Thread: Vietnam: Looking Back - At The Facts

R7,

Permit me a stab at this, astralis. There were a lot of reasons. I think the main one is that "Vietnamization" was not the step-by-step, gradual transition of force that it should have been. It would have taken way too long to do it right. And even then, there were so many variables, some that I've touched on above, the situation was so complex and so gone-to-hell by that time that "Vietnamization" was not much better than an ad slogan.

thanks for the info. i know you already were out of country by the time the NVA pulled their Easter Offensive, but what did you think of the ARVN response? moreover, how was the ARVN during Lam Son 719?

it seems that the ARVN was able to stop the NVA in '72 with US air support but once that was gone they had nothing. i've heard conflicting evidence of the ARVN will to fight-- there were some ARVN units that went down very hard in '75 and some ARVN units that simply disappeared.

Originally Posted by Red Seven

Permit me a stab at this, astralis. There were a lot of reasons. I think the main one is that "Vietnamization" was not the step-by-step, gradual transition of force that it should have been. It would have taken way too long to do it right. And even then, there were so many variables, some that I've touched on above, the situation was so complex and so gone-to-hell by that time that "Vietnamization" was not much better than an ad slogan.

I'm not sure about the Army, but most US Marine ground combat units in I Corps were gone by June 1971. The "transition" that took place was not a transition, it was a pack-up, roll-up and get-out-of-town. When your unit's turn came, there was, for OPSEC reasons, very little warning. You burned what you didn't need, you left what you couldn't carry and you got on the helo. Xin chao, xin loi.

Red,

I'm hoping to find time for longer replies to all of the posts here, but just a quick point on 'Vietnamization'. it actually began in 1955 one way or another. The scale of its failure the first time around was the need afer 1960 to keep increasing the US presence in Vietnam until full scale interevention was unavoidable. Flash forward 5 years & it was tried again, starting from a bigger base (the ARVN was quite large by then) and more successful, but not successful enough. I'm afraid the ARVN always struggled without the US as battlefield backup.

LCol, in late October, 1950, the Chinese People’s Volunteers were a very sadly equipped force. They had inadequate winter gear and a very wide variety of Chinese, Japanese, US and other weapons. POW reports say little more than a quarter of the soldiers in some regiments had rifles, and there were almost no heavy mortars or larger guns crossing the border that year.

Units present in Korea before the end of 1950 were identified in other places in China just a few months earlier. For example, in May 1950, the 40th Army under General Han Xianchu was at its post-Civil War base in Henan. On October 25th, they were in Korea.

These guys didn’t do modern logistics; they lived off the land, or died.

Originally Posted by DOR

These guys didn’t do modern logistics; they lived off the land, or died.

David, that is the point. No way in hell could they have lived off the land and drive the 8th Army that fast. You forage or you march and if you forage for others, you have to catch up. The 8th Army moved faster than Chinese trucks could keep up and thus, 4 guns divisions were left behind. Two infantry divisions smashed into Kapyong. A human body is still a human body, needing 2 litres of water a day and 1000 calories just to live, nevermind fighting a battle after a 20 hour march. Yes, you could convince me that this was the case at the Sino-Korean border or even at Choisin but at Kapyong, the Chinese should have been bingo food, water, and ammunition. They were not.

LCol, if we’re talking about the same thing, the Battle of Kapyong (Jiaping, in Chinese) was late April 1951. Plenty of time for resupply.

I’m going to back up a couple of paces. I’m no expert on this battle, and I haven’t read anything about it, beyond Wikipedia and passing references in half a dozen books. I'm out of my depth.

But, after the CPVs over-ran UN forces straight down the peninsula, and then retreated back up; and after six months in which to get their supplies oriented, it doesn’t strike me that the simple answer to how they were able to fight effectively in April 1951 is that they got their supply lines set up before June 1950.

So, back to my original point: Mao & Co were aware of a war on their border only very few days or weeks before it started.

More,

This analysis [http://www.alternativeinsight.com/Korean_War.html] based on Soviet sources says Stalin warned Kim Ilsung off of an attack in Q-1 1949, and six months later was still telling him to keep it civil.

In January 1950, Dean Acheson did not mention Korea in his National Press Club speech outlining US strategic interests in East Asia (oops). That same month, Kim Ilsung complained to Soviet Ambassador Terentii Shtykov about the USSR’s lack of support for an invasion, but it isn’t clear to me whether Kim knew of Acheson’s speech at that time.

