Thiseas

that's what turks are reporting to one another
lets see what a nutrual eye has witnesed

Thiseas

George Horton: An American Witness in Smyrna
Date: Monday, October 16 @ 12:00:57 EDT
Topic: Greece

By James L. Marketos
Exactly eighty-four years ago yesterday (September 13, 1922), a massive fire broke out in the Armenian quarter of Smyrna (modern-day Izmir). Ever since, controversy has raged over who started the fire, whether it was an intentional act of genocide, and how many people were killed. Estimates range from one or two thousand to over 100,000. There is no dispute, however, that this was the 20th century’s first holocaust.

In 1922, Smyrna was a large and important commercial port on the Asia Minor coast. Its population was about 400,000. Roughly 43% were Turkish Muslims, 45% were Greek and Armenian Christians, 6% were Jews, and 5% were foreigners. The Greek and Armenian Christians had deep roots in Smyrna going back countless generations. Many owned successful and long-established businesses. Others were professionals, artisans, or educators. They had a thriving cultural life.

The fire raged for four days. A strong breeze drove the flames away from the Turkish quarter and toward the waterfront, and with it the city’s horrified Greeks and Armenians. The fire eventually consumed all of the city except the Turkish quarter.

By late afternoon of the 13th, the fire had pinned thousands of victims on the harborside quay, where they had fled hoping to finds means of escape. On the narrow quay they found themselves trapped between the raging fire at their backs and the deep harbor in front. There they were subjected to unspeakable atrocities while the uncontrollable fire burned itself out. And over the following weeks and months, more perished from starvation and exposure while waiting to be evacuated.

Tragically, the entire scene was witnessed by representatives of the Allied Powers. They had pledged themselves to neutrality at the Paris Peace Conference following World War I, and so they watched from warships anchored about 250 yards offshore. All vessels that had been tied up along the quay (including the U.S. destroyer Litchfield) had to move off due to the intense heat of the fire. The foreign crews evacuated their respective nationals from any danger in Smyrna and plucked from the sea as many victims as could swim out to the ships. At night, the foreign vessels drowned out the terrible screams coming from the quay with band music and tried to keep rapes and murders to a minimum with occasional sweeps of their powerful searchlights.

Some Turkish apologists contend that resentful, demoralized retreating Greek army troops started the fire. Others contend that Armenians, some disguised as Turkish soldiers, started the fire. They also question why Turks would want to burn such a rich city.

By contrast, the Greek and Armenian version of events is that regular Turkish army soldiers started the fire by spreading and igniting petroleum in houses and other locations, and that the numbers that perished are at the higher end of the estimates. This version also contends that Turkish nationalist troops rampaged through the city before and during the fire, assaulting, looting, and killing Christians. The Greek and Armenian case is persuasively supported by the testimony of an American eyewitness:

George Horton.
Biographical Information
Horton was a literary man. He was a scholar of both Greek and Latin. He translated Sappho. He wrote a guide for the interpretation of Scripture. He wrote several novels and was a renowned journalist in Chicago, a member of what was called the “Chicago Renaissance.”

He was also a professional diplomat who loved Greece. He became U.S. Consul in Athens in 1893, where he actively promoted the revival of the Olympic Games and inspired the U.S. team’s participation. He wrote a lyrical visitor’s guide to Athens and composed a reflective description of a few months’ stay in Argolis. And he married Catherine Sacopoulo, a Greek American woman.

He served twice as U.S. Consul in Athens (1893-1898; 1905-1906). He also served in Thessaloniki (1910-1911) and then in Smyrna up to the U.S.’s break-off of diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire (1911-1917) in World War I. He served again as consul in Smyrna after the war (1919-1922) and remained in Smyrna until after the fire began on September 13, 1922, spending the last hours before his evacuation signing passes for those entitled to American protection and transportation to Piraeus.

Today, George Horton is best remembered for his book about the events leading up to and during the fire. The book was published in 1926, and its title, The Blight of Asia, unabashedly refers to the abominable behavior of the Turks. By the time of publication Horton had resigned his diplomatic commission, and he wrote strictly in the capacity of a private citizen, drawing on his own observations and those of the people he quotes. In these remarks, I draw mostly on Horton’s book, but also informative is the long cable he wrote to the State Department from the Athens consulate two weeks after the fire.

Horton wanted his book to make four main points.

First, he wanted to illustrate that the catastrophic events in Smyrna were merely “the closing act in a consistent program of exterminating Christianity throughout the length and breadth of the old Byzantine Empire.”

Second, he wanted to establish that the Smyrna fire was started by regular Turkish army troops with, as he put it “fixed purpose, with system, and with painstaking minute details.”

