U. S. Intelligence community to have dropped the SS-4 concept in favor of the North Korean Taep'o-dong reworked model approach certainly seems to suggest that this is what is going on.

The Washington Times, on September 22, 1999 quoted the Air Intelligence Agency, National Air Intelligence Center of Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio report entitled "Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat." Which discussed several issues related to the Iranian missile programs. Those quoted comments from the NAIC publication were as follows:

"Iran is working on the development of at least two medium-range ballistic missiles, The Shahab-3 and Shahab-4. The Iranian defense minister has also stated that a Shahab-5 missile is in development. The Shahab-5 probably will have a longer range than the Shahab-4 and may be an IRBM. (Intermediate Range Ballistic missile)."

The article went on to quote from other officials to the affect that the U. S. Intelligence community believes that, "Iran's long range missile program will be disguised as a space program." It went on further to state that a senior U. S intelligence officer had said in a briefing that, "Iran appears to be developing long-range missile "in a step-by-step approach to get to the ICBM's."

"Clearly they're progressing on a path,…more likely following this … rather than a copy cat approach,".

It went on to suggest from the officials statements that the alternative approach for Iran to follow was to do what North Korea did when it developed the Taep'o-dong-1 launch vehicle. That is it could use the No-dong Iran's Shahab-3 and Scud-B/Hwasong-5 Iran's Shahab-1 and adding a solid motor third stage plus warhead to create what would be a very limited range ICBM. They also added that the Iranians could follow the North Korean Taep'o-dong-2 design approach to what would be a LRICBM with a range limit of 3,400 miles (5,470.60 kilometers). They seemed to suggest that the Taep'o-dong-2 design approach was the better way to go. (9) On February 9, 2000, The Washington Times, disclosed the following information, "The [12] engines arrived in Iran on Nov. 21, (1999) after they were spotted being loaded aboard an Iran Air Boeing 747 cargo jet that left Suinan International Airfield about 12 miles north of-----Pyongyang (North Korea)". These are the same engines used in No-dong MRBM.

The article went on to state that China is continuing to "sell missile technology to North Korea despite promises ---", and it also stated that the Iranian's are working on the, "longer range Shahab-4 --- ."

Then the article went on to describe several design alternatives for the use of the engines by Iran that could be used to create a Taep'o-dong-1 class booster. Among those design suggested for the Shahab-4 was to duplicate the Taep'o-dong-1 class booster by reworking the Taep'o-dong-1 design. Alternatively they could utilized the No-dong engine applied to the first stage of the Shahab-3 toped by another Shahab-3 with the same engine as a second stage with a solid motor third stage and warhead added. (10) It is definitely known that Iran is receiving No-dong engines from North Korea based on two separate intelligence documented events disclosed by the Washington Times that have been publicly published. This is perhaps the strongest series of possible indication that the North Korean and Iranian ballistic missile and satellite launch vehicle programs are almost one and the same programs.

Quoting from "Mr. Robert Walpole National Intelligence officer for Strategic and nuclear programs from Congressional testimony in the Washington Times of February 10, 2000 "Those engines are critical to the Taep'o-dong Program,-----of the North Korean's Long-range missile. And They would be critical to the Shahab-3 program and any extensions of the Shahab-3 program".

--------" The CIA analysis also said North Korea has not stopped developing its Taep'o-dong long-range missile----". (11, 13)

NBC News on February 23, 2000 noted the following, " Iran's Defense minister last year publicly acknowledged the development of the Shahab-4 originally called it a more capable ballistic missile than the Shahab-3 but later categorizing it as solely a space launch vehicle with no military application. Iran's defense minister also has publicly mentioned plans for a "Shahab-5""----. (12)

On September 13, 2000 hearing U.S Senate discussion Mr. Walpole National Intelligence officer for Strategic and nuclear programs stated:

"Iran's Defense minister announced the Shahab-4, originally calling it a more capable ballistic missile than the Shahab-3, but later categorizing it as a space launch vehicle with no military applications.

Tehran also mentioned plans for the Shahab-5 strongly suggesting that it intends to develop even longer-range systems in the near future.

Iran has displayed a mock-up satellite and space launch vehicle (IRIS), suggesting it plans to develop a vehicle to orbit Iranian satellites------- Most believe that Iran could develop and test a three-stage Taep'o-dong-2 type ICBM during this same time frame, possibly with North Korean assistance. -----ICBM booster capability and that a Taep'o-dong-type system tested as a space launch vehicle would be the shortest path to that goal.

