UK officer calls for US special forces to quit Afghan hotspot

Ray · 08-12-2007, 03:15 AM

Quote:

UK officer calls for US special forces to quit Afghan hotspot

High civilian toll as teams rely on air strikes to provide cover

Declan Walsh in Islamabad and Richard Norton-Taylor
Friday August 10, 2007
The Guardian

Tension between British and American commanders in southern Afghanistan erupted into the open yesterday as a senior UK military officer said he had asked the US to withdraw its special forces from a volatile area that was crucial in the battle against the Taliban.

British and Nato defence officials have consistently expressed concern about US tactics, notably air strikes, which kill civilians, sabotaging the battle for "hearts and minds" and infuriating Hamid Karzai, the Afghan president.

Des Browne, the defence secretary, recently raised the issue with Robert Gates, his US counterpart, and Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Nato's secretary general, admitted last month that an increasing number of civilian casualties was undermining support for alliance troops. He said Nato commanders had changed the rules of engagement, ordering their troops to hold their fire in situations where civilians appeared to be at risk.

Yesterday, a senior British commander was quoted in the New York Times as saying that in Sangin, in the north of Helmand province, which had been calm for a month, there was no longer a need for special forces. "There aren't large bodies of Taliban to fight any more," he said. "We are dealing with small groups and we are trying to kick-start reconstruction and development."

Twelve-man teams of US special forces had been criticised for relying on air strikes for cover when they believed they were confronted by large groups of Taliban fighters and their supporters.

Unnamed British officers were quoted yesterday as saying the US had caused the lion's share of casualties in their area and that after 18 months of heavy fighting since British forces arrived in Helmand they were finally making headway in securing key areas, but were now trying to win back support from people whose lives had been devastated by bombing.

The newspaper estimated the number of civilian casualties this year in Helmand at close to 300 - most caused by foreign and Afghan forces, not the Taliban. Human rights and aid groups estimate that 230 Afghan civilians were killed throughout the south of the country last year.

Nato officers admit they are troubled by the high toll. One medic told the Guardian that during a 14-day period last month, British soldiers rescued 30 Afghan civilians wounded in bombings or firefights - half of whom were children.

The US and Nato yesterday denied the British commander had asked US special forces to leave his area of operations. However, Mr Browne, visiting British and Nato troops in Afghanistan, said the commander was expressing a personal view.

"It is the reporting of an observation of a British officer on a particular part of the American military," he told reporters in Kabul. "That may be his view, but it is not the view of the Helmand taskforce commander, it is not the view of our government, it is not the view of the Americans, it is not the view of the alliance. These things can be said in the heat of battle. These are very difficult circumstances."

After a meeting with Mr Karzai, Mr Browne said the British-led Helmand force has made "enormous progress in driving back the Taliban in the north of the province". He added: "The forces' progress has been followed by targeted development projects that are making a difference to ordinary Afghans' lives."

British officers say US special forces are cavalier in their approach to the civilian population. The tensions were illustrated by an incident the Guardian witnessed in Sangin earlier this summer.

A British patrol was abandoned by its American special forces escort in the town for several hours. Stranded in central Sangin, British officers tried to establish radio contact with the Americans, who had disappeared without warning, and swore impatiently when they could not.

The British criticisms intensified after the Americans led them to their proposed site for a new Afghan patrol base in the town - beside a graveyard and a religious shrine. "Sensitivity is not their strong suit," said one British officer.

Most British soldiers work well with regular American troops and some speak admiringly of them. But US special forces units are a different matter.

They operate under a different chain of command, with their own rules on everything from dress code to the use of weapons. Whereas the British troops operate under Nato command, the American special forces are commanded from the US-led coalition in Bagram airbase outside Kabul. That means the Americans can call on a wider range of airstrikes, and also that British officers have little control over which munitions are dropped in populated areas.

The British military spokesman in Helmand, Lt Col Charlie Mayo, said the special forces had supported seven British-led operations in Helmand since last April. He said that relations between the two sides were "excellent".

"To work together effectively we have to have bloody good cooperation and we have to mutually support each other," he said. Col Mayo stressed that the British commander who had a problem with special forces had requested them to leave Sangin town only, not all of Helmand.

