S-2

A New Course On Iraq (For Democrats, That Is)

His commentary gratuitously affirms the role which the democratic party played in shifting our Iraq policy. Nonetheless, O'Hanlon asserts that we are hardly out of the woods and are facing a long-term commitment.

His approach makes palatable that condition for democrats. O'Hanlon acknowledges the continued failures to achieve reconciliatory legislation. It remains critical to Iraq's long-term "sustained stability" as O'Hanlon credits Kenneth Pollack as phrasing.

Sounds about right.

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"This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski

FibrillatorD

Looks a lot like Obama's plan

Swift Sword

Hi Guys,

I understand what O'Hanlon is saying, but in the grand scheme of things, it would appear to amount to them and those who cross the aisle setting up the Iraqis as scapegoats for Congress's own inability to come up with a better plan.

I am not sold on this idea of tying "our" continued funding to "their" progress in meeting our quotas/deadlines/milestones/benchmarks/however-we-wish-to-phrase-thems.

I think it imprudent and unrealistic to count on Iraqi elites subordinating their own interests in favor of ours (though there is arguably overlap in some areas). Whether or not we can and/or choose to continue funding our own efforts may not concern certain parties in Iraq: it is our problem, not theirs.

Though many in Iraq are benefiting from the continued U.S. presence to be sure, I somehow just do not think enough of them are willing to redistribute their own wealth and power to keep it coming.

Too, it gives U.S. enemies and competitors both inside and outside of Iraq a lever to disrupt activity: meddle in designated key areas enough to to keep U.S. allies in Iraq from meeting the criteria imposed upon them.

I've got no real answers easy or otherwise at this point, but I suspect O'Hanlon's prescription for the Democrats would amount to being a convenient dodge on the domestic political front but ultimately hamper U.S. efforts in the region.

I did not think the invasion of Iraq was a particularly bright idea at the time but it is in our interests to do something useful now that we are there and a bad compromise in Congress will most likely badly compromise U.S. interests in Iraq and elsewhere in the region.

Regards,

William

__________________
Pharoh was pimp but now he is dead. What are you going to do today?

FibrillatorD

There is almost total overlap.

If you disagree, then where do our interests diverge? Is it over the preferred price of oil?
That is defeatism. Iraqis are as rational as anyone. They'll find a way to make things work, once we start pulling the rug out - slowly and steadily. We can't leave our foot in the door either if we're going to be credible.

I don't buy that. If we can get out and leave behind a state that can stand on its own two feet, and can satisfy the major voices in society enough to NOT incite rebellion, then we will have succeeded.

Thus, one of the bigger security things left to do before we leave completely is to DIVERSIFY the Iraqi security forces.

S-2

Let's not forget what O'Hanlon has recommended-

The Case For Soft-Partition in Iraq

or Joe Biden and Leslie Gelb-

Unity Through Autonomy In Iraq

Fibrillator says-

"I don't buy that. If we can get out and leave behind a state that can stand on its own two feet, and can satisfy the major voices in society enough to NOT incite rebellion, then we will have succeeded."

That would be the essence of Pollack's "sustained stability".

I've personally advocated our departure-to Kurdistan. No WMD in Iraq's future, no Baath party, no Saddam Hussein, no Iraqi regional adventurism, a secure Kurdistan. Our work is done except assuring Kurdistan's survival- independant or otherwise.

After that, our influence in shaping Iraq's internal political composition extends to what we can establish and sustain on the ground. We've gone above-and-beyond the "call of duty" to establish a modicum of grass-roots security. Meanwhile we've seen no movement afoot towards a parliamentary reconciliation in the form of unifying legislation. I wonder if we ever shall.

The imperative to do so seems missing.

The absence of Iraq news is interesting. The absence of activity on this board is interesting. Have we surrendered? Have we declared victory? I know that we've achieved huge tactical successes on the ground. This matters in Iraqi communities once racked with violence. But to whom does it matter most-us or them?

We tolerated and sustained an occupation of S. Korea for approximately thirty years (1953-1983) before witnessing the emergance of a reasonably democratic society. This in an internally cohesive cultural framework. How long for Iraq's institutions where such social cohesiveness is absent and minus a clear unifying external threat of communist invasion?

It appears that we're unwilling to abandon Iraq and champion Kurdistan instead, for a variety of reasons. I'm unwilling to abandon Iraq AND Kurdistan. So I'm tied to Iraq, if only to assure Kurdistan's continued existence. That exposes my nation to political blackmail by all parties involved.

We see that now as our presence provides cover for their dissembling and self-serving political intercourse. I hate it but am uncertain of the alternatives. Our blood and money has bought the Iraqis a lot of opportunities which they seem intent upon missing.

The Iraq parliament would change if told that our continued presence could only be assured if they foot the bill. Oil prices being what they are, the cost of providing for our presence would focus and sharpen Iraqi debate and resolution, if only to rid themselves of us.

Just a thought.

Swift Sword

Hi FibD,

Well, for starters, Washington's stated, fervrent interest in Iraqi political reconciliation does not seem to.be fully shared, if you are willing to take progress to date as a metric, at any rate.

As to the preferred price of oil, the state of the Iraqi oil business was well understood before the rush to war and would not have represented much of an incentive to a rational actor, one would think.

If those two oil men in the White House were thinking Iraq was an out for energy security issues, they might just be as dumb as their more loopy critics would have us believe.

That smacks of paternalism and paternalism is part of the reason we are in this whole mess in the first place.

