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#1 (permalink) |
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A Self Important
Senior Contributor
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Iraq's foreign fighters: few but deadly
Iraq's foreign fighters: few but deadly
A new report says foreigners make up 4 to 10 percent of Iraq's 30,000 insurgents. By Dan Murphy | Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor CAIRO – Much of the US effort in Iraq in recent months has been aimed at stopping the inflow of foreign jihadis. US warplanes have blown up bridges to deny insurgent infiltration routes, troops have occupied small towns thought to be crossing points for foreigners into bigger cities, and spy drones continuously buzz the Syrian border. Even if the US can seal Iraq's borders, stopping the flow of foreign fighters would do little to eliminate most of the country's insurgents. Only 4 to 10 percent of the country's combatants are foreign fighters, according to a report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies released last week. But while they are a minority, says the report, they are a potent segment largely from Algeria and Syria. "The fact that there are 3,000 foreign fighters in Iraq is cause for alarm, particularly because they play so large a role in the most violent bombings and in the efforts to provoke a major and intense civil war,'' write coauthors Anthony Cordesman, a former director of defense intelligence assessment for the secretary of Defense, and Nawaf Obaid, a Saudi national and security analyst. Based mostly on Saudi intelligence, they estimate that active members of the insurgency number about 30,000. Since the fall of Saddam Hussein, the report says, Iraq has become one of the global centers for the recruiting and training of what Mr. Cordesman and Mr. Obaid term "neo-Salafi" terrorists. These are essentially Islamist fighters that share Al Qaeda's extreme rejection of non-Muslim "infidels" and seek to create Islamic states patterned after the Arabian peninsula of the 7th and 8th centuries. Also, the large numbers of foreign fighters who may survive the conflict are likely to return to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Algeria carrying terrorism skills and highly radicalized world views with them, they write. "They are also a threat because they give bin Laden and other neo-Salafi extremist movements publicity and credibility among the angry and alienated in the Islamic world, and because many are likely to survive and be the source of violence,'' in other countries. Most of Iraq's fighters, they say, are Sunni Arab "nationalists" who distrust Shiites now in power. Foreign fighters, the report claims, are seeking to manipulate this distrust into a wider civil war. The authors also point out that the "fly paper" theory about the Iraq war - that a limited global number of Islamic militants would be lured to Iraq and destroyed - is probably incorrect. Instead, they estimate that many of the foreigners fighting in Iraq were peaceful before the US invasion. In particular, the authors find that the presence of Saudi militants in Iraq has been overstated - estimating they make up 1 to 2 percent of fighters there - but say that most of the young Saudis fighting in Iraq were not violent before the war. One of their paper's "primary conclusions is the unsettling realization that the vast majority of Saudi militants who have entered Iraq were not terrorist sympathizers before the war; and were radicalized almost exclusively by the coalition invasion." Relying on interviews with US and Saudi intelligence officials, as well as the findings of the Saudi National Security Assessment Project, which is directed by Obaid and is described as a private group, the paper says that Algerians make up the largest group of foreign fighters at 20 percent, followed by Syrians (18 percent), Yemenis (17 percent), Sudanese (15 percent) and Egyptians (13 percent). Because Turkey and Iran are less hospitable to foreign extremists, and the Saudi border is a well-patrolled harsh desert, Syria has been the principal means of entry for foreign fighters into Iraq. Syria's 380-mile border with Iraq is well traveled and porous. In a guide for would-be Jihadis posted on Internet forums, a "Mujahidin" who calls himself Al Muhaijar al-Islami, urges brothers to make the crossing along the Syria-Anbar Province border in Eastern Iraq, according to a translation of the document provided by Evan Kohlman, a New York-based terrorism consultant. Al Islami says "close connections" among Sunni Arab tribes - like the Shamar who live on both sides of the border and whose influence stretches into Saudi Arabia - make passage easier, as does their disdain for the central Syrian government. He says the large number of scattered villages there, and frequent engagements with US forces in cities like Al Qaim, make it possible to walk into Iraq in 30 minutes. He warns militants to shave their beards, carry cigarettes (most Salafis don't smoke), and avoid shortening their robes after the fashion of Salafis. Cordesman and Obaid's findings seem to back up Al Islami's advice. They point out that 270,000 Saudis visited Syria alone in the first half of this