Third, he wanted to emphasize that the Allied Powers shamefully elevated their selfish political and economic interests over the plight of the beleaguered Christian populations of Asia Minor, thereby allowing the Smyrna catastrophe to unfold without any effective resistance and, as he said, “without even a word of protest by any civilized government.” And fourth, he wanted to illustrate that pious western Christians were deluded in thinking they were making missionary headway in the Muslim world. I will address only the first two points.

Historical Background
To understand these two points, we first need to review briefly the key events in Asia Minor in the period leading up to 1922. In World War I, the Ottoman Empire sided with Germany. Horton, you will recall, was at his consular post in Smyrna during the war until 1917. After the war, the victorious Allies gathered at Versailles to formulate peace terms. Among the Peace Commission’s thorniest tasks was partitioning the defeated Ottoman Empire.

Greece entered the war late, but sided with the eventually victorious Allies. At the Peace Conference, Greece’s prime minister, Eleutherios Venizelos, lobbied hard for the annexation to Greece of Eastern Thrace, Constantinople, and a large territory along the Asia Minor coast. In all of these areas there were large populations of indigenous Greek Christians engaged mostly in commerce and agriculture.

In May 1919, the Supreme Council of the Paris Peace Commission endorsed the Greek army’s landing at Smyrna and the establishment of a Greek administrative zone. From Smyrna, the Greek army pushed eastward into Anatolia, the Turkish heartland, successfully expanding the Greek zone; and Greece’s claims not only to this zone but also to Eastern Thrace were ratified by the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres, which the Great Powers imposed on the humbled Ottoman Empire.

There remained, however, the problem of a rising Turkish nationalist movement in Anatolia led by a charismatic former Ottoman army officer, Mustafa Kemal, whose military strength the Great Powers and Greece dangerously underestimated. The result was the rout of Greece’s over-stretched, war-weary army by Kemal near Afyonkarahisar on August 30, after which Kemal’s nationalist troops began a relentless advance toward Smyrna. Before them they drove the remnants of the Greek army and hordes of frightened Christian farmers and villagers.

According to Horton, news of the Kemalist advances began reaching Smyrna soon after the Greek defeat and produced immediate panic among the Christian population. Their panic was completely understandable, he said, as he had predicted in a consular dispatch that if the Greek Army retreated in Asia Minor it would be followed by the entire Christian population. His prediction was based on his nearly thirty years of consular service and, as he put it, on “some things which all men who have had long residence in this country absolutely know.”

First, the city filled with refugees from the interior, mostly small farmers, who were lodged in the churches, schools, and other public institutions. Many got away in the first days on steamers and sailboats. “Then,” says Horton, the defeated, dusty, ragged Greeks soldiers began to arrive, looking straight ahead, like men walking in their sleep. . . .

In a never-ending stream they poured through the town toward the point on the coast to which the Greek fleet had withdrawn. Silently as ghosts they went, looking neither to the right nor the left. From time to time some soldier, his strength entirely spent, collapsed on the sidewalk or by a door.

Then they learned that the Turkish army was moving on the city. The Turkish cavalry units arrived on the morning of September 9, filing along the quay toward their barracks at the Konak (the Turkish administrative headquarters building) at the other end of the city. In the evening of the same day, the looting and killing began in the Armenian quarter. The following morning, Americans began to report seeing corpses lying in the streets in the interior of the city. Horton himself saw Turkish civilians armed with shotguns watching the windows of Christian houses ready to shoot at any head that might appear.

The shooting continued in the Christian quarters the night of September 10. Throngs of frightened people were begging to be let into various American institutions. After the Armenian quarter had been thoroughly sacked for nearly four days, the fire erupted in the Armenian quarter.

**** A lecture by James L. Marketos at the AHI Noon Forum, on September 14, 2006

To be continued

Thiseas

Horton was a literary man. He was a scholar of both Greek and Latin. He translated Sappho. He wrote a guide for the interpretation of Scripture. He wrote several novels and was a renowned journalist in Chicago, a member of what was called the “Chicago Renaissance.”
[edit] Journalist

Horton started his career as a literary journalist, first as the literary editor of Chicago Times-Herald (1899-1901) and then as the editor of the literary supplement of Chicago American newspaper (1901-1903).
[edit] Diplomat

Horton was also a professional diplomat who loved Greece. He became U.S. Consul in Athens in 1893, where he actively promoted the revival of the Olympic Games and inspired the U.S. team's participation. He wrote a lyrical visitor's guide to Athens and composed a reflective description of his stay in Argolis.

Horton served twice as the U.S. Consul in Athens 1893-1898 and between 1905-1906. Horton was the US Consul in Salonika between 1910-1911.

