I think you meant North Korea, but yes, our efforts at the beginning especially with the main force units was a failure. Mostly because we failed at building a good officer corps and didn't understand their patronage system. Once units got good officers, that were warriors, not political appointees they did rather well. This was especially clear with the "elite units" like the seals, marines, paratroopers, rangers and cavalry soldiers. We also failed in properly equipping them early on. We often gave them weapons that were ill suited to them like the M-14 or that was obsolete. Again, that was early-middle of the war, by the last years of the war the ARVN was a very different creature.My comments were directed just as much at our advisory effort, which was second rate until 1969/1970, and was off the mark for many of those years, trying to build a force that looked exactly the US Army and was prepared to fight South Korea again.