Three Choices, Mr. President

Ray · 10-24-2006, 16:07 PM

Quote:

Three Choices, Mr. President

The Least Bad Option on Iraq: Disengagement and Damage Control

By Richard Holbrooke
Tuesday, October 24, 2006; Page A19

Dear Mr. President:

As soon as the midterm elections are over -- and regardless of their outcome -- you will have to make the most consequential decision of your presidency, probably the most complicated any president has had to make since Lyndon Johnson decided to escalate in Vietnam in 1965, and far more difficult than your decisions after Sept. 11, 2001. Then, you rallied a nation in shock, overthrew the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and confronted Iran and North Korea over their nuclear programs -- acting in all cases with self-confidence and overwhelming national approval.

Now all four projects are in peril. With far less public support, and time running out on your presidency, you must reverse the recent decline in Afghanistan, get North Korea back to the six-party talks, isolate a cocky, dangerous Iran that thinks events are going its way and, above all, figure out what to do with Iraq. So allow me to offer some very unsolicited suggestions on that war.

Broadly speaking, you have three choices: "Stay the course," escalate or start to disengage from Iraq while pressing hard for a political settlement. I will argue for the third course, not because it is perfect but because it is the least bad option.

In your radio address last week, you said that "our goal in Iraq is clear and unchanging: . . . victory." You added that the only thing changing "are the tactics. . . . Commanders on the ground are constantly adjusting their approach to stay ahead of the enemy, particularly in Baghdad." One can only hope that you do not mean those words literally -- or believe them. "Stay the course" is not a strategy; it is a slogan, useful in domestic politics but meaningless in the field.

Your real choice comes down to escalation or disengagement. If victory -- however defined -- is truly your goal, you should have sent more troops long ago. You and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld say that the commanders in Iraq keep telling you they don't need more troops, but, frankly, even if technically accurate, this is baffling. Plain and simple, there are not, and never have been, enough troops in Iraq to accomplish the mission.

But where would more troops come from? The Pentagon says the all-volunteer Army is stretched to the breaking point; it is now recruiting 42-year-olds and lowering entry standards. Afghanistan also needs more troops. And suppose additional troops do not turn the tide? Does the United States then send still more? Even advocates aren't sure escalation will produce a turnaround.

The last option is the most difficult for an embattled wartime president: Change your goals, disengage from the civil war already underway, focus maximum effort on seeking a political power-sharing agreement, and try to limit further damage in the region and the world.

Even your strongest critics understand that disengagement is fraught with risk. You have warned of the bloody consequences that might follow a U.S. withdrawal. Preventing such a tragedy must be your first priority. For this and other reasons, I do not favor a fixed timetable for withdrawal, since it would give away any remaining American flexibility and leverage. But the kind of killing that you predict would follow an American departure is in fact already underway, and nothing we have done has prevented it from increasing rapidly. At the current pace, there will be well over 40,000 murders a year in Iraq. A recent University of Maryland poll found that 78 percent of Iraqis surveyed believe the American presence is now "provoking more conflict than it is preventing," and 71 percent support a U.S. withdrawal within one year.

I urge you to lay out realistic goals, redeploy our troops and focus on the search for a political solution. We owe that to the Iraqis who welcomed the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and put their trust in us, only to find their lives in danger as a result. By a political solution, I mean something far more ambitious than current U.S. efforts aimed at improving the position of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki by changing ministers or setting timelines for progress. Sen. Joe Biden and Les Gelb have advocated what they call, in a reference to the negotiations that ended the war in Bosnia in 1995, a "Dayton-like" solution to the political situation -- by which they mean a looser federal structure with plenty of autonomy for each of the three main groups, and an agreement on sharing oil revenue. Your administration has dismissed these proposals out of hand, and the time lost since Gelb first presented them more than two years ago has made them far more difficult to achieve.

Yet only two weeks ago, the Iraqi parliament took a big step toward creating more powerful regions, with an interesting proviso to delay implementation for 18 months. You could use this legislation as leverage to negotiate a peaceful arrangement for sharing power and oil revenue, while redeploying and reducing our forces in Iraq. If such an effort fails, nothing has been lost by trying.

Those who say this is a proposal to partition Iraq into three countries (which it is not) and would trigger all-out civil war are misrepresenting the idea, while offering nothing in its place. Whatever else you do, Mr. President, you should send American troops to northern Iraq (Kurdistan), which is still safe but increasingly tense, to reduce the very real risk of a Turkish-Kurdish war. Both the Turks and the Kurds would welcome this U.S. presence, but it would have to be accompanied by a cessation of Kurdish terrorist raids into Turkey. This would allow Special Forces troops to move rapidly into other parts of Iraq if a terrorist target appeared, and it would show the world that you were not withdrawing from America's commitment to Iraq.

In recent years, almost any advocate of a change in policy has been accused of wanting to "cut and run." Such rhetoric works against the bipartisanship that this crisis requires. But if you were to decide to draw down American troops -- without a fixed timetable -- and seek a political compromise, the responsible leadership of the Democratic Party would surely work with you, especially if the Iraq Study Group, co-chaired by James Baker and Lee Hamilton, recommends significant changes in policy, which you could use as a starting point for rebuilding a bipartisan national consensus.

