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#31 (permalink) |
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Patron
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From Day 1.
'Assasinate' Saddam in person, not with bombs. Once war is declared the head of the army is a legitimate target and I don't see why a dictator should be off limits, when the poor buggers he has been killing for the past couple of decades are fair game. Deploy heaps of guys round the boarders, nasty job but it will pay off in the long run. Set up some large bases out in the desert. Similar to the fire base concept in the Vietnam war. If Iraqi army units want to stand down they can get in contact with the nearest base. If not and they choose to fight it out then you'll see them coming. Up the number of troops deployed and send over as many engineers (*seabees) as possible. (*do the US still have these?) Lay off the 'Shock and Awe' especially in relation to bridges and general infrastructure. When a building is destroyed build two in its place. Basically the idea acknowledges that Iraq was a dictatorship and that most people would be more than happy to have him gone, they just don't want their house destroyed in the process. This will keep people onside, allowing for troops to be based in cities and villages full-time. This is good for the Iraq economy as soldiers spend money, Iraqi's get to meet US soldiers and learn that they are a decent bunch of guys, increases relations and thus means you get good intel on terrorists/weapon supplies etc. Then you just need to take care of the left over army (minimal I would imagine) and the inevitable influx of forign fighters, terrorists and other assorted a#%holes. Isn't perfect but I just find the idea of 'bombing them back to the stone age' is inherantly unfair when applied to people suffering under dictatorships. Last edited by RadioM : 02-28-2007 at 02:52 AM. |
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#32 (permalink) |
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Patron
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Folks..if i may without causing offense, but in my opinion US is largely a society on a major 'macho trip'. It's fascination with 'shock and awe' border sometimes on the puerile. Much of it's establishment before moving into Iraq was unable to see beyond S&A. That was the fundamental problem, consequences be damned. The best option would have been to look into other examples around the world that led to regime change.
IMO the best example was 1971, when India fought 2 and a half weeks to bring about a regime change in E. Pakistan. India fought against world opinion and prepared to defend itself along 5 different tactical fronts in the subcontinent. It went in with the explicit understanding not to destroy civil institutions during the war, it went in specifically with the intention not to stick in their over a few brief months. It handed power, made sure people were back to work. And scooted. US did'nt prepare the scoot scenario. They came in with a mindset of staying there for a few years. IMO they should have appointed a milder 'dictator' who'd have made "Musharaffesque' type promises of bringing in democracy. Left him and his team to do the rest of the dirty work and started pulling out. IF this was plan B, then there should have been a plan C, D to be on the safe side. It's apparent US basking in it's macho 'shock and awe' power plan never even took into account a Plan B. Let alone plan C. Thus the soup it finds itself in at present. Possibly thats what happens when Hollywood hype starts being taken a little too seriously. I hope my American friends take this critically and not in an offensive way. Thanks. ![]() |
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#33 (permalink) | |
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Resident Mythbuster
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#34 (permalink) |
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Senior Contributor
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Hi Guys,
It seems to me that the real trouble with the Iraq expedition (outside of going in the first place, as Snow Leapord has pointed out) exists at the strategic/planning rather than any operational level. In a nutshell: the overall objectives were unrealistic and not limited enough in scope as to be readily acheivable via the chosen means. It was decided to do what we wanted, not what we could. The U.S. record on nation building shows that the odds of success for such activity in Iraq were at at least 4 to 1 against and taking the risks that Mr. Bush chose to take in the Middle East at 4 to 1 when the "supreme interests" of the United States were not at stake was not a sound propostion. A better strategy is pretty much as Snow Leapord articulated: isolate and contain on a regional level. I would back it up with continued, limited objective low level military activity to keep Saddam off balance, multi national efforts to break up his clandestine networks, attempts to engineer a coup, perhaps some sort of MEPALS (Middle East Partnership Against Limited Strikes) to offset missle/WMD issues, etc. Limited, readily definable objectives was the hallmark of ODS that appears to have been missing in OIF and any search for a "newer/better/alternate etc., etc." Iraq strategy is probably best started here. Regards, William
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Pharoh was pimp but now he is dead. What are you going to do today? |
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#35 (permalink) | |
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Senior Contributor
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Slightly OT, but being a known contrarion, I must point out that most public policy that has been bad was usually midwifed with copious quantities of legal and moral justification and OIF might follow this same trend (I never liked it for sound, historical reasons, but, in all fairness, the fat lady ain't crooning yet). Regards, William |
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#36 (permalink) |
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Foreign Service
Moderator Lei Feng Protege |
recognize the limits of RMA and defense transformation. gone in, perhaps, with the same force, but immediately follow it up by the level of troops which gen. shinseki recommended.
immediately begin arms clean-up. gather the old iraqi army afterwards and detail large numbers to border patrol, while slowly reforming it. use iranian fear and force a "grand bargain", if possible, all the while making noises about moving the troops east or west (even more so than we did here). lay down the law. make it clear that WE are the boss, not the podunk cleric from next door. re-start the old iraqi state companies, and immediately create the equivalent of an iraqi civilian conservation corps (like the US did in the depression). that'd be a pretty good start...
