Understanding Current Operations in Iraq

**Shek** · 06-26-2007, 07:37 AM

The lastest from the SWJ Blog . . .

Understanding Current Operations in Iraq (SWJ Blog)

Quote:

Understanding Current Operations in Iraq

I’ve spent much of the last six weeks out on the ground, working with Iraqi and U.S. combat units, civilian reconstruction teams, Iraqi administrators and tribal and community leaders. I’ve been away from e-mail a lot, so unable to post here at SWJ: but I’d like to make up for that now by providing colleagues with a basic understanding of what’s happening, right now, in Iraq.

This post is not about whether current ops are “working” — for us, here on the ground, time will tell, though some observers elsewhere seem to have already made up their minds (on the basis of what evidence, I’m not really sure). But for professional counterinsurgency operators such as our SWJ community, the thing to understand at this point is the intention and concept behind current ops in Iraq: if you grasp this, you can tell for yourself how the operations are going, without relying on armchair pundits of whatever political ilk. So in the interests of self-education (and cutting out the commentariat middlemen—sorry, guys) here is a field perspective on current operations.

Ten days ago, speaking with Austin Bay, I made the following comment:

“I know some people in the media are already starting to sort of write off the “surge” and say ‘Hey, hang on: we’ve been going since January, we haven’t seen a massive turnaround; it mustn’t be working’. What we’ve been doing to date is putting forces into position. We haven’t actually started what I would call the “surge” yet. All we’ve been doing is building up forces and trying to secure the population. And what I would say to people who say that it’s already failed is “watch this space”. Because you’re going to see, in fairly short order, some changes in the way we’re operating that will make what’s been happening over the past few months look like what it is—just a preliminary build up.”

The meaning of that comment should be clear by now to anyone tracking what is happening in Iraq. On June 15th we kicked off a major series of division-sized operations in Baghdad and the surrounding provinces. As General Odierno said, we have finished the build-up phase and are now beginning the actual “surge of operations”. I have often said that we need to give this time. That is still true. But this is the end of the beginning: we are now starting to put things onto a viable long-term footing.

These operations are qualitatively different from what we have done before. Our concept is to knock over several insurgent safe havens simultaneously, in order to prevent terrorists relocating their infrastructure from one to another, and to create an operational synergy between what we're doing in Baghdad and what's happening outside. Unlike on previous occasions, we don't plan to leave these areas once they’re secured. These ops will run over months, and the key activity is to stand up viable local security forces in partnership with Iraqi Army and Police, as well as political and economic programs, to permanently secure them. The really decisive activity will be police work, registration of the population and counterintelligence in these areas, to comb out the insurgent sleeper cells and political cells that have "gone quiet" as we moved in, but which will try to survive through the op and emerge later. This will take operational patience, and it will be intelligence-led, and Iraqi government-led. It will probably not make the news (the really important stuff rarely does) but it will be the truly decisive action.

When we speak of "clearing" an enemy safe haven, we are not talking about destroying the enemy in it; we are talking about rescuing the population in it from enemy intimidation. If we don't get every enemy cell in the initial operation, that's OK. The point of the operations is to lift the pall of fear from population groups that have been intimidated and exploited by terrorists to date, then win them over and work with them in partnership to clean out the cells that remain – as has happened in Al Anbar Province and can happen elsewhere in Iraq as well.

The "terrain" we are clearing is human terrain, not physical terrain. It is about marginalizing al Qa’ida, Shi’a extremist militias, and the other terrorist groups from the population they prey on. This is why claims that “80% of AQ leadership have fled” don’t overly disturb us: the aim is not to kill every last AQ leader, but rather to drive them off the population and keep them off, so that we can work with the community to prevent their return.

This is not some sort of kind-hearted, soft approach, as some fire-breathing polemicists have claimed (funnily enough, those who urge us to “just kill more bad guys” usually do so from a safe distance). It is not about being “nice” to the population and hoping they will somehow see us as the “good guys” and stop supporting insurgents. On the contrary, it is based on a hard-headed recognition of certain basic facts, to wit:

(a) The enemy needs the people to act in certain ways (sympathy, acquiescence, silence, reaction to provocation) in order to survive and further his strategy. Unless the population acts in these ways, both insurgents and terrorists will wither, and the cycle of provocation and backlash that drives the sectarian conflict in Iraq will fail.

(b) The enemy is fluid, but the population is fixed. (The enemy is fluid because he has no permanent installations he needs to defend, and can always run away to fight another day. But the population is fixed, because people are tied to their homes, businesses, farms, tribal areas, relatives etc). Therefore—and this is the major change in our strategy this year—protecting and controlling the population is do-able, but destroying the enemy is not. We can drive him off from the population, then introduce local security forces, population control, and economic and political development, and thereby "hard-wire" the enemy out of the environment, preventing his return. But chasing enemy cells around the countryside is not only a waste of time, it is precisely the sort of action he wants to provoke us into. That’s why AQ cells leaving an area are not the main game—they are a distraction. We played the enemy’s game for too long: not any more. Now it is time for him to play our game.

(c) Being fluid, the enemy can control his loss rate and therefore can never be eradicated by purely enemy-centric means: he can just go to ground if the pressure becomes too much. BUT, because he needs the population to act in certain ways in order to survive, we can asphyxiate him by cutting him off from the people. And he can't just "go quiet" to avoid that threat. He has either to come out of the woodwork, fight us and be destroyed, or stay quiet and accept permanent marginalization from his former population base. That puts him on the horns of a lethal dilemma (which warms my heart, quite frankly, after the cynical obscenities these irhabi gang members have inflicted on the innocent Iraqi non-combatant population). That's the intent here.

