astralis

not just the most inhospitable environs. there are muslims in the societies of many of our close allies, and in our very own country. unless you're going to go around bombing allies and instituting a system of informants and concentration camps within the dear old USA, that idea is a non-starter.

__________________
Never let the future disturb you. You will meet it, if you have to, with the same weapons of reason which today arm you against the present.

-Marcus Aurelius, Meditations

Bluesman

The 'war' part was magnificent. What came next has been pretty dam' good, but with the American public's standard of cheap, fast, and perfect, even as well as we've done may not be good enough. (And yeah, I'm prepared to defend that proposition, but it's another subject, for another thread.)

The three major mistakes that, had they NOT been made, would've seen us safely home and victorious by now were:

1. The Iraqi armed forces should not have been disbanded wholesale and sent 'home'. (They didn't go 'home'; they went into the field in a new, harder to defeat form.)

2. The borders were never properly secured, which was a function of too few troops. If they had been, the dead-enders and fanatics would all be dead by now, and the chokehold would've squeezed off the windpipe of the insurgents from the men, money and materiel they need to keep going.

3. Our Information Operations and Public Affairs effort has been for SH!T. We screwed it up, never got it right, neglected it, and totally blew off the single most important aspect of this entire thang. If this war succeeds or fails, it will be because of this, the most important part of the battlespace: the information realm.

To win as fast as the American, Iraqi and world publics expected us to, we should've fought the war exactly as it was (and with a proper 'prep', Turkey could've been persuaded/forced to allow us through into northern Iraq, as our plan called for, but which the Europeans screwed us out of).

After that, take command of the surviving and controllable parts of the Iraqi Armed Forces (all of the Air Force, as they nearly-universally HATED Saddam), the apolitical 'line' units of the Army, the patrol and beat cops (none of their commanders, nor the Republican Guard, though, for obvious reasons), and most importantly (as detailed below), the Border Guards. Set them to work alongside our guys hunting down and killing the regime bubbas that were on the run, BEFORE they could get their hidey-holes all set (it took about two months for 'em to get very adept at avoiding capture; we had a small window to sweep 'em all, we just didn't know how important it would be to do that), AND to wipe out the Fedayeen Saddam and the other out-and-out terrorists. Their other important mission would've been to secure all weapons depots, and provide the muscle under American supervision to keep 'em locked down tight.

Next, begin the dual missions of training the Iraqis to take on the security mission, while laying the groundwork for return-to-sovereignty. (That was another AWESOME success story that everyone seems to have forgotten. The Iraqis were running their country LONG before anybody thought it would be possible.) While the training cadre is doing that, release as many American troops as possible as soon as possible to get out to the Syrian and Iranian frontiers and SEAL 'EM UP. STRICTLY. This gets the majority of our troops out of sight of the big towns, so they're not 'running things', and it doesn't look as much like an occupying force. Also, we can plausibly state (because it would be true) that we are defending Iraqis and their born-again country from outside troublemakers. NO American troops go home until the borders are under control. Once the battlefield is isolated, we begin the hard but finite work of grinding down the enemy order-of-battle, and it'll go a helluva lot faster as the enemy knows there is no help coming. They'll quit.

And finally...and it's too heart-breaking to really go into...we should've done our very best work in the arena that was quite literally neglected and left to wither: the information battlefield. I simply don't have enough time to go into what I would've done differently here, but I'll tell you this: it would've been WAY better, even if I'd half-assed it all, because at least I would've been in the game.

THAT is how I would've done it, now that we're here on Monday morning, as we all know so dam' much about how WE could've won the Super Bowl.

__________________
"The quickest way of ending a war is to lose it, and if one finds the prospect of a long war intolerable, it is natural to disbelieve in the possibility of victory."
- George Orwell

ExNavyAmerican

.Bluesman, I must say I agree with you. Most notably at the part of not disbanding the Iraqi army. I agree that the war itself was beautifally performed, but this is what I would have done from the beginning...

The pre invasion-
Sent in airborne troops to the east, west, and north. We can easily supply them day-to-day; therefore we wouldn't have to worry about supplies as we did in WW2. I would have used those troops to gain control of the border, and attract attention away from the main invading army. I would use the navy, and air force to take out their Iraqi counterparts immediately. I would also attempt to take out a large part of the mechanized force using air strikes. This wouldn't be enough, and there would still be a lot to do.