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Never let the future disturb you. You will meet it, if you have to, with the same weapons of reason which today arm you against the present. -Marcus Aurelius, Meditations |
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#37 (permalink) | |
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Patron
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For you and for all of the others whom like to think that problem of Iraqi insurgency and extremism could be solved by sending small well trained special stealthy and what not force, I have very disappointing news. Please understand that you are fighting the IDEA. Idea as it is, is not a material thing and therefore it can't be eliminated by blowing things up. You can kill someone that is the carrier of that idea but the idea itself won't get hurt at all. In your little special operation thing, the intelligence would find top commander of some problematic organization, than special forces will go there and neutralize that person. For a brief moment his followers would be stunned and disorganized but only for little while. You can bet that soon there would be someone else whom would say that he can do things better and you have a new target. And using the same tactics you would take him out but again soon after he is killed another one will pop up. And that could go for all eternity. This happens because in all your special operations, you didn't eliminated the idea itself, just the carrier of that idea. Will that reassure people whom believe in idea-no. It will force them to be more effective, more careful and each time you will have more difficulties. In order to fight radical Islam you need to understand first the origins of Islam and than what causes it to become radical. You have to fight that idea with your idea not with LGB or SEALs. They are useless in this case.
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Human stupidity is immortal. Last edited by Versus : 02-28-2007 at 14:10 PM. |
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#38 (permalink) |
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Regular
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Total War
We won WWII not by fighting an army and a few insurgents. We won it by utterly destroying the peoples will to take up arms against us. That must be done in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the rest of the radical muslim world. White gloves and liberals do not win wars. They must be made to want to surrender to us utterly.
dave
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Relax. It's worse than you think. |
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#39 (permalink) | |
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Military Professional
Moderator |
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"So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3 |
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#40 (permalink) | |
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Moderator
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If a successful mission proved possible based upon twice-confirmed intelligence, invade with no less than 350,000 troops. 150,000 to secure the borders, and 150,000 to invade Iraq. 50,000 to secure defeated areas and to deter looting. After reaching Baghdad, bring in a team with the intelligence of putting Iraqi's to work in all aspects of crucial domestic needs, i.e., water, sewer, power, food, etc. Let the Iraqis build gradually from there. You can not help people who can not help themselves. ![]() |
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#41 (permalink) | |
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Patron
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Ok so I'm chief in command here and here is what I would do. Part of hacking and burning is over, my military has defeated the Iraqi military and I'm now all over the country. Ok so I won. Next move. Number one, secure the Iraqi borders. Assignment: Secure borders with Iran and Syria heavily Saudi Arabia and Turkey not so heavily. In order to avoid any international disputes set the buffer zone along the border. On the border itself Iraqi patrols,some 5 miles from the border coalition buffer force. On that way borders are shut and no weapons or other things and people could come in or out without my knowledge. Theoretically. Organize and support Iraqi new govt. focusing on intimidate clean up of the mess I made when I was taking out the regime. Aka repairing infrastructure as soon as possible. Parallel with that, form the body that would be some sort of national crime tribunal for crimes committed during the Saddam's era. This would reduce chances of insurgency to a minimum. Since I'm not actually present in the cities and meddling with everyday city life my presence in Iraq would not be that noticeable and annoying. Supporting the modernization and expansion of infrastructure. Bringing quality to the everyday life and to the average people. Special focus in urban areas would be parks with fountains. We know how much desert lacks water and this is more than just a stunt. It will have a long term psychological effect on the population reverting them from being hostile. Last edited by Versus : 02-28-2007 at 14:48 PM. |
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#43 (permalink) | |
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Moderator
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#44 (permalink) |
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Senior Contributor
Join Date: 01-27-06
Location: DPRK, Democratik People's Republik of Kalifornia
Posts: 9,363
Country:
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That fighting part was almost perfect. We won.
The managing part was the disaster.
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"Only Nixon can go to China." -- Old Vulcan proverb. |
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