(d) The enemy may not be identifiable, but the population is. In any given area in Iraq, there are multiple threat groups but only one, or sometimes two main local population groups. We could do (and have done, in the past) enormous damage to potential supporters, "destroying the haystack to find the needle", but we don't need to: we know who the population is that we need to protect, we know where they live, and we can protect them without unbearable disruption to their lives. And more to the point, we can help them protect themselves, with our forces and ISF in overwatch.

Of course, we still go after all the terrorist and extremist leaders we can target and find, and life has become increasingly “nasty, brutish, and short” for this crowd. But we realize that this is just a shaping activity in support of the main effort, which is securing the Iraqi people from the terrorists, extremist militias, and insurgents who need them to survive.

Is there a strategic risk involved in this series of operations? Absolutely. Nothing in war is risk-free. We have chosen to accept and manage this risk, primarily because a low-risk option simply will not get us the operational effects that the strategic situation demands. We have to play the hand we have been dealt as intelligently as possible, so we're doing what has to be done. It still might not work, but "it is what it is" at this point.

So much for theory. The practice, as always, has been mixed. Personally, I think we are doing reasonably well and casualties have been lower so far than I feared. Every single loss is a tragedy. But so far, thank God, the loss rate has not been too terrible: casualties are up in absolute terms, but down as a proportion of troops deployed (in the fourth quarter of 2006 we had about 100,000 troops in country and casualties averaged 90 deaths a month; now we have almost 160,000 troops in country but deaths are under 120 per month, much less than a proportionate increase, which would have been around 150 a month). And last year we patrolled rarely, mainly in vehicles, and got hit almost every time we went out. Now we patrol all the time, on foot, by day and night with Iraqi units normally present as partners, and the chances of getting hit are much lower on each patrol. We are finally coming out of the "defensive crouch" with which we used to approach the environment, and it is starting to pay off.

It will be a long, hard summer, with much pain and loss to come, and things could still go either way. But the population-centric approach is the beginning of a process that aims to put the overall campaign onto a sustainable long-term footing. The politics of the matter then can be decisive, provided the Iraqis use the time we have bought for them to reach the essential accommodation. The Embassy and MNF-I continue to work on these issues at the highest levels but fundamentally, this is something that only Iraqis can resolve: our role is to provide an environment in which it becomes possible.

All this may change. These are long-term operations: the enemy will adapt and we'll have to adjust what we're doing over time. Baq’ubah, Arab Jabour and the western operations are progressing well, and additional security measures in place in Baghdad have successfully tamped down some of the spill-over of violence from other places. The relatively muted response (so far) to the second Samarra bombing is evidence of this. Time will tell, though....

Once again, none of this is intended to tell you “what to think” or “whether it’s working”. We’re all professional adults, and you can work that out for yourself. But this does, I hope, explain some of the thinking behind what we are doing, and it may therefore make it easier for people to come to their own judgment.

David Kilcullen is Senior Counterinsurgency Adviser, Multi-National Force—Iraq. These are his personal views only.

Danielk · 06-26-2007, 12:00 PM

Very good read.

Thanks shek

S-2 · 06-26-2007, 16:12 PM

http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/...ntsvictory.pdf

Cordesman reviews current operations in Baquba and relates them to the overall condition of Iraq.

"...Giving tactical victories lasting meaning requires the following additional elements:

1. Iraqi Army forces must begin to take over meaningful operations without US embeds and US partner units, and dependence on US reinforcement and
support. There does seem to be increasing Iraqi Army capability here, but
Coalition reporting does not provide a useful picture of progress – merely grossly inflated figures on areas of responsibility and total numbers of battalions in the lead.

2. Iraqi police and local security forces must establishing a lasting security
presence in the areas where tactical victories are won, and do so credibly in
ways that give ordinary Iraqis security. There can be no “win” without “hold.”
So far, the US has made claim after claim to have secured cities after winning
tactical battles to control them, and has never actually established lasting security in even one of them. The most critical problem has been the lack of active, combat-capable police, without corruption and sectarian or ethnic ties. Falluja and Samara are only the most obvious cases of such failures.
Coalition reporting so far talks about the number of police posts established. It has not said a word about the ability to provide lasting security using Iraqi police in parts of Baghdad or anywhere else. It also has not talked about the ability to support police efforts with an effective local criminal justice and court system or to screen detainees in ways that do not breed local hostility.
The Coalition also needs to start talking about who actually does provide local
security, and stop treating militias, local security forces, and police hired locally without Coalition training as if they are always hostile or do not exist. In the real world, these forces and not the “trained and equipped” police are the real local security forces in most of Iraq. There has to be a credible plan to use, absorb, or contain them.

3. The Iraqi government must follow-up security with a meaningful presence and by providing steady improvements in services. “Winning hearts and minds”
doesn’t come from public information campaigns and propaganda. It comes from providing real security for ordinary Iraqis, and showing the government cares, is present, and can steadily improve services. Once again, promise after promise has been made in past campaigns, and the central government has not yet shown it can follow up in even a single case. If this is happening even in the “secured” areas of Baghdad, no one has yet said so. How it can happen in Diyala or other high threat areas is unclear.