If that is the case, than why all this talk of decades long commitment in some quarters? Sounds like some would like to leave a Hell of a lot more than just our foot in the door credible or otherwise.

Even after the conquerors leave, the carpet baggers with ties to State and Others will surely remain.

There is a school of thought that holds we went to Iraq precisely to remove a state that could stand on its two feet.

As to major voices in society, if the Congress chooses to clearly define targets that will influence policy if they are not met, any minor player will have a shot at derailing the whole shebang.

Besides, a stable, sovereign Iraq would sort of contradict Neo Wilsonian policy imperatives.

Methinks that may be a hard sell to our little Southwest Asian brothers

Saddam Hussein clearly demonstrated Mao's dictum on the point of origin of political power via monopolization of the states security apparatus in the acquisition, accrual and maintenance of power. What makes you think that his successors are blind in the light of such a glaring example and deaf to its Siren?

At any rate, I still say the Democrats idea of tying the funding of our programs to their progress is a bad idea. It shows our house divided against itself and that should be enough to put the brakes on if no other reason can be found. After all, what kind of message does that send to the Iraqis, our allies, and our enemies?

Hope you have a good weekend.

William

Swift Sword

Hello S-2,

While I share you general sympathy for the Kurdish cause, I would like to broad brush paint three issues I have with the partition of Iraq at this point:

1. There could be some hang ups with regards to the U.S. supporting Iraqi Kurds while simultaneously playing softball with Ankara over their Kurdish issues. This would no doubt not escape the gaze of our Kurdish friends.

2. On general principle, I have a predisposition to the opposition of Iraqi partition (gratuitous alliteration ) if for no other reason than ill thought out schemes for the partition of the Middle East are part of the reason we are in the current mess in the first place.

3. Introducing three small, weak actors into the current geopolitical climate in that region strikes me as a recipie for continued friction.

Just a few thoughts on your thinking.

Regards,

William

S-2

"So I'm tied to Iraq,..."

This remains the essential element for myself, regardless of pipe-dreaming. It actually affords Kurdistan a place in the sun to which the Turkish gov't. cannot object, even if not completely independant as a sovereign nation.

"3. Introducing three small, weak actors into the current geopolitical climate in that region strikes me as a recipie for continued friction."

No doubt it is. Still, it's ultimately not our choice whether such nation-states might arise. We'll see if a common ground can be struck between the three main elements. If not, it's on to PLAN B, whatever that might be.

In sum, we've surrendered our freedom of action by tying ourselves irrevocably to Iraq's success such that we may wish for it more fervantly than the Iraqis.

I just don't know on that score.

FibrillatorD

From today's WAPO:
William, back in September the dems called the surge a failure because it hadn't produced security nor the ultimate goal of a long-term political solution. But the surge forged on and now the data proves that over the past three months the military has executed their end of the surge strategy, to a remarkable degree. Equally important, during this time the political reconciliation-end of the surge has not kept pace.

As long as there is this lag between diplomatic success in the form of a political reconciliation and military success in the form of increased security, then the surge has not succeeded. Or at least, it hasn't concluded. But today the dems can't rattle off criticisms so easily like they could in the 2006 election, when the pre-surge strategy looked to be going nowhere on either front.

So the situation has become tricky, politically. The Democrats' success in 2006 elections left them with a weak-broad mandate to end the war, one way or another. Also, in 2006 O'Hanlon advocated soft partition as a "plan B," in case the surge failed. Soft partition, by my judgment, would have been consistent with the Democratic mandate after 2006, because it assumes Shias can't get along with Sunnis. So, acknowledging the military success and the diplomatic failure, O'Hanlon now ditches soft partition in favor of a strong-armed diplomacy driven by a Democratic-led Congress - specifically, its appropriations power. Whether or not his aim is political (to bail out the Dems) is irrelevant. He has the right idea because for once it puts real pressure on Iraq's leaders (although I like Obama's plan better. It leaves greater discretion for the Chief Exec to change course (again) should he have to).

Iraq's patriots appear unwilling to step up under the current paradigm. The carrots aren't desirable till we set a hard timeline for withdrawal, and the sticks aren't painful till Iraqis understand they can extend our security guarantee only by making the hard political decisions.

You can call this kind of rationalizing paternalistic, but it's tough love paternalism, and ultimately good for all parties involved. At least, good in that it is the best way to achieve the big neo-con idea of a democratic oil-producing society in the mideast.

S-2

"Iraq's patriots appear unwilling to step up under the current paradigm. The carrots aren't desirable till we set a hard timeline for withdrawal, and the sticks aren't painful till Iraqis understand they can extend our security guarantee only by making the hard political decisions.

You can call this kind of rationalizing paternalistic, but it's tough love paternalism, and ultimately good for all parties involved. At least, good in that it is the best way to achieve the big neo-con idea of a democratic oil-producing society in the mideast."

FibrillatorD, your summary is excellent. It perfectly captures the intransigence behind Iraq's political stalemate. A change to the political dimension of our assistance is long overdue. The prevailing impasse' has been evident for some time to even mildly interested observers.

Whether positive movement will achieve "the big neo-con idea" is another matter. I suspect Pollack is more realistic. "Sustained stability" is probably all we can hope for in the near-term, particularly given the yet-to-leap legislative hurdles in Iraq and America's declining interest in the matter as it fades from our front-pages.

What evolves over time from that is anybody's guess. My own unabashed neo-con ambitions for Iraq aside, I doubt that I'll ever witness it become a fully empowered democratic state.