He then served as U.S. Consul in Smyrna up to the U.S. break-off of diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire (1911-1917) in World War I. He served again as consul in Smyrna after the war (1919-1922) and remained in Smyrna until after the |fire began on September 13, 1922, spending the last hours before his evacuation signing passes for those entitled - and others who were not - to American protection and transportation to Piraeus.
[edit] The Blight of Asia

Today, Horton is most remembered for his 1926 account "The Blight of Asia" relating, among a variety of topics, the Great Fire of Smyrna that ravaged the city of Smyrna, Asia Minor, starting on 13 September 1922, two days after the consul's departure from his post there on 11 September, and that lasted for 4 days. [1]

Horton wanted his book to make four main points.

First, he wanted to illustrate that the catastrophic events in Smyrna were merely “the closing act in a consistent program of exterminating Christianity throughout the length and breadth of the old Byzantine Empire.”

Second, he wanted to establish that the Smyrna fire was started by regular Turkish army troops with, as he put it, “fixed purpose, with system, and with painstaking minute details.”

Third, he wanted to emphasize that the Allied Powers shamefully elevated their selfish political and economic interests over the plight of the beleaguered Christian populations of Asia Minor, thereby allowing the Smyrna catastrophe to unfold without any effective resistance and, as he said, “without even a word of protest by any civilized government.”

And fourth, he wanted to illustrate that pious western Christians were deluded in thinking they were making missionary headway in the Muslim world.

By the time of publication Horton had resigned his diplomatic commission, and he wrote strictly in the capacity of a private citizen, drawing on his own observations and those of the people he quotes. His account remains as controversial as the fire itself. [2]
[edit] Sources

* The Political Graveyard: Index to Politicians: Horton

[edit] External links

* Online download of "The Blight of Asia"
* "The Blight of Asia" online.
* A second site with "The Blight of Asia" online

Thiseas

STATISTICS OF DEMOCIDE
Chapter 5
Statistics Of
Turkey's Democide
Estimates, Calculations, And Sources*

By R.J. Rummel




The infamy of executing this century's first full scale ethnic cleansing belongs to Turkey's Young Turk government during World War I. In their highest councils Turkish leaders decided to exterminate every Armenian in the country, whether a front-line soldier or pregnant woman, famous professor or high bishop, important businessman or ardent patriot. All 2,000,000 of them.

Democide had preceded the Young Turk's rule and with their collapse at the end of World War I, the successor Nationalist government carried out its own democide against the Greeks and remaining or returning Armenians. From 1900 to 1923, various Turkish regimes killed from 3,500,000 to over 4,300,000 Armenians, Greeks, Nestorians, and other Christians.

This wholly genocidal killing is difficult to unravel. During this period Turkey fought five wars, forcefully changed governments several times, endured major revolutionary changes, and was occupied by foreign powers. Suffering deportations, famine, exposure, war, genocide, and massacres, millions of Turkish Moslems, Armenians, Greeks, and other Christians died.

Moreover, current Turkish governments utterly reject any claim that Turkey committed genocide, and scholars specializing in the study of Turkey must avoid the topic or follow the Turkish official line if they hope to do research in the country. This line is that the government had to deport the Armenians from the eastern war zone because of, or for fear of, their rebellion. Many died in the process regardless of Turkish attempts to protect and care for them; others died in communal strife or in a civil war between Armenians and Moslems.1 On the other side, Armenian scholars may have exaggerated the size of the Armenian population in Turkey, the number killed, and Turkish brutality and genocidal intentions.

Then there are the third-party reports, commentaries, and studies, published during World War I. Since Turkey fought on the side of Germany, it was in the interest of the French and British, who during the war years widely disseminated anti-German propaganda, to put the worst face on events in Turkey. Moreover, Armenians themselves may have falsified high level Turkish documents and reports on the killing in order to win sympathy and support for restoration, reparations, or the independence of Armenia.

Nevertheless, I do not doubt that this genocide occurred. Extant communications from a variety of ambassadors and other officials, including those of Italy, the then neutral United States, and Turkey's closest ally Germany, verify and detail a genocide in process. Moreover, contemporary newsmen and correspondents documented aspects of the genocide. Then, two trials were held. One by the post-war government that replaced the Young Turks, which gathered available documentation and other evidence on the genocide and found the leaders guilty.2 The second trial was of the Armenian who assassinated the former Young Turk leader Talaat in Munich in 1920.3 Although the Germans were still friendly toward the Young Turks they had supported during the war, the evidence on the genocide presented at the trial convinced the court that the assassination was justified. Finally, Turkish government telegrams and minutes of meetings held by government leaders establish as well their intent to destroy all the Armenians in Turkey. In my related Death By Government4 I have quoted selections from this vast collection of documents and need not repeat them here.5 The sheer weight of all this material in English alone, in some ways as diverse and authoritative as that on the Holocaust, is such that the invalidity or falsification of some of it can hardly effect the overall conclusion that a genocide took place.