Officers also argue that where Taliban fighters mount ambushes from inside heavily populated areas, civilian deaths are unavoidable. "When you are working in a high intensity counter insurgency environment like this, regrettably you are going to have civilian casualties," Col Mayo said.

In London, British officials confirmed UN forecasts that southern Afghanistan's opium poppy crop, based in Helmand, will exceed last year's record. Foreign Office minister Lord Malloch Brown described the figures as "extremely disappointing".

A Tough Call

These things will occur when a mix of different types of troops are employed because of the differing mindset that is singular to each country.

Notwithstanding, in a Counter Insurgency environment, it is essential not to alienate the local population. Wanton killing or heavy armed tactics is obviously not the answer. A great amount of sensitivity is required, even if one may feel like emptying a whole magazine in anger or disgust. Unless one is dead sure that one is a terrorist, one should desist from firing with the inevitable result of killing or maiming.

Afghanistan is important to the US and ISAF cause since it is important that Afghanistan turn out to be a success story in the pall of gloom that floats heavy over Iraq! Unlike, the govt in Iraq, which is practically lameduck, the Afghan govt has at least some sheen of governance.

Hotheadedness in Afghanistan will only bring in an Iraq like situation.

HKDan · 08-12-2007, 06:17 AM

Sir,
Recently I read an article(Im having difficulty finding it again to post) about a change in mindset in US Special Forces while Rumsfeld was the boss. The gist of the article was that during Rumsfeld's tenure as Sec Def Specal Forces started to place emphasis on the direct action role to the detriment of their other traditional roles. Could this be a result of that change? The comment made by one British Officer that, "sensitivity is not their strong suit" is especially disturbing. As Special Forces sensitivity should be exactly their strong suit.

**Parihaka** · 08-12-2007, 06:28 AM

The NZSAS expressed dissatisfaction with working with them as well, something to do with prisoner treatment.

HKDan · 08-12-2007, 06:56 AM

I wonder if the US should take a hard looks at its capabilities in Civil Affairs. This seems to be an area that they are really struggling with in both Iraq and Afghanistan. I may not be accurate in my opinion, but I have the feeling that the units in Iraq that have done the best work in this regard have not been Special Forces. Off the top of my head the work of the 3rd ACR in Tal Afar comes to mind, and that seemed to be more the work of an exceptionally talented commanding officer as opposed to anything else.

If the Special Forces are going to spend most of their time looking for fights, should the Army consider expanding its Civil Affairs units instead of the expansion that is going on in Special Forces?

Cactus · 08-12-2007, 10:08 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Ray

These things will occur when a mix of different types of troops are employed because of the differing mindset that is singular to each country.

Ray,

Is it a question of difference arising from nationality, or is it one arising from differing commands?

Out of curiosiy, does Indian Army have specialized scout-sniper teams? Are they deployed in COIN role in Kashmir? How do regular infantry feel if (lets say you have such teams)/when such teams disrupt the normal tempo of operations? What do batt commanders says when such teams report directly to a higher chain of command?

You can also answer similar questions regarding your 50th Indpendent Brigade, often listed under Army HQ Reserves - do they report to their immediate superiors wherever they are deployed? Are they always subject to the local commander's COIN plans? Or is there more to their missions?

Ray · 08-12-2007, 10:19 AM

Here are some links that would indicate the psyche:

Strong support for torture among US military in Iraq: A corollary of occupation

Take No Casualties
PARAMETERS, US Army War College Quarterly - Summer 1996

The transformation of the US Military psyche is possibly the resultant of SLA Marshall's book Men Against Fire, wherein he claims that in WWII no more than one soldier actually fired their weapons, while in contact with the enemy and based on his findings the US Army changed its training procedures to ensure that more fire was brought on the enemy and the troops more aggressive in intent.

He also studied the Korean War and claim to the conclusion that the ration of fire had more than doubled.

It must be added that SLA Marshall also had critics, who debunked his theories and the veracity of his statistics!