4. There must also be effective local government. The liberation of various areas often has seen the emergence of local leaders willing to work with the Coalition –although often with little faith in, or ties to, the central government. In most cases, however, they have become targets, and the effort has broken down in local factional disputes or because of a lack of effective government support and problems in Coalition civil affairs efforts. Once again, if there is progress in creating stable, survivable, effective local government; none of the details are clear.

5. There has to be economic aid and progress. Iraqis have to give priority to
physical security and key services, but unemployment, underemployment, and
shut or failed businesses affect some 60% or more of Iraqis nationally and the
figures are even higher in high threat and combat areas. The strategy President Bush announced in January 2007 advanced proposals for accomplishing such an effort in Baghdad. Once again, there has been no meaningful Coalition reporting on broad progress in such efforts in the secured areas of Baghdad, and past promises such aid would be provided in “liberated” cities like Samara and Falluja were not kept.

6. There must be an end to sectarian and ethnic cleansing and displacement.
There is no near and perhaps midterm answer to suicide bombings and atrocities, to attacks on sacred shrines and critical facilities. No mix of security forces can stop even small cadres of extremists from occasional successes. No tactical victory has meaning, however, unless Iraqis can be secure in neighborhoods and areas where they are in the minority, and can reach across ethnic and sectarian lines and barriers in ordinary life.
One of the greatest single failures of the current approach to fighting in Iraq is that it does not track sectarian and ethnic separation and displacement and make ending this on a local and national level at least as important as halting major attacks and killings. It may take years to make Iraqis secure from Islamist extremists and the worst elements of Shi’ite gangs and militias.

There can be no meaningful tactical success, however, unless Iraqis can be safe from their own neighbors and begin to lead ordinary lives in their own neighborhoods..."

As Cordesman indicates, our military operations represent only a component of the overall requirements to stabilize Iraq and make viable its government. As presently conceived, it's fine that 80% of AQI's Diyala leadership has moved on according to Kilcullen, so long as we secure the population remaining behind. I'd agree, in theory. On the ground, again as Cordesman points, there are serious flaws to this concept that largely stem from the Iraqi government and military that raise fundamental questions to eventual success, much less any meaningful near-term progress.

Iraq's challenges are MASSIVELY larger than any over-publicized, under-staffed military operation can reasonably address. I can't help but be convinced that the issues and salvation increasingly reside with the Iraqis, not us. Sadly, with each passing day, Iraqi talent drains away from the nation as divisions only grow deeper among those remaining

.

Feanor · 06-27-2007, 00:16 AM

The U.S. doesn't have the troops to secure Iraq. The troops surge was a step in the right direction, but it was way too small.

Ray · 06-27-2007, 03:48 AM

The problem of CI is that while one can clear an area of insurgents, they must also ensure that that area is not repopulated by the insurgents again.

That is the hard part.

The local people in that area have hardly any say since they are fed up with the disruption of their daily lives by both the sides.

If they side with the insurgent, the govt troops will sort them out and if they are with the govt, the insurgents will KILL them.

Therefore, it safer NOT TO BE KILLED, which the media gleefully reports as people are with the militants!

Likewise, the Human right pinkos will be told of govt atrocities, because if they tell about the militants, then they will be killed!

That is the Cross one has to bear.

Hearts and minds are won within the hearts and minds of a large majority but those hearts and minds won cannot speak out, because they will be killed by the militants!

A mugs game!

S-2 · 06-28-2007, 10:08 AM

Hard bargaining - Council on Foreign Relations

"...Many critics of the war now hope that a threat of US withdrawal will provide this lever. Senator Carl Levin, for example, has long argued that the US military presence serves as a crutch that enables Iraqis to avoid painful compromise and hard bargaining, and that only a timetable for removing this crutch can compel them to face facts and swallow a settlement.

The administration, by contrast, sees its troop surge as the means to reconciliation. In its view, chaos in Baghdad has pushed politics aside in favor of sectarian self-defense and the vengeance of militias. By deploying enough troops to bring security to the capital, the administration hopes to create breathing room and a political space within which a deal can be struck.

Neither view is sound. Instead, if there is any hope of a peaceful solution to Iraq’s civil war, it will require a new strategy in which military force is tied much more actively to ongoing political negotiations. Rather than merely creating space for diplomats to talk, our military must provide the leverage needed to drive unwilling factions toward compromise.

The surge will give us 160,000 heavily armed troops in Iraq. This is not enough to secure the whole country, but it is enough to provide some powerful sticks and carrots. Used selectively to threaten factions that do not compromise and assist those that do, American military power can be an important tool for negotiators..."

Biddle is an interesting guy, well credentialed and thoughtful.

"...:Iraq’s factions reject reconciliation, and will continue to reject it until outside pressure forces them to compromise..."

He assesses our current chance for success as slim and offers a radically different view of the employment of U.S. ground forces to politically leverage the various factions. While intrigued, I assess our chances as nil and have long preferred a re-deployment of our forces to Kurdistan.

I frankly think that our nation cannot stand another protracted public debate on strategy such as we went through from last May, 2006 through January 2007. Too long, too cumbersome, too public. Worst, too late, even then. As such, I think that we've committed ourselves to Petraeus' plan until it succeeds or our patience is exhausted.

I bet on the latter.