The problem, then, is somehow to cut through the exaggerations and propaganda to make some reasonable estimates of the number of Armenians and others killed. Tables 5.1A and 5.1B organizes this attempt, along with the relevant estimates from the literature, their sources, and my calculations and checks. Note that throughout the tables I use the specific term genocide where appropriate, rather than the more general democide. Here, the people were murdered simply because they were Christians, Armenians, Greeks, or Moslems.

I divide the tables into four major periods. The first covers the last years of Sultan Abdul Hamid's rule, 1900 to April 1909 (lines 1 to 4 of Table 5.1A). Then there is the Young Turk rule before World War I (lines 5 to 72--the six-month period when the Young Turks were out of power is irrelevant here and ignored) and that during the war (lines 74 to 274). The final major division comprehends the post-WWI interregnum (lines 276 to 436) until the internationally accepted establishment of a sovereign and independent Turkey (Treaty of Lausanne). In the following two sections I summarize the results for genocide (lines 438 to 488 of Table 5.1B) and total dead 1900 to 1923 (lines 490 to 504), and then present estimates for refugees (lines 508 to 539) and populations (lines 540 to 632). Finally, I calculate the overall genocide rate (lines 634 to 641).

Possibly two massacres took place during the first period, but there is no evidence in the sources that these were democidal (lines 2 to 3 of Table 5.1A).

Turning to the first years of the Young Turk period, first I list the three wars that Turkey fought (lines 7 to 26--one was started while the Young Turks were out of government). Although the sources record the military dead for these wars, they usually ignore the civilian war-dead. I assumed a total low of 20,000 civilian war-dead (line 30) for the three wars, but the sources are not adequate to estimate a mid-value or high. This low added to military war-dead (line 31) gives at least 84,000 overall dead in these wars.

As to the 1909 massacres of Armenians in the Cilicia region, particularly Adana, there are a variety of estimates shown in the table (lines 35 to 61). Most notable is that these massacres occurred when the Young Turks had just overthrown the government and even pro-Armenian sources differ as to their complicity in the massacres. I therefore treat these as nondemocidal, and consolidate them into a likely 30,000 killed (line 64).

Hints in the sources suggest that some genocide did occur elsewhere and subsequently. Turk authorities apparently did kill Armenians and Greeks in pogroms and expulsions from their villages, at least in 1913 (lines 67 to 68). Lacking more information, I can only give a conservative low estimate of 5,000 killed in genocide for the whole period.

The table recapitulates the various totals for this period (lines 71 to 71b) and sums them (line 72). Overall, some 109,000 to 152,000 people died, the vast majority in wars.

Considering next the World War I period, and the resulting war-dead (lines 76 to 90), a problem is separating from the estimates those for civilian war-dead, versus those including massacres and genocide. I could include confidently only one estimate for war-dead (line 86). When this is added to the probable 400,000 consolidated battle-dead (line 83), we find that some 650,000 Turkish soldiers and civilians died from the war (line 90).

Of greatest importance are the estimates of the Young Turk's genocide during the war. In the table I organize these into several categories. The first gives and consolidates those of the number deported (lines 93 to 102), and then also does this for the estimates of their toll (lines 104 to 121). I calculate an alternative total (on line 122) from the estimated percentages of those killed during deportation (notes on lines 105, 116, and 118) and the consolidated number deported (line 102). From these two alternative ranges (lines 121 and 122) I determine a total (line 123) in the usual way.

Next I list the estimates of Armenians that the Turks killed (lines 125 to 146). These I classified by soldier or civilian and by place killed and then consolidate or sum them (lines 131, 138, and 147), and total them overall (line 148).

Finally, the table presents the many estimates of the overall genocide's toll during 1915 to 1918 (lines 151 to 186). These I order from the lowest to the highest figures. As can be seen, they vary from a low of 300,000 (lines 151 to 152) to a high of 2,000,000 (line 163), which anchor the consolidated range (line 187). Consistent with the estimates 1,000,000 dead (see lines 157, 160, 164 to 178) appears the most prudent mid-value.

Next I independently check this consolidation against the sum (line 188) of those Armenians murdered during the deportations (line 123) and otherwise (line 148). As can be seen, the alternative totals (lines 187 and 188) are divergent, the mid-value alone being off by 808,000 dead. To compensate for this, I give the final genocide range (line 189) the lowest low and highest high of the two and average their mid-values. Thus, given all these estimates, the Turks murdered most likely 300,000 to 2,686,000 Armenians, probably 1,404,000 of them. A critical question is then whether this is consistent with the Armenian population, itself a contentious estimate. This I will later consider.

