troung

Which made all the difference.

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And Malaysia went on until 1992 or so. The fighting saw the use of Allouette gunships, cross border raids and heavy artillery. Malaysia was in fact forced to scrap plans for Mirage-5s because of the need for equipment more suited for the fighting.

And the Huks survived and became the NPA. Bands of former Huks might have been basically bandits for over a decade but they were still there. Punitive operations were carried out in the 1960s against Huk bands in Tarlac by the PC and sometimes the army.

__________________
To sit down with these men and deal with them as the representatives of an enlightened and civilized people is to deride ones own dignity and to invite the disaster of their treachery - General Matthew Ridgway

Herodotus

The problems with comparing Malaya to Vietnam are several:

1.) The Malayan insurrection was sad and pathetic when it came to weaponry and tactics. The MRLA had no stand-off weapons (no rockets, only two mortars that didn't work), so it only relied on rifles and other small arms (grenades). Their tactics weren't anything to marvel at either.

2.) The MCP and MRLA (despite its name) were composed entirely of ethnic Chinese, a minority that had long been at odds with the Malayan majority. So the MRLA was isolated in small parts of Malaya and couldn't break out. Peng couold never convince any sizable number of Malayans to join him, partly because...

3.) The British granted Malaya independence (1957 IIRC), and promised it to them during the insurgency, so there was no reason for large numbers of Malayans to join the insurgency and in fact this encouraged large numbers to oppose the MRLA.

4.) The border between Malaya and Thailand was small, much smaller than the Vietnam border. Even still Peng and his most loyal cadres kept up hit and run raids for twenty years after the emergency ended, and eluded capture by hiding in that jungle. He finally made peace in 1989 (not 1992), and still lives to this day in Bangkok.

As to the question was Vietnam winnable: Its debatable, but I don't really envision a scenario where the North Vietnamese government would have allowed any part of Vietnam to exist independent of it, or allow foreign troops to be stationed there. The land of Anam had chafed under Chinese dominance, cut a deal with the French, and waited a hundred years to expel them and then the Americans. It would have been unacceptable to them to stop short of that goal.

From 1940-1990 Vietnam, or a portion thereof was almost in a perpetual state of resistance and war or preparing for war, and most of that time was spent trying to expel foreigners and re-unite Vietnam--The Vietnamese were tough, or stubborn, or determined, however you want to look at it. I don't think they had blown their wad on the Easter offensive. They were hurt, but could still fight, so I think if the US had stayed longer or increased troop levels, or had not cut off aid to Thieu, the result would have been the same.

S-2

"The border between Malaya and Thailand was small..."

...unlike the border between SVN and Cambodia/Laos.

"...I don't really envision a scenario where the North Vietnamese government would have allowed any part of Vietnam to exist independent of it..."

Also a key difference. Foreign support (N. Vietnam), foreign control (after TET, N. Vietnam), neutral sanctuary (Cambodia) and long borders argue against a Malay/Phillippines model.

So too, according to many Brits less enamoured than ourselves w/ Robert Thompson and some of the less highlighted and questionable tactics of British and colonial forces that prevailed throughout the length of the campaign. I'm unaware of these and need to know more but was surprised at how poorly received Nagl's LEARNING TO EAT SOUP WITH A KNIFE is among them.

Still, there were methodologies poorly implemented or left largely untried until too late. Most of all, to me anyway, was our inability to break through the semi-feudal-mandarin management system that remained as a post- french colonial legacy.

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"This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski

Bigfella

El Guapo,

The first thing I am going to do is reproduce a post by Shek from early in this thread. i think it represents a fair analysis of the US end of the conflict:

"Here's my two cents.

1) Our advisory effort sucked for over a decade. We tried to tool the ARVN to fight a battle against a conventional force, when the problem was an internal insurgency with only minor to moderate support externally. We focused out instead of in. Additionally, our strategic hamlet program was a disaster in implementation. A NLF goldmine of an operation.

2) Our strategy of tactics - attrition, blew. We wasted the better part of three years using heavy handed tactics that was a recruiting dream for the NLF. Sure, we attrited many NVA regiments and NLF units, but that was treating the symptom, and not the problem. More importantly, we squandered three years of American support, and history has demonstrated that democracies (yes, I know, we are a constitutional republic, but a democracy in spirit) are fickle.

3) While GEN Abrams made a tremendous effort to bring the "other war" under the wings of a "one war" concept, this was an uphill battle all the way. The NLF helped us by impaling their formations on our phalanxes during the Tet offensive, and this created the breathing space for us begin pacifying the countryside. Thieu finally got around to making some important land reforms in 1971, I believe. While the NLF wasn't totally dead, they were on life support, and the COIN was, if not a win for the SVN/US, it was definitely in the "winning" column.