TD-1 could be developed patterned after the NK approach or use it as a test bed to TD-2 etc. TD-1 is the test bed for the TD-2 larger technology. Iran is insisting on the development of an indigenous effort, which takes longer to develop. (13) It was suggested at the time that the Taep'o-dong-2 will be deployed without flight testing by North Korea according to the NAIC. Research and development on the Taep'o-dong-2 continues unabated according to these reports.
Shahab-4 Program Moth Balled?

The Iranian flight test of the Shahab-4/Taep'o-dong-1/NKSL-X-1 derivation satellite launch vehicle should have taken place with in a years or so of February, March, or April 1999. This is when static test firings of the Shahab-4 booster engines were to have taken place. That is if Iran had chosen to go that way. It did not as is now apparent.

The no show launch appearance of Iranian's Shahab-4 booster after over two years of being expected certainly indicates some kind of program problems or portends a program redirection that has developed delaying that flight test or the project has been mothballing in favor of something better. It was seen being stacked and de-stacked several times on its launch pad near Shahroud East of Tehran, Iran in late April through early June 1999 buy U.S. intelligence imaging systems as stated before. This situation was confirmed on July 13, 2001 by the Ha'aretz, news paper in Israel, with the following statement, "It also appears that development of the Shihab 4, whose range is estimated to exceed 2,000 km, has been put on hold." (14)

"Israeli sources believe this is a temporary hiatus which may originate in political considerations and pressure from the European Union and the U. S." (14)
Shahab-4 Research and Development Status Remains Unclear.

To analyze the question concerning the status of the development of the Shahab-4 missile we have to stick with the trends seen to date while being mindful of the new Middle East report suggestions. More recently on September 7, 2001 it was suggested that the Shahab-4 development program is slowly continuing. It was suggested that the Shahab-4 program has been impacted by "a slow down in Russian aid," and it was further suggested that the program "has been taken over by China."(15) The report went on to suggest that Iran is under considerable pressure from "The European Union, to stop the Shahab-4 program," and that the published report suggesting that the program had been "temporally shelved" (14) was a "result of Iranian disinformation". (15) It was also suggested in this Middle East Newsline report that the missile technology transfers from Russia to Iran's missile program had been "significantly reduced under President Vladimir Putin" presidency. (15)

This report, suggesting the continued development of the Shahab-4, flies in the face of the trends previously noted on the historical development of the Shahab-4 program. Under the best conditions, based on what is thought to be understood on this Shahab-4 program, it can only be considered to be a pathfinder program for the much more serious Shahab-5 and Shahab-6 program as previously noted. However, Iran's defense minister has suggested, as previously noted, that the Shahab-4 will be used to launch a satellite. This however, does not preclude Iran's final development of the Shahab-4, while masquerading as a space booster, designed to be a ballistic missile.

The United States has, through the Department of State and the Bureau of Arms Control, expressed considerable concern that several of the rogue states of North Korea, Iran and Pakistan are trying to disguise their ballistic missile programs "under the guise of peaceful space-launch programs." (16) The September 14, 2001 article, in the Middle East Newsline, further suggested that "China is a significant contributor to the", Shahab-4 and Shahab-5 programs. (16) This was previously suggested on this Iranian missile web site as actually having been requested of China by Iran.
Besides Iran, what is North Korea Doing?

In fact North Korea also has abandoned its Taep'o-dong-1 booster in favor of its Taep'o-dong-2 booster program. They scrapped the launch site pad and gantry umbilical tower and built an entirely new launch pad and much taller gantry umbilical tower to handle the Taep'o-dong-2 and follow on redesigned booster systems. More recently inn late June or early July 2001 North Korea used that launch pad to static test fire the Taep'o-dong-2 integrated first stage and four thrust chambered engine or engines. The firing was done with the first stage sitting up vertically on the pad firing downward into the pad flame bucket, which ducts under the gantry umbilical tower. The burn mark from that firing was very prominent according to the imagery news reports. The North Korean launch site and its combined gantry umbilical tower and flame bucket use the same plan form as that used by China in its Long March launch vehicle launch facilities design. There should be no surprise in this realization of the Chinese influence on this North Korean program.

If as it does appear circumstantially that Iran and North Korea are cooperating both ways then perhaps the political decision was correctly portrayed by the Iranian Defense Minister when he initially said that the Shahab-4 program was a better long range ballistic missile than the Shahab-3. Then he some months later said that the Shahab-4 was to be used as a space booster only and that Shahab-3 was Iran's last long range ballistic missile for war that it would be developing. (6 , 7)

Could this reflect that the Iranian military began to have second thoughts as they assess the technological limits of the Taep'o-dong-1 design and its serious limitations for military applications as a strategic system? Clearly this was North Korea's assessment since it was only designed as a technological pathfinder launch vehicle for a better larger higher performance Taep'o-dong-2 class system which would carry out the assigned tasks with greater certainty of successful results verses the marginal performance of the Taip'o-dong-1 system. But it must also be stated here that the Taep'o-dong-2/Shahab-5/6 class system is even less viable as a strategic deployable ballistic missile but is better suited to be a space booster than the marginal performance Taep'o-dong-1 booster.