Not only did the Turks murder Armenians, but Greeks as well. Estimates of this are far fewer (lines 201 to 203), but we do have assessments of those deported (lines 193 to 197) from which to calculate the possible toll (line 198). The actual percentages from which I make this calculation reflect the relevant historical bits and pieces in the sources.6 Combining this calculation and the sum of the estimates (line 204) suggest a likely genocide of 84,000 Greeks.

Sometimes the sources would refer to Christians killed (lines 207 to 207b), which most likely included Armenians or Greeks, but could also refer to the relatively small number of Turkey's Nestorians, Bulgarians, or Cossacks. These are totaled separately (line 208).

During the war the British navy blockaded Turkey, including the Turkish Levant. No food was allowed in by sea. The resulting famine in Lebanon and Syria (with consequences shown on lines 208a to 208d) would not have become as deadly as it did had not the Turks commandeered available food supplies and refused to help the starving. As a result they bear the greater responsibility for the famine, which I calculate as probably around 75 percent of the total dead (line 208i).

The Young Turks did not confine their democide to Turkey. When they invaded Caucasia, their soldiers massacred Armenians and other Christians and also encouraged Kurds and Azerbaijanis to do so. Overall, Turks possibly killed (lines 212 to 220) 10,000 Christians, most of them probably Armenians--there were very few Greeks in Caucasia. (It is difficult to keep this number in perspective when other figures are in the tens and hundreds of thousands; but imagine the contemporary enraged and horrified outcry were the highest American, British, or French authorities to be responsible for the murder of 10,000 Moslem citizens--the responsible government would fall or be impeached.) For this genocide the table also lists some specific estimates (lines 224 to 227). These I consolidated (line 228) and then add (line 229) an assumed 4/5ths of the Christian dead determined above. The table then sums the two ranges (lines 228 and 229) to get the genocide (line 232).

As noted, the Turks also massacred Nestorian Christians, for which there are also a few estimates (lines 235 to 238). From my assumption that 1/5th of the Christian dead previously determined (line 218) were Nestorians, I calculate a final genocide (line 241).

Only one estimate of Moslem Azerbaijanis killed is available (line 244).

I now can calculate the overall foreign genocide (line 249), which probably ranges from 105,000 to 157,000 killed, most likely 131,000.

Turkey's Armenians also massacred Moslems. Claims that this may have amounted to at least 1,000,000, or even 1,500,000 Moslem dead (table 5.1A, lines 106b and 106e) however, have no substantiation beyond former Young Turks or their officials. Had the Armenians indeed massacred even half this number, the Young Turks surely would have given it wide publicity, photographs and all. They had no better way to counter sympathy for the Armenians they were killing. In any case foreign newsmen and diplomats in the country surely would have noted the massacres. Moreover, the Turkish statistician Ahmed Emin, who was hardly sympathetic to the Armenians, gave (table 5.1A, lines 105 and 106f) an upper limit of 40,000 Moslem Turks killed by Armenians (including possibly by Armenian-Russian troops) in the area occupied by Russian forces after the Russian Revolution in 1917, and at least 128,000 for the 1914-1915 period.7 Given the other estimates and the overall populations involved, I estimate that from 128,000 to 600,000 Moslem Turks and Kurds were killed. Since this was done by Armenian irregulars serving with Russian forces, I split responsibility for these deaths in Turkey between the Russians and Armenians, and show in Table 5.1A (line 255) the Armenian half--probably 75,000 murdered.

Many Moslem Turks also died from famine and disease during the war (lines 258 to 262). Most estimates mix up the toll from these causes with the number killed from combat. To compensate for this, I first consolidate the estimates (line 263) and then subtract the war-dead previously determined (line 264) to get an overall famine and disease range (line 265).

Finally, I can bring together these various totals (lines 268 to 271). Domestically and during their foreign military actions and occupations, the Young Turks probably murdered at least 743,000 and perhaps as many as 3,204,000 people, probably 1,883,000 Armenians, Greeks, Nestorians, and other Christians (line 273). Altogether, likely 3,947,000 died or were killed during the war (line 274). When I add this to the toll I will determine below for the next period, we will be able to test the overall total against the population deficit and unnatural death).

The next division in the table covers the interregnum period after WWI. Turkish Nationalist forces fought three wars during this time (lines 279 to 303). Estimates for the Greco-Turkish war give two ways of determining war-dead (lines 302 and 303), from which I select a final war-dead range in the usual way.