year. "Separating the legitimate visitors from the militants is nearly impossible," they write. "The problem of successfully halting the traffic of Saudis through Syria into Iraq is overwhelmingly difficult, politically charged, and operationally challenging." In the end, while they're worried about the potential for foreign fighters to spread terrorism and violence to their homelands once they leave Iraq, they argue that pacifying the country is now far from a simple counter-insurgency operation. "The outcome in Iraq is going to be determined by how well Iraq's political process can find an inclusive solution to bringing Arab Sunnis, Arab Shiites, Kurds, and Iraqi minorities into a state that all are willing to support,'' they write. "Military action, counterinsurgency and counterterrorism cannot unite or build a country." • To read the entire CSIS report go to www.csis.org/press/wf_2005_0919.pdf. |
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#2 (permalink) |
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A Self Important
Senior Contributor
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Report attacks 'myth' of foreign fighters
Brian Whitaker and Ewen MacAskill Friday September 23, 2005 The Guardian The US and the Iraqi government have overstated the number of foreign fighters in Iraq, "feeding the myth" that they are the backbone of the insurgency, an American thinktank says in a new report. Foreign militants - mainly from Algeria, Syria, Yemen, Sudan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia - account for less than 10% of the estimated 30,000 insurgents, according to the Washington-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). The report came as President Bush said a pullout of US forces would embolden America's enemies, allowing the Jordanian-born terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and Osama bin Laden "to dominate the Middle East and launch more attacks on America and other free nations". The report says the presence of foreign fighters is cause for alarm "particularly because they play so large a role in the most violent bombings and in the efforts to provoke a major and intense civil war". The CSIS disputes reports that Saudis account for most of the foreign insurgents and says best estimates suggest Algerians are the largest group (20%), followed by Syrians (18%), Yemenis (17%), Sudanese (15%), Egyptians (13%), Saudis (12%) and those from other states (5%). British intelligence estimate the number of British jihadists at about 100. The CSIS report says: "The vast majority of Saudi militants who have entered Iraq were not terrorist sympathisers before the war; and were radicalised almost exclusively by the coalition invasion." The average age of the Saudis was 17-25 and they were generally middle-class with jobs, though they usually had connections with the most prominent conservative tribes. "Most of the Saudi militants were motivated by revulsion at the idea of an Arab land being occupied by a non-Arab country. These feelings are intensified by the images of the occupation they see on television and the internet ... the catalyst most often cited [in interrogations] is Abu Ghraib, though images from Guantánamo bay also feed into the pathology." In terms of fighters entering Iraq, Syria is clearly the biggest problem, the report says, but preventing militants from crossing its 380-mile frontier with Iraq is daunting. "Even if Syria had the political will to completely and forcefully seal its border, it lacks sufficient resources to do so." Oil-rich Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, has spent $1.2bn (£670m) over the past two years and deployed 35,000 troops in an effort to secure its border. During the past six months this has led to the capture of 63 Saudis trying to cross into Iraq but also 682 Iraqi intruders and smugglers. The smuggling included explosives destined for Islamist groups in Saudi Arabia and neighbouring countries. http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story...576666,00.html |
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#3 (permalink) |
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Defense Professional
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Russians actually feeled that less foreign fighters are now in Chechnya..... Iraq become much more fasionable place to go fight jihad. There are several reasns why Chechnya fell out of fashion to Iraq:
The climate is just perfect.... no snow or rains.... no need to hide in mountains - you fight in cities. Arms supply is not worse than in Chechnya..... and they are paid beter for every emeny soldier shot down. Moreover kidnapping is much more profitable business in Iraq where there are a lot more wealthy companies/contractors than in Chechnya..... you may speak arab and english - a languages many jihadists know well, while in Chechnya even rebels use a lot of Russian for intercommunication. US was always considred an ULTIMATE enemy supporting hated Israel.... so they like fighting US and its allies. And finally locals are much less agressive, which make foreign jihadists much more comfortable than in Chechnya, where locals very agressive and bloody revenge is normal practice. All this changed preferences of the jihadists they all flee to Iraq nowadays. |
