astralis

yellowfever,

because those 150,000 soldiers are NOT doing hunter-killer operations the whole time. they're running patrols, seperating clashing sunnis and shia, clamping down militias, rebuilding neighborhoods...and basically doing many of the jobs that the iraqi government has abdicated.

also, many of the insurgents we're fighting with are not transnational terrorists- they want a piece of the iraqi pie, not america. AQI, however, is a transnational group...

__________________
Never let the future disturb you. You will meet it, if you have to, with the same weapons of reason which today arm you against the present.

-Marcus Aurelius, Meditations

astralis

parihaka,

other than the fact that the core premise of imperialism goes against everything a representative democracy stands for...these days both the would-be imperialist and the natives are a lot less willing (and the natives have considerably greater powers to disagree).

nah, i wouldn't invite the iranians in. or if i would, it'd have to be a grand bargain, somewhat akin to what happened in libya.

not politically feasible, both domestically and internationally.

JAD_333

Is it really so simple? Who are the terrorists and who are the insurgents? What missions do we relinquish to reach the 75,000 troop level? Can those missions be handled by the IA? What if those missions are handled badly and they detract from our purely anti-terrorist operations.

I would expect that the administration and the military command has considered the ramifications of letting go the big steering wheel and taking on a smaller one, and would welcome the brief political relief a move like that
no doubt bring, but I suspect they know damn well that it won't fly. To start with the terrorists led by AQ will simply change tactics and target those missions in hopes fomenting civil war.

I understand your reasoning. Things didn't go well to start with; the war continues; people are being killed; the GOI is stalemated on key issues; the world is against us; the consensus at home perfers a withdrawal over winning. So let's try something else.

You favor the surge and want it to succed, yet you say if it doesn't alter the political equation (to what?) it will be just a "temporary bandage" and we will then need a better idea.

Therefore, if I understand your contention correctly, the antiwar faction here must extol the surge's successes and the do-nothing GOI there must get on the stick on account of it, otherwise the surge no matter how successful militarily will be in total unsuccessful.

Brother, that makes no sense. The primary object of the surge is to increase security in Iraq. With security comes increased government stability, accelerated rebuilding, economic improvement, healing of social wounds and what have you. And all that makes possible the realization of our original goals, and we WIN.

When I say win, I don't mean Roman-style victory parades, gloating, and so on and so forth. I mean having confronted terrorist organizations in the chicken coop, having stabalized a stategic state within the ME, having put teeth in our warnings to countries that support terrorist organizations, and so forth.

We've invested a huge amount and put our troops in arms way to get this result. Our infrastructure is already there. The surge is showing signs of success. Add to it, and go all the way.

I'd venture to say that most Americans who now favor an early withdrawl would have a change of heart if it seemed we were finally turning the corner. As for the code-pinks and their like-minded groups, they'll never change their tune. Forget them. They are not the America we want to wake up and realize what winning and losing means to this country.

So, what is your plan?

__________________
To be Truly ignorant, Man requires an Education. (Plato)

JAD_333

Vietnam was not the outgrowth of escalating attacks on us by terrorists attempting to eject us from an region of vital concern to us, e.g., the ME.

It serves in the present debate only as a prime example of what happens when you try to fight a limited war, when you allow an enemy the benefit of sanctuary in an adjoining country until it is too late, and when you withdraw under political pressure.

It is an example of a withdrawal made to look like an honorable end.

It is also an example of breaking promises of aid made to a country in need.

Korea is little different. There we shrank back from attacking santuaries in China from whence its troops and its air force were protected while they fought our troops. Another limited war for which we still suffer the consequences.

Douglas MacArthur was fired for opposing Truman's limited objectives, and rightly so. But he was right in principle. Once the Chinese decided it had no choice but to save North Korea, then staggering from military routs, he argued that the war must be extended to Chinese territory.

He wanted to cross the Yalu and attack Chinese air fields and supply lines, but Truman and the JCOC feared such a move would risk a land war in China and would bring in the Soviets. Remember this was the early 1950s when neither China nor Russia had the military might it now has.

MacArthur's prologue to his argument was a lesson history teaches us. In war the better course is to win or lose trying. Accepting the halfway course, when victory was possible, of a permanent truce strengthens your enemy in time. Because?...well, look at the world today. We have North Korea, a personal fiefdom for a criminal and extortionist. We have troops tied down in South Korea to protect it from attack. Our military ever since, to counter the communist China and Soviet threat, has had to be larger than it would have been otherwise. And one can even argue that Vietnam would never have turned out as it did had we won in Korea.