The main invasion-
The main invading army spearhead would be a single armor division. Behind them there would be a mechanized division to mop up. And behind them there would be engineers, and two heavy infantry divisions. Baghdad would not be my objective (Napoleon made that point 200 years ago-what was Bush thinking?), my objective would be the Iraqi army, and when they surrendered, I would bring in two additional field armies for occupation. Altogether the force in the aftermath would be comprised of about 200,000 men. The Airborne would be withdrawn following the surrender of the Iraqi. Note, I would continue to keep the borders secure using drones, other air support, and mechanized units.

The aftermath-
The provisional governor would not be from the state department; he would be a provost marshal from the army, and it would be his duty to weed out all senior officers in the Iraqi army-that is the rank of colonel, and above. He would also be responsible for setting up an Iraqi provisional government, and using them as a figurehead government. He would also be responsible for getting society, and infrastructure back into a working pattern, though I would leave most of it to the future Iraqi government. When things settled down, I would unleash the disaster that is the American state department, and they would work with prominent Iraqis to form a new government. But note the Americans would only be advisers; I would leave it primarily to the Iraqis. After the constitution is ratified, we would help enforce it, when the constitutional government is implemented we would help support it. When the new government took control of the armed forces, I would reduce the occupational force by half as a sign of goodwill. This does not mean however that I was preparing for a general withdrawal.

Our withdrawal-
I would not set a timetable to withdrawal until my advisers and I agreed it was time. And when we came to such a conclusion, we would not disclose anything to the public. The force would be withdrawn in a piecemeal sort of way over 6 months

__________________
"I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just; that His justice cannot sleep forever."
- Thomas Jefferson

Officer of Engineers

30 days or even 14 days delay. That would have brought three extra divisions, one extra brigade, one more flag, into the fight. The difference that would have made in the aftermath is sounding better and better.

__________________
Chimo

Bluesman

A good plan, but that airborne thang: I know why you would've done it, but the fact is, they expected it. In the best report I ever wrote, I covered it, and my analysis concluded that the Iraqi command thought we were going to do somethin g like the Kandahar Plan, in which we seized airbridges, established bases as hubs to spread out and attack the surrounding areas. They were geared towards reacting rapidly and in massive force to whip a sizable but isolated American unit, and I wouldn't advise giving them the opportunity, even if we COULD kick their ass with airpower when they mass to fight; after all they COULD get lucky and inflict a bunch of casualties on us.

And also...I'm SERIOUS about the information realm being vital. I'd recommend that ANY plan get that part as right as possible. If we don't, THIS is what we get.

Parihaka

Hmm, haven't read anyone elses so I'll be brief.
Wouldn't have fired off those missiles hoping to kill Saddam cause it meant he could fire back, which lead to a slightly undignified kick-off with all the coalition forces having to scatter so as not to be hit by a random scud.
Whatever that unit was that had to park outside Baghdad for three days cause the supply hadn't kept up? I'd've gone a bit slower.

Day after I took over I would have anounced General whoever as new ruler of Iraq and ordered everyone in the country to return to work, including top officials and army. Anyone not working or reporting to barracks would be taken into resettlement areas and used as labourers in reconstruction. (well fed, housed and clothed of course, I'm not a tyrant)
Over next few years I'd quietly have taken top officials and army commanders guilty of genocide somewhere quiet and hung them, replacing them with my own plants. Round about now I'd be giving them their own elections, two parties only, all members of parliament hand picked by me.
ten years from now I'd be closing down half my military bases.

ExNavyAmerican

I agree with your point about the informational realm, and I understand your point about the airborne, but U.S. Airborne could easily stand against the Iraqi army. Let's compare and contrast-

The British 1st airborne against 2 SS panzer divisions during the invasion of Holland. The British held out for nine days with little or no communication, no heavy weapons, no air support, and no supplies. Compound this with the fact that Germans and the British were about equal in technology, and that the German tanks were superior compared to all the allied tanks of the time.

