S-2

"...a timetable should be set and kept to. however, a force of around 50K-75K is sustainable over some period of time...it will allow our troops to concentrate on defeating al-qaeda, deter turkish adventurism, and if positioned away from the cities, give us a good base for wielding a stick versus iran."

Sustainable? Logistically? Of course. Nationally? At what cost and to what end? I support our forces continuing to exploit our current successes at the local level as completely as possible. We've got momentum here and it deserves continuance. But the horizontal successes we'll likely achieve don't create conditions that necessarily foster reconciled communities. That said, establishing baseline security takes precedence and, to date, our new approach has proved the only effective solution. Still, if effectively pursued, there'll come a time where we'll have reached the natural limits of success. What then, if so? What then if we're stymied, as our continued success itself is not assured?

Are you really worried about turkish "adventurism"? I see their issues with the PKK as legitimate and a severe test of KRG maturity. 3,000 PKK guerrillas appear intractable to the Kurds? Let them suffer the consequences of not even trying.

Do we accrue significant strategic advantage with Iran by having 75,000 troops tied to a time-line along their border? That constitutes about one reinforced corps. How would they threaten Iran in any case without crossing the border as an invasion? If so, there are a veritable bevy of questions that stem from that supposition.

In short, the threat of invasion by their presence must be credible in objective and means. Is it?

AQI in Iraq doesn't, by itself, require the commitment of 75,000 U.S. ground troops for any period of time. I probably can't be convinced that AQI represents a viable direct threat to the United States. Frankly, I can't be convinced that they represent more than a wild-card who's cachet of local credibility is nil.

It's a huge commitment of forces for marginal gain beyond our current objectives. Those are limited objectives based upon realities down on the deck. I believe that we're fast approaching the end of our useful purpose. After that, without a breakthrough to a nat'l reconciliation, we're targets sheparding three nations to a partition from one another.

It'll be an unmitigated goat-screw. Even in Kurdistan.

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"This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski

astralis

S-2,

which is why i favor something of a timeline here, which doesn't necessarily need to be set in stone. what remains to be seen is if we can take the current tactical successes and translate them into strategic victory. if it becomes clear that we cannot, well, there are other missions in iraq that are worth troops.

yes, i am worried about turkish adventurism. how silly would NATO look if turkey, a NATO member, went into US-friendly kurdistan? as you said a while back, kurdistan is really our one unalloyed success story in iraq, and a turkish invasion there would make even that kaput. not to mention the backlash from the kurds.

well, we keep 37,000 soldiers in sk to this very day as a tripwire against the north. if we position troops in large, isolated bases against the borders of iran (would NOT be good for counter-insurgency, but would be good againt this particular threat), well- we let iran know that we have the ability not just to bomb their reactors but to effect regime change. makes them think twice, and puts psychological pressures on the mullahs- at a not overly high cost to ourselves.

how many US ground troops are in germany? given that the middle east will remain highly problematic for the foreseeable future (and is by far the most likely area where the US Army will have a role to play), having a significant level of US troops in the region serves as a visible deterrent- and prepared staging ground in case things go south. part of our transformation efforts is to get boots on the ground at the rate of brigade in 96 hours, division in 120 hours, 5 divisions in 30 days. well- with a certain level of troops in iraq (and the accompanying bases), we can jack up that speed enormously.

__________________
Never let the future disturb you. You will meet it, if you have to, with the same weapons of reason which today arm you against the present.

-Marcus Aurelius, Meditations

S-2

Kurdistan-

Nobody here has sung the praises like me but I've also noted that it's critical that Kurdistan do it's share and that we've the leverage to enforce that effort. To date, it's not been shown. Holding high the example of Kurdistan as an "unalloyed" success requires continuing affirmation. Their behavior on this issue is a major step backwards.

Keeping 37,000 troops as a tripwire is not philosophically the same as keeping 75,000 as a permanent threat of regime-change. Can we put those 75,000 regime changers in Herat? That way they can threaten the taliban while they threaten Iran. Is it a temporary threat? Didn't you mention time-limits somewhere? Will our guys threaten regime change for as long as we've held a trip-wire for S. Korea's defense? It must be credible. It isn't as postured.

"how many US ground troops are in germany? given that the middle east will remain highly problematic for the foreseeable future (and is by far the most likely area where the US Army will have a role to play), having a significant level of US troops in the region serves as a visible deterrent- and prepared staging ground in case things go south."

Accompanied tours? Ski Tabriz with the family? Don't we have considerable force infrastructure in Kuwait protecting access to the Saudis? I like an "over the horizon" power-projection capability anyway. This is hardly the scenario which our forces faced in western Europe and that serves as a particularly weak illustration.

Astralis, reach an accomodation with the Kurds such that they'll ruthlessly pursue the PKK off their soil and you can park 200,000 G.I.s there. But get that agreement first. After that, I'm all over maintaining a massive ogre presence there. I mean it. But not down south where our continued utility ends once we've walled-off every community that's possible.