**astralis** · 06-28-2007, 17:33 PM

S-2,

Quote:

I frankly think that our nation cannot stand another protracted public debate on strategy such as we went through from last May, 2006 through January 2007. Too long, too cumbersome, too public. Worst, too late, even then. As such, I think that we've committed ourselves to Petraeus' plan until it succeeds or our patience is exhausted.

from the view of an outsider, it seems to me that petraeus's plan is a good counter-insurgency plan. but the gravity of the fighting has shifted to sectarian warfare, and then such a plan seems less applicable.

taking one example, a lynchpin of this idea is to have the iraqi army hold the areas we clear. however, if the shi'a portion of the iraqi army decide to engage in a bit of ethnic cleansing in a "cleared" spot...

S-2 · 06-28-2007, 20:03 PM

I'm not opposed to the tenets resting behind Petraeus' plan. Not at all. Nor do I necessarily endorse Biddle's thoughts. Astralis, I'm simply taking heed of America's domestic political climate.

The Republican party is developing sizable schisms within its ranks. We face the real possibility that enough votes may swing to enable the next democratic-sponsored timeline/budget to over-ride any veto. Meanwhile, by my count, we spent about eight and one-half months wringing our hands while developing consensus (of sorts) on an under-resourced strategy constrained by unrealistic expectations and afforded WAY too little time with some arbitrary mid-September reporting timeline.

What, reasonably, can we expect Petraeus to report to Congress in mid-September - that Iraqi forces have shown huge strides in "standing up"? Correct me if I'm wrong but everything that I THINK I've heard from Dana Pittard, Douglas Lute, and Michael Yon (yup, read him too!) says that these boys ain't near ready to HOLD after we CLEAR.

Seen any hints of political reconciliation? I haven't sensed one iota of change within Iraq's political climate- certainly not the security of Baghdad, as yet. Anbari sheiks deciding that their future decisively doesn't exist with AQI isn't necessarily a ringing endorsement of the Iraqi government. How embarassing to have the al-Anbari sheiks bombed in a hotel used by the Chinese as their embassy, which I presume resides nicely within the "green zone".

Do our local sectarian militias appear disciplined and under control of their leaders? Maybe the Peshmerga, but after that, I suspect neither al-Hakim nor Sadr have a clue who's doing what down where the rubber meets the road. Meanwhile, aren't those two tossing lead at each other down in Amara-or at least their hard-to-handle minions?

Petraeus is charged with a near impossible task, plain and simple. It would help dramatically if we KNEW that we'd be there, in force, for the next ten years.

Or left altogether for cooler climes.

S-2 · 07-06-2007, 04:34 AM

NYT Link

An interesting article discussing a myriad of problems- 1.) Shia-dominated provincial and national leaders reluctant to empower sunni communities, 2.) Corrupt Interior Ministry officials, 3.) AQI., 4.) An absence of Sunni tribal networks.

None of this stopped Cpt. Ben Richards, CDR B Troop, 1-14 CAV, who's slowly integrating the small village of Buhritz (sounds German to me) into his defense network. Why and how?

The town sits astride one of AQI primary LOCs into Baquba from rural staging areas. So extensive are the arms caches, munitions, and other supplies as well as AQI troops that our forces are calling the rural areas surrounding Baquba as Al Qaeda FOB.

Richards has managed to foster some tenuous but growing ties with local sunni community leaders and former (current?) members of the Sunni 1920s Revolutionary Brigades.

Swift Sword should enjoy the irony of our working with former sunni insurgents, no doubt all also on the Saudi payroll as proxies.

A very good read by Michael Gordon.

nabilfannoush · 07-06-2007, 16:52 PM

Bottom line: You can dress it up and analyze to bits, but it's still a mess and a series of serious bungles. I've known Iraq and Iraqis all my life, and in spite of the efforts of the good American soldiers on the ground this is going nowhere. sorry

Ray · 07-07-2007, 01:39 AM

So, what is the answer?

What are your suggestions?

JAD_333 · 07-07-2007, 03:07 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Ray

So, what is the answer?

The answer is 100,000 more troops, majority support by the American people, a commitment to victory, a strategy of retake and hold population centers; out-of-country training of Iraqi military and police recruits, shutting up the brass from discussing gains, a crash program to repair infrastucture with emphasis on medical care and shorten tours of duty to no more than 6 months in country. All or most of which we won't do because of political weakness, popular opposition, fear of the draft, and US policy of pretending there is an Iraqi government.

Plain and simple, we are trying to win a war with less force than is required to win it. We have the force but won't use it because we have to maintain forces elsewhere. If this is the prescription the US intends to stick to in future wars, we will lose them all.

nabilfannoush · 07-07-2007, 05:46 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Ray

So, what is the answer?

What are your suggestions?

Sorry didn't get back to you right away, Ray. Time difference.

An answer or a suggestion? That's the million dollar question everyone's hoping for an answer. One thing for sure: The Bush Administration and armed forces don't have it, or even get it. One can't help but think that the moment an American soldier, good honorable capable soldier that he is, set foot on Iraqi soil it was already too late.