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#4 (permalink) |
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A Self Important
Senior Contributor
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http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default...2-2-2005_pg4_7
US and rebels hype Zarqawi’s role in Iraq, say experts By Michel Moutot Bush’s administration has found a new ‘bad guy’ that it can sell to its own public opinion as well as abroad as the embodiment of the terrorist threat With ulterior motives, both the United States and Iraqi insurgents find it expedient to exaggerate the role of Islamic extremist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq, according to various analysts. Zarqawi, a Jordanian-born fugitive with a 25-million-dollar US price on his head, is being blamed for more attacks that a single man, even at the head of an effective network, can reasonably be expected to claim. In 38-year-old Zarqawi, who is seen as a frontman for Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda network in Iraq, US President George W Bush’s administration has found a new “bad guy” that it can sell to its own public opinion as well as abroad as the embodiment of the terrorist threat in Iraq. Iraq’s nationalist insurgents, who include many members of the ousted Saddam Hussein regime, for their part find it convenient to pin on a foreigner attacks which might prove unpopular. “The Americans are trying to attribute most of the (Iraqi) resistance’s actions to him (Zarqawi), to create something like Bin Laden,” a knowledgeable Iraqi source said in Beirut. “On the other hand, certain sectors of the resistance themselves, in order to continue and stay anonymous also attribute some of their actions to Zarqawi,” the source who spoke on condition of anonymity said. “So I think he is inflated by both sides. He is serving the purpose of both sides.” “How could Zarqawi do all these things? It’s grossly exaggerated by both sides,” the source said. “I met somebody who knows what’s going on: he estimated Zarqawi’s followers to (be) no more than 200 people.” In a country where some regions are wracked by chaos and escalating violence, US troops and Iraqi government forces conveniently used the name Zarqawi to explain away a shadowy and multi-faceted insurgency. Former UN weapons inspector Scott Ritter believes that the spectacular spates of attacks blamed on Zarqawi are in fact the work of Saddam Hussein’s former intelligence apparatus. “One cannot help but wonder if al-Zarqawi was used as a lure to trap the Americans into taking this action,” Ritter, a former US marine officer, wrote. “On the surface, the al-Zarqawi organisation seems too good to be true. A single Jordanian male is suddenly running an organisation that operates in sophisticated cells throughout Iraq.” “No one man could logically accomplish this. But there is an organisation that can - the Mukhabarat (intelligence service) of Saddam Hussein,” he added. He sees the Zarqawi phenomenon as a “myth” and a “fictional target” part of a “Mukhabarat disinformation effort” and believes Saddam’s intelligence chiefs had long prepared for the 2003 US-led invasion of their country. And French-based Iraqi historian Hassan al-Zaidi said it was highly unlikely that a foreigner could establish himself as a resistance leader in Iraq, a country where clans and tribes play such a dominant role. “Iraqis tend to look down on Jordanians, a bit like the French do with Belgians,” he added. “They would not accept to be led by a Jordanian.” But Daniel Benjamin, a US analyst with the Center for International Strategic Studies in Washington, warned against falling for “conspiracy theories” which are popular in the Middle East. “Our intelligence people believe that to a significant extent Zarqawi is a real phenomenon, and he’s the real deal. As it’s always the case, and specially in the Middle East, there’s a desire to embrace conspiracy theories,” he said. “He (Zarqawi) appears to be a real terrorist who has carried out a significant number of major terrorist attacks,” Benjamin said, while conceding that “it would not be surprising to find out that he has not done them all.” “But however you cut it, he has proven himself to be a capable actor and a genuine threat,” he added. afp Home | Foreign ---- From a Pakistani paper... |
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#5 (permalink) | |
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Staff Emeritus
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And of course wahabbi's that were gaining a foot hold in Chechnya with their ideology might have to start over fresh in Iraq -good thinking on that & declaring war on the Shia- and may lose what little grasp they had on Chechnya and the attempt at pushing out the resident Naqshbandi school of Sufism. |
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#6 (permalink) |
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WAB Bartender
Defense Professional
Military Professional |
I disagree with most of each of the three articles posted by truong. The foreign fighter problem is MUCH bigger than stated. And Zarqawi's role really is as big as all that.