The mindset is highly aggressive and it sanitises the mind from thinking anything beyond the mission or beyond the safety of own soldiers. The human element apparently is not there, which is good to fight a regular conventional battle, but not for Insurgencies, where the population has to be weaned away from the influence of the terrorists, if the battle is to be won.

Ray · 08-12-2007, 10:42 AM

[QUOTE]

Quote:

Originally Posted by Cactus

Ray,

Is it a question of difference arising from nationality, or is it one arising from differing commands?

Different mindset and hence also different views at the command level of how to apply the troops to the Operation in hand.

Quote:

Out of curiosiy, does Indian Army have specialized scout-sniper teams? Are they deployed in COIN role in Kashmir? How do regular infantry feel if (lets say you have such teams)/when such teams disrupt the normal tempo of operations? What do batt commanders says when such teams report directly to a higher chain of command?

No, there is no scout sniper team per se. Standard CASO tactics is applied.

Quote:

You can also answer similar questions regarding your 50th Indpendent Brigade, often listed under Army HQ Reserves - do they report to their immediate superiors wherever they are deployed? Are they always subject to the local commander's COIN plans? Or is there more to their missions?

All troops and units, specialised or standard when placed under command of any commander operate as per the direction and plans of that Commander.

The overall strategy of COIN cannot be undertaken in penny packets and in isolation.

It requires coordinated effort with no overlapping and with sensitiveness. Even so, the Security Forces have to be ready to face flak from the population. The aim is to minimises such flak.

Cactus · 08-12-2007, 10:51 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Ray

The mindset is highly aggressive and it sanitises the mind from thinking anything beyond the mission or beyond the safety of own soldiers. The human element apparently is not there, which is good to fight a regular conventional battle, but not for Insurgencies, where the population has to be weaned away from the influence of the terrorists, if the battle is to be won.

Ray,

If you look at it from the top-down view, you will find the Human Element as priority #2 - "safety of own soldiers" (ic): A far higher ranking in the doctrinal setup than any traditional or 95% of contemporary doctrines. In fact the popular opinion held that it was a particularly bad liability in winning the conventional battle, but that is a different story. As I see it, the trick to defeating insurgencies would be to first raise "safety of the neutral population" to priority #3, and then to include it in a redefined/expanded priority #2 "safety of own side". That too is tangential to the discussion at hand.

Limit ourselves to: What is the nature of special operations? Does it supercede the COIN concerns?

Cactus · 08-12-2007, 11:01 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Ray

All troops and units, specialised or standard when placed under command of any commander operate as per the direction and plans of that Commander.

What does it mean to keep a brigade under Army HQ Reserves? I am trying to figure out whether there are any Indian troops who act as strategic assets, thus bypassing the local commanders in whose area of operations they may be located in. If there are no such troops in Indian Army, then it is hard to explain with an anology how US command is structured wrt special operations. You have to forgive me of ignorance.

Ray · 08-12-2007, 12:07 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Cactus

What does it mean to keep a brigade under Army HQ Reserves? I am trying to figure out whether there are any Indian troops who act as strategic assets, thus bypassing the local commanders in whose area of operations they may be located in. If there are no such troops in Indian Army, then it is hard to explain with an anology how US command is structured wrt special operations. You have to forgive me of ignorance.

Special Ops would be trans border.

No. No can bypass the command and control of the commander conducting the ops.

The example of use of strategic reserves would be something like the Tangail Ops in 1971.

Ray · 08-13-2007, 03:25 AM

Quote:

America, stop waving the nuclear threat at potential adversaries

The US should use its nuclear arsenal for deterrence only and preserve the 'taboo' on nuclear weapons use.
By Jack Mendelsohn

from the August 10, 2007 edition

Washington - Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton were asked in a recent presidential debate whether they would meet with such controversial foreign leaders as Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez and Cuba's Fidel Castro.

Despite the sparring between the two over the timing and pre-conditions for such a meeting, they both essentially said they would engage international reprobates – something this administration has repeatedly balked at doing. Remember, Vice President Dick Cheney said, "We don't negotiate with evil. We destroy it."