Like I said I've known the country and its people for a very very long time and one has to understand that increasing foreign military intervention is actually a factor to the problem: It is providing various radical armed factions the 'grounds' and 'purpose' for armed conflict, misguided and outrageous as they are. Take a look at what's happening there right now. i've been there: even the two bitter enemies Sunni insurgents and radical Shi'ite elements are fighting the US forces there tooth and nail, no matter what the media says, with heavy casualties in US forces and the helpless civlian population. And now Al-Qaeda has a foothold in the country because after the chaos ensuing the invasion it is now a place where they can target Americans and blow up civilians in the name of 'Jihad' against Americans and 'traitors' who 'help them',
(yes, I know that there are certain people in the Bush administration who say that Saddam Hussien was an ally of Al-Qaeda, but anyone who is familiar with the Iraqi regime before-Americans included- would tell you that this is impossible and not even worth discussing).
It's hard to say this, but I don't see any quick fix for the mess in Iraq now. Any fix is going to have be long-term, arduous, and any desire for a particular political system will have to be at least for now put aside until the basics for stability have been acheived, and I'm afraid a lot more blood has to be shed, lives lost and property destroyed before things start to improve, and for things to improve the Iraqis themselves need to follow a a self-imposed strategy of enforcing relative peace and the world community as a whole must be more active in the rehab process in a positive and not a solely military role, particularly the neighboring nations that share at least a partial understanding of Iraqis and connecting to them: You can fence yourself in, but you can't shut the entire world out. Eventually the conflict will cave from internal and external pressures ( a situation that bears several certain similiarities with what happened in Northern Ireland).
What's worrisome is that there are noises in the White House about an increase in US forces there. This has long ceased being a solely military situation and such an increase for the reasons I've stated above will only complicate the situation further. This has to stop, or Vietnam, Northen ireland and post-soviet Afghanistan will pale by comparison

JAD_333 · 07-07-2007, 14:27 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by nabilfannoush

An answer or a suggestion? That's the million dollar question everyone's hoping for an answer. One thing for sure: The Bush Administration and armed forces don't have it, or even get it. One can't help but think that the moment an American soldier, good honorable capable soldier that he is, set foot on Iraqi soil it was already too late.

The answer is so obvious that we gloss past it as if it was a pipedream. It's total commitment. That is to say, commitment of whatever it takes to turn the tide; only when the tide is turned can the commitment be deemed adequate. We are not at that point and have never been, in part because of the early Rumsfeld policy of limited commitment. You cannot fight a war or an insurgency successfully with a commitment limited by non-military considerations.

I don't see that it is too late yet, but if the waste inherent in partial measures continues, a withdrawal is not only inevitable, but ought to proceed immediately. Partial measures by their nature don't achieve lasting progress. They just bleed a nation dry of resources and will, and leave it impotent to deal with future threats. The US is becoming the mouse that roared. Lack of follow through is being added to its international profile.

We are in a dilemma. Apparent lack of lasting progress has swung public opinion around to where it believes we cannot succeed, yet it opposes the commitment necessary to succeed. Congress follows, as is expected in a representative democracy, by offering up an insipid compromise that simultaneously demands progress by fall but virtually blocks the level of commitment needed to achieve success. It's like continuing to build a highway that you know you won't finish.

Quote:

What's worrisome is that there are noises in the White House about an increase in US forces there. This has long ceased being a solely military situation and such an increase for the reasons I've stated above will only complicate the situation further. This has to stop, or Vietnam, Northen ireland and post-soviet Afghanistan will pale by comparison

The noises will continue to be noises because at this very moment there is no political will in Congress to fund the level of commitment needed to succeed. An October Surprise is always possible, a Gulf of Tonkin event to swing public opinion around. But I agree with you, it has to stop as it is. I feel the same way about Iraq as I did Vietnam. If we aren't willing to do what it takes to win, end it, for logically it makes no sense to continue when you know you are going to quit short of your goal.

Just a personal note. I take a hardline on fulfilling our objectives, whether they are military or political, for three reasons:

first, I believe it is more wasteful of time, material and life to put one foot in rather than two;

second, I believe the prevention of future conflicts depends heavily on the world's perception that we back up our threats to the hilt;

and third, I believe that following the principle of both-feet-in-or-none will make us much more selective in chosing when to use military force in the future.

Personal note: I am always uneasy shooting my mouth off about things that involve people dying when my life is not on the line. We have guys over there facing violent death everyday. I wonder what I would think about it all if I had to join them tomorrow. What do the military pros here think about it from their perspective--how the pols act and when public opinion is against what you're doing, so on?

nabilfannoush · 07-07-2007, 16:21 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by JAD_333

The answer is so obvious that we gloss past it as if it was a pipedream. It's total commitment. That is to say, commitment of whatever it takes to turn the tide; only when the tide is turned can the commitment be deemed adequate. We are not at that point and have never been, in part because of the early Rumsfeld policy of limited commitment. You cannot fight a war or an insurgency successfully with a commitment limited by non-military considerations.

I don't see that it is too late yet, but if the waste inherent in partial measures continues, a withdrawal is not only inevitable, but ought to proceed immediately. Partial measures by their nature don't achieve lasting progress. They just bleed a nation dry of resources and will, and leave it impotent to deal with future threats. The US is becoming the mouse that roared. Lack of follow through is being added to its international profile.

We are in a dilemma. Apparent lack of lasting progress has swung public opinion around to where it believes we cannot succeed, yet it opposes the commitment necessary to succeed. Congress follows, as is expected in a representative democracy, by offering up an insipid compromise that simultaneously demands progress by fall but virtually blocks the level of commitment needed to achieve success. It's like continuing to build a highway that you know you won't finish.

The noises will continue to be noises because at this very moment there is no political will in Congress to fund the level of commitment needed to succeed. An October Surprise is always possible, a Gulf of Tonkin event to swing public opinion around. But I agree with you, it has to stop as it is. I feel the same way about Iraq as I did Vietnam. If we aren't willing to do what it takes to win, end it, for logically it makes no sense to continue when you know you are going to quit short of your goal.