This crisis is far too acute for recrimination. If we are still at war during the 2008 campaign, as seems likely if you do not change course, it will benefit neither party but will leave your successor with the same choices you now face, but under far worse circumstances.

Richard Holbrooke, a former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, writes a monthly column for The Post.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...102301036.html

I can't say I agree with some of the contentions because it sounds a trifle pacific and some appear counterproductive in some ways.

I wonder what you folks have to say, especially Americans.

Ray · 10-24-2006, 16:14 PM

Read the above with this.

Quote:

Containing a Shiite symbol of hope

By Robert Malley and Peter Harling
WASHINGTON; AND BEIRUT, LEBANON – In the US search for enemy No. 1 in Iraq, with Saddam Hussein detained and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi buried, Moqtada al-Sadr appears to be taking the lead. Recent clashes between US and US-backed Iraqi soldiers and Sadr's Shiite militiamen, leading up to the spectacular show of force by his followers in their southern stronghold of Amarah last week, has catapulted him to the rank of principal threat to Iraq's stability.

It's a convenient notion, but misguided. The Sadrist movement cannot be reduced to its armed militia any more than the matter of militias can be reduced to its Sadrist version. His movement reflects a deep social divide among Shiites, while the proliferation of militias is more symptom than cause of Iraq's collapse.

The Iraq war brought to the fore a plethora of new actors and social forces. Of these, none is more enigmatic than Sadr. Although he comes from a prestigious line of Shiite clerics, he was the most unlikely of heirs. Young, with few religious credentials, he held a relatively insignificant position within his own family and was virtually unknown outside it. The former regime, so prompt to respond to threats, real or imaginary, never took him seriously, and Sadr was never in real jeopardy.

Following the US invasion, Sadr and his followers were dismissed as irrelevant; the US and its Iraqi allies considered his behavior inconsistent, his judgment erratic, his discourse inflammatory, and his followers a mob of fanatics. Three years later, the enormity of that miscalculation is plain. Sadrists play a key part in government and parliament. The young imam enjoys a cult-like following among Shiite masses. His Mahdi Army may have emerged bloodied from its early confrontations with US forces, but it is still standing - no small achievement given the disparity in forces.

Impoverished Shiites emboldened

As with so much else, the US got things wrong because it listened to those who said what it wanted to hear - in this case, former Shiite exiles who viewed Sadr at best as insignificant, at worst as a dangerous intruder. But while the exiles came from one social order, the war ushered in another. The ensuing upheaval emboldened the more disadvantaged, impoverished Shiites. They did not feel represented by the exiles any more than by the traditional clerical leadership, both of whom the US co-opted. The intra-Shiite division is not really about ideology, politics, or theology. It is, above all, about social class.

The US helped build a political process that made it easy, at first, to exclude Sadr. It was not so easy to cut him off from his social base. Because he was one of them, Sadr found ready support among poor Shiites. They identified with his subordinate family status and the vexations he endured, while his lack of education made them feel better about their own. Based in popular aspirations more than clerical tradition, the Sadrist movement is more social than religious. It articulates the frustrations, hopes, and demands of many who have no other representative and who remain marginalized in the post-Hussein order.

The Mahdi Army can be properly understood only in this context. Mahdi Army members make up for their dispossession and exclusion in various ways. They find employment as security personnel for ministries under Sadr's control, borrow ministry cars to carry out their missions, and get involved in racketeering and theft. Membership also has its symbolic rewards: Militiamen carry weapons, defy traditional social hierarchies, and impose their own moral standards.

In all this, the Mahdi Army differs little from the vast array of militias that have sprung up since the war. The state has failed to redistribute resources and ensure basic security, so private militias have stepped into the void, providing alternative means to acquire goods and services, gain protection, or - most perniciously - mete out their version of justice. As more armed groups compete for a limited share of wealth and power, one turns against the other, and their leaders - Sadr included - see their control gradually slip away.

That has been the case in recent months. The Mahdi Army's actions belie Sadr's appeals to his followers not to respond to "US provocations" and not to "fall in the trap" of a new cycle of open confrontations. Most notably, sectarian killings by Sadrists contradict what Sadr claims he stands for - the unity of Iraq.

The right way to handle the militias

What's the right response? Paradoxically, the most pressing step - dismantling the militias - should not be the first one. Instead, Iraq and the US should focus on limiting the militias' role to protecting civilians in places where government forces cannot. Meanwhile, they must take strong action against politi- cal assassinations, sectarian attacks, or attempts to overrun government offices, as happened last week in Amarah when Sadr forces attacked police stations.

Sadr is distracting US policymakers, and it may be comforting to designate him the latest public enemy No. 1. But the real issues that warrant attention are the social grievances that he echoes and the failings of the Iraqi government that feed the growth of armed militias. Neither problem can be addressed by military means, by prematurely pressing the Iraqi government to disarm the militias, or by singling out the Sadrists. There has been enough misdirection in this war already. Let's not choose the wrong target again.