There is one incredibly low estimate of the overall war and massacre dead for this period (line 307) and a reasonable one for the Muslim male war-dead from 1914 to this period's end (line 308). From the latter I subtract the WWI war-dead to get an estimate of the post-WWI war-dead (line 310). Since it largely excludes female dead, this is a conservative result. Nonetheless, as can be seen by comparing this to the war-dead sum for the three wars (lines 311), the mid-value and high are significantly greater than the sum. Departing from the usual approach because of the incredible low of zero (on line 310--this implies that less than 500 were killed), I take the low of line 311 for the low (line 312), the high of line 310 for the high, and average the two mid-values.

Following this I list the estimates, consolidations, and sums for the Nationalist genocide of Christians (lines 315 to 329), Armenians (lines 334 to 359), and Greeks (lines 366 to 375). Regarding the Christian genocide, one estimate (line 322) of those killed in Izmir could refer to the former city of Smyrna, or to the Izmir peninsula next to Smyrna. I cannot determine which is meant (the estimate is only cited in Gross8 and his source is in Armenian), and I thus conservatively assumed that it largely duplicates those already given for Smyrna. Virtually all the total domestic Christian democide (line 329) took place in the Aydin Administrative District, of which Smyrna was a part. Since almost all the Christians in this area were either Greeks or Armenians, and in 1914 Greeks made up 94 percent of the total of the two,9 we then can assume that the Armenians were 6 percent (line 330) and Greeks 94 percent (line 331) of the Christian toll. I later employ the resulting ranges (lines 353 and 373) to determine the total number of these two groups that the Turks killed.

For the Armenian toll (lines 334 to 359) I include the refugee deaths (lines 358 to 359). Armenia, which became temporarily independent during this period, and adjacent areas contained hundreds of thousands who had fled the Young Turk genocide. Within a few years they also had to flee before the genocidal massacres of invading Nationalist forces and their Kurdish-Azerbaijani tribal allies. These refugees died from famine, disease, and exposure--deaths surely the responsibility of the Nationalists. The sources give one estimate of these deaths (line 358), and based on this and the estimates of the number of refugees I consolidate elsewhere in the table (lines 509 to 522), I estimate the range of deaths shown (line 359). To display the effect of these assumed refugee deaths on the Armenian genocide total, I sum the deaths for non-refugees (line 362) and then list one estimate of the overall number of returning deportees killed in Turkey (line 362a), which understandably is much lower than the non-refugee sum. Note, however, that it is the same as the low for those killed in Turkish Armenia (line 350). Adding the lowest of line 362a and 350 to the low for refugee deaths (line 359) gives us the low for the Armenian genocide (line 363), and summing all the estimates, including refugees, gives us the mid-value and high. Most likely then, in total during this period the Turks killed from 325,000 to 545,000, most probably 440,000 of their Armenians--these along with those murdered during WWI.

In the table I next list partial estimates (lines 367 to 374) for the genocide of the Greek. There is one calculation of Turkey's Anatolian (Asia Minor) Greek population deficit during 1912 to 1922, taking into account emigration and deportation from Turkey (line 378). Subtracting from this the WWI Greek genocide I calculated from previous totals (line 379), I get the range of post-WWI losses shown (line 380). This then provides an alternative to the sum of the specific mortality estimates (line 381). From these alternative ranges I calculated a final Greek genocide for this period in the usual way (line 382). Most probably, the Nationalists Turks murdered 264,000 Greeks; 703,000 Greeks and Armenians together in the post-WWI years (line 385).

Nationalist forces also committed similar genocide during their invasion of Armenia, particularly in Kars and Alexandropol (lines 389 to 398). Many Armenians also died during flight to escape the massacres and tribal Kurdish and Azerbaijanis allies (lines 405 to 408). One source provides the overall Armenian toll in Caucasia from 1914 to 1922 (line 412), which gives us a total for this period (line 414) when we subtract those killed during WWI (line 413). There is one estimate we can compare to this result (line 415), which we find within its range. I also repeat the result (line 418) so that we may compare it to an alternative total (line 419) that I summed from the previous consolidations. The two ranges differ enough for me to calculate a final genocide toll (line 420) as for previous such cases.

The Greek Army before and during the Greco-Turkish War massacred Moslem Turks or permitted such to take place by Greek villagers. I show some specific estimates of the democide in the table (lines 424 to 427). From these and material in the sources, particularly Housepian10 and Toynbee11, I believe a minimum number of killed is 15,000 (line 428).

Finally, I pull together the various totals (lines 431 to 434). In this post-WWI period the Turks killed overall probably 878,000 Armenians and Greeks, or at least 665,000 and even perhaps as many as 1,156,000 in total (line 435). Including war-dead, 1,031,000 Turkish citizens or those under Turkey's rule or fleeing from it died during these years (line 436).