He leads many, many more fighters than 200; that number is absolutely ludicrous (unless it describes the number of people that operate in close proximity to him, and not the whole structure that he controls). He's been named the Emir of Iraq by Osama; how much bigger can you dam' well GET?!?! That dismissive and sniffy assertion that the US government just WANTS you believe so-and-so, but the writer's evidence shows otherwise is the trick of a professional liar that's posing as a serious journalist that knows more than his colleagues, and he's scooped the credulous naifs with his penetrating analysis and hard-nosed, finely-honed investigative instincts. There is a HUGE number of foreign fighters in Iraq (oddly enough, SOCOM got a brief from CENTCOM about that very subject YESTERDAY), and YES, Zarqawi is a real person, and NO, the government didn't 'invent' him, or inflate his accomplishments to make him a convenient focus, and it is absolutely, completely untrue that Iraqis wouldn't consent to be led by a Jordanian. In short, all three of those articles are crap.
__________________
"The quickest way of ending a war is to lose it, and if one finds the prospect of a long war intolerable, it is natural to disbelieve in the possibility of victory." - George Orwell |
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#7 (permalink) | |
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Defense Professional
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You must have little knowledge of Chechens to state "Iraqi's can't be that much more mercifull over relatives killed in attacks by foreign infiltrators than Chechens "..... Chechens revenge traditions are far beyond what Iraqi's may even imagine |
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#9 (permalink) | |
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Banished
Senior Contributor
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Which in turn is fair play for what the foreign insurgents, like Saudi and Afghan scum do to captured Russian soldiers or civilians which are friendly towards the Russians. I'm sure you've seen some of those beheading videos. I have never killed a person and never am planning to go to Chechnya, but if you allow me to torture a captured Saudi scum, trust me, I will do whatever I can to make him feel miserable. I'll make a hole in his stomach and let rats eat him alive bit by bit :D I hate those ****ers, wahabbi's deserve to die a horrible death. |
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#10 (permalink) | |
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Banished
Senior Contributor
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Quote:
First of all, the wahabbi's never had a firm foothold in Chechnya, Dudayev called them over in the first war purely because he needed more men. The Chechens don't trust them and don't like them but are forced to work with them because they have other choice. The only Chechen wahabbi's are in Shamil Basaev's group, but they are few. Chechen are mountain warriors, wahabbi's are Camel Humping Desert Scum. |
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#11 (permalink) | |
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Military Professional
Moderator |
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__________________
"So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3 |
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#12 (permalink) | |
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Banished
Senior Contributor
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Quote:
Yes, but surely you would not expect a person from Europe or say Asia to believe an article about Iraq written by a newspaper called the Christian Science Monitor. |
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#13 (permalink) | ||
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Military Professional
Moderator |
Quote:
Now, if the title were the "Crusader Times" or the "Jihadi Times," I would whole heartedly agree that any and all articles contained within are not worth reading. But, that isn't the case here. If you would like to educate yourself about the newspaper, you can continue to read below. Quote:
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