leo

I wanted to start a poll on what people think about Saddam harboring or helping Al Qeada with the 9/11 attacks.

At first I thought that as an absolute dictator Saddam wanted nothing to do with terrorist, but I did hear and see other information since then and had a change of mind - now I had to look up some more information and I'm going back to my first opinion, but really do want to know what the rest of ya think and I will try be open minded and to post information on both sides...

First and MOST importantly is the 9/11 Commission's full report w/ a web link to look up more information :

10.3 "PHASE TWO" AND THE QUESTION OF IRAQ

President Bush had wondered immediately after the attack whether Saddam Hussein's regime might have had a hand in it. Iraq had been an enemy of the United States for 11 years, and was the only place in the world where the United States was engaged in ongoing combat operations. As a former pilot, the President was struck by the apparent sophistication of the operation and some of the piloting, especially Hanjour's high-speed dive into the Pentagon. He told us he recalled Iraqi support for Palestinian suicide terrorists as well. Speculating about other possible states that could be involved, the President told us he also thought about Iran.59

Clarke has written that on the evening of September 12, President Bush told him and some of his staff to explore possible Iraqi links to 9/11. "See if Sad-dam did this," Clarke recalls the President telling them. "See if he's linked in any way."60 While he believed the details of Clarke's account to be incorrect, President Bush acknowledged that he might well have spoken to Clarke at some point, asking him about Iraq.61

Responding to a presidential tasking, Clarke's office sent a memo to Rice on September 18, titled "Survey of Intelligence Information on Any Iraq Involvement in the September 11 Attacks." Rice's chief staffer on Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, concurred in its conclusion that only some anecdotal evidence linked Iraq to al Qaeda. The memo found no "compelling case" that Iraq had either planned or perpetrated the attacks. It passed along a few foreign intelligence reports, including the Czech report alleging an April 2001 Prague meeting between Atta and an Iraqi intelligence officer (discussed in chapter 7) and a Polish report that personnel at the headquarters of Iraqi intelligence in Baghdad were told before September 11 to go on the streets to gauge crowd reaction to an unspecified event. Arguing that the case for links between Iraq and al Qaeda was weak, the memo pointed out that Bin Ladin resented the secularism of Saddam Hussein's regime. Finally, the memo said, there was no confirmed reporting on Saddam cooperating with Bin Ladin on unconventional weapons.62

On the afternoon of 9/11, according to contemporaneous notes, Secretary Rumsfeld instructed General Myers to obtain quickly as much information as possible. The notes indicate that he also told Myers that he was not simply interested in striking empty training sites. He thought the U.S. response should consider a wide range of options and possibilities. The secretary said his instinct was to hit Saddam Hussein at the same time-not only Bin Ladin. Secretary Rumsfeld later explained that at the time, he had been considering either one of them, or perhaps someone else, as the responsible party.63

According to Rice, the issue of what, if anything, to do about Iraq was really engaged at Camp David. Briefing papers on Iraq, along with many others, were in briefing materials for the participants. Rice told us the administration was concerned that Iraq would take advantage of the 9/11 attacks. She recalled that in the first Camp David session chaired by the President, Rumsfeld asked what the administration should do about Iraq. Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz made the case for striking Iraq during "this round" of the war on terrorism.64

A Defense Department paper for the Camp David briefing book on the strategic concept for the war on terrorism specified three priority targets for initial action: al Qaeda, the Taliban, and Iraq. It argued that of the three, al Qaeda and Iraq posed a strategic threat to the United States. Iraq's long-standing involvement in terrorism was cited, along with its interest in weapons of mass destruction.65

Secretary Powell recalled that Wolfowitz-not Rumsfeld-argued that Iraq was ultimately the source of the terrorist problem and should therefore be attacked.66 Powell said that Wolfowitz was not able to justify his belief that Iraq was behind 9/11. "Paul was always of the view that Iraq was a problem that had to be dealt with," Powell told us. "And he saw this as one way of using this event as a way to deal with the Iraq problem." Powell said that President Bush did not give Wolfowitz's argument "much weight."67 Though continuing to worry about Iraq in the following week, Powell said, President Bush saw Afghanistan as the priority.68

