Thread: Henry Kissinger on the 1979 Sino-Vietnam War.

Ah, you beat me to it xinhui. Wanted to start a thread in the book section about 'On China'. How to go about it is the challenge though.

So i looked for reviews in various newspapers. Lots of arguments pro & con. Some even against Kissinger himself because he was such a polarising figure and the left absolutely hates him. One needs to be aware of this bias and discount it to get at the essence of what he is saying.

What do you suggest ?

Maybe looking at small sections in narrow areas might be a better idea as you've done here. Better to have seperate threads on various parts of the book rather than one BIG thread on it ?

The main question to answer for me is how important is this book to non-americans or chinese in gaining an understanding of China. That would be the present day China rather than of the 70s where Kissinger made his mark.

Henry has his bias that is for sure -- love to see how he kept referring how the Uber statesmen save the day, I can see that he is not talk about Deng or Zhou, but himself rather.

Some of the stuff in the first chapters are echoed by many historians, seriously students of history will gain little. That said, it is a ready enjoyable and easy read. he writes well. One thing for sure, he has a better understanding of Chinese strategic culture than most.

So, do you want to keep this thread strictly about 1979-soviet vietnam war or is it ok to introduce here other ideas from his book ?

Intend to get the book when its out in paperback.

Originally Posted by xinhui

That situation did, in fact, occur over a decade later when the collapse of the Soviet Union and of Soviet financial support brought above a retrenchment in Vietnamese deployment in Cambodia. Ultimately over a time period more difficult to sustain for democratic societies, China achieved a considerable part of its strategic objectives in SE Asia. Deng achieved sufficient maneuvering room to meet his objective of thwarting Soviet domination of SE Asia and the Malacca Strait.

..
In retrospect, Moscow's relatives passivity in the third Vietnam war can be seen as the first symptom of the decline of the Soviet Union.

Page 375

The third Vietnam war may thus be counted as another example in which Chinese statesmen successed in achieving long-term, big-picture strategic objectives without the benefit of a military establishment comparable to that of their adversaries. Though providing breathing space for the remnants of the Khmer Rouge can hardly be counted as a moral victory, China achieved its larger geopolitical aims vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and Vietnam-- both of whole militaries were better trained and equipped than China.

Page 376

Singapore's Prime Minister lee Kuan Yew has summed up the ultimate result of the war: "The Western press wrote off the Chinese punitive action as a failure. I believe it changed the history of East Asia.

A lot of revisionism here. I remember that there were general low level panic on just how far behind the PLA was and by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, just how far ahead the Soviet Army was. The natural barriers the PLA was counting on were no match for Soviet engineers.

For 15 years, China let both USSR and Vietnam to have their way. It was only in 1984 that the PLA achieved some sort of military superiority over their Vietnamese foe but not enough to deny them their say in SE Asia.

Come 1990s, China was in no shape to dictate anything, having just suffer Tianamen and the resulting economic collapse. While both China and Afghanistan took their toll on the Soviet budget, there can be no denying that it was Reagan who posted the challenge that collapse them, not China.

But Col, that won't fit into Henry's narrative, wouldn't it? Again, he is looking at this from the POV of a Uber statesman. That said, he idea that the Chinese strategic culture is not "event based" but rather long-term planned is on the mark.

Sirs,I'm a bit in the dark here.I heard this idea from the Colonel about the fright the Soviet Army caused the PLA after '79 a few times.But was it justified considering the different context?
The Soviets had~50 divisions in the Far East.The Chinese had terrain ,the PLA and the People's War doctrine.The 40th Army had only terrain to conquer during initial stages.It was no mean feat,but still,nobody shot at them.

The initial PLA defence lines were 100 miles into China. In other words, they were relying on that 100 miles to stretch and to delay the Soviet Army. Afghanistan showed that 100 miles might as well be 100 feet.

Also compared to their own advances in Vietnam, the Soviets not only managed to hide their axis of advance but did not suffer the delays the Chinese encountered.

The Chinese relied heavily on saturation fire which was not the case with the Soviets who had no qualms about human recce forces and thus enjoyed a superiority of accurate fire the Chinese had no clue on how to achieve.

The Soviets planned their operations so well that they never allowed the enemy to set up even a hasty defence. This in contrast that the Chinese were meeting ambushes left, right, and centred.

Soviet tanks drove right through the heart of Afghanistan. Chinese tanks were stung to death by RPG traps.