By Chris Paul, Beth Grill & Colin P. Clarke of the RAND Corp, this is a study written on behalf of SWJ intended to isolate best and worst practices from insurgencies fought globally between 1978 and 2008.
As Robert Haddick describes it,
"Red flags for the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan
What are the best ways to fight an insurgency? Researchers at the Rand Corp. think they have an answer. These analysts studied all insurgencies begun and concluded between 1978 and 2008. Their goal was to find strong evidence that would either support or reject various approaches for combating insurgent movements.
In an article written for Small Wars Journal, Rand's researchers summarized the detailed report. The 30 cases examined in the study occurred on six continents and across a variety of cultures and terrain. From the cases, Rand extracted 15 "good" practices and 12 "bad" practices for counterinsurgents. As one would expect, virtually all the cases exhibited a combination of good and bad practices.
The good news is that the researchers believe they can make some conclusions about what approaches work -- when good approaches outnumbered bad, the counterinsurgents always prevailed. The bad news is that according to their analysis, things don't look good for the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan.
The report highlights the need for positive involvement in the counterinsurgency campaign by the host-nation government. The local government should achieve legitimacy with the local population and practice good governance. By all accounts, the Afghan government has much room to improve on these measures.
Next, the report recommends that the counterinsurgent forces engage in multiple lines of efforts simultaneously. These would include security, economic development, and building indigenous capacity. In Afghanistan, economic development and local capacity seem to be lagging behind the security effort.
According to the report, steady access by the insurgents to tangible support was the single best explainer of success or failure. Cut off insurgents from support, whether from the local population or from across a border, and the counterinsurgents nearly always succeed. By contrast, failure to isolate the insurgents from support invariably leads to defeat for the counterinsurgent. In the case of Afghanistan, Taliban access to support and sanctuaries in Pakistan remains an unresolved and perhaps unsolvable problem and thus an ominous red flag for the counterinsurgency campaign.
The Rand report has its flaws. It follows the conventional wisdom and codes the Soviet counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan as a failure. By contrast, a team of U.S. military officers, most of whom have combat experience of their own in Afghanistan, concluded in their own study that the Soviet campaign was a success -- the Soviets withdrew their forces on terms of their choosing and left a friendly government behind, a regime that ended up outlasting the Soviet Union itself. In another example, the Sri Lankan government's crushing of the Tamil Tigers occurred too recently to make it into the report; this government's harsh but thus far successful methods would clash with a few of the conclusions in the Rand report.
These points aside, the Rand study draws some useful evidence from recent history about what does and doesn't work when battling an insurgency. Policymakers responsible for Afghanistan very likely agree with much of the report's conclusions. Unfortunately, Afghanistan's stubborn facts are getting in the way of implementing this sound advice."
Dr. Christopher Paul is a Social Scientist at the RAND Corporation. Colin P. Clarke is a doctoral candidate at the University of Pittsburgh’s Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, and is a Project Associate at RAND. Beth Grill is also a Project Associate at RAND.
Victory Has A Thousand Fathers-SWJ/RAND Corp. Paul, Grill & Clarke
This is the unabridged document from RAND Corp. It is 153 pages-considerably longer than the SWJ version. The original report, btw, was prepared for OSD-
Victory Has A Thousand Fathers-RAND Corp. Paul, Grill & Clarke
You can access this site to download or view the underlying statistical data supporting this study.
Mull as you see fit. Better mulling occurs from those who've read it. I haven't so I'll reserve my thoughts until then. Enjoy.
Last edited by S2; 22 Jan 11, at 18:29.
"This aggression will not stand, man!"
Jeff Lebowski
And yet another study that does not talk about 'K'.
They clarify this (presumably) by saying...
"Only resolved cases were included because cases in which the outcome has yet to be determined are not useful for identifying the correlates of COIN success".
..which begs the question, 'K' isn't considered resolved as far as insurgency is concerned.
Diminished, yes, resolved, no which is fine.
But why not Punjab. That's a pretty much done deal AFAIK.
Last edited by Double Edge; 22 Jan 11, at 11:19.
I agree with the paper's conclusions but don't see much new here. Should I be disappointed with RAND?
The single most important COIN strategy is to cut the insurgents off from tangible support? Mao 101: the people are the sea in which the guerrilla fighter swims. The other elements are also well known: legitimacy and credibility of the host government with its own people; security, civic action, eco development, establishing a dependable infrastructure for the population, etc etc.
It's not so much that we don't know what the symphony should sound like, it's that we can't always play it in tune.
The study has merit as another teaching text for COIN studies.
Last edited by Red Seven; 22 Jan 11, at 13:25.
"Should I be disappointed with RAND?"
I'm unsure. The unabridged version is far more detailed. My point is whether the study is solidly-grounded. If so, then there's utility.
"The single most important COIN strategy is to cut the insurgents off from tangible support? Mao 101: the people are the sea in which the guerrilla fighter swims."