President Bush told Bob Woodward that the decision not to invade Iraq was made at the morning session on September 15. Iraq was not even on the table during the September 15 afternoon session, which dealt solely with Afghanistan.69 Rice said that when President Bush called her on Sunday, September 16, he said the focus would be on Afghanistan, although he still wanted plans for Iraq should the country take some action or the administration eventually determine that it had been involved in the 9/11 attacks.70

At the September 17 NSC meeting, there was some further discussion of "phase two" of the war on terrorism.71 President Bush ordered the Defense Department to be ready to deal with Iraq if Baghdad acted against U.S. interests, with plans to include possibly occupying Iraqi oil fields.72

Within the Pentagon, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz continued to press the case for dealing with Iraq. Writing to Rumsfeld on September 17 in a memo headlined "Preventing More Events," he argued that if there was even a 10 percent chance that Saddam Hussein was behind the 9/11 attack, maximum priority should be placed on eliminating that threat. Wolfowitz contended that the odds were "far more" than 1 in 10, citing Saddam's praise for the attack, his long record of involvement in terrorism, and theories that Ramzi Yousef was an Iraqi agent and Iraq was behind the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center.73 The next day, Wolfowitz renewed the argument, writing to Rumsfeld about the interest of Yousef's co-conspirator in the 1995 Manila air plot in crashing an explosives-laden plane into CIA headquarters, and about information from a foreign government regarding Iraqis' involvement in the attempted hijacking of a Gulf Air flight. Given this background, he wondered why so little thought had been devoted to the danger of suicide pilots, seeing a "failure of imagination" and a mind-set that dismissed possibilities.74

On September 19, Rumsfeld offered several thoughts for his commanders as they worked on their contingency plans. Though he emphasized the worldwide nature of the conflict, the references to specific enemies or regions named only the Taliban, al Qaeda, and Afghanistan.75 Shelton told us the administration reviewed all the Pentagon's war plans and challenged certain assumptions underlying them, as any prudent organization or leader should do.76

General Tommy Franks, the commanding general of Central Command, recalled receiving Rumsfeld's guidance that each regional commander should assess what these plans meant for his area of responsibility. He knew he would soon be striking the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan. But, he told us, he now wondered how that action was connected to what might need to be done in Somalia, Yemen, or Iraq.77

On September 20, President Bush met with British Prime Minister Tony Blair, and the two leaders discussed the global conflict ahead. When Blair asked about Iraq, the President replied that Iraq was not the immediate problem. Some members of his administration, he commented, had expressed a different view, but he was the one responsible for making the decisions.78

Franks told us that he was pushing independently to do more robust planning on military responses in Iraq during the summer before 9/11-a request President Bush denied, arguing that the time was not right. (CENTCOM also began dusting off plans for a full invasion of Iraq during this period, Franks said.) The CENTCOM commander told us he renewed his appeal for further military planning to respond to Iraqi moves shortly after 9/11, both because he personally felt that Iraq and al Qaeda might be engaged in some form of collusion and because he worried that Saddam might take advantage of the attacks to move against his internal enemies in the northern or southern parts of Iraq, where the United States was flying regular missions to enforce Iraqi no-fly zones. Franks said that President Bush again turned down the request.79

. . .

