Shek

Keys to a successful surge - Los Angeles Times

MAX BOOT
Keys to a successful surge
Sending more troops to Iraq will work only if the U.S. changes its ways.
Max Boot

February 7, 2007

WHILE politicians debate whether more U.S. troops should be sent to Iraq, just as important is how those troops will be utilized. In the Boer War, a "surge" of soldiers helped. In the Vietnam War, it didn't. The difference is that the British had a sounder strategy.

In formulating the right strategy, there is no better guide than a slim 1964 volume, "Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice." Its author was a French officer named David Galula, who saw service not only in World War II but in postwar China, Greece, Hong Kong and Algeria. If there is a Clausewitz of counterinsurgency, Galula is it.

Although much has changed in recent decades, most of his admonitions still apply, which is why so many are echoed in the new Army-Marine counterinsurgency field manual. U.S. forces have gotten better at this demanding type of warfare in Iraq, but even now they're still falling short, often through no fault of their own, in carrying out many of Galula's key precepts:

"Which side gives the best protection, which one threatens the most, which one is most likely to win, these are the criteria governing the population's stand…. Political, social, economic and other reforms, however much they ought to be wanted and popular, are inoperative when offered while the insurgent still controls the population."

Too often the U.S. has gotten it backward, building infrastructure, holding elections and carrying out other civil reforms in an insecure environment. Expensive projects, such as electrical and water treatment plants, have been sabotaged. Any goodwill won has been ephemeral.

Our top priority must be to establish a modicum of security. Only then can reconstruction go forward.

"If insurgents, though identified and arrested by the police, take advantage of the many normal safeguards built into the judicial system and are released, the police can do little."

Captured Iraqi insurgents know they can remain silent and that most likely they will never be convicted because witnesses and judges can be bought or intimidated.

"Eight of 10 detainees are set free," write military analysts Bing West and Eliot Cohen. "One in 75 American males is in jail, compared to one in 450 Iraqi males." Since, as they note, "Iraq is not six times safer than the U.S.," the disparity is because of faults with the legal system that need to be fixed — perhaps by imposing martial law. Iraq will not become safer until more militants are behind bars, but they will never be convicted under peacetime rules of evidence.

"Clearly, more than any other kind of warfare, counterinsurgency must respect the principle of a single direction. A single boss must direct the operations from beginning until the end."

There has never been a single boss in Iraq. On the American side, responsibility has been split between the Defense and State departments, which have not always worked harmoniously together. On the Iraqi side, the split is between the Interior and Defense ministries, between the police and army. The situation is especially muddled in Baghdad because President Bush has promised that Iraqis will "lead" operations there. That makes Gen. David H. Petraeus' job much harder. One of his first tasks as the top U.S. general in Iraq will simply be figuring out command relationships.

"Expensive constructions for housing the troops should be prohibited…. If no construction other than what is strictly necessary is allowed, the counterinsurgent forces will be forced to live with the population, in shacks if necessary, and this will help to create common bonds."

THE U.S. HAS spent countless billions of dollars to build an elaborate network of forward operating bases in Iraq where troops are totally isolated from the population. A key part of the Baghdad security plan must be to get forces into smaller outposts where they can interact with locals, gather intelligence and provide security. This may increase casualties in the short term, but it will save American and Iraqi lives in the long run.

"Control of the population begins obviously with a thorough census. Every inhabitant must be registered and given a foolproof identity card."

Amazingly enough, the Iraqi and American governments have not issued biometric ID cards — something like our driver's licenses, with a fingerprint included — to the populace and have not equipped security forces with portable computer terminals linked to a central database.

The lack of such a setup — employed by pretty much every U.S. police department — makes it difficult to tell whether someone stopped at a checkpoint is a wanted terrorist.

These aren't insuperable problems. But they do need to be addressed if the reinforcements being sent to Iraq are to have any hope of success.

__________________
"So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

Ray

Spot on.

Without security, nothing can be foundationed.

Correct employment of troops will give rich dividends. Already, the armed militias are being curbed. The intent is good, but the security is still not in place owing to command and control issues. As soon as this is resolved, there will be a dip in the attacks by the terrorists. The civilian morale would be better and things will start to work out.

Other niggling issues on security will get sorted out once the security plan is put into action.

__________________


"Some have learnt many Tricks of sly Evasion, Instead of Truth they use Equivocation, And eke it out with mental Reservation, Which is to good Men an Abomination."

I don't have to attend every argument I'm invited to.

HAKUNA MATATA

Galrahn

The substance of this article is interesting, as is the timing.

It should be pointed out that the man recommended for appointment to assume General Casey's job as Commanding Officer of Military Forces in Iraq, General David H Petraeus, actually rewrote the book for the US Army on counterinsurgency.

That is literally true, he did it over the last 2 years after serving in Iraq, where in 2004 he was selected to raise the Iraqi Army of less than 1000 to a force of over 150,000 by late 2005 when he was rotated out. Ignorant people actually criticized him because ahis focus was on quantity instead of quality, as if an Army starting from scratch is supposed to be a perfect force in less than 18 months.

By the way, that book he wrote is called Field Manual 3-24, which is the official counterinsurgency guide of the US Army.

Like I said, the timing and substance of this article is interesting.

TheChosenOne

I rather agree almost completely with this article. SECURITY, SECURITY, SECURITY is the upmost overriding factor in stabilizing Iraq. It has been my opinion from the start and always will be that we needed a minimal of 500,000 + on the ground. Even now I feel that we need more then the 21,500 surge though the army can't physically do that unless we re-instate the draft. In hindsight, we definetly never prepared for the outcome of Bremer's political vaccum his de-bathification created. I also agree that we need to move to smaller outposts when it comes to larger population centers. The more you interact with the population, I feel the better off you are. Instead they see us as an occupier sitting on a huge bases.

This following example is why I believe from the article that controlling the population is important. My base is in a Shi'ite area. Most of the surrounding population enjoy's our presence and supports us to an extent. We do a variety of things to help the locals. But the militia's and the insurgents use fear and intimidation through death threats, though they rarely execute their threats, to scare the local population into becoming a benign entity on keeping them out of the AO. Therefore, the insurgents gain free movement and don't have to worry about the locals reporting their activing for the fear of death. Before we got here, our base had only received 1 IDF incident from 2003 - April 2006 and the locals captured them and the local shiek carried out a death sentence on them. Now, IDF and IED's have become almost a daily occurence and we do get great human intel yet from the population but most of them are afraid to come forward for a variety of reasons.

Synikul

If we're not willing to do the kind of things that Saddam did to keep the savages in line, then we will fail, because that's the only thing that will work there.

Parihaka

The price of freedom is that those you have set free may very well CHOOSE to do things you don't like, including hating you and trying to kill themselves and others. I'd still rather see the country free than just replace one dictator with another.

TheChosenOne

I agree with Parika on both his statements.

I dislike the fact the very people we are helping in my area CHOOSE to attack us but we do what we must in response to that.

Ray

This is another key

Training for Iraq

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