• Robert Malley is Middle East program director and Peter Harling is a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group.
http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/1024/p09s01-coop.html

Anon · 10-24-2006, 18:23 PM

Holbrooke is a dipshiit in my estimation.

S-2 · 10-25-2006, 05:24 AM

"Whatever else you do, Mr. President, you should send American troops to northern Iraq (Kurdistan), which is still safe but increasingly tense, to reduce the very real risk of a Turkish-Kurdish war. Both the Turks and the Kurds would welcome this U.S. presence, but it would have to be accompanied by a cessation of Kurdish terrorist raids into Turkey. This would allow Special Forces troops to move rapidly into other parts of Iraq if a terrorist target appeared, and it would show the world that you were not withdrawing from America's commitment to Iraq."

I've long argued that the above should largely constitute our "exit strategy", without actually exiting. Send a heavy brigade and two composite air-wings north to Kurdistan on the promise of full security (and a guarantee of sovereignty should Iraq partition itself) in exchange for the removal of sanctuary to the PKK. This would affirm our continuing presence in Iraqi development while removing ourselves as a focus of needless wrath further south. It would also go far to stabilizing an otherwise dangerous and continuing threat to Iraq/Kurdistan, as Holbrook mentions.

Quietly re-assign our troops to embedded advisory roles down to the platoon level. Send their combat brigade H.Q.s and the rest home. Make a big deal about all the units that are leaving. Build and maintain a couple multi-functional training and logistics facilities to service the Iraqi Army and secure them with a couple of battalions...

and divest ourselves from the day to day b.s. that defines the Iraqi gov't.

Anon · 10-25-2006, 12:22 PM

All due respect Sir, but i think that Turkey would "have a baby" if Kurdistan were to become an independent state, and especially if that state were "propped up" with US forces and airpower.

On a related note, why is it that everyone in that part of the world seems to want everyone else dead? Or is it that muslims just arent happy unless they're killing someone?

I rely on you high speed low drag gold or silver oakleaf sporting type fellows for these sorts of answers, as they are far beyond this PFC's(proud fukkin Civilian) comprehension.

Ray · 10-25-2006, 14:57 PM

A view from Pakistan on Iraq.

It gives an interesting perspective.

One wonders what is really going on.

Quote:

Lost in the maze of Iraq war

By Najmuddin A. Shaikh

THE number of American soldiers who have been killed in Iraq is now approaching 3,000, with October being on course to becoming the bloodiest month for the Americans since the clashed in Fallujah and Najaf two years ago. The number of Iraqi deaths has been estimated as more than 600,000 in an article in the British medical journal, the Lancet.

This figure has been hotly disputed by American officials and the Iraqi government, but there is no doubt, given the grisly reports appearing on a daily basis, that the Iraqi death toll is far higher than the 30,000 that President Bush had offered as an off the cuff estimate some two months ago.

The Iraqi government has now ordered its ministry of health to stop releasing the figure of monthly deaths as recorded by the mortuaries to the United Nations and has stated that all mortality figures will now be released only by the prime minister’s office. This figure for September, and that too only for Baghdad, was 2,667.

The new security offensive launched by the combined Iraqi and American forces to bring peace to Baghdad has failed. An American commander has conceded that the number of attacks in Baghdad was 22 per cent higher in October than last month suggesting that the death toll in October for Iraqis in Baghdad, too, will go well beyond 3,000. This plan is now said to be under review. It has become clear that this carnage is caused for the most part by sectarian attacks that have, in most cases, only a tenuous link with the Ba’athist or foreigner-led insurgency. It is now acknowledged that sectarian violence and the spread of militias have replaced the insurgency as the biggest challenge to US efforts to bring security to Baghdad and other parts of Iraq.

The oft-repeated promise by Prime Minister Maliki to cleanse the Iraqi security forces of militia elements and to bring the militias — the principal perpetrators of sectarian strife — under control remains unfulfilled. Maliki’s problem is that while he recognises that armed militias cannot be allowed to compete with the regular security forces and that those elements of the militia that have infiltrated the security forces need to be weeded out, he cannot take decisive or even semi-decisive actions in this direction without jeopardising the fragile coalition he heads.

He has dismissed the Shia officials in the interior ministry, who headed the special commando force and the public order brigade, and has promised to place both forces under the command of a non-partisan competent official. But so fraught is the situation that the new appointee’s name has not been made public since he has insisted that arrangements for providing security for his family should be made before he takes over.

A stark illustration of Maliki’s limited authority and his political weakness was provided by a recent incident. An official of Moqtada Al-Sadr’s party was arrested by the Americans who said the raid in which they arrested the cleric, Sheikh Mazin al-Saidy, was carried out on the basis of intelligence that suggested that he had led a Mahdi army unit involved in death-squad killings and assassinations. Sheikh Mazin was released at the specific request of Prime Minister Maliki, one of whose spokesman said that his release had been ordered because he was innocent. Another spokesman said that there was “room for political engagement with Moqtada” and that anything that would disrupt such political engagement would not be “very constructive”.