Having issued directives to guide his administration's preparations for war, on Thursday, September 20, President Bush addressed the nation before a joint session of Congress. "Tonight," he said, "we are a country awakened to danger."80 The President blamed al Qaeda for 9/11 and the 1998 embassy bombings and, for the first time, declared that al Qaeda was "responsible for bombing the USS Cole."81 He reiterated the ultimatum that had already been conveyed privately. "The Taliban must act, and act immediately," he said. "They will hand over the terrorists, or they will share in their fate."82 The President added that America's quarrel was not with Islam: "The enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends; it is not our many Arab friends. Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists, and every government that supports them." Other regimes faced hard choices, he pointed out: "Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make: Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists."83

President Bush argued that the new war went beyond Bin Ladin. "Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there," he said. "It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated." The President had a message for the Pentagon: "The hour is coming when America will act, and you will make us proud." He also had a message for those outside the United States. "This is civilization's fight," he said. "We ask every nation to join us."84

President Bush approved military plans to attack Afghanistan in meetings with Central Command's General Franks and other advisers on September 21 and October 2. Originally titled "Infinite Justice," the operation's code word was changed-to avoid the sensibilities of Muslims who associate the power of infinite justice with God alone-to the operational name still used for operations in Afghanistan: "Enduring Freedom."85

The plan had four phases.

* In Phase One, the United States and its allies would move forces into the region and arrange to operate from or over neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan and Pakistan.This occurred in the weeks following 9/11, aided by overwhelming international sympathy for the United States.
* In Phase Two, air strikes and Special Operations attacks would hit key al Qaeda and Taliban targets. In an innovative joint effort, CIA and Special Operations forces would be deployed to work together with each major Afghan faction opposed to the Taliban. The Phase Two strikes and raids began on October 7.The basing arrangements contemplated for Phase One were substantially secured-after arduous effort-by the end of that month.
* In Phase Three, the United States would carry out "decisive operations" using all elements of national power, including ground troops, to topple the Taliban regime and eliminate al Qaeda's sanctuary in Afghanistan. Mazar-e-Sharif, in northern Afghanistan, fell to a coalition assault by Afghan and U.S. forces on November 9. Four days later the Taliban had fled from Kabul. By early December, all major cities had fallen to the coalition. On December 22, Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun leader from Kandahar, was installed as the chairman of Afghanistan's interim administration. Afghanistan had been liberated from the rule of the Taliban.

In December 2001, Afghan forces, with limited U.S. support, engaged al Qaeda elements in a cave complex called Tora Bora. In March 2002, the largest engagement of the war was fought, in the mountainous Shah-i-Kot area south of Gardez, against a large force of al Qaeda jihadists. The three-week battle was substantially successful, and almost all remaining al Qaeda forces took refuge in Pakistan's equally mountainous and lightly governed frontier provinces. As of July 2004, Bin Ladin and Zawahiri are still believed to be at large.

* In Phase Four, civilian and military operations turned to the indefinite task of what the armed forces call "security and stability operations."

Within about two months of the start of combat operations, several hundred CIA operatives and Special Forces soldiers, backed by the striking power of U.S. aircraft and a much larger infrastructure of intelligence and support efforts, had combined with Afghan militias and a small number of other coalition soldiers to destroy the Taliban regime and disrupt al Qaeda. They had killed or captured about a quarter of the enemy's known leaders. Mohammed Atef, al Qaeda's military commander and a principal figure in the 9/11 plot, had been killed by a U.S. air strike. According to a senior CIA officer who helped devise the overall strategy, the CIA provided intelligence, experience, cash, covert action capabilities, and entrée to tribal allies. In turn, the U.S. military offered combat expertise, firepower, logistics, and communications.86 With these initial victories won by the middle of 2002, the global conflict against Islamist terrorism became a different kind of struggle.


The link to 9/11 Commission Report :

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

An interview w/ FBI agent from 60 minuets :

Interrogator Shares Saddam's Confessions, Tells 60 Minutes Former Iraqi Dictator Didn't Expect U.S. Invasion - CBS News

And on the flip side some possible links of Saddam to Al Qaeda from a UK news paper:

The proof that Saddam worked with bin Laden - Telegraph



All opinions are great and welcomed, but links for the information that can support your opinions are even better...

Thanks ans God Bless

Bluesman

Opinion isn't part of any matter of fact. A poll may be useful in trying to determine what people THINK about something, but it in no way affects objective truth about that thing.

And I can tell you that Saddam's Iraq was just as shocked about 9/11 as the rest of the world. I even wrote a fairly extensive intelligence report to that effect.