4) Vietnamization was bearing fruit. As troung pointed out, the Easter Offensive was a loss for the PAVN. However, the denial of the ability to bomb supply lines in Cambodia, Loas, and NVN, and the slashing of funds to SVN following our pullout, and the total cutoff in 1975 meant that Vietnamization was doomed to failure. A fully funded ARVN and the means to deny resupply in the South could have resulted in a stalemate, one that would have eventually have led to a decision by Moscow to stop supply a non-success.

In the end, I think that US strategy was fatally flawed except for the Abrams years, when a winning strategy was implemented, but because of its linkage to a domestic situation that prevented the threat of aid ad infinitum, it was a strategy that was too little, too late that nearly suceeded, nonetheless."

It isn't possible to cover all the isues with your post, but let me try to do what I can.

The first thing anyone studying the Vietnam War needs to understand is the Korean War. America lost a bit over 30,000 in Korea in a War where 'good guys' & 'bad guys' where pretty clear. Despite this, it was just as unpopular as Vietnam. Indeed, it played an important role in Eisenhower's 1952 election win.

The second thing you need to understand is that the Vietnam War was primarily about the VIETNAMESE. There is literally a library of books on the American experience in Vietnam. There are very few on the Vietnamese experience, north or south. The Vietnamese did most of the fighting & most of the dying. American involvement was crucial, but it ultimately wasn't America's war to win. Any American examining the war needs to understand this.

This point leads to another couple of fundamental issues to do with the nature of the two states involved. The DRV (the Nth) started life with the inherited legitimacy of Ho Chi Minh's declaration of independence in 1945 & his victory over the French. It inherited a tradition of Vietnamese nationalism stretching back over a millenium, and just as importantly, the demographic heartland of that national identity - the Red River Delta & the coastal strip down to he DMZ. The apparent discipline & unity of purpose of the DRV wasn't just born of communist dictatorship. It was born of a very old national identity.

The RVN (Sth) had no such tradition. Most of it was the equivalent of the American frontier, but far more fragmented. Between the Chinese, Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, Khmers, Chams, Hill tribes, Buddhist clergy, Catholics, & a very divided Vietnamese community, the place was well nigh ungovernable. While this situation did progressively improve, it was always sitting there in the background. It also goes some way to explaining issues such as morale problems in the ARVN & the rampant corruption that was a feature of the RVN.

Worse, the RVN was lumped with a ruling clique that provided ample targets for NLF propaganda. The Diem regime, while successful in some ways, was always dogged by the overt & somewtimes fanatical Catholicism of its leading family. Diem found himself relying on a collection of Catholics, landowners, Chinese businessmen & army officers who had collaborated with the French & sometimes the Japanese too. The final insult, of course, was that this governing class was seen to be dependent on foreigners for its survival. As bearers of the torch of Nationalism the DRV could get away with this (plus they didn't use foreign combat troops). The RVN could not.

Add up all that I have just said about Vietnam and it is possible to see how the NLF became so entrenched in the RVN over the first decade of its existence. Add to this disastrous strategy & tactics as laid out by Shek, and it is actually remarkable that the RVN survived 20 years. of course, the only reason it did was because every time it was threatened America either introduced troops or launched a massive bombing campaign (or both). With each US escalation the NLF & DRV had to change their strategy & tactics, but they were usually able to do so more effectively than the US.

Now, back to my reference to Korea, because it is important. This was the reason for a number of major US decisions. The first was the reluctance to put in combat troops. Indeed, despite the RVN almost toppling several times after 1960, major US ground units didn't arrive until 1965. When they did they were supposed to win a quick victory. Johnson correctly feared public reaction to a long and/or costly war. he believed that by using overwhelming US firepower he could attrit NLF/PAVN forces to the point where the Nth would be forced to negotiate. He was wrong. In the end Americans over 50% of them) decided that the cost was too high before the death toll was past 30,000. The DRV probably lost 1-1.5 million.

Johnson was also committed to not invading the Nth. The reason was simple, he belived, correctly, that China would intervene. If that happened he foresaw a repeat of the Korean disaster & a rapid end to US involvement. Indeed, despite having no formal relations, the US & China informally established an understanding that China would not commit combat forces if the US didn't invade the Nth.

So, you have a nation that can only exist with massive US military support, some of it direct battlefield involvement, and an America that could only sustain that sort of effort for a limited time. The RVN was always going to struggle. Even if America had done everything right in the first 8 years there is no guarantee that the RVN would have made it. By doing a bunch of stuff wrong, America guaranteed that the RVN would not survive.

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Win nervously lose tragically - Reds C C

Herodotus

Good points regarding the political structure of Vietnam, and foreign support for the NLF. Malaya was seen as the prototype "perfect" COIN operation in the post-WWII world. Casualties and attacks peaked (1951 or 1952) soon after the Briggs Plan was implemented and gradually went down while CT KIA and Captures went up. Difficult to replicate that success, especially in larger insurgencies.