A tougher question is whether the next president would threaten to use nuclear weapons against a foreign enemy. Four Republican candidates – Mitt Romney, Duncan Hunter, Jim Gilmore, and Rudy Giuliani – have already expressed their willingness to use "tactical" nuclear weapons against Iran to prevent it from obtaining nuclear weapons. Again, this tracks with the vice president who is reportedly urging an attack on Iran's nuclear infrastructure by next year at the latest.

Mr. Obama recently told the Associated Press that he would not use nuclear weapons "in any circumstance" involving civilians. Mrs. Clinton once again criticized his foreign policy position saying that she didn't believe that "any president should make any blanket statements."

If the Democrat candidates want to distinguish themselves from their opponents, and if the Republicans want to recover from the disastrous foreign policy of this administration, the candidates should commit to delegitimizing – not stressing – nuclear weapons. Every time the United States threatens a potential adversary with nuclear weapons it tells the world that these weapons are acceptable instruments of modern warfare and that there are no political or moral constraints on US behavior.

It is overwhelmingly in the US national interest to preserve the "taboo" on nuclear weapons use and to seek to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in US security policy. To achieve this, the candidates should address four issues:

First, announce that they reject nuclear intimidation and the current policy of preventive war. In the future, and under their leadership, the United States will retain its nuclear arsenal for deterrence only and will not employ nuclear weapons except in retaliation for a nuclear attack.

Second, commit to the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons. Even President Reagan sought a nuclear-free world and a number of senior US statesmen, from the late Paul Nitze (Democrat) to George Schultz and Henry Kissinger (both Republicans), agree that the US would be much safer in a world without nuclear weapons.

Third, declare that they plan to withdraw all US nuclear weapons from Europe during their term in office. These weapons are relics of the cold war: There is no strategic requirement for them, and no military mission that cannot be carried out by conventional weapons.

Finally, make it clear that the United States will not resume nuclear testing. A reaffirmation of the decade-old moratorium on nuclear tests (or ratification by the next Congress of the treaty banning such tests) would strengthen US efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons to other nations.

In the run-up to the presidential election, the candidates of both parties have a chance to indicate to the world that the next administration will forgo the policy of nuclear intimidation and actively strive to delegitimize nuclear weapons. This nation cannot become more secure by reserving for itself the right to use nuclear weapons while preaching nuclear abstinence for the rest of world.

• Jack Mendelsohn was a US State Department official, a member of the US SALT and START delegations and deputy director of the Arms Control Association. He is presently an adjunct professor at George Washington University and American University.

Cactus,

Here is an article from the CSM, which is a balanced newspaper, and which indicates the American mindset.

Cheney epitomises it with:

"We don't negotiate with evil. We destroy it."

But the moral question is who is to decide what is 'evil'.

If one goes by Cheney's style of thinking, I reckon it would mean anyone/ any country that does not toe the US line!

Before one is judgemental, one has to see the US history. It is full of evil vs good. The Indian Wars, Go West by the Pioneers, the Wild West and its Justice by the Gun and lynchings, the Civil War, the World Wars, Iraq War and so on.

It is full of violent answers to what one thought and justified as conflicts of good vs evil.

And no holds barred!

Bluesman · 08-13-2007, 03:30 AM

Oh, for Gawd's sake.

Ray · 08-13-2007, 04:01 AM

some problem?

If the articles are worng or my comments are wrong, then please Spell it out.

I sure would like to learn of a contrary view and would be delighted.

'O God' does not state much!

Cactus · 08-13-2007, 08:16 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Ray

No. No can bypass the command and control of the commander conducting the ops.

Okay, then there may be no equivalency in Indian military to illustrate what is the role of US special operations command. If Indian artillery uses forward observation officers (FOO) - you know, relatively junior officers who have high security clearence and report directly to much higher commands - you may have something vaguely resembling the special operations command structure? (I have just about exhausted my list of independent roles with this one!). If there is absolutely no such equivalent setup, you would have to use your imagination on this one to understand its significantly different role.

PS: Also its not a matter of "bypass" (apologize to having introduced that misleading word), but of being under a different command in the same area if I understand the article correctly.

Cactus · 08-13-2007, 08:39 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Ray

Cactus,

Here is an article from the CSM, which is a balanced newspaper, and which indicates the American mindset.
...