But the Iraqi military thought they'd get rolled for it, anyway. They were right, as it turns out, but not because we blamed 'em for it, or thought they were in on it. But we were in a MOOD, and they were dumb enough to catch our eye.

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"The quickest way of ending a war is to lose it, and if one finds the prospect of a long war intolerable, it is natural to disbelieve in the possibility of victory."
- George Orwell

T_igger_cs_30

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FEAR NAUGHT

I don't work here ...I am an analyst!

leo

I agree with you 100% on everything you have said.

And I did just want to know what some people were thinking about the connection between them.

Thank you both for your thoughts and your time to reply on the subject of that very tragic day indeed...

JAD_333

I am of Blue's mind. Saddam shat a brick when he heard about 9/11 and probably knew in that instant that he was doomed. Oddly enough he did little to save himself and made all the wrong moves as the pressure for an invasion mounted. But that is another subject.

Overall, I think we can safely agree that Saddam's intel people had a link to OBL. I would have been surprised if they did not. It's the business of intel folks to nose around. But whether they were up to something involving attacks on the US is a totally separate question, and so far we have no answers. If our intel people find a smoking gun, we'll know about it within days if not hours. So far, the silence is telling.

As for the FBI agent who "lived" with Saddam for so long, it is entirely possible, knowing Saddam's shrewdness, that he gamed the agent. He knew it was his last chance to shape his history. So, he admitted some things to give others credibility. A book can't be far off.

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To be Truly ignorant, Man requires an Education. (Plato)

Bluesman

There was some terrific intel that has made it into open-source since 9/11, re: Saddam's inner circle making panic moves of their families and assets. If they'd been in any way culpable, it would've hapenened in slo-mo BEFORE 9/11, not the first week AFTER, and in such an obvious fashion.

They KNEW they were about to get the hammer dropped on 'em, though, even if they had aught to do with it. And they started making plans to dime out their intel services leadership, just in case we ever demanded that Iraq give us some patsies and scapegoats to slake our blood-lust, which they figgered we'd be in the mood for, because that's how THEY roll, and they thought we'd have to have some public executions to make our public NOT demand that we nuke Iraq off the map. So they were basically going to give up some of their top guys, IF their lives would buy us off. Think about how savage that is.

Looking back, when I wrote the report, I started in a dead-neutral position on the question of whether there was ANY Iraqi involvement in 9/11 (which, by simple good practice, all intelligence reporters MUST adopt to the greatest extent possible when fact-finding). As I researched and steered collection on the question, it became obvious that if Iraq had been involved, it was SO rogue and SO unsanctioned that if these guys even existed (they didn't), they were no more 'Iraqi' than the hijackers were 'Saudi'.

JAD_333

Hadn't seen that. Good point.

I hear you saying they planned to offer up some big fish of theirs to buy up off. I hadn't that. That would be admitted culpability, wouldn't it?

I assume that is more of less our intel position.

Bluesman

No. They thought we were going to frame 'em (again, because that's what THEY would've done).

JAD_333

That's an interesting observation--the idea that those people expected from others what they would done to them. I wonder what that makes us, since we did to them exactly what they would have done to us.

Parihaka

I think I've had one of Shamus's epiphanies.

JAD_333

Is that were the sky turns gold and shiney and a spirit appears to open your eyes to a hitherfore unappreciated truth, or are you talking backgammon here.

Officer of Engineers

I think it's relief from constipation.

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Chimo

glyn

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Semper in excretum. Solum profunda variat.

ned kelly

i juts finished reading "Hubris" by a writer called Michael Isikoff, basically confirming bush et al oversold saddam and any WMD and any iraq/al qaeda connection....the was no atta iraq meeting in Czechoslovakia as previously stated and obviously no WMD....it was used as the excuse to go to war but not true

Shek

But Ned, there were WMD, just nowhere near the expectation, and there were WMD programs that were just waiting to be reactivated.

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"So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3