The 82nd, and 101st airborne divisions. We have air superiority so we can provide them with air support. We don't need to hold drop zones because we have helicopter. We are far more advanced than the Iraqis. The airborne also maintains heavier weapons than it did in WW2, and these weapons are superior to those of the Iraqis. We already have about 60-70 thousand invading from the south. Compound this with the fact that, remember during the initial war, Iraqi divisions were constantly surrendering. In my plan the initial casualties would probably be higher, but the aftermath would have gone much more smoothly. The Airborne would in my opinion serve a very valuable purpose.

Bluesman

I probably didn't explain it as well as I should have.

Could an American airborne division stand off almost any conceivable force that the Iraqis could put together out west? Yeah, if that's the way it went, with the entire division fighting together, and able to form a singular, coherant battle plan. But what the Iraqis expected and prepped for was for us to swoop down on one of the western airbases, take it over, then send out the tentacles in all directions like the rays of the sun. It worked at Kandahar; it would've been dangerous in western Iraq.

There are always accidents, and that's what I'd be afraid of.

Hypothetical: Weather closes down, and even our most excellent tac air has trouble doing what they do. A single battalion gets isolated and gets over-run before it can be rescued.

In other words, the Iraqis roll a natural eleven; we roll snake-eyes. Doesn't mean they end up with all our money, but we lose a BIG bet, simply because we gave 'em the chance. Long odds, true. But with the American public becoming increasingly immature and unreasonable about military matters, PERFECTION is the standard, and a major unit going off-line or, even worse, god forbid, going into the bag (even temporarily), can you imagine the political ramifications?

I can. Ted Kennedy caterwauling on the Senate floor and demanding a whole crap-load of generals be fired, the world being amazed at the incredible feat-of-arms that the plucky, beleagured Iraqis manage to put over on the World's Greatest Military(tm), and Jesse Jackson offering to fly to Baghdad to negotiate with Saddam the release of 350 US Army POWs and the 250 bodies of our dead...and who knows what else.

It was bad enough when a single combat service support company gets shot up and a few of our guys - and two females - are taken. I'd rather do it the way it was done: everybody in a huge, unbeatable mass, rolling right through the middle of the best effort the Iraqis can mount, taking hardly ANY casualties, and going as fast as their commanders want 'em too. Less risky than going with the Afghanistan template.

Shek

Not feasible. 1/3 of the 82nd Airborne was conducting OEF3. Additionally, our air LOCs were maxed out as it was. If you want to execute your plan, what spare parts do you take out of the mix? Tank engines? Track pads? Etc.? What units do you want to cut out of the main force, since their equipment can't be flown?

__________________
"So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

Shek

Sir,
Agree. While the weather would have made the going more difficult, troops would have had more time to acclimate, and Garner and his team would have had more time to plan and maybe flush out some of the gaping holes in the Phase IV plan and gotten some attention from CENTCOM onto these issues.

ExNavyAmerican

I think you're taking this too seriously. This is a theoretical friendly discussion that gives the entire U.S. military as our resource to invade Iraq, while ignoring continencies outside of Iraq-within reason (meaning we don't commit our entire armed forces). Take a deep breath.

Shek

Theory still has to be confined to reality Iraq doesn't happen without 9/11, thus OEF remains a real constraint. Additionally, you have only four active airborne brigades in the US Army in 2003, two of which were already used for OIF as executed. You put your 82nd ABN BDEs and 101st BDEs on the border, you now have no light infantry to clear the cities that have been seized. Mech infantry can be used for that role, but based on the threat that actually presented itself, they are suboptimal as they have fewer dismounted troops and have a logistics requirement an order of magnitude greater than a similarly sized light unit.

Bluesman

He wasn't jumpin' on ya, bro. He's a good dude, and he's breathing okay, trust me.

Seriously, this is one of the limitations on reading somebody's words, vice watching and listening when somebody speaks. Do me a favor: re-read his post with a smile on your face and a vision of him just speaking, instead of 'debating' you. I think it'll come across better.

Shek

Thanks, Blue.

I'm kind of bummed - I had set up a TDY to the Punta Gorda Air Show this month and was going to try to link up with you, Confed, and TH on your home turf, but it (the TDY) got cancelled.

Bluesman

I don't want to over-react, here, but...DAMMIT!

That would've been about the greatest piece of luck.

No chance to get it turned on again, is there?