Thread: Strategic Bombing - Fact or Fiction

the first link does not work .
i have read this however:

Strategic Air Attack on the German Oil Industry

I assume the first Link was about this:

http://aupress.au.af.mil/bookinfo.asp?bid=45

Here you can read the summary report for the European Theatre:
United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report (European War)
and here for the Pacific one:
United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report (Pacific War)

The seeming paradox of the attack on the aircraft plants is that, although production recovered quickly, the German air force after the attacks
was not again a serious threat to Allied air superiority. The attacks in the winter of 1944 were escorted by P-51's and P-47's and with the appearance of these planes in force a sharp change had been ordered in escort tactics. Previously the escort planes had to protect the bomber force as their primary responsibility. They were now instructed to invite opposition from German fighter forces and to engage them at every opportunity. As a result, German fighter losses mounted sharply. The claimed losses in January were 1,115 German fighters, in February 1,118 and in March 1,217. The losses in planes were accompanied by losses in experienced pilots and disorganization and loss of the combat strength of squadrons and groups. By the spring of 1944 opposition of the Luftwaffe had ceased to be effective.

German air generals responsible for operations in France stated under interrogation that on D-day the Luftwaffe had only 80 operational planes with which to oppose the invasion. At no time between D-day and the breakthrough at St. Lo did reinforcements offset losses and increase the size of this force.

German fighter production continued to increase during the summer of 1944, and acceptances reached a peak of 3,375 in September. Although it has studied the problem with considerable care, the Survey has no clear answer as to what happened to these planes; the differences of opinion between German air generals, it might be added, are at least as great as between those who have searched for the explanation. Certainly only a minority of the planes appeared in combat. Possibly the remainder were lost in transit from factory to combat bases, destroyed on the fields, or grounded because of a shortage of gasoline or pilots. Conceivably some are part of an inflation of German production figures. The answer is not clear.
After September, German aircraft production declined gradually until December, when 3,155 planes were accepted, and in January 1945, because of the shortage of gasoline, production of all except jet types was virtually discontinued

i was wondering about that paradox myself

The attacks in the winter of 1944 were escorted by P-51's and P-47's and with the appearance of these planes in force a sharp change had been ordered in escort tactics. Previously the escort planes had to protect the bomber force as their primary responsibility. They were now instructed to invite opposition from German fighter forces and to engage them at every opportunity. As a result, German fighter losses mounted sharply. The claimed losses in January were 1,115 German fighters, in February 1,118 and in March 1,217. The losses in planes were accompanied by losses in experienced pilots and disorganization and loss of the combat strength of squadrons and groups. By the spring of 1944 opposition of the Luftwaffe had ceased to be effective.

That can't be right. The first number should be 1943, shouldn't it?

jan and feb 1944 = winter 1944

uh..yeah..ok. Nevermind..gotta go.

Originally Posted by Shek

http://aupress.au.af.mil/Books/USSBS/USSBS.pdf

Should say

http://aupress.au.af.mil/digital/pdf/book/USSBS.pdf

Originally Posted by 1979

i was wondering about that paradox myself

In the end it's moot point.
Germany could afford to lose 2081 fighter aircraft per month ( the production figure covered it )
it could not do the same however with fighter pilots.

IMO, even if the effect is indirect, like draining an airforce of pilots, it is effective and can be decisive. In Japan, it was even more devastating than in Germany, and it effectively ruined railways and transportation hubs, but their industry was more dispersed and was often not as easy to target as European industrial centers. Though strategic bombing is not a war winner on its own.

What is the strategy? A systematic annihilation of a nation can be achieved through strategic bombing. When the nation doesn't exist any more, the goal would have been achieved. We did that to Japan. The threat of total annihilation was real and Hirohito threw in the towel. Of course this strategy will involve the G word that we don't want to hear...genocide.

I believe the only strategic bombing that can end wars is one that threatens genocide. Otherwise we need to march troops in and physically hold the land and control the people.

Strategic bombing is nice, but like Israel Tal said: "The border is drawn where the tracks stop". it's the forces on the ground that actually change things

depends on what the ultimate goal is.

although i have to note, just looking at the recent air campaign in libya, air power's effectiveness seems to be going up. ie if even the ragtag libyan rebels can advance given that type of airpower...then almost literally the only type of ground force you need to "hold" after such a bombardment might just be several boy scout troops with hunting rifles and shovels, lol.

Originally Posted by bigross86

Strategic bombing is nice, but like Israel Tal said: "The border is drawn where the tracks stop". it's the forces on the ground that actually change things

Yet strategic bombing silenced Dutch anti-tank guns, filled in Warsaw's anti-tank ditches, and emptied the gas tanks of German and North Korean tanks. I think the proper focus allows strategic bombing to have an effect far heavier than its cost to the bomber force equipped nation.

I never said Strategic bombing is not necessary, but it has some very obvious limits, one of them being that airplanes can't hold ground. In all your examples, the strategic bombing was there to facilitate the ground troops' advance.