Just a personal note. I take a hardline on fulfilling our objectives, whether they are military or political, for three reasons:

first, I believe it is more wasteful of time, material and life to put one foot in rather than two;

second, I believe the prevention of future conflicts depends heavily on the world's perception that we back up our threats to the hilt;

and third, I believe that following the principle of both-feet-in-or-none will make us much more selective in chosing when to use military force in the future.

Personal note: I am always uneasy shooting my mouth off about things that involve people dying when my life is not on the line. We have guys over there facing violent death everyday. I wonder what I would think about it all if I had to join them tomorrow. What do the military pros here think about it from their perspective--how the pols act and when public opinion is against what you're doing, so on?

First, your personal note: I do not believe you are any less a person-nor anyone lese here-by not being there and talking as you do. At the end of the day US troops need and deserve the support of loved ones at home. They put their lives on the line in admirable loyalty and commitment, and must be honored for it.

But I'm sorry. Everything you said is not relevant to the facts on the ground. You are talking as if it was a crusade against a fascist Hitler in the second world war. It isn't. This has nothing to do with fortitude or the commitment of the US armed forces, in fact, the dogged persistence of their presence in all this time proves that they are extremely commited to accomplishing operations and doing their given duties without any complaint.
But this is the solution to the wrong problem. Again, and I cannot stress this too much, the US administration simply is not understanding the Iraqis and is not trying to. It's like when a body is ravaged by an unknown fever and is being injected randomly by irrelevant serums that are only making things worse. Let's play the scenario and see what happens: Right now, the US army is facing Sunni insurgents, Shi'ite militias, foreign armed elements intent on killing Americans and 'infidels' and from what I know of Iraqis, they're probably starting to have trouble from Kurdish sepradists elements in the north, at the same time fighting each other...Let's say that Congress approves sending more troops, this solves nothing, unless the US policy is simply killing and butchering enough people til there is less of them fighting, something which leaders from the previous regime were arrested and hanged for doing, and in this case your 100,000 is not nearly enough anyway. In the meantime, Iraqi civilians who have absolutely nothing to do with all this are tired, ill-fed, sick and scared and are lacking the basic emenities of life, and those are the lucky ones who are not being killed on a daily basis who are beyond count, something which, and I am deeply sorry to have to say this, Iraqis did NOT suffer under Saddam hussien sadistic and inhumanly cruel dictator that he was...They are the real victims here of uninformed irresponsible descisions of hacks thousands of miles away sending their brave sons and daughters to kill and die with such an insignificant return it makes Vietnam resemble a soccer friendly. This isn't rhetoric or theory, the numbers and the situation on the ground speak for themselves. 3000 brave american soldiers die, civilians are massacared on a daily basis in numbers so large and beyond count they lost meaning, property and infrastructure destroyed so badly the populace live like medeival serfs, 'officials' are either corrupt or ill-suited for their jobs, and I wish there improvement prospects, there aren't. And what 'solution' is that imbecile Bush contemplating? Sending in more troops.
I have been an analyst for a long time, and I have known the region and its people for far longer, and I have never studied or seen anything like this so-called 'stick to the course' policy followed and its disastrous effects. it is so incredibly irresponsible and uninformed and incompetent and stubborn to the point of being criminal. Even if one does take it by the merits, nothing and I mean nothing is worth this unmitigated catastrophe. What's the point of trying to bring civilized human values such as sufferage if while you're trying to do it people are subjected to such barbaric destruction and genocide?
Even on a strictly military and strategic point of view the merits are meaningless: All rhetoric aside, the American servicemen and women there are performing their tasks with effeciency and devotion admirably, but to what? They are like the referee who is constatly being betrayed and attacked by the sides he is arbiting. Strategic objectives cannot exist simply because the conditions on the ground won't let you form any, so what's the point or even long-term goals of offensive operations to be obtained by the forces already there, let alone sending more troops? There are none.

I am sorry, but there it is. This is a long post, and I can just go on and on for far longer giving a point-by-point specific account on why this whole sorry affair is a complete disaster on all terms humanitarian and practical, but the bottom line is : For this to start improving the one thing it does NOT need is further irritation by sending in more guns, and what's more, everybody's starting to see it, including americans. You only have to look at polls to see it.