S-2

"He wanted to cross the Yalu and attack Chinese air fields and supply lines, but Truman and the JCOC feared such a move would risk a land war in China and would bring in the Soviets."

I don't recall any discussions about the U.N. carrying a land war into China. Truman and the JCS were rightfully concerned about the Soviet Union, but most specifically with Europe.

"...won in Korea."

Unify the nation in 1950? Perhaps, if it didn't lead to us losing Europe as I mentioned earlier. And, yes, it may, under those circumstances, retarded Chinese and Soviet assistance later to the DPRV. But Vietnam would have occurred in any case, I believe. Simply as a different war than that to which it eventually evolved, perhaps. HCM's ambitions for Vietnam always stemmed from his sense of nationalism.

As for N. Korea today, given the risk at the time, our decision to settle for a partial solution was taken in the context of a hostile PRC and Soviet Union, to include the strategic correlation of forces (particularly in Europe) at the time. Further, there were regional implications that extended to Japan and Taiwan's security, not just S. Korea's. On the whole, history would probably support the increasing isolation underwhich N. Korea has found itself. Even it's former allies are now part of a cabal of nations, each more powerful than N. Korea, that surround N. Korea.

N. Korea is experiencing it's demise from "internal contradictions" inherent to Stalinist communism just fine without shedding all the possible blood that might otherwise have been spent fifty-five years ago or so.

"...the do-nothing GOI there must get on the stick on account of it, otherwise the surge no matter how successful militarily will be in total unsuccessful."

The military backdrop of "the surge" is to provide the political conditions for legislation of reconciliation. That's the premise behind the plan. So, yes, "military" success will be meaningless in the face of continued recalcitrance by Iraq's key political factions.

The greatest threat to Iraq is sectarian division. AQI plays upon that but, by themselves, they are a marginal contributor to the Iraqi milieu-and are increasingly isolated as a political player to boot.

OUR issue is transnational terrorism. Where Iraq's and our interests directly intersect is the prosecution of foreign enemies of Iraq upon its soil, i.e. AQI. The only solution for Iraq, though, remains political reconciliation. Without, it likely won't matter how many troops we have there now.

Iraq is no longer an exercise in American determination. Our continuing battle with transnational irhabists will be.

__________________
"This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski

Parihaka

I've got no problems with permanent bases in the north, in fact I'd positively applaud it. My problem is the abandonment of the south. Apart from the moral/humanitarian considerations of the vast majority of people there being peaceful types abandoned to the irhabi, if you want to talk about long term breeding grounds for terrorism, there's your ideal place.

__________________
In the realm of spirit, seek clarity; in the material world, seek utility.
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz

Parihaka

If you are going to go around using military solutions to strategic problems, you'd better get used to the idea of how to conduct imperialism properly, rather than just saying 'it's against our principles'. If the name offends you, just call it regional stabilisation.


So if there was an open book response in the way Gaddafi did, you could see handing the south of Iraq to Iran as an option, yet dismiss the notion of Imperialism?


5 odd years ago it was perfectly possible to invade Iraq but now it's not possible to sack the poorly performing government?
What has brought about this incredible weakening of the Administration?

JAD_333

A little background:

There were no serious discussions in the UN itself that I know of. The Korean "conflict" was technically a UN police action to throw the North Koreans back across the 38th parallel after they invaded South Korean, but it was under the command of a US general and could not have taken place without US forces.

MacArthur was sent in to take command after the north had invaded and had UN troops bottled up near the coast. Thanks to his brilliant landing at Inchon behind enemy lines he was able to take the initiative and rout the north's army forcing it back across the 38th parallel.

Here comes the Yalu part... MacArthur was making great strides in the north and was close to complete defeat of the north's forces when Chinese Migs began to appear in the skies to challenge our air force. He requested permission to bomb Chinese air fields and was denied. Then the Chinese army quietly infiltrated the north and mounted a surprise attack on several fronts. Again MacArthur asked for permission to go after Chinese bases and lines of logistics. He was denied. He asked for more troops and was denied. At first he wanted Formosa to remain out of the battle; then he wanted Formosa in to distract the Chinese.

Truman on the advice of the JCS nixed the idea and when MacArthur started lobbying his friends in Congress and speaking out publicly about our no-win strategy, he was fired.



Yes, you are right. Truman was worried about Soviet retaliation in Europe if we pressed for a win in Korea. That was really the fault of the US having over demobilized after WWII. Stalin gets points for leading FDR to believe he would honor his agreement to allow the eastern border countries like Poland to regain their independence.


Well, you make a point in that there appeared to be a risk at the time. And I am sure that all that followed was predicated on it. But I believe it was also a case of political cold feet and a lack of foresight. Truman was hardly more popular then for the Korean war than Bush is today for the Iraq war.

