Bluesman

You have a good eye for spotting Democratic Party perfidy and back-stabbing, ole buddy:

I've already posted this article elsewhere, and gave a purty good broadside to go with it. But I want everybody to see this, and to know what a sewer the Democratic Party has become. I want everybody to have the same awareness as you as to what a rat-bastard Democrat will do to his country's own troops, and his own nation's war effort, in order to capitalize politically.

Anybody still want to claim that they're proud to be a Democrat, and their party's leadership makes them want to work as hard as they can to place Democrats at all levels of government?

__________________
"The quickest way of ending a war is to lose it, and if one finds the prospect of a long war intolerable, it is natural to disbelieve in the possibility of victory."
- George Orwell

smilingassassin

It wouldn't surprise me that when the U.S. and Japan would be so close to convincing N. Korea to give up its nuke plant plans that the Dems would push for resolutions recognising Japanese atrocity's in WW2 and the Tien Amin square massacre....

__________________
Facts to a liberal is like Kryptonite to Superman.

-- Larry Elder

gunnut

I agree with the resolution, just not the timing.

We need Turkey on our side right now.

We needed Turkey on our side during the Cold War.

There was a brief moment in time when such an alliance wasn't that critical. That was between the end of the Cold War and the beginning of War against Islamonazis.

__________________
"Only Nixon can go to China." -- Old Vulcan proverb.

astralis

good to see JAM being challenged; this and that big battle which left 49 JAM guys dead.

----

Cutting a Deal with Mahdi Militants - TIME

Cutting a Deal with Mahdi Militants
Monday, Oct. 22, 2007 By DARRIN MORTENSON/HASWAH

The soldiers joke darkly when they talk about what was left of Iskandariyah's mayor after he was blown up by a powerful roadside bomb called an EFP earlier this month. They have to. The details are so horrible that one either laughs or cries, or falls into that numb, silent stupor known to combat-hardened troops as the thousand-yard stare. They know EFPs are often aimed at them.


The troops perk up and start speaking more soberly, though, when they discuss the recent breakthrough following that ugly assassination, a breakthrough that has left the local chapter of their Mahdi Army enemy reeling and has local U.S. Army soldiers feeling like they've turned a corner in an pivotal area of south-central Iraq.

Last week, after two Sunni men were gunned down by Shi'ite militants in the sectarian hotspot of Haswah, near the city of Iskandariyah, Sunni members of a citizens' paramilitary group led Iraqi and U.S. military officials to the main Haswah mosque, where they told officials that the gunmen were celebrating their recent kill. With permission from the highest echelon of the U.S. command and Iraqi government in Baghdad, a specially-trained Iraqi Army unit raided the mosque while U.S. forces stood by with additional firepower. The Iraqi soldiers returned with a booty no one had expected: several local commanders of the Jaish al Mahdi, including the top commander in the region who came in at number two on Army's most wanted list.

Army officials say they believe the detainee known as Abu Karam gave the orders to assassinate Iskandariyah's mayor and was in charge of special Iranian-trained cells that plant the powerful roadside bombs known as EFPs, explosively formed penetrators, to kill American GIs in this volatile area south of Baghdad. The capture threw the local Jaish al Mahdi into a crisis, leading two top-tier leaders to knock on the gates of the nearby American base two days later asking for an audience with the American commander there. It was the first time the leadership of the JAM, as it's commonly known, had made such a bold overture.

TIME was present at the six-hour meeting as the militants tried to cut a deal. Let them see the top three prisoners and they would shut off all attacks against U.S. forces in Haswsah, they said. The American negotiators were skeptical but nevertheless got approval for the JAM delegation to see the detainees from a distance of about 10 meters in the prison yard. It was a vast departure from the old "we don't deal with terrorists" line of the Bush Administration and early commanders of the U.S. occupation, but quite in keeping with the spirit of a new counterinsurgency strategy taking shape across Iraq that has not only reached out to insurgents but enlisted them in a fight against Shi'ite and Sunni radicals alike.

After the cross-yard engagement, in which the JAM emissaries shouted emotional greetings to the captives that seemed to U.S. officials like veiled attempts to assure the leaders that their capture was not an inside job, the delegation left the U.S. base, obligated by their promise to end the attacks. Even more incredibly, the men left with a promise that there would be a pro-American rally in the town at precisely 10 a.m. the next day, sponsored by none other than the American's main enemy in the region, the Jaish al Mahdi.

Befuddled by the crush of developments and not trusting the JAM, yet curious to see what would happen next, the local American commander sent his men out on night and early morning patrols to the Haswah area as usual, even amid radio reports that the main routes were laden with freshly planted EFPs and that at least 1,000 JAM reinforcements were on their way down from Baghdad's Sadr City, the massive JAM stronghold in the capital. The Americans knew who they would apprehend in the event of a JAM attack: the lead JAM sheik in the negotiation said he would take full responsibility for any subsequent violence.

But the next morning came and went without incident. U.S. troops patrolled the town without being attacked. The parade, which the Americans never took seriously, never took shape. You win some, you lose some, U.S. soldiers joked. Still, nearly a week has passed without violence in Haswah. Meanwhile, the detainees remain in custody and tips from the community keep pouring in in the wake of the recent bust. On Wednesday, U.S. troops in the area were led to a cache of more than 100 copper disks, the deadly projectile component of EFPs. Military officials say it was one of the largest EFP caches found in more than a year and another big dent in the local network of Shi'ite militants bent on planting them. In a region where troops say they often take one step forward for every two steps back, another step forward is worthy of note. Either way, it's a deadly dance in a place where the music never seems to stop.

__________________
Never let the future disturb you. You will meet it, if you have to, with the same weapons of reason which today arm you against the present.

-Marcus Aurelius, Meditations

S-2

So how does our successes move forward nat'l reconciliation? One heavily patrolled, armed, maybe walled, cleansed, but secure neighborhood at a time?

These tribal openings have been the only good news to date. Our troops have shown incredible acumen in filling the gaps. But the backfill from everybody else (diplomats, bueraucrats, technocrats, PRTs, NGOs, etc.) seems lagging given the temporal nature of this window.

Pardon my cynicism as I really admire the breakthroughs achieved by our guys but it highlights to me the severe state of Iraq six months ago that we can find such hope in this modest advance of the most grass-roots nature. It's spreading laterally, and that's really good. How to move this vertically seems the challenge to me.

__________________
"This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski

astralis

S-2,

if the first report continues to hold, we can separate the mahdi army from the populace; then we can begin taking it down as a military organization.

to be honest, i think what these successes in the long-term means is that we may see the organization of iraq into three nominally-affiliated separate states.

however, as long as they're not openly warring with each other, are relatively AQ-free, and have reduced iranian influence, that's good enough given the absolutely desperate situation of a few months earlier, when it looked like the sunni section was going to hell, and the mahdi army had a firm grip on the shi'a.

S-2

"...we can separate the mahdi army from the populace; then we can begin taking it down as a military organization."

This story indicates a local truce arising from an unanticipated bounty. The intel came to us from a sunni civil militia- not JAM elements. We've smartly negotiated a brief visitation. The circumstances here don't indicate anything but expediency on both sides though I freely acknowledge that surprising in-roads are actually being made separating shia villages from JAM.

Further, the so-called 49 killed has been challenged by, it seems, every Iraqi official in Baghdad. Accusations of civilian deaths from helicopter gunship attacks and protestations that the only bodies seen were civilians. Totally indicative of the stink.

If we're gonna see this partition, then why the desire to take down JAM as a military organization? Kurdistan won't give up it's PESHMERGA to the nat'l gov't. Why should a Shiastan surrender the military foundation of it's regional gov't? Do the Badr brigades inherit that mantle? If so, why?

Who defends the sunnis-the national army? Not likely as they're still largely shia-dominated. What happens to the nat'l army in a climate with armed regional armies? Do they play a wild-card role, lending their weight this way and that? Nominally affiliated separate states sounds kinda like the GCC but I bet you don't envision that "separate" do you? As in "sovereign"?

"however, as long as they're not openly warring with each other, are relatively AQ-free, and have reduced iranian influence, that's good enough given the absolutely desperate situation of a few months earlier..."

Your last comments are the most interesting. A very LARGE part of me would love to use those conditions as they exist now to declare victory and split. Maybe even dump on the Kurds and be gone. I do not want the American public funding some arbitration council with uniforms and guns for the next fifteen years. At this pace, it'll be that long before McDonald's shows up.

That, my friend, is the symbol of total victory.

S-2

Astralis,

Remember Iraq

From Friedman-

"It still feels to me as if we’ve made Iraq just safe enough for its politicians to be obstinate, corrupt or reckless on our dime. Even the moderate Kurds must have developed some kind of death wish, allowing their radicals to simultaneously provoke both Turkey and Iran and risking the island of real decency the Kurds have built in the north."

This has also been my impression. We've been subsidizing bad behavior and deluding ourselves that we're witnessing the "growing pangs" of a new democracy.