06-26-2007, 16:12 PM	#3 (permalink)
S-2 *Military Professional* Join Date: 09-11-06 Location: Portland, Oregon Posts: 2,105 Country:	Another Perspective on Current Ops. http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/...ntsvictory.pdf Cordesman reviews current operations in Baquba and relates them to the overall condition of Iraq. "...Giving tactical victories lasting meaning requires the following additional elements: 1. Iraqi Army forces must begin to take over meaningful operations without US embeds and US partner units, and dependence on US reinforcement and support. There does seem to be increasing Iraqi Army capability here, but Coalition reporting does not provide a useful picture of progress – merely grossly inflated figures on areas of responsibility and total numbers of battalions in the lead. 2. Iraqi police and local security forces must establishing a lasting security presence in the areas where tactical victories are won, and do so credibly in ways that give ordinary Iraqis security. There can be no “win” without “hold.” So far, the US has made claim after claim to have secured cities after winning tactical battles to control them, and has never actually established lasting security in even one of them. The most critical problem has been the lack of active, combat-capable police, without corruption and sectarian or ethnic ties. Falluja and Samara are only the most obvious cases of such failures. Coalition reporting so far talks about the number of police posts established. It has not said a word about the ability to provide lasting security using Iraqi police in parts of Baghdad or anywhere else. It also has not talked about the ability to support police efforts with an effective local criminal justice and court system or to screen detainees in ways that do not breed local hostility. The Coalition also needs to start talking about who actually does provide local security, and stop treating militias, local security forces, and police hired locally without Coalition training as if they are always hostile or do not exist. In the real world, these forces and not the “trained and equipped” police are the real local security forces in most of Iraq. There has to be a credible plan to use, absorb, or contain them. 3. The Iraqi government must follow-up security with a meaningful presence and by providing steady improvements in services. “Winning hearts and minds” doesn’t come from public information campaigns and propaganda. It comes from providing real security for ordinary Iraqis, and showing the government cares, is present, and can steadily improve services. Once again, promise after promise has been made in past campaigns, and the central government has not yet shown it can follow up in even a single case. If this is happening even in the “secured” areas of Baghdad, no one has yet said so. How it can happen in Diyala or other high threat areas is unclear. 4. There must also be effective local government. The liberation of various areas often has seen the emergence of local leaders willing to work with the Coalition –although often with little faith in, or ties to, the central government. In most cases, however, they have become targets, and the effort has broken down in local factional disputes or because of a lack of effective government support and problems in Coalition civil affairs efforts. Once again, if there is progress in creating stable, survivable, effective local government; none of the details are clear. 5. There has to be economic aid and progress. Iraqis have to give priority to physical security and key services, but unemployment, underemployment, and shut or failed businesses affect some 60% or more of Iraqis nationally and the figures are even higher in high threat and combat areas. The strategy President Bush announced in January 2007 advanced proposals for accomplishing such an effort in Baghdad. Once again, there has been no meaningful Coalition reporting on broad progress in such efforts in the secured areas of Baghdad, and past promises such aid would be provided in “liberated” cities like Samara and Falluja were not kept. 6. There must be an end to sectarian and ethnic cleansing and displacement. There is no near and perhaps midterm answer to suicide bombings and atrocities, to attacks on sacred shrines and critical facilities. No mix of security forces can stop even small cadres of extremists from occasional successes. No tactical victory has meaning, however, unless Iraqis can be secure in neighborhoods and areas where they are in the minority, and can reach across ethnic and sectarian lines and barriers in ordinary life. One of the greatest single failures of the current approach to fighting in Iraq is that it does not track sectarian and ethnic separation and displacement and make ending this on a local and national level at least as important as halting major attacks and killings. It may take years to make Iraqis secure from Islamist extremists and the worst elements of Shi’ite gangs and militias. There can be no meaningful tactical success, however, unless Iraqis can be safe from their own neighbors and begin to lead ordinary lives in their own neighborhoods..." As Cordesman indicates, our military operations represent only a component of the overall requirements to stabilize Iraq and make viable its government. As presently conceived, it's fine that 80% of AQI's Diyala leadership has moved on according to Kilcullen, so long as we secure the population remaining behind. I'd agree, in theory. On the ground, again as Cordesman points, there are serious flaws to this concept that largely stem from the Iraqi government and military that raise fundamental questions to eventual success, much less any meaningful near-term progress. Iraq's challenges are MASSIVELY larger than any over-publicized, under-staffed military operation can reasonably address. I can't help but be convinced that the issues and salvation increasingly reside with the Iraqis, not us. Sadly, with each passing day, Iraqi talent drains away from the nation as divisions only grow deeper among those remaining . __________________ "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski

06-27-2007, 03:48 AM	#5 (permalink)
Ray Postmaster General *Military Professional* Join Date: 08-20-03 Posts: 26,119 Country:	The problem of CI is that while one can clear an area of insurgents, they must also ensure that that area is not repopulated by the insurgents again. That is the hard part. The local people in that area have hardly any say since they are fed up with the disruption of their daily lives by both the sides. If they side with the insurgent, the govt troops will sort them out and if they are with the govt, the insurgents will KILL them. Therefore, it safer NOT TO BE KILLED, which the media gleefully reports as people are with the militants! Likewise, the Human right pinkos will be told of govt atrocities, because if they tell about the militants, then they will be killed! That is the Cross one has to bear. Hearts and minds are won within the hearts and minds of a large majority but those hearts and minds won cannot speak out, because they will be killed by the militants! A mugs game! __________________ "Some have learnt many Tricks of sly Evasion, Instead of Truth they use Equivocation, And eke it out with mental Reservation, Which is to good Men an Abomination." I don't have to attend every argument I'm invited to. HAKUNA MATATA Last edited by Ray : 06-27-2007 at 03:56 AM.