The table's next section in Table 5.1B sums up the various sub-totals and compares them to overall estimates in the sources and demographic calculations. The first of these concerns the Armenian domestic genocide (lines 441 to 449). I consolidate these (line 450) and compare the result to one population based calculation of the Anatolian Armenian dead (line 451--relatively few lived in European Turkey) 1912 to 1922. Clearly this is way below that of the various estimates. Moreover, it also is under the low of the Armenian toll that I calculated in the previous sections (line 452), even when I omit refugee deaths (line 453). This suggests caution in accepting the totals.

To further check on this, I did my own demographic analysis and calculated the likely Armenian unnatural deaths (line 454--see lines 601 to 606). Given that this is calculated independently from the estimate-based totals, the range is remarkably close to that for the relevant non-refugee total (compare line 454 to line 453). Accordingly, I accept the totals previously calculated and restate their sum (line 455).

To get the foreign genocide of Armenians in Caucasia, I sum the previous totals (line 458) and compared the range to that of the Armenian-Russian population deficit (line 459) I calculated separately (lines 608 to 611). As can be seen, the summed range (line 458) is conservative and therefore acceptable (line 460), even keeping in mind that Armenians were also killed in WWI, in the Turkish invasion of Caucasia, in Armenia's war against Georgia, and in military conflict with Azerbaijan. Moreover, thousands probably immigrated from the region.

Next I add together the Turkey and Russian Armenian population deficits and compared them to the sum of domestic and foreign Armenian genocide (lines 463 to 466). The result is acceptable: the low is below that of the combined deficit, the high is close, and the mid-value is also close and below that of the deficit. This helps further establish confidence in the figures determined here.

As to the genocide of the Greeks, I sum the previous totals I calculated (line 470) and show beneath it a partial estimate of the Greek dead (line 471) and the Anatolian Greek population deficit (line 472). The deficit is well within the range that I independently calculated and I therefore adopt it as the final genocide (line 473).

After summing or displaying various totals (lines 475 to 485f), I show Tashjian's estimate of those killed or deported 1822-1922 (line 486). Now, as noted in Death By Government, the Ottoman Empire committed numerous genocidal massacres of Armenians in the previous century, particularly in 1894 to 1896 when Turks murdered perhaps 100,000 to 300,000 Armenians. Were I to add to this 100,000 for other pre-1900 genocides, and then reduce Tashjian's estimate by the sum to compensate for these deaths, and by another 10-15 percent to account for those surviving deportation (for the sources of the percentages, see line 122 of Table 5.1A), the resulting figure (line 486a) would still be within the range calculated here. Adding all the sub-totals (line 488) gives us the grand total genocide in turkey or committed by it: 1,428,000 to 4,380,000 murdered, likely 2,781,000 Armenians, Greeks, Nestorians, Moslem Turks, Azerbaijanis, and others.

Besides the tests of the genocide totals shown above (lines 451, 454, 459, 466, 471, 472, 486), we can also check the table's total domestic dead. The table first lists and consolidated three independent, overall dead estimates or calculations for the years 1912 (or 1914) to 1922 (lines 492 to 495), and then presents together the various totals (lines 498 to 501a) that I previously determined and sums them (line 502) to get the total dead, and next the overall domestic dead (line 503). Beneath this I show for comparison the consolidation of the estimated domestic dead (line 504). The comparison is as it should be: the low of line 503 is lower than line 504, the high is higher, and the mid-value is slightly below by about 5 percent. Because of this, there appears no need for me to reconsider the various calculations going into this total.

I next show the estimates and consolidations for refugees from Turkey's wars and genocides (lines 510 to 537). There is nothing unusual in their presentation and their consolidations figure in the calculation of population deficits and unnatural deaths (e.g., line 606).

In order to calculate population deficits I give population estimates and consolidations for Turkey as a whole (lines 542 to 551) in 1914 to 1915. To determine a population deficit later, I also calculate the population for 1920 to 1921 (line 552) from the minority population estimates given next for Armenians (lines 556 to 596), Greeks (lines 615 to 625), and Muslims (lines 628 to 630). Moreover, I had to calculate an average population controlled by the Nationalists (line 553) for later use in the genocide ratios (lines 640 to 641). I could not find any information on what this proportion was, even for a particular year, and therefore from narrative histories of this period12 I estimated it to vary from 40 to 75 percent, with a mid-value of 50 percent, taking into account that French and Greek forces occupied a portion of south-western Anatolia during this period.