The force ratios in Malaya were off the chart. If the Home Guard was included (not directly COIN but they guarded villages, and other tasks that freed up the Malaya police, and Gurkhas to fight the MRLA) then the good guys had a 40 to 1 force ratio. Compare that with Vietnam when force ratios were 3 to 1 in our favor. Even when we beat down the NLF the NVA would infuse new troops into South Vietnam so we could never get the whatever-magic- number it is per 1,000 population, in order to stifle the Communist influence there.

I haven't read Nagl's book, I should get it, and see what he says about Malaya and Vietnam. It would be difficult to apply lessons directly from one insurgency to the next since no two insurgencies are exactly alike. In order to "beat" an insurgency knowing the history and culture of the peoples involved and in that country would be helpful. The British understood (at least I think they did) the differences between the Malayans and Chinese and how best to exploit them. The British understood their colonies, and knew when it was time to leave, whereas the French, and Portuguese, did not.

S-2

The key lesson I drew from LEARNING TO EAT SOUP WITH A KNIFE wasn't tactical or even operational. Lessons from discrete experiences in past COIN operations, whether Malaya, SVN, or the Phillippines as example only, have utility. Marginal to exceptional political and military experiences- all deserve consideration when facing a new and assymetric enemy. So too the entirely new and novel.

Key to this open exploration of responses tailored and appropriate to the emerging threat is possessing a LEARNING CULTURE within your military and diplomatic/bureaucratic communities. Nagl makes a compelling case that the British possessed sufficient intellectual openness to re-evaluate failure, draw relevant contextual lessons, and apply them rigorously.

Perhaps it was the remarkable legacy of similar military innovativeness as had recently existed in Slim's 14th Army during W.W.II. Maybe a cultural awareness lying semi-dormant from their colonial history. Some wild combination quite possibly. It doesn't matter.

As Nagl's counter-example, he uses the U.S. Army leading to the mid-sixties and it's tactical/operational experiences in SVN. He actually suggests that our inability it adapt as a culture has persisted into the present to a very great degree. Nagl points to the widespread acceptance, even acclaim, fostered on Harry Summers' On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War , noting that Summers central thesis is unwillingness to apply our battle dominance appropriately, choosing to engage in an enemy's preferred war of nat'l liberation rather than the destruction of the root issue- N. Vietnam. Published in 1982, this is hardly revisionist thinking as it simultaneously absolves our military culture of inadequate awareness. Instead, our military was compelled to fight on a political plane of war by our political leaders for which it wasn't designed.

I think this perspective is no longer dominant to our military culture. Recent debate within the ranks (to include LTC Nagl) highlights the intense intellectual rigor our officers seemingly now bring to the table.

Shek may have some different perspectives on EAT SOUP's lessons. I'll look forward to reading your thoughts once you've read the book. It's an instructive text.

avon1944

I for one do not feel the war was winnable for America. The reason if the North Viet Namese have been fighting invaders around two thousand years and the Americans in their opinion was just another in a long series of invaders. The most recent were the Japanese, the French, and finally the Americans.
Yes America could have won on the battlefield (Operation Linebacker Two showed that point) but, the North would not give up and one weakness of democracies is their inability to fight wars without end. If America would not or could not quit, then the war would still be going on today!! A continuous stalemate until America quits.

Adrian

Elbmek

not a chance in hell, and vietnam was hell on earth.

Da Nang, one of the biggest US bases in SE Asia, and the VC had an underground city beneath it!!! No way the US was ever going to win.

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Never lie, then you have nothing to try and remember.

Kansas Bear

I guy I worked with in the '80s said then he first landed in Vietnam, they were told that the country was 95% VC......

Blademaster

We would have won the war if we had invaded N. Vietnam and dare China to attack us. China didn't want another Korean War. That last Korean War was very costly for China. I think China would have fortify her south position but not invade N. Korea.

However, I think not invading N. Vietnam and letting N. Vietnam win the war was the best thing for US in the Cold war. It essentially removed one dealbreaker between China and US and allowed China to cross over the aisle and join US against USSR.

Officer of Engineers

Now, I am NOT paraphrasing this one.

"I will fight the Americans down to the last Vietnamese" - Mao Tse-Tung.

However, Hitesh, 300,000 PLA troops served in North Vietnam during the Vietnam War, including AD regiments around Hanoi. Vietnam was the 2nd time where Chinese and American forces clashed.

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Chimo

kukiyi

Vietnam and China were allies during Vietnam War, so why did they fight each other just after the war ?

Officer of Engineers

Main reason, they were not that good of allies. Ho Chi Minh, and therefore, the rest of Hanoi, never forgave Mao for the creation of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Hanoi had thought that they should be one country - Indochina.

kukiyi

I thought it's because of after Sino-Soviet split, Vietnam drift toward the Soviet.

Elbmek

Which of course, they used to be Er, wasn't indo china more of a "region" ?