Which sea? The loci of the insurgency or the sanctuary. Often two different nations contributing to one key element, tangible support, which comes in many different forms.
Many of our Pakistani friends here argue that the afghan insurgency is entirely indigenous and is fueled solely by home-based support and arms and supplies acquired via donations, drug sales and theft. Many Americans suggest differently and place great emphasis on external sanctuary.
Then let's consider home-based support for a moment. How is it acquired? Is it by opposition against the host government? Is it by sympathy for the insurgent forces? Is it by intimidation exercised by the insurgent forces? Is it by services provided by the insurgent forces? Is it some combination of all?
Each category seems to break down further. The unabridged version is an extensive study. How valuable it is might be for the eyes of a better scholar than I but I'm going to try to slowly wade through it. Produced for OSD, somebody made the decision up high to generate this study and and spend the money. I'd hope it simply isn't regurgitating shop-worn stereotypes but, instead, truly examining the elements of insurgent sucesses and failures.
"This aggression will not stand, man!"
Jeff Lebowski
At least Moldova and Croatia weren't insurgencies.Sir,where can I find the unabridged version?Originally Posted by S-2
Those who know don't speak
Mihais,
See the original post-second link. There's also a database if you follow the third link.
"This aggression will not stand, man!"
Jeff Lebowski
Thanks.I suppose I got blind because I did not saw them .
Those who know don't speak
"...I suppose I got blind because I did not saw [sic] them ."
Thank God you didn't have sawdust in your eyes because you didn't see them either.
"This aggression will not stand, man!"
Jeff Lebowski
And defeat is an orphan.
"And defeat is an orphan."
See SWJ abstract (first link)-intro.
"This aggression will not stand, man!"
Jeff Lebowski
They left behind a government which controlled very little territory and handed over power in areas it "controlled" to ethnic militias who it had to pay with Soviet money, a government which was totally unable to stand on its own without Soviet aid. The war only kept going in part because Pakistani advisers sucked, the DRA was well dug into the cities they controlled, and the Uzbeks were well paid. Just because the Soviet's picked the date they left and a government which controlled little outside of major cities doesn't mean they were successful.The Rand report has its flaws. It follows the conventional wisdom and codes the Soviet counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan as a failure. By contrast, a team of U.S. military officers, most of whom have combat experience of their own in Afghanistan, concluded in their own study that the Soviet campaign was a success -- the Soviets withdrew their forces on terms of their choosing and left a friendly government behind, a regime that ended up outlasting the Soviet Union itself. In another example, the Sri Lankan government's crushing of the Tamil Tigers occurred too recently to make it into the report; this government's harsh but thus far successful methods would clash with a few of the conclusions in the Rand report.
To sit down with these men and deal with them as the representatives of an enlightened and civilized people is to deride ones own dignity and to invite the disaster of their treachery - General Matthew Ridgway
I know, i was completing the famous JFK quote."And defeat is an orphan."
See SWJ abstract (first link)-intro.
It was a 1972 Paris Accord redux, in an equally, but different convoluted way. It's no wonder they call Afghanistan the Soviet's Vietnam.
Yeah I'm struggling to see the victory in Afghanistan. I figure that team of military officers was trying to lower the bar by calling that a victory, damn the facts to the contrary. I hope we shoot for a little more then to flee on our own time and hand over the country to the Taliban.It was a 1972 Paris Accord redux, in an equally, but different convoluted way. It's no wonder they call Afghanistan the Soviet's Vietnam.
To sit down with these men and deal with them as the representatives of an enlightened and civilized people is to deride ones own dignity and to invite the disaster of their treachery - General Matthew Ridgway
It was more of a political "cover-your-ass" move by the Soviets to sell the retreat to the public back home - didn't work. Between der Papst, Poland, a failing economy, and Afghanistan, the Soviets fell.
I like to think the victory in the Cold War had one father, and his sons finished the work - Mannerheim of Finland. In 1944, Hitler was still in control over most of his conquests, and on paper, it wasn't at that point clear whether he could revive the German war machine and win a negotiated peace (a real possibility if he could split the western Allies and Soviets, as was attempted.
Mannerheim lit a cigarette when Hitler came to visit Finland - a clever ploy to gauge whether Hitler was working from a position of weakness or strength. Hitler, an avid anti-smoking proponent (his anti-smoking regulations in Germany were ahead of their time - even ahead of the modern US policies), said nothing. Mannerheim thus knew that Hitler was in a position of weakeness.
Finland, a liberal democracy, negotiated a very favorable piece in 1944. If this had not happened, there are two routes into western Europe:
1) From Eastern Europe
2) through Finland, Sweden, Denmark
So, did Mannerheim's cigarette save Europe from Stalin? Mannerheim sure did what was in the best interest of the rest of the Western democracies and the way they thought the world should be organized. An interesting thought.
Last edited by Ironduke; 25 Jan 11, at 06:06.
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