The table lays out the calculation of the Armenian population deficit and unnatural deaths (lines 600 to 611). From the consolidated estimates of the Armenian's population growth rate, I projected what the population should have been in 1923 (line 604) and subtracted from it the actual population (line 589). Subtracting from this the number of refugees that escaped the genocide (line 522--this is conservative, since many refugees returned to later be killed by the Nationalists) gives an estimate of those Armenians who died unnatural deaths (line 606). I did the same for Armenian-Russians (lines 609 to 610). I also sum the two ranges of unnatural deaths (lines 606 and 610) to get the number of unnatural deaths for Russia and Turkey's Armenians together (line 611). And I also give or calculate the population deficits for the Greeks and Muslims (lines 626 and 632).

Finally, in the remainder of the table I calculate the democide rates for the Young Turks (lines 636 to 637) and the local Nationalists (lines 640 to 641). Per year the Young Turks killed almost 1 out of every 100 of their population (line 637). The Nationalists, however, were far more vicious. For the population they controlled they murdered 1 out of every 38 per year (line 641). 

Big K

so you mean that Turkish soldiers were having enough petroleum to spread and ignite oh the houses??...hahaha

Turkish Army was starving at that period...they were short of shoes...short of horses...short of food...short of ammo....short of manpower..(the big offensive of Turkish War of Independence took place with 1/1 ratio of offenders(Turks) and defenders(Greeks)) short of everything...it was the very last and final effort of a whole nation...

and you mean that they were having enough petroleum to spread aroun??? eh...i am laughing but it does not comes from my mouth....

__________________
I'm not willing to remain silent even there will be no effect when i say.

glyn

__________________
Semper in excretum. Solum profunda variat.

Ucar

If he can make a clear and concise summary of his points, and support them with some links, than some members may be tempted to discuss with him. As it is now, I doubt many people will take the time to read through all the above.

He will definetely ignore me, but I hope he listens to you glyn.

Low-tech

Dude, the articles..........my eyes are crossed.........

Too long/Didn't read.

The thing about citation is that they are used to back positions you state. We don't need the full article ad verbatim, just a paragraph or 2 that touches upon the point you are trying to make. A posters thoughts and opinions usually take precedent over the citations that form those views......for sake of conversation/communication.

If someone disputes the citation, links are good........let the other person do the work reading from a link.

Citation/cut and paste arguments on a text messaging medium is a visual trainwreck.

Kansas Bear

You need to give a link/website for the information you've posted. What you've done borders on plagiarism.

Khan_Han

People need to move on and look to the future...I hate seeing individuals who use "history" to fuel their hatred, especially when the "history" they assert is bogus!

The Turks and the Greeks will never be at peace if there are more like minded people like you.

Remember, the only alternative to co-existence is co-destruction....

laertes

I advise you to read Arnold J. Toynbee`s book the `Western question in Greece and Turkey` if you seriously want to know about the atrocities of the Greco Turkish war of 1919-1922, you will have plenty such neutral observers being quoted...Plus, nobody can claim Toynbee to be pro-Turkish, considering his other works..

About George Horton whom you quoted extensively:

IngentaConnect George Horton: the literary diplomat

Considering your deep interest in human right abuses Thesis, i assume you might be interested in the other Greek atrocities perpetrated much earlier, in the early 19th century, with the beginning of the Greek revolt against the Ottoman Empire..

This is one of the basic books i find in my university`s library about the subject..And im quoting you just the beginning of it while shortening it:

If you would argue that this source is biased, i can assure you that it is not because St. Clair is a historian of Greece, and there are many other such books about the atrocities of the Greek revolt. Plus, he talks equally vehemently about the atrocities which had been perpetrated against the Greeks at the same period of time, in Chios or elsewhere..

Khan_Han

Guys not one person in this thread has mentioned the other side to the coin. I am very disappointed that even my Turkish freinds did not mention these.

The day the Turks of Western Thrace in Greece are allowed to educate their Imams without let or hinderance, is the day Turkey will allow the Greek Orthodox school at Halkali to be opened. The day Greece recognizes the Imam of Western Thrace is the day the Greek Patriarchate of the Phanar will be recognized as the "Ecumenical" Patriarchate of Istanbul!


A majority of you cite Article 40 of the 1912 Treaty of Lausanne and continuously state that Turkey is violating this provision. But you do not mention (perhaps intentionally, I don't know your motives) why Turkey is doing this.

Well here is why:

While Article 40 provides for the obligations of Turkey, there are also obligations for the Greek regarding the protection of the ethnically Turkish Muslim minority in Greece. Greece does not allow the training of Imams in Western Thrace. It also does not allow the use of Turkish mosques. For a review of the plight faced by the Turkish minority in Western Thrace, I just suggest you read the following report by the UN sponsored organisation Human Rights Watch: