Thread: Greatest Militaries of All Time

Originally Posted by Feanor

In both cases it's actually a lack of the resources needed to maintain their huge armies. Napoleons army suffered huge casualties during the winter because of lack of food and sleighs for transportation, along with warm clothes.

Another thing both failed to understand (which is why Hitler truly had no chance even if he took moscow) is that Russia doesn't end in Moscow. It starts in Moscow.

Contrary to popular belief Napoleon invasion of Russia was well planned, down to detail. It was Tsar's unwillingless to grant Napoleon his "decisive battle" that doomed the grande armee into the vastness of Russia.

Napoleon trend was always the "decisive battle" which ultimatly granted him enemy territories and land and towns by negociation after the "decisive battle": Such was the case for Austerlisz, Jena-Ausdent (spell?), Frienland and Wagram. Both in the Peninsular war and the Russian invasion of 1812, that trend was non-existant. Needless to say Borodino was attrition at best.

Furthermore, the tight military system using corps d'armee that Napoleon had used with great results in the earlier campagins, broke down as his marshals could not make a "decisive" decision, and therefore in the vastness of Russia Napoleon genuis could not be transferred into physical reality.

Furthermore, it should be noted that the unbearable Russian summer vanquished quite a few troops from the Grande Armee if not more then the Russian winter. However, it is the winter that people always remember incase of Napoleon, because he was in full retreat with his tail between his legs. What most people dont realise either is that Russians lost more people in the Winter both during the Napoleonic and Germanic invasions.

Those would have been the decisive battles of Austerlitz, Jena-Auerstadt, Friedland and Wagram actually.

As you've noted, Napoleon took great care to ensure the proper provisioning for his army in the invasion of Russia. However, the system ultimately broke down. Further, being tied to a supply chain, rather than 'living off the land' as they had done in earlier successful campaigns meant that the French weren't quite quick enough to catch the Russian army and force a decisive battle early.

Ultimately it was simply the Tsar's refusal to 'surrender' that defeated Napoleon, combined with the vastness of Russia itself. Napoleon 'assumed' that the Tsar would negotiate after a decisive defeat of his army in the field. Having failed at the one opportunity he was granted to do so (i.e. Borodino), Napoleon then 'assumed' that the Tsar would be 'forced' to negotiate once Moscow was occupied. So ultimately Napoleon was defeated by the obvious flaw in his strategy, which was that it all depended on the Tsar 'giving up'. Even if the Russian army had been 'defeated' in the field, even with Moscow occupied, all the Tsar had to do was refuse to surrender and Napoleon could not win. With a rapidly diminishing army deep inside Russia, and erstwhile 'allies' Prussia and Austria in his 'rear' looking for a chance for revenge, the entire invasion was basically a 'no win' situation for the French from the start. The only chance they ever really had was for the Tsar to fail to recognize that fact.

Originally Posted by chankya

It's not so much pompous as ingrained. The Knights were the only ones who could afford the heavy armour. The whole feudal system is basically built around that. It took some time getting used to the fact that commoners (the longbowmen) could beat mounted knights. Inertia really.

That and the fact that French peasants were quasi not allowed to fight. It was the British abolishment of serfdom that made the difference.

Hi deadkenny,

I could be wrong but wasnt the Grande Armee unlike the preceding Royal army was based on supplies and provisions throughout the history of First Empire. I thought that it was the armies of Louis XIV and perhapes earlier revolutionary armies that "lived off land".

Hi xerxes,

The armies in Europe had undergone a change in this regard. During the 30 Years War, the armies largely 'lived off the land' and much of 'Germany' (i.e. the 'Holy Roman Empire' at the time) was devastated as a result. That wasn't seen as good because a number of other European 'nations' wanted 'control' (direct or indirect) over that territory. In order to avoid such an effect, and also for 'cultural' reasons (the 'Enlightenment') armies became smaller 'professional' forces that were supplied via a chain of 'magazines' or 'depots' and 'lived off the land' to a much more limited extent. As you've indicated, that system 'broke down' with the French Revolutionary Armies - both because of the overall breakdown of the 'system' and because of the 'mass armies' that the French fielded to face the 'professional armies' of various combinations of European opponents with practically 'untrained' recruits. Napoleon used this 'reversion' to 'living off the land' to his advantage during several of his successful campaigns in Italy and 'Germany' (including Austria and Prussia as well as the 'Confederation of the Rhine' and smaller German states which he created). The armies would be 'supplied' to a point, but once he made his 'lightning' thrusts, (e.g. catching Mack at Ulm in 1805 or catching the Prussians at Jena in 1806) the French Army would 'force march' and outrun it's supply. It is these manoeuvers where 'living off the land' allowed the French to move quickly enough to catch their opponents by surprize or unprepared and set up the decisive victory. Although this worked well in the relatively 'rich' and not especially 'hostile' areas in northern Italy and Germany, it did not work so well in the poorer and more hostile regions such as Spain or Russia. That is also part of the reason that the French failed to win decisive victories in those countries, and ultimately lost the war there.

thanks,

I also remember reading that supplies taken to Russia by Napoleon were carried on chariots by horses and oxens, and the idea was that as the Grande Armee went deeper into Russia and the supplies were consumed, the less number of horses and oxe were needed to carry them, thereafter the animals themselves were slaughetered on the way.

Yes, that is basically correct, although the conveyances would more accurately be described as 'carts' rather than 'chariots'. The carts would be drawn by draft animals, such as oxen. As supplies were consumed there would be excess animals which could then be slaughtered to provide additional meat for the army.