The question of concern is whether Iran will in fact flight test the Taep'o-dong-2/Shahab-5, 6 class booster for North Korea and Iran in place of North Korea? This is because North Korea can not afford to do so because of its international agreements not to flight, test its ballistic missiles. Equally this would imply that Iran did not want to waste its time and money repeating the Taep'o-dong-1 pathfinder program and instead chose to go for the real systems engineering goal instead nearly two years ago. Surely the political leadership of Iran recognized the geopolitical impact of Iran attempting to launch a satellite and perhaps succeeding would create considerable pressure on their regime thus the decision to shelve the Shahab-4 marginal system in favor of the Shahab-5 more capable system can be understood.
References

1. Gertz, Bill, "Missiles In Iran of Concern To State", The Washington Times, 11, Sept.1997, pp. 1 & p. A14.
2. Wright, Robin, "Russia Warned on helping Iran's Missile Program", The LA Times, 12, Feb. 1997 pp.1 & A6.
3. Gertz, Bill, "Gore Raises Sale to Iran with Chernomyrdin", The Washington Times, 13, Feb. 1997, p?.
4. Gertz, Bill, "House, seeks sanctions on Russia for Iran arms", The Washington Times, 18, Oct. 1997, pp. A4.
5. Gertz, Bill, "Long range on Iranian missile", The Washington Times, 29, July 1998, p.A12.
6. "Iran says missile for satellite launching", Florida Today on line, 8, February 1999, AP Tehran, Iran.
7. Hackett, James, "Growing missile threat from Iran", James Hackett, The Washington Times, 2, March 1999, pp. A13.
8. Timmerman, Kenneth, "Iran's deadly missile potential", The Washington Times, 16, July 1999, pp. A15.
9. Gertz, Bill, "Tehran increases range on missiles", The Washington Times, 22, Sept. 1999 pp?.
10. Gertz, Bill, "N. Korea sells Iran missile engines", The Washington Times, 9, Feb. 2000, pA1.
11. Gertz, Bill, ""Critical " N. Korean missile parts seen aiding Iran's Program", The Washington Times, 10, Feb. 2000, p.A3.
12. Windrem, Robert, NBC News Producer, "CIA: Iran expands missile program", MSNBC, 23, Feb. 2000,.
13. 21 Sept. 2000 hearing - U.S Senate discussion on the Iranian ballistic missile programs by Mr. Walpole National Intelligence officer for Strategic and nuclear programs.
14. Schiff, Ze'ev, Ha'artez Military Editor, "Syrian Scud Fired with chemical warhead," Ha'aretz, 13, July 2001,
15. Rodan, Steven, Iran Continues Shihab-4 Missile Project, Middle East Newsline, Sept. 7, 2001, (Middle East Newsline - Area News - Updated Daily)
16. U. S. Concerned Over Space Launch Programs, Middle East Newsline, Sept. 14, 2001.

Taep'o-dong-1 / Shahab-4

Range to Payload/Throwweight Trade-offs

Stages Payload Range
kg Pounds km Miles
Two-Stage 1,000 2,205 2,000 1,243
750 1,654 2,200 1,367
Three-Stage 500 1,103 2,475 1,538
380 838 2,672 1,660
290 640 2,896 1,800
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Iran's Ballistic Missile Program

August 2004
As the world ponders Iran's expanding nuclear prowess – and wonders whether an atomic bomb might result – there has been a tendency to overlook an important fact: Iran has also been building a fleet of long-range missiles ideally suited to carrying nuclear warheads. With the help of North Korea, Russia and China, Iran has been able to field short and medium range missiles, including one that could deliver a nuclear-sized payload to Israel and Saudi Arabia.

This brief essay traces the history of Iran's missile effort and explains where Iran managed to find foreign help.


EARLY MISSILE AMBITIONS

Iran's determination to acquire and produce ballistic missiles grew out of its war with Iraq in the 1980s. Tehran found itself ill-prepared to retaliate against Iraq's missile attacks on Iranian cities. Tehran decided that for its own protection, it had to achieve self-reliance in missile production.

Scud B and Scud C
Iran's first efforts to achieve this aim focused on the import and production of short-range Scud-type missiles. In 1985, the then-head of Iran's Parliament, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, led a high-level delegation to Libya, Syria, North Korea and China. As a result of the trip, Iran obtained Scud missiles from Libya and North Korea, and later acquired rocket components and know-how from both North Korea and China.