06-28-2007, 10:08 AM	#6 (permalink)
S-2 *Military Professional* Join Date: 09-11-06 Location: Portland, Oregon Posts: 2,105 Country:	Hard Bargaining- Another Perspective By Steve Biddle Hard bargaining - Council on Foreign Relations "...Many critics of the war now hope that a threat of US withdrawal will provide this lever. Senator Carl Levin, for example, has long argued that the US military presence serves as a crutch that enables Iraqis to avoid painful compromise and hard bargaining, and that only a timetable for removing this crutch can compel them to face facts and swallow a settlement. The administration, by contrast, sees its troop surge as the means to reconciliation. In its view, chaos in Baghdad has pushed politics aside in favor of sectarian self-defense and the vengeance of militias. By deploying enough troops to bring security to the capital, the administration hopes to create breathing room and a political space within which a deal can be struck. Neither view is sound. Instead, if there is any hope of a peaceful solution to Iraq’s civil war, it will require a new strategy in which military force is tied much more actively to ongoing political negotiations. Rather than merely creating space for diplomats to talk, our military must provide the leverage needed to drive unwilling factions toward compromise. The surge will give us 160,000 heavily armed troops in Iraq. This is not enough to secure the whole country, but it is enough to provide some powerful sticks and carrots. Used selectively to threaten factions that do not compromise and assist those that do, American military power can be an important tool for negotiators..." Biddle is an interesting guy, well credentialed and thoughtful. "...:Iraq’s factions reject reconciliation, and will continue to reject it until outside pressure forces them to compromise..." He assesses our current chance for success as slim and offers a radically different view of the employment of U.S. ground forces to politically leverage the various factions. While intrigued, I assess our chances as nil and have long preferred a re-deployment of our forces to Kurdistan. I frankly think that our nation cannot stand another protracted public debate on strategy such as we went through from last May, 2006 through January 2007. Too long, too cumbersome, too public. Worst, too late, even then. As such, I think that we've committed ourselves to Petraeus' plan until it succeeds or our patience is exhausted. I bet on the latter.

06-28-2007, 20:03 PM	#8 (permalink)
S-2 *Military Professional* Join Date: 09-11-06 Location: Portland, Oregon Posts: 2,105 Country:	Astralis Reply I'm not opposed to the tenets resting behind Petraeus' plan. Not at all. Nor do I necessarily endorse Biddle's thoughts. Astralis, I'm simply taking heed of America's domestic political climate. The Republican party is developing sizable schisms within its ranks. We face the real possibility that enough votes may swing to enable the next democratic-sponsored timeline/budget to over-ride any veto. Meanwhile, by my count, we spent about eight and one-half months wringing our hands while developing consensus (of sorts) on an under-resourced strategy constrained by unrealistic expectations and afforded WAY too little time with some arbitrary mid-September reporting timeline. What, reasonably, can we expect Petraeus to report to Congress in mid-September - that Iraqi forces have shown huge strides in "standing up"? Correct me if I'm wrong but everything that I THINK I've heard from Dana Pittard, Douglas Lute, and Michael Yon (yup, read him too!) says that these boys ain't near ready to HOLD after we CLEAR. Seen any hints of political reconciliation? I haven't sensed one iota of change within Iraq's political climate- certainly not the security of Baghdad, as yet. Anbari sheiks deciding that their future decisively doesn't exist with AQI isn't necessarily a ringing endorsement of the Iraqi government. How embarassing to have the al-Anbari sheiks bombed in a hotel used by the Chinese as their embassy, which I presume resides nicely within the "green zone". Do our local sectarian militias appear disciplined and under control of their leaders? Maybe the Peshmerga, but after that, I suspect neither al-Hakim nor Sadr have a clue who's doing what down where the rubber meets the road. Meanwhile, aren't those two tossing lead at each other down in Amara-or at least their hard-to-handle minions? Petraeus is charged with a near impossible task, plain and simple. It would help dramatically if we KNEW that we'd be there, in force, for the next ten years. Or left altogether for cooler climes.

07-06-2007, 04:34 AM	#9 (permalink)
S-2 *Military Professional* Join Date: 09-11-06 Location: Portland, Oregon Posts: 2,105 Country:	Grassroots Politics- Baquba Style NYT Link An interesting article discussing a myriad of problems- 1.) Shia-dominated provincial and national leaders reluctant to empower sunni communities, 2.) Corrupt Interior Ministry officials, 3.) AQI., 4.) An absence of Sunni tribal networks. None of this stopped Cpt. Ben Richards, CDR B Troop, 1-14 CAV, who's slowly integrating the small village of Buhritz (sounds German to me) into his defense network. Why and how? The town sits astride one of AQI primary LOCs into Baquba from rural staging areas. So extensive are the arms caches, munitions, and other supplies as well as AQI troops that our forces are calling the rural areas surrounding Baquba as Al Qaeda FOB. Richards has managed to foster some tenuous but growing ties with local sunni community leaders and former (current?) members of the Sunni 1920s Revolutionary Brigades. Swift Sword should enjoy the irony of our working with former sunni insurgents, no doubt all also on the Saudi payroll as proxies. A very good read by Michael Gordon.

06-26-2007, 12:00 PM	#2 (permalink)
Danielk Regular Join Date: 04-17-06 Location: Australia Posts: 57 Country:	Very good read. Thanks shek

06-27-2007, 00:16 AM	#4 (permalink)
Feanor Banished Join Date: 06-12-07 Location: San Jose, CA Posts: 2,385 Country:	The U.S. doesn't have the troops to secure Iraq. The troops surge was a step in the right direction, but it was way too small.

07-06-2007, 16:52 PM	#10 (permalink)
nabilfannoush Regular Join Date: 05-28-07 Posts: 43	Bottom line: You can dress it up and analyze to bits, but it's still a mess and a series of serious bungles. I've known Iraq and Iraqis all my life, and in spite of the efforts of the good American soldiers on the ground this is going nowhere. sorry

07-07-2007, 01:39 AM	#11 (permalink)
Ray Postmaster General *Military Professional* Join Date: 08-20-03 Posts: 26,119 Country:	So, what is the answer? What are your suggestions?