Thread: EBO and SOD

I'm even further behind and am now only beginning to refine my understanding of EBO along with the morphing that's subsequently occurred. In short, I know enough to be dangerous to myself and others on the topic.

WRT SOD, I'm in the dark. What's interesting to note is that EBO has been formally discarded in some quarters-

Memorandum For Joint Forces Command-Mattis August 14, 2008 SWJ

Concurrent with that, Mattis also more specifically issued his commander's guidance which can be found at the bottom of the memorandum as a separate link. It shares Mattis' thinking in greater detail.

The above, too, from Shek. There are some documents scattered in both the PowerPoint and "We Were Caught Unprepared" threads that might deserve moving here and consolidating.

Shek's post here offers some additional links into the discussion.

That discussion, btw, includes "We Were Caught Unprepared" as illustrative of how EBO has mutated beyond coherant understanding and sensible application on the battlefield. There is a related paper- The Israel Defense Forces in the Second Lebanon War: Why the Poor Performance? AVI KOBER

that I can't offer but if you're nice when approaching Shek via P.M he may be able to sprinkle magic dust...

Related from Stephen Biddle and Jeffrey Friedman-

The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy-Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College

Here's an introductory monograph regarding SOD-

Systemic Operational Design (SOD)-Maj. Ketti C. Davison USA

That's quite a bit of reading. I imagine anybody whom does so will know more than they ever wished while being truly well-armed at late-night beer fueled B.S. sessions...

Here's where I reach my first hurdle. I understand that (grand) strategy has generally operated at what I euphemistically call "echelons above reality"-i.e, win the war stuff. Operational planning evolves and is executed in support of that strategic goal and ITS planning. Tactical planning and execution, in turn, supports the operational objectives.

Simple enough. However, where I become confused is in my unwillingness to ignore that within each level of command-from the highest to the lowest- these characteristics of strategy, operation, and tactic assert themselves. Does not the platoon leader have a strategic objective within his defined world that is imparted operationally to his squad leaders and implemented tactically by his fire-teams and individual soldiers? If so, isn't it fair to say that strategy, operations, and tactics not only define the levels of command but the methods of implementation within a hierarchical MDMP (Military Decision-Making Process) system?

My first dilemma-as yet not fully understood. MDMP, as described by Davison, is hierarchical, mechanistic, and concentrates