Thread: Debunking The 10:1 Ratio of Forces in COIN

No they're not that bad.They're worse.

Take the ANA out of any post-ISAF/U.S. equation. What we're really discussing are two items, 1.) ethnic makeup of units and, 2.) anti-taliban enmity.

Pashtun Tajik Hazara Uzbek Others

Officer 42.16% 40.98% 7.58% 4.08% 5.21%

NCO 48.78% 37.63% 8.47% 3.50% 1.62%

Soldier 43.42% 30.11% 10.43% 8.54% 7.50%

Total Force 44.70% 33.38% 9.58% 6.68% 5.66%

MOD Goal 44% 25% 10% 8% 13%
based on National Proportion

The Ministry of Defense shares percentages in rough proportion to the field force. The objective is to strengthen Pashtun, Uzbek and other minorities at the expense of Tajik and Hazara levels. That may or may not prove possible by 2014.

Meanwhile there's little denying that current forces are becoming increasing more capable and better-armed. Progress is uneven between the ANA and the ANP as well as among units within both organizations.

Here are three separate reads spanning since 2009

NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) Ministry of Defense: A Year In Review-Jan. 23, 2011

The Long March: Building An Afghan Army-RAND 2009

Afghanistan Security-Afghan Army Growing But Additional Trainers Needed-GAO January 2011

Once civil war arrives (my prediction-although hardly alone), the multitude of well-armed, reasonably well-trained factions will suggest that the taliban will find great difficulty asserting control. Aside from traditional anti-Pashtun sentiment among tajiks, uzbeks, turkomen and Hazara, many pashtun tribes are hardly enamoured with the afghan taliban.

Though welcome, it would prove an unusual occurrence to see a viable nat'l government emerge. The traditional impetus against such seems overwhelming and there's no compelling evidence presented by the GIRoA to suggest otherwise.

"I am not familiar with the situation other than what I read in the papers, but the ANA is reminding me more and more of ARVN every day."

I'm uncertain about the relevance of the ANA to this discussion. I doubt they'll prove serious practicioners of COIN principles as established within western military doctrine.

As such, we may be broaching thread de-railment.

Originally Posted by S2

Once civil war arrives (my prediction-although hardly alone), the multitude of well-armed, reasonably well-trained factions will suggest that the taliban will find great difficulty asserting control. Aside from traditional anti-Pashtun sentiment among tajiks, uzbeks, turkomen and Hazara, many pashtun tribes are hardly enamoured with the afghan taliban.

Though welcome, it would prove an unusual occurrence to see a viable nat'l government emerge. The traditional impetus against such seems overwhelming and there's no compelling evidence presented by the GIRoA to suggest otherwise.

Sir,the ANA may be better,but they're only that good because they have the foreign support.That this will continue after we're gone is something that can be doubted.Much can change between now and then.Vietnam is not a happy precedent.

Even if that doesn't happens,in absence of NATO combat units,the ANA alone cannot control the country.Many reasons.They'll be in a roughly similar position to the Soviet Army,only with less firepower,mobility assets and trained men.
But I agree there won't be a semblance of COIN after we depart.Just a lot of chaos and bloodshed.

Not sure where we disagree. Maybe here-

"That this will continue after we're gone is something that can be doubted..."

Ummm..., I'll disagree here. The names will change and the visible nature of the support may change but there'll be foreign hands engaged in a post-ISAF Afghanistan.

Soldier skills are increasing. For whom those men end up "soldiering" is the question. I suspect tribal or warlord factions. Afghanistan shall prove a well-armed, well-trained, war-like society.

Plenty of bullets to shoot, people to kill and scores to settle.

Sir,I have no doubt we won't drop support completely right when the big army flies home.But politics change and frankly I don't trust your decision makers to stick to the course.I may be wrong and I'd like to be wrong about that.The precedent however is right in front of our eyes.The bar wrt A-stan's future was set lower and lower since 2007.

Agreed about the warlords part.There is however a bright future for the Taliban in the scheme.The Southern warlords and troops(mostly deployed in the N,these days) will be between the hammer and the anvil.On one hand,the northerners will inherit the best men(for example,the 205th Corp contains few Pashtuns,IIRC, and is arguably the best in ANA).On the other they'll have our old friends across the border,augmented by our frenemmies even more than today.I bet my first wage they'll strike a deal.
To what degree this becomes a fight between Pakistan and everyone else,no idea.But there will be a lot of ''sport''.