For the Americans, who have now openly acknowledged that the sectarian strife and carnage, rather than the insurgency, poses the greatest security challenge, this has been particularly galling. Moqtada has been a thorn in their side since the very beginning. It was at his behest that the first killing of religious leaders took place shortly after the American invasion and it was then that the seeds were laid for the open battles that the Americans had to fight against Moqtada’s Mahdi army in Najaf.

Currently, American reports, clearly based on official briefings, maintain that 92 per cent of the mortar and rocket attacks on the Green Zone housing the Americans and the Iraqi government were launched from Sadr City — the Baghdad suburb of impoverished and frustrated Shias that is under the control of Moqtada Al-Sadr and indeed his principal bastion of support.

On the other hand, Moqtada controls a large and crucial bloc of seats in parliament and it was with his support that Maliki won the right to be prime minister. It is on his continued support that his fragile government depends. After the Sheikh Mazin incident, Maliki flew to Najaf to seek the assistance not only of Ayatollah Sistani but also of Moqtada to bring down the level of violence. So far, the plea for assistance appears to have elicited little response.

There has been a proliferation of militias. A senior American military official estimated there were 23 militias operating in Baghdad alone. There is also in the south a struggle for power between rival Shia groups. The traditional struggle for leadership between the late Ayatollah Sadr — the father of Moqtada Al-Sadr — and Ayatollah Hakim — the father of the present leader of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) — has surfaced most recently in Amara, a few weeks after a similar but less publicised clash in Diwaniya. The intra-Shia conflict is threatening to grow and may well spread from the Shia strongholds in the south to Baghdad and its immediate environs.

The Iraqi parliament is not helping matters. It has approved in the face of strong Sunni opposition a proposal allowing the Shia majority provinces in the south to form an autonomous region akin to Iraqi Kurdistan. The only concession to Sunni sensibilities was that the measure would be implemented after 18 months. No effort appears to have been made to address the central Sunni concern that with the formation of these autonomous regions, the Sunnis in resource-poor central Iraq will have no access to the oil revenues generated in the north and south of the country.

There has been no call for disarming and disbanding the militias. There has been no follow-up on the amnesty for the insurgents. In other words, there appears to be no willingness to address the hard question that need to be resolved if Iraq’s descent into sectarian chaos is to be halted and reversed.

In America, Bush’s Iraq policies are under increasing attack and may prove to be the single most decisive factor in the November midterm elections. Nobody is prepared to accept the further loss of American lives in what is seen to be a lost cause. Increasingly, Bush finds himself isolated not only from most independent Americans but also from traditional Republicans. Support for him and for his Iraq policy has fallen to an all-time low. Calls for a change of policy which implicitly if not explicitly provides for a withdrawal of American forces are now coming from the likes of Senator Warner — a strong Bush supporter and one of the most influential leaders of the Republican Party.

It is likely no matter what Bush does now that the Democrats will win control of the House and may well win the majority in the Senate also. For the moment, however, the president seems to be unwilling to consider any drastic change. In his Saturday radio address to the nation, he reiterated that while he was prepared for a change of tactics his goal in Iraq remained “clear and unchanging” and that the goal was “victory”. That, however, is unlikely to come.

It is perhaps indicative that the Republican co-head of the Iraq Study Group, formed at the urging of prominent Republican and Democratic congressional leaders, Mr James Baker, famous for leading the legal battle that ensured Bush’s electoral victory in Florida in the 2000 presidential elections, has revealed that he agreed to join the Group only after President Bush urged him to do so. Baker’s official involvement with Iraq has been limited to the tour he undertook, again at Bush’s urging, to get international assistance pledges for the reconstruction of Iraq. But his recently published book makes clear that he had serious reservations about the Iraq policy even though much of the criticism was directed at the Rumsfeld-led department of defence rather than the White House.

This would seem to indicate that President Bush, in asking him to join the panel, was looking for a bipartisan recommendation that would make a change of policy less damaging politically. Even if this is not so and Bush remains determined to “stay the course” his political weakness will not allow him to do so.

Baker and his Democratic counterpart, Lee Hamilton, have said that they will make their recommendations only after the elections, possibly immediately after the Thanksgiving holidays, and have refused to reveal any details publicly of what their conclusions are. But speculation is rife. The ideas that will apparently be included in the Group’s recommendations are said to range from (a) a phased withdrawal with more resources being devoted to the training of Iraqi security forces and a small rapid reaction force being retained in the country or in a neighbouring country to respond to calls for assistance from the Iraqi government; (b) a partition of the country into Kurdish, Sunni and Shia regions; (c) dialogue with Iran and Syria to secure their assistance in bringing the sectarian strife and insurgency in Iraq to an end and making the concessions necessary to ensure their cooperation; (d) holding an international conference bringing together Iraq’s neighbours and other influential member of the international community to use their influence with various factions in Iraq to bring about reconciliation and an agreed solution to the problems of federalism.