Our conscience, if we have one, has no place in deciding whether to take up arms. Sounds cruel, doesn't it?

Still, there is always a struggle in our minds over what is right to do when the right course involves bloodshed.

I am torn everytime I express support for military action. I wish with all my heart that the people of the world could coexist without the struggles their governments feel are necessary either for agressive conquest or for defense and survival.

But there is bloodshed in complaisance as well as in victory, and the choice of which course to take is, for this country anyway, always difficult because it ultimately rests on the will of the people, and where the people cannot see the purpose in the fight they will always choose against bloodshed.

Every morning my mind wanders to Iraq and I go over the whole picture--the region, the world, the threats, etc. I do this because I am mindful of the fact that my support for war, however slight, contributes to the bloodshed there. I came to oppose the Vietnam war when our leaders left us nothing to do there but spill more blood. In Iraq we have plenty at stake. We need to win.


Yes, but which comes first? Success of the surge or political success? Should we suppose the surge will fail and therefore give it up, or do we play it out now that it's showing progress? When do we say, 'enough progress, now stop, get out'? September, November...when?

Yes, AQI on a military level is limited, but I liken AQ & OBL to Mao--doctrinaire and dogged pursuer of a caliphate and the downfall of US interests in the ME. Don't take a chance by ignoring the threat.

I agree and therefore, it matters that we secure Iraq; and if we need more troops, send them. But to act on the presumption that more troops won't help and thus not provide them is damning us to events we cannot control.

Iraq never was simply an exercise in determination. I wouldn't support it if it were. I agree our battle is with transnational terrorism and it won't be over with Iraq, but it will one large step closer to over if we prevail in Iraq.

S-2

"...you [Astralis] could see handing the south of Iraq to Iran as an option..." .

Didn't you suggest the same?

"You want a political solution?
Either arrange with the Iranians that they take over administrative control of south and central Iraq in what would probably be a long term solution..."

I'd agree that in either case this arrangement would represent the sort of cynical intrigue associated with the "great game" era of British and Russian Imperial ambitions. As of now, though, the British appear to have already abandoned the south. America's choice seems to be fill the vacumn left by our ally or leave shiastan the responsibility of a shia-dominated Iraqi government. That seems natural enough.

No treaty, no intrigue. We simply don't fill the vacumn left by the Brits departure. This doesn't necessarily abdicate the south to Iran. It does abdicate the south to shia interests, to be defined more clearly in the yet-to-be determined future.

Who'll prevail there? al Hakim and higher, al-Sistani? Perhaps Sadr w/allegiance to Iran? Perhaps Sadr without allegiance to Iran? The Badr brigades and the Mahdi Army have been engaged in some very nasty intra-sect battles around Najef. How about al-Maliki? He is the prime minister and shia. His shia-dominated government has a vested interest, it would seem, in the south. Finally, the Persians. They could, perhaps, directly dominate proceedings or rule under proxy from one or more of the aforementioned elements. Then again, they're Persians and that matters.

My suspicion is this-within Iraq, the kurds wouldn't object to our moving north nor would the shia demand that we cover for England's retreat. That leaves only the sunni, especially the few remaining in the south determined to continue living among a largely shia populace. That would be a human tragedy, quite possibly, but avoidable and not entirely predictable.

As for AQI

"Apart from the moral/humanitarian considerations of the vast majority of people there being peaceful types abandoned to the irhabi, if you want to talk about long term breeding grounds for terrorism, there's your ideal place."

The salafist/wahabbist ideology will find no fertile ground in the hotbed of Khomeinism. Having said that, I could easily conceive of a continuation of the state-sponsored Khomeinist terror which we've seen exported through the good offices of the IRGC and al-Quds to Nasrallah and the boys at POG (Party of God)...and ultimately this is the greater of the two pan-Islamic threats to the west in my view.

But that presumes the dissolution of the Iraqi government, thus it's inability to assert even a nominal influence on the south. Obviously, we're not at that stage yet.

Our strategic and regional interests don't lie in the south yet. Maybe soon, but not now. Frankly, there's little influence which we can directly assert there in any case. Meanwhile, the potential human tragedy to which you refer will be at the hands of shias, should it happen. That may include, perhaps, a shia-dominated Iraqi government.

Without political reconciliation, partition is inevitable- either de facto or formal. It's just not our say at this point. It's the Iraqis, most specifically their government.