Iran's first batch of Scuds (known as Scud Bs) arrived from Libya in 1985. These single-stage, nuclear capable, Soviet-origin missiles use liquid fuel and can fly about 280-300 kilometers when carrying a 770-1,000 kilogram warhead. Before long, Iran had depleted its small supply. It then turned to North Korea in hope of finding a new supplier. Tehran offered to help finance Pyongyang's missile program in exchange for technology transfer and an option to buy North Korean missiles as soon as they came off the production line.

The first batch of North Korean Scud Bs was delivered in July 1987, and it was reported that the delivery took place even before the missiles were available to North Korea's own army. Over the next seven months, Iran imported 90-100 missiles, most of which were promptly used in combat. According to the U.S. Defense Department, Iran fired nearly 100 Scuds at Iraq between 1985 and 1988.

After the war ended, Tehran continued its missile efforts. By late 1990, Tehran had negotiated to buy North Korea's newest missile offering, the Scud C. U.S. intelligence began to detect shipments of North Korean Scud C missiles moving to Iran in 1991. The liquid-fuel Scud C is longer and wider than the Scud B, which suggests that the fuel tanks have been expanded to hold more propellant. It has an estimated range of more than 500 kilometers when carrying a 700 kilogram warhead. According to press reports, Iran ordered some 200 Scud Bs and Scud Cs from North Korea in 1991. Iran also succeeded in test-firing what U.S. intelligence identified as a Scud C in 1991.

In 1992, the U.S. State Department imposed trade sanctions against the Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics for engaging in "missile technology proliferation activities" with North Korea. Under U.S. law, Washington can penalize a foreign company or person who engages in the transfer of Scud-size missiles or of equipment or technology that "contributes to the design, development or production of missiles" to a country such as Iran.

In early 1993, an additional North Korean shipment of Scud Cs, along with several launching pads, was reported by the Israeli media. According to U.S. intelligence, Pyongyang also supplied Scud production technology. "Iran's relationship with North Korea follows the usual pattern," said a U.S. State Department official at the time, "you first buy entire missiles and the kits to assemble missiles, and then you learn to make them on your own – designs and blueprints come with the package." According to the official, North Korean specialists worked on the ground in Iran to help Iranian scientists master the basic steps of Scud production. In 1993, Iranian Minister of Defense Akbar Torkan announced that "our technological capability is such that if we require similar missiles [to the Scud-B] then we can manufacture them ourselves."

According to The Middle East Military Balance, an annual survey of military might published by Israel's Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, Iran was already thought to have acquired or built some 300 Scud B missiles and 100 Scud Cs by 1994. The CIA, in a report on missile proliferation in 2003, estimated that Iran possessed "a few hundred" short-range ballistic missiles at that time.


INCREASING THE RANGE

Shahab 3
In July 1998, Iran took a giant step forward by flight-testing a version of North Korea's medium-range NoDong missile, components of which Iran had imported. This liquid-fueled, road mobile, nuclear capable ballistic missile became known as the Shahab 3 in Iran. According to Iran's Aerospace Industries Organization, the Shahab 3 is designed to carry a 1,200 kg payload 1,300 km; however, another report estimates the missile's payload at around 750 kg. Prototypes of the missile have been on public display.

Iran has subjected the missile to at least six test flights. During the first test in July 1998, the missile exploded in mid-air during the latter portion of its flight, leading U.S. officials to question whether the test was a failure or the explosion was intentional. A second test took place in July 2000, which Iran's state media called a success. In September 2000, Iran conducted a third test of the Shahab 3, but the missile reportedly exploded shortly after launch. In May 2002, Iran conducted another test, which it claimed was successful and which Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ) also called successful. Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani said that the test enhanced the Shahab 3's "power and accuracy." Another test reportedly occurred only two months later, in July 2002, and was unsuccessful. Despite the mixed results of these test flights, Iran's foreign ministry claimed on July 7, 2003 that Iran had completed a "final test" of the Shahab 3 "a few weeks ago." According to the New York Times, the ministry described the test flight as "the final test before delivering the missile to the armed forces."

The Shahab 3, like the North Korean NoDong missile from which it is derived, is a scaled-up version of the Scud B and Scud C missiles, and shares the Scud's weaknesses. The Scud B is only accurate to within about a kilometer of its target at a range of 300 km. Because accuracy diminishes with range for a given guidance system, the accuracy of the Shahab 3 at its range of 1,300 km has been estimated at no better than three kilometers of its target, making it of little use as a battlefield weapon. With such low accuracy, it could not be counted on to hit troops or even an airfield. Instead, it seems intended for use against cities. The CIA estimates that Iran "probably has a small number of Shahab 3's available for use,"