There will be many other variations but the end objective is clear. America’s politicians are now looking upon Iraq as an insoluble problem and want to find a way to “cut their losses” and “run” from the ill-considered adventure. But they want to do so in a manner that can be presented to the world as at least halfway “honourable”. When they do, a devastated Iraq with little by way of visionary leadership and a very fractured domestic polity will be left on its own to cope with an impossible situation. A replay of the miseries that were visited upon Afghanistan by an indifferent world community and meddling neighbours in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal in 1988 and the emergence of a Taliban like force is not difficult to visualise.

I hope I am wrong but developments seem to be pointing in that direction. The Muslim world in general and Pakistan in particular should start preparing to cope with the devastating impact it will have on us all.

The writer is a former foreign secretary.

http://www.dawn.com/2006/10/25/op.htm

Ray · 10-25-2006, 15:00 PM

Quote:

Scuttling to victory

AMERICANS, Iraqis and many others must have wondered just what George Bush meant in his weekly radio address on Saturday when he insisted: “Our goal in Iraq is clear and unchanging. Our goal is victory.”

The president’s comments can only be counted as bizarre at a time when concerns about the deteriorating situation have reached a “tipping point” due to a combination of events on the ground in Baghdad, Amara and elsewhere — and the impending decimation of the Republicans in the November 7 Congressional elections. Mr Bush’s nonsensical message, a variant of his stock line about “staying the course”, is likely to be quickly forgotten. The phrase that will be long remembered is that of Alberto Fernandez, head of public diplomacy at the state department: he told al-Jazeera that US policy in Iraq had suffered from “arrogance” and “stupidity”.

Recent days have seen policy-makers in Washington scuttling to catch up with ordinary voters, and with some leading Republicans, who have had enough of this misconceived and incompetent war, their interest galvanised by leaks from James Baker’s blue-ribbon, bipartisan Iraq study group. Mr Bush and Condoleezza Rice both say there is no fundamental shift of strategy in the offing, merely a review of “tactics” in pursuit of a stable democracy. But talk of milestones, yardsticks and benchmarks attests to an increasingly urgent desire to quit before the going gets very much worse.

The long-standing refusal to set out a timetable for US withdrawal for fear of emboldening the insurgents is collapsing into hints about giving Nuri al-Maliki 18 months to rein in the militias. Other volte-face are being mooted from the list of bad options now available: formal three-way partition of an already dangerously fractured country; seeking the help of neighbouring Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia; negotiations with any Iraqi group except Al Qaeda; installing a new “strongman”. The overall effect is one of panic and floundering.

The difficulty here is sorting out what is in the best interests of the people of Iraq.

—The Guardian, London
http://www.dawn.com/2006/10/25/op.htm

Notice the unmitgated glee of the newspaper in reproducing an article from the Guardian.

As if it is the be all and end all of Iraq!

-{SpoonmaN}- · 10-25-2006, 20:10 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by M21Sniper

All due respect Sir, but i think that Turkey would "have a baby" if Kurdistan were to become an independent state, and especially if that state were "propped up" with US forces and airpower.

On a related note, why is it that everyone in that part of the world seems to want everyone else dead? Or is it that muslims just arent happy unless they're killing someone?

I rely on you high speed low drag gold or silver oakleaf sporting type fellows for these sorts of answers, as they are far beyond this PFC's(proud fukkin Civilian) comprehension.

No, its more that poor people like killing eachother till they can get rich. Plus, if you were Kurdish, and you'd been through what many of them have, you'd be pretty fricken mad too. And I'm quite sure you know it.
As for the three options this fool puts forward, I'm for escalation, in all four cases. More troops in Iraq and A-stan, taking the pressure off inexperienced parts of the Indigenous Forces until they're ready. Better managed reconstruction handled by the Military instead of these idiot contractors. In Afghanistan continued, or more to the point, unrelenting pressure on the Taliban. In Iraq, more and more troops to privide as much security as possible. As for Iran, try to lay some sanctions down on them, although in reality I'd see them of less of a threat than North Korea. For the NKs, try Air Strikes.

gunnut · 10-25-2006, 20:34 PM

Quote:

Disengagement and Damage Control

I like that. Another name for "cut and run" and "redeploy." What will the liberals come up with next?

troung · 10-25-2006, 21:01 PM

Damn right stay the course...

S-2 · 10-25-2006, 22:44 PM

"All due respect Sir, but i think that Turkey would "have a baby" if Kurdistan were to become an independent state, and especially if that state were "propped up" with US forces and airpower."

M21 Sniper, imagine the following-

Two AFBs w/ two composite air-wings and a heavy brigade for security are built and provided for NOW, by invitation of the Iraqi gov't. Perhaps even "joint" facilities shared with Iraqi forces. Given the regional nature of these "forces", they'd likely be PESHMERGA anyway.

However we try, we may not be able to prevent the dissolution of Iraq and it's partition. It might be peacable, but probably not-were it to happen. If Iraq emerges sovereign and whole, there's no harm-no foul. HOWEVER, if not we'll have needed to prepare this possibility before hand. Things could go quickly south.

No doubt that this will upset the Turks. So? Why wouldn't a new Kurdish gov't. welcome U.S. forces on their soil in return for squeezing out the PKK sanctuaries that currently exist? MORE IMPORTANTLY, why would a new Kurdish gov't. welcome a competing Kurdish political vision (PKK) that endangers the existance of a free and sovereign Kurdistan by operating against Turkey from sanctuaries within Kurdistan? I doubt that autonomy for Turkish Kurds would seem as important as securing the sovereignty of the first Kurdish state. As such, a Kurdish state under the security umbrella of the United States might be the BEST opportunity for Turkey to peacefully resolve the Kurdish autonomy question within it's borders. Moreover, the potential for GOOD relations between the two nations could be fostered through the construction of a pipeline through Turkey to ship Kurd oil from Mosul, Irbil, and Kirkuk. I can't imagine that Kurds would be eager to ship this commodity through southern Iraq, Iran, or Russia. Turkey could tax the revenues, lowering the tax over time as a confidence-building exercise. Too, the active restriction or elimination of the PKK could create cross-border commerce between Turkey and Kurdistan. A win-win where none existed before.

Meanwhile, with no interest in dissuading Kurdish aspirations in Syria and Iran, a U.S. security presence encourages Kurdish support/sustain to Kurdish national movements within those two nations.

What's in it for America? Geo-strategic positioning indefinitely. We retain a very critical perch on the gulf, Iran, and Russia. Iran remains squeezed between Kurdistan and Afghanistan. After all, surrounded by Iraq, Iran, Syria, Turkey, and Russia, could Kurdistan ever really feel THAT safe? We reduce our vulnerability to Iranian directed operations. We also have the opportunity to play "democracy transformation" one more time-hopefully better.

M21 Sniper, I just think it's a good idea all the way around. I see nothing from Turkey that suggests I should take notice of their fears, particularly if my proposal may actually reduce the attacks by PKK from within Kurdistan.

Anyway, a few thoughts to toss around or beat silly as need be

.

Anon · 10-26-2006, 02:55 AM

Oh i agree it's a big winner for us, which is why i suspect there is some well-hidden and massively powerful land mine laying in wait down that particular road.

Remember sir, Murphy's law of combat number 5 clearly stipulates:

"The easy was is always mined."

The whole thing is a total disaster. Someone really ought to have kicked Rumnamara in his big transformational ass prior to this op getting the green light.

"Bring little US Flags to hand out for the parades the Iraqis will throw you" they said....

This whole mess has been like watching the 1985 Superbowl Champion Bears stumble into an overtime tie against a Divsion IAAA college team.

Fuccking idiots.

S-2 · 10-26-2006, 04:09 AM

Snipe,

Please, drop the "sir" and save it for the brigadier and colonel, who are certainly worthy. I'm flat-out not. "deuce", "a-hole", anything but sir.

"Oh i agree it's a big winner for us, which is why i suspect there is some well-hidden and massively powerful land mine laying in wait down that particular road."

Yeah, I didn't mean to present it as a full-blown sales pitch, though it might read that way. Given the massive SNAFU that OIF phase IV has represented, I hold little hope that our government could build the facilities needed, and do so reasonably quietly. I doubt that we could, in general, avoid creating panic within the Iraqi government, especially the shias and sunnis. Talabani's invitation to us basically created a shih-storm with both the sunnis and shias. We seem unwilling to let the Iraqi government know that we have alternatives that may meet our more selfish needs. Bush says our patience isn't infinite. I disagree. As long as we offer ourselves no alternative, we'll keep on keepin' on.

What we really can't afford is to return stateside utterly defeated. From my neo-connish perspective I can actually proclaim about three significant operational victories already- elimination of any WMD potential for the forseeable future; elimination of the baath party and Saddam, and; establishment of a kurdish enclave with federation status within Iraq. Unfortunately, those operational victories must be viewed currently in the context of a strategic defeat. We've reached the limits of our influence within Iraq. Our only remaining objectives are, in my view, no longer attainable - the democratic transformation of Iraq is not going to occur quite as easily as

"'Bring little US Flags to hand out for the parades the Iraqis will throw you' they said...."

Meanwhile, we've no guarantee of a long-term strategic presence under the current government of Iraq. I could be still wrong, and a unified, democratic Iraq would be a fair exchange for being wrong again.

However, if I'm correct, and we haven't laid the groundwork for a continued presence in the one region where we can expect to be welcomed as friends, then we run a gamet of bad to horrible outcomes. Anything from being invited to leave-lock, stock, and barrel to helicopters landing in the "Green Zone" ala Saigon, 1975. No thanks.

It's funny, but I think that we might have laid the seeds of partition during Operations "Provide Comfort" and "Northern Watch" back in the early/mid nineties. In drawing a distinction about the Kurds- good, bad, or indifferent, we've perhaps long ago subconsciously set the terms of Iraq's final disposition. If each group deserves a protected status within Iraq, along with a requisite regional/ethnic/sectarian militia, it really makes hard the notion of a unified nation rising from those sentiments.

It might have been unusually precient and cool had our leaders acknowledged that we intended to dismantle "Iraq" henceforth and forever more. An artificial Ottoman/British colonial legacy that just can't be justified as a rally point for these people and therefore no long deserves to exist. That sort of Pax Americana neo-imperial strut, however, would have required considerably more dictatorial will than even this President could amass.

Anon · 10-26-2006, 12:30 PM

We respect the rank sir, even if we do not neccesarilly respect the man.

As far as kurdistan, the one real problem i see with it is that it's 'land-locked'.

Swift Sword · 10-26-2006, 13:04 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by gunnut

I like that. Another name for "cut and run" and "redeploy." What will the liberals come up with next?

History seems to show that the "fools who rushed in" concocted the ephitet "cut and run" to hurl at their political opponents. What will the conservatives come up with next?

10-25-2006, 05:24 AM	#4 (permalink)
S-2 *Military Professional* Join Date: 09-11-06 Location: Portland, Oregon Posts: 2,109 Country:	I Like This- "Whatever else you do, Mr. President, you should send American troops to northern Iraq (Kurdistan), which is still safe but increasingly tense, to reduce the very real risk of a Turkish-Kurdish war. Both the Turks and the Kurds would welcome this U.S. presence, but it would have to be accompanied by a cessation of Kurdish terrorist raids into Turkey. This would allow Special Forces troops to move rapidly into other parts of Iraq if a terrorist target appeared, and it would show the world that you were not withdrawing from America's commitment to Iraq." I've long argued that the above should largely constitute our "exit strategy", without actually exiting. Send a heavy brigade and two composite air-wings north to Kurdistan on the promise of full security (and a guarantee of sovereignty should Iraq partition itself) in exchange for the removal of sanctuary to the PKK. This would affirm our continuing presence in Iraqi development while removing ourselves as a focus of needless wrath further south. It would also go far to stabilizing an otherwise dangerous and continuing threat to Iraq/Kurdistan, as Holbrook mentions. Quietly re-assign our troops to embedded advisory roles down to the platoon level. Send their combat brigade H.Q.s and the rest home. Make a big deal about all the units that are leaving. Build and maintain a couple multi-functional training and logistics facilities to service the Iraqi Army and secure them with a couple of battalions... and divest ourselves from the day to day b.s. that defines the Iraqi gov't.

10-25-2006, 21:01 PM	#10 (permalink)
troung A Self Important *Senior Contributor* Join Date: 08-03-03 Posts: 4,236 Country:	Damn right stay the course... __________________ To sit down with these men and deal with them as the representatives of an enlightened and civilized people is to deride ones own dignity and to invite the disaster of their treachery - General Matthew Ridgway

10-25-2006, 22:44 PM	#11 (permalink)
S-2 *Military Professional* Join Date: 09-11-06 Location: Portland, Oregon Posts: 2,109 Country:	M21Sniper Reply "All due respect Sir, but i think that Turkey would "have a baby" if Kurdistan were to become an independent state, and especially if that state were "propped up" with US forces and airpower." M21 Sniper, imagine the following- Two AFBs w/ two composite air-wings and a heavy brigade for security are built and provided for NOW, by invitation of the Iraqi gov't. Perhaps even "joint" facilities shared with Iraqi forces. Given the regional nature of these "forces", they'd likely be PESHMERGA anyway. However we try, we may not be able to prevent the dissolution of Iraq and it's partition. It might be peacable, but probably not-were it to happen. If Iraq emerges sovereign and whole, there's no harm-no foul. HOWEVER, if not we'll have needed to prepare this possibility before hand. Things could go quickly south. No doubt that this will upset the Turks. So? Why wouldn't a new Kurdish gov't. welcome U.S. forces on their soil in return for squeezing out the PKK sanctuaries that currently exist? MORE IMPORTANTLY, why would a new Kurdish gov't. welcome a competing Kurdish political vision (PKK) that endangers the existance of a free and sovereign Kurdistan by operating against Turkey from sanctuaries within Kurdistan? I doubt that autonomy for Turkish Kurds would seem as important as securing the sovereignty of the first Kurdish state. As such, a Kurdish state under the security umbrella of the United States might be the BEST opportunity for Turkey to peacefully resolve the Kurdish autonomy question within it's borders. Moreover, the potential for GOOD relations between the two nations could be fostered through the construction of a pipeline through Turkey to ship Kurd oil from Mosul, Irbil, and Kirkuk. I can't imagine that Kurds would be eager to ship this commodity through southern Iraq, Iran, or Russia. Turkey could tax the revenues, lowering the tax over time as a confidence-building exercise. Too, the active restriction or elimination of the PKK could create cross-border commerce between Turkey and Kurdistan. A win-win where none existed before. Meanwhile, with no interest in dissuading Kurdish aspirations in Syria and Iran, a U.S. security presence encourages Kurdish support/sustain to Kurdish national movements within those two nations. What's in it for America? Geo-strategic positioning indefinitely. We retain a very critical perch on the gulf, Iran, and Russia. Iran remains squeezed between Kurdistan and Afghanistan. After all, surrounded by Iraq, Iran, Syria, Turkey, and Russia, could Kurdistan ever really feel THAT safe? We reduce our vulnerability to Iranian directed operations. We also have the opportunity to play "democracy transformation" one more time-hopefully better. M21 Sniper, I just think it's a good idea all the way around. I see nothing from Turkey that suggests I should take notice of their fears, particularly if my proposal may actually reduce the attacks by PKK from within Kurdistan. Anyway, a few thoughts to toss around or beat silly as need be .