“'We have created a real case of moral hazard in Iraq,' said Marc Lynch, a Middle East specialist at George Washington University. 'Because all the key players think the Americans are going to bail them out, they have no incentive to make any real concessions to one another.'”

That's only one-half of the coin, Astralis, because all the key players also retain delusions of win-lose scenarios and believe that we'll eventually leave. Is it then a surprise that they use our time, money, and blood to further their ends in preparation for the show-down they envision after our departure?

Anyway, just mulling through SWJ late.

astralis

S-2,

i meant the first story in this thread, in which JAM's unpopularity is going up.

depends on how much we succeed. i would submit that as a baseline we should be like to replace JAM with a less fanatical set of people in which the cult of personality doesn't play such a large role. also one that isn't so explicitly tied to iran. that would probably be the badr brigades, as bad as they are. if we- or rather, the iraqis here- succeed in more than this baseline, hopefully replacing these militias with a real national gov't instead, and a national army.

like it or not, the US army will soon be forced to draw down simply from lack of replacements, and the lack of desire to continue extending deployments. most likely, we're going to be looking at anywhere from 50K-75K troops deployed in iraq throughout the next presidency: the scenario which pentagon planners were looking at as an alternative to the surge. so we'll try to wring as much tactical advantage as we can out of this, and hopefully a well-conducted withdrawal will allow us to avoid the mistake of over-coddling.

it's a damn hard rope-walk here.

JAD_333

A lot of hidden issues are lurking in that state of affairs, but I do hope that when we leave, we leave because we got the job done, not because the water ran out of the canteen.

The whole body of pre-Iraq analysis concerning US resolve in responding to threats is going to be tossed out the window if we walk out of Iraq as having accomplished our main goals there. You will be surprised at the change, and perhaps even proud of it. It is a ways off yet, but to our adversaries and friends, everyday we stay in Iraq and every time we fall down on some tactic and get back up and succeed, gradually convinces the countries in the region and the world that the US will respond to threats to its secuirty and vital interests. It's a new US, or if you will, a reborn US. The dems will be chastized, but prepared to reconcile and even perhaps agree. The only thing I hope never happens is that we unnecessarily put our guys in harms way to prove the dems wrong.

__________________
To be Truly ignorant, Man requires an Education. (Plato)

Bluesman

EXCELLENT points.

S-2

"...we'll try to wring as much tactical advantage as we can out of this, and hopefully a well-conducted withdrawal will allow us to avoid the mistake of over-coddling.

it's a damn hard rope-walk here."

So...in your mind we'll maintain a force of 75,000 or so for the better part of the next administration and who knows beyond that. All for a very likely partitioned Iraq as you've earlier indicated. Astralis, for this marginal end-game we'll continue to make the above level commitment. The only tactical advantage which I can see is the preservation of our forces as they draw down.

Meanwhile, the open-ended commitment of 75,000+ through 2008 and much of the administration beyond doesn't excite me one bit, given the severe operational and strategic disadvantages we accrue for this marginal end-state.

We should pursue stabilization of the nation at the base level through the continued pursuit of neighborhood self-interest (that's what it really is) and leave. Period. That'll rationally use our forces to create the conditions for further progress, should the Iraqis desire to do so. It acknowledges the success we're finding on the ground and carries it forth nationwide. Vertical penetration is a separate issue and neither we nor the Iraqis have found an answer there. We shouldn't try.

"Coddling" will end the moment that we recognize our legitimate obligations and limits of influence and transfer responsibility to the rightful shoulders. Them. To fail or succeed as they see fit. To which we'll adjust accordingly just as every other nation will in whatever eventuality transpires.

astralis

S-2,

i wouldn't want it to be open-ended- a timetable should be set and kept to. however, a force of around 50K-75K is sustainable over some period of time given the increases in the force structure as outlined by SECDEF gates. and there will be very good benefits: as i said earlier, it will allow our troops to concentrate on defeating al-qaeda, deter turkish adventurism, and if positioned away from the cities, give us a good base for wielding a stick versus iran. this force is sufficient for these matters, but insufficient for running the country (the force we have in place today ain't enough for that, anyways).

Bluesman

I haven't been drinking, so I have NO idea how to explain my total agreement with your very sensible post (with one caveat: NO TIMELINES; every decision on troop levels should be predicated on the extant situation on the ground, PERIOD).

Maybe YOU have been drinking.

JAD_333

No matter who has been drinking, S-2's points are reasonable, except I agree with you that no timetables should be set. That is to say, timetables may not reflect realities on the ground. However, conditional timetables based on realities would be workable.