Mao visited Moscow December 1949 to January 1950, but relations between Stalin and Mao were not very good. Stalin hadn't backed the CCP against the KMT during the Anti-Japanese War. Stalin didn’t treat Mao as an equal, keeping him waiting and generally pissing off the Chairman in ways he never forgot.

The analysis I cited above says “according to all available data the Soviet dictator never mentioned to the Chinese guest his decision to launch an attack on the South…” This fits very well with the well-known competition between Mao and Stalin for leadership of the international communist movement, particularly in Asia.

My best guess is that Stalin began to come around to the idea of a small adjustment to the Korean situation (invasion and conquest) in January 1950, but thought the timing was not yet right. Kim got Stalin’s go-ahead during a trip to Moscow in April 1950, and Mao was aware of plans, but not preparations, only in mid-May 1950. That’s not much time, and given the assumption that the North Koreans would walk all over the South – and that the US would stay out – there wouldn’t have been too much emphasis on stockpiling materiel in Liaoning and Jilin.

Then, there's this

Korea: Reluctant Dragons and Red Conspiracies

However, a couple of things.

1) Warning orders are not the same as execution. Getting ready to intervene does not mean intervention itself. Those Chinese divisions were given warning orders to get ready. They have to. Again, food, water, and ammunition must be sourced before you go into battle. Foraging in the middle of a battle, especially against a superior armed foe, is not an option.

2) 6 months is not a hell of a lot of time, especially when you don't know where your army would be in 48 hours, This is not Stalingrad where the enemy is static and you can build up your supplies for the offensive, this is a retreating force with ample firepower and complete air superiority that could and did cut the LOCs almost daily.

What both means is that the Chinese had all their contingencies planned out, at least to the point where they can adjust tactically. That cannot be done in the traditional timing that has been suggested.

Originally Posted by astralis

R7,



thanks for the info. i know you already were out of country by the time the NVA pulled their Easter Offensive, but what did you think of the ARVN response? moreover, how was the ARVN during Lam Son 719?

it seems that the ARVN was able to stop the NVA in '72 with US air support but once that was gone they had nothing. i've heard conflicting evidence of the ARVN will to fight-- there were some ARVN units that went down very hard in '75 and some ARVN units that simply disappeared.

ARVN in general was inconsistant. Individual units at all levels--division, regiment, battalion, company and platoon--seemed to mirror the competency or incompetency of their officers. I know this is true in many armies, but in ARVN it was so pronounced as to be remarkable.

I had the fortune and misfortune to be integrated (our word back then for "embedded") with both a "good" ARVN unit and later a "bad" ARVN unit. The good one I'd rate pretty dependable to outstanding...the bad one was undependable, corrupt, treacherous and cowardly. Night and day, in other words, and I've heard other advisors, covans, combined action and SF folk often describe their counterparts in these black and white extremes.

The main reasons for the inconsistency, I believe, was the corruption and political favoritism rife throughout the officer corps.

There were some very good ARVN units engaged in Lam Son 719; airborne, armor, Rangers, Marines. There were also some serious command and control issues at higher levels. Tactical airstrikes on NVA triple A sites in Laos were unable to sortie due to bad weather. The NVA managed to react with great effectiveness, especially in filling the air with steel causing us to lose a few hundred helicopters. A few hundred. (I can't imagine the public's reaction today if our forces were to lose as many aircraft in a single operation.)

ARVN was simply outfought in Laos. In the end it was US and SVN air support that saved their bacon, but everybody who went into that hornet's nest got stung bad...some units were so decimated the survivors just walked and limped all the way back to their villages in Quang Tri and Quang Nam...and the many weaknesses in the doctrine of helocentric/airmobile assault--such a staple of American war-making then--were brutally exposed.

Some images



ARVN Rangers during retreat




During the Easter '72 offensive, the PAVN was actually invading Southern territory, (with PAVN tanks coming down through the Hai Van) which I suspect injected some steel into the backbone of the ARVN resistance.

thanks for the words and the pix, Red...much appreciated.

i guess the good units were outnumbered by the bad units(?). and by the end the logistics system was all FUBAR'd.

Originally Posted by astralis

thanks for the words and the pix, Red...much appreciated.

i guess the good units were outnumbered by the bad units(?). and by the end the logistics system was all FUBAR'd.

Good units probably outnumbered bad. But ARVN had had many years to become dependent upon US support, and it's not all their fault. During Lam Son, I think the higher-ups expected to find the PAVN all standing around in the open at Tchepone asking to get shot. Charlie in fact wasn't there...he was everywhere but there. Here are some maps:




And a flight map showing LZs and objectives inside Laos, etc