10-26-2006, 02:55 AM	#12 (permalink)
Anon New Member Join Date: 08-03-03 Posts: 0	Oh i agree it's a big winner for us, which is why i suspect there is some well-hidden and massively powerful land mine laying in wait down that particular road. Remember sir, Murphy's law of combat number 5 clearly stipulates: "The easy was is always mined." The whole thing is a total disaster. Someone really ought to have kicked Rumnamara in his big transformational ass prior to this op getting the green light. "Bring little US Flags to hand out for the parades the Iraqis will throw you" they said.... This whole mess has been like watching the 1985 Superbowl Champion Bears stumble into an overtime tie against a Divsion IAAA college team. Fuccking idiots. Last edited by Anon : 10-26-2006 at 02:57 AM.

10-26-2006, 04:09 AM	#13 (permalink)
S-2 *Military Professional* Join Date: 09-11-06 Location: Portland, Oregon Posts: 2,109 Country:	M21 Sniper Reply Snipe, Please, drop the "sir" and save it for the brigadier and colonel, who are certainly worthy. I'm flat-out not. "deuce", "a-hole", anything but sir. "Oh i agree it's a big winner for us, which is why i suspect there is some well-hidden and massively powerful land mine laying in wait down that particular road." Yeah, I didn't mean to present it as a full-blown sales pitch, though it might read that way. Given the massive SNAFU that OIF phase IV has represented, I hold little hope that our government could build the facilities needed, and do so reasonably quietly. I doubt that we could, in general, avoid creating panic within the Iraqi government, especially the shias and sunnis. Talabani's invitation to us basically created a shih-storm with both the sunnis and shias. We seem unwilling to let the Iraqi government know that we have alternatives that may meet our more selfish needs. Bush says our patience isn't infinite. I disagree. As long as we offer ourselves no alternative, we'll keep on keepin' on. What we really can't afford is to return stateside utterly defeated. From my neo-connish perspective I can actually proclaim about three significant operational victories already- elimination of any WMD potential for the forseeable future; elimination of the baath party and Saddam, and; establishment of a kurdish enclave with federation status within Iraq. Unfortunately, those operational victories must be viewed currently in the context of a strategic defeat. We've reached the limits of our influence within Iraq. Our only remaining objectives are, in my view, no longer attainable - the democratic transformation of Iraq is not going to occur quite as easily as "'Bring little US Flags to hand out for the parades the Iraqis will throw you' they said...." Meanwhile, we've no guarantee of a long-term strategic presence under the current government of Iraq. I could be still wrong, and a unified, democratic Iraq would be a fair exchange for being wrong again. However, if I'm correct, and we haven't laid the groundwork for a continued presence in the one region where we can expect to be welcomed as friends, then we run a gamet of bad to horrible outcomes. Anything from being invited to leave-lock, stock, and barrel to helicopters landing in the "Green Zone" ala Saigon, 1975. No thanks. It's funny, but I think that we might have laid the seeds of partition during Operations "Provide Comfort" and "Northern Watch" back in the early/mid nineties. In drawing a distinction about the Kurds- good, bad, or indifferent, we've perhaps long ago subconsciously set the terms of Iraq's final disposition. If each group deserves a protected status within Iraq, along with a requisite regional/ethnic/sectarian militia, it really makes hard the notion of a unified nation rising from those sentiments. It might have been unusually precient and cool had our leaders acknowledged that we intended to dismantle "Iraq" henceforth and forever more. An artificial Ottoman/British colonial legacy that just can't be justified as a rally point for these people and therefore no long deserves to exist. That sort of Pax Americana neo-imperial strut, however, would have required considerably more dictatorial will than even this President could amass.

10-24-2006, 18:23 PM	#3 (permalink)
Anon New Member Join Date: 08-03-03 Posts: 0	Holbrooke is a dipshiit in my estimation.

10-25-2006, 12:22 PM	#5 (permalink)
Anon New Member Join Date: 08-03-03 Posts: 0	All due respect Sir, but i think that Turkey would "have a baby" if Kurdistan were to become an independent state, and especially if that state were "propped up" with US forces and airpower. On a related note, why is it that everyone in that part of the world seems to want everyone else dead? Or is it that muslims just arent happy unless they're killing someone? I rely on you high speed low drag gold or silver oakleaf sporting type fellows for these sorts of answers, as they are far beyond this PFC's(proud fukkin Civilian) comprehension.

10-26-2006, 12:30 PM	#14 (permalink)
Anon New Member Join Date: 08-03-03 Posts: 0	We respect the rank sir, even if we do not neccesarilly respect the man. As far as kurdistan, the one real problem i see with it is that it's 'land-locked'. Last edited by Anon : 10-26-2006 at 12:36 PM.

Currently Active Users Viewing This Thread: 1 (0 members and 1 guests)

Thread Tools
Show Printable Version Email this Page
Display Modes	Rate This Thread