S-2

My father served as an M-24 tank commander in the scout platoon of the 70th Armor Battalion (Separate) when they landed at Pusan in August of 1950. His tank battalion was attached to the 1st Cav. Div. in the Pusan perimeter. He fought north with elements of the 7th Cav. Regt. in TF Lynch in September, 1950, linking up with the 7th I.D. south of Kimpo. He earned the Bronze Star (V) assisting the reduction of a roadblock on the Imjin-gang when we crossed into the north. He saw Bob Hope in Pyongyang in late Oct. 1950. The 7th Cav's sister regiment, the 8th CAV, was decimated trying to withdraw through "the gauntlet" less than a week later.

I was born in Formosa in 1955, so I grew up around this stuff, especially the march north. Again, perhaps it was a semantic misunderstanding, but a land war in China entails U.N. ground forces crossing the Yalu. Nothing else could bring a "land war" to China. This is not the same as generally widening the war, either indirectly (Europe) or directly in Korea. As Soviet pilots routinely flew with the PLAAF against the allies, "directly" could only mean Soviet ground forces assisting the PLA and the N.K.P.A south of the Yalu. Those constitute the primary risks that Truman faced by permitting MacArthur to bomb north of the bridges.

"Yes, but which comes first? Success of the surge or political success? Should we suppose the surge will fail..."

My guess is that Petraeus would tell you that achieving a sovereign state of Iraq is far more dependant upon sectarian reconciliation than ending the scourge of AQI. All parties concerned recognize the limits of AQI/ISI in the struggle to achieve a sovereign nation. They are virulent wild-cards, but not more.

Their destructive potential is, of course, magnified by the nature of "virtual combat". To now, AQI and it's corporate headquarters have executed a very effective, globally distributed info ops campaign, drawing recruits to the battles in Iraq and Afghanistan while proselytizing their message throughout the UMMA.

Still, the message is not uniformly welcomed. Not even in the sunni tribes of Iraq, as you are aware. As for the south, the competing shia radical pan-Islamism espoused through Khomeinism represents, in my view, the greater threat to mankind, if fully articulated. Here, the political message of reconciliation can hopefully forestall the shia regions from slipping into the tender mercies of their Persian cousins. But that's nothing to do with AQI, and we've little influence there.

Al Qaeda is a global menace because it's virtual, easily franchised and supported, and the ideology is out of the bag. Whether OBL, Zawahiri, and Mullah Omar are alive or dead is irrelevant at this point. The message has been absorbed throughout the UMMA.

Attacking elements of AQI is only a small, albeit necessary, component of the GWOT. It, IMHO, is distinct however from 1.) establishing a sovereign Iraq, 2.) maintaining our geo-strategic presence over the Persian Gulf region, and 3.) securing Kurdistan as a means of doing so while continuing the process of democratic transformation.

Here is the undiminished key. "Democratic Transformation" has not been, JAD 333, invalidated by OIF-even Phase IV. The ineptness of execution makes problematic the rising of a sovereign Iraq. Kurdistan, upon partition, offers a second opportunity if we fail in Iraq proper.

This isn't a game for us to play. Transforming the ethics and ideals of the middle-east remains a legitimate goal of American foreign policy. It simply must be practiced better in Kurdistan. With a functioning government, a viable economy, and a cohesive society, Kurdistan offers as good, or better opportunities to cash in on this ideological windfall than Iraq.

Right now. Today.

Containing Persian ambitions, battling Al Qaeda and pursuing the goal of democratic transformation in this region are all still very achievable. Those seem to me our over-riding responsibilities.

Parihaka

Yes of course I did. It's a solution that would fit with as you call the great game, what Ray would call realpolitic, and which I like to call imperialism, just to wind up Astralis. Whether this fits with the long term strategic interests of America is another matter, but it would be a compromise between the true democracy now seemingly lost to them judging by the tone of this thread, and the barbarity ensuing from an arbitrary withdrawl.
As far as I can see the level of integration of the Basra area into Iranian financial structures is complete. It is Iranians who are doing the heavy financial investments, and the British have been encouraging this. So will the south belong to Iran? Yes, because it already does.