It is full of violent answers to what one thought and justified as conflicts of good vs evil.

And no holds barred!

Ray,

This is way off topic; and IMHO unnecessary exercise in trying to characterize a definitely uncharacterizable thing as a "national psyche". India surely did not deploy the Jaina Regiment or the Gandhi Legion when attacked in 1999, why then do you expect Americans to respond with Amish Brigade or Thoreau Division when similarly wronged? Anyway, I have no intention of being dragged into what I feel is an unnecessary debate - more posts fired off in this direction amounts to wasted ammo, and I am willing to say so because debate is one field where is good to draw fire on oneself!

08-12-2007, 06:28 AM	#3 (permalink)
Parihaka Global Moderator Join Date: 11-10-04 Location: Te Ika a Maui Posts: 11,613 Country:	The NZSAS expressed dissatisfaction with working with them as well, something to do with prisoner treatment. __________________ Yet, in holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as we should, we must also be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientifictechnological elite. Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1961

08-13-2007, 03:30 AM	#12 (permalink)
Bluesman WAB Bartender *Defense Professional* *Military Professional* Join Date: 11-24-04 Location: Vacaville, CA. Posts: 7,667 Country:	Oh, for Gawd's sake. __________________ "The quickest way of ending a war is to lose it, and if one finds the prospect of a long war intolerable, it is natural to disbelieve in the possibility of victory." - George Orwell

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08-12-2007, 06:17 AM	#2 (permalink)
HKDan Contributor Join Date: 05-23-06 Location: Shanghai, baby! Posts: 450	Sir, Recently I read an article(Im having difficulty finding it again to post) about a change in mindset in US Special Forces while Rumsfeld was the boss. The gist of the article was that during Rumsfeld's tenure as Sec Def Specal Forces started to place emphasis on the direct action role to the detriment of their other traditional roles. Could this be a result of that change? The comment made by one British Officer that, "sensitivity is not their strong suit" is especially disturbing. As Special Forces sensitivity should be exactly their strong suit.

08-12-2007, 06:56 AM	#4 (permalink)
HKDan Contributor Join Date: 05-23-06 Location: Shanghai, baby! Posts: 450	I wonder if the US should take a hard looks at its capabilities in Civil Affairs. This seems to be an area that they are really struggling with in both Iraq and Afghanistan. I may not be accurate in my opinion, but I have the feeling that the units in Iraq that have done the best work in this regard have not been Special Forces. Off the top of my head the work of the 3rd ACR in Tal Afar comes to mind, and that seemed to be more the work of an exceptionally talented commanding officer as opposed to anything else. If the Special Forces are going to spend most of their time looking for fights, should the Army consider expanding its Civil Affairs units instead of the expansion that is going on in Special Forces?

08-12-2007, 10:19 AM	#6 (permalink)
Ray Suspended Join Date: 08-20-03 Posts: 29,172 Country:	Here are some links that would indicate the psyche: Strong support for torture among US military in Iraq: A corollary of occupation Take No Casualties PARAMETERS, US Army War College Quarterly - Summer 1996 The transformation of the US Military psyche is possibly the resultant of SLA Marshall's book Men Against Fire, wherein he claims that in WWII no more than one soldier actually fired their weapons, while in contact with the enemy and based on his findings the US Army changed its training procedures to ensure that more fire was brought on the enemy and the troops more aggressive in intent. He also studied the Korean War and claim to the conclusion that the ration of fire had more than doubled. It must be added that SLA Marshall also had critics, who debunked his theories and the veracity of his statistics! The mindset is highly aggressive and it sanitises the mind from thinking anything beyond the mission or beyond the safety of own soldiers. The human element apparently is not there, which is good to fight a regular conventional battle, but not for Insurgencies, where the population has to be weaned away from the influence of the terrorists, if the battle is to be won.

08-13-2007, 04:01 AM	#13 (permalink)
Ray Suspended Join Date: 08-20-03 Posts: 29,172 Country:	some problem? If the articles are worng or my comments are wrong, then please Spell it out. I sure would like to learn of a contrary view and would be delighted. 'O God' does not state much!

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