No indeed, the Wahabis aren't likely to get a strong following in the south, infact what they are going to get is as you say, Al Quds sponsored irhabi attacking Saudi Arabia, and Saudi Arabia has already said that it will intervene if America withdraws.
I would suggest Saudi Arabia is of strategic significance, and so we come back to our first ever discussion, what happens if the house of Saud and the Sepah-e Pasdaran go face to face.

astralis

parihaka,

thanks for winding me up ray's description of it is better. imperialism does involve realpolitik, but realpolitik is not necessarily imperialism.

the first invasion brought down a tyrant in the name of democracy (and WMD violations). now the US is going to bring down a democratically elected government? that's gonna go over well, how?

astralis

JAD,

the primary object of the surge is to buy the iraqi government the space and time needed to come to badly needed political compromises. and my contention is the very one used by petraeus: that if the GOI doesn't fix things up, everything they've done militarily will unravel; it is at best a temporary bandage.

however, it has become increasingly clear that the GOI does not believe in this. they have not made any real moves towards political reconciliation, and without this, increased security is only temporary in nature. government stability, accelerated rebuilding, economic improvement, healing of social wounds...all of this is the GOI's job, not the american military's job. and the GOI is failing.

astralis

this is what i mean. sometimes it is not just GOI incompetence, it is outright belief in the tyranny of the majority. given this, does anyone really believe the government is going to effectively utilize the time and space the surge is providing them?

----

Iraqi, U.S. officials get testy - Conflict in Iraq - MSNBC.com

Tempers flare between Iraqi, U.S. officials
Iraq prime minister reportedly wants Petraeus replaced for arming Sunnis

Updated: 6:15 p.m. ET July 28, 2007

BAGHDAD - A key aide says Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s relations with Gen. David Petraeus are so poor the Iraqi leader may ask Washington to withdraw the overall U.S. commander from his Baghdad post.

Iraq’s foreign minister calls the relationship “difficult.” Petraeus, who says their ties are “very good,” acknowledges expressing his “full range of emotions” at times with al-Maliki. U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker, who meets with both at least weekly, concedes “sometimes there are sporty exchanges.”

It seems less a clash of personality than of policy. The Shiite Muslim prime minister has reacted most sharply to the American general’s tactic of enlisting Sunni militants, presumably including past killers of Iraqi Shiites, as allies in the fight against al-Qaida here.

An associate said al-Maliki once, in discussion with President Bush, even threatened to counter this by arming Shiite militias.

Strained relations
History shows that the strain of war often turns allies into uneasy partners. The reality of how these allies get along may lie somewhere between the worst and best reports about the relationship, one central to the future of Iraq and perhaps to the larger Middle East.

A tangle of issues confronts them, none with easy solutions:

—Al-Maliki, a Shiite activist who spent the Saddam Hussein years in exile, hotly objects to the recent U.S. practice of recruiting tribal groups tied to the Sunni insurgency for the fight against the Sunni extremists of al-Qaida, deemed “Enemy No. 1” by the Americans. His loud complaints have won little but a U.S. pledge to let al-Maliki’s security apparatus screen the recruits.

—Aides say the Iraqi leader also has spoken bitterly about delivery delays of promised U.S. weapons and equipment for his forces.

—Petraeus, meanwhile, must deal with an Iraqi military and police force, nominally under al-Maliki’s control, that often acts out of sectarian, namely Shiite, interests, and not national Iraqi interests. He faces a significant challenge in persuading al-Maliki to shed his ties to radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, who runs the Mahdi Army militia.

—On the political front, Crocker is grappling with the prime minister’s seeming foot-dragging or ineffectiveness in pushing through an oil-industry law and other legislation seen as critical benchmarks by the U.S. government. Reporting to Congress in September, Crocker may have to explain such Iraqi inaction while U.S. troops are fighting and dying to give al-Maliki political breathing space.

First word of strained relations began leaking out with consistency earlier this month.

Sami al-Askari, a key aide to al-Maliki and a member of the prime minister’s Dawa Party, said the policy of incorporating one-time Sunni insurgents into the security forces shows Petraeus has a “real bias and it bothers the Shiites,” whose communities have been targeted by Sunnis in Iraq’s sectarian conflict.

“It is possible that we may demand his removal,” al-Askari said.

A lawmaker from the al-Sadr bloc, who wouldn’t allow use of his name because of the political sensitivity of the matter, said al-Maliki once told Petraeus: “I can’t deal with you anymore. I will ask for someone else to replace you.”

Such a request isn’t likely to get much of a hearing in Washington, where the Bush administration presents Petraeus as one general who can improve the Iraq situation.

‘Maliki needs more leverage’
Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari told Newsweek magazine the Petraeus-al-Maliki relationship is “difficult.” For one thing, the Americans retain control of the Iraqi military. “The prime minister cannot just pick up the phone and have Iraqi army units do what he says. Maliki needs more leverage,” Zebari said.

The prime minister has complained to President Bush about the policy of arming Sunnis, said the Sadrist lawmaker.

“He told Bush that if Petraeus continues doing that, he would arm Shiite militias. Bush told al-Maliki to calm down,” according to this parliament member, who said he was told of the exchange by al-Maliki.

In Washington, White House officials who have sat in on Bush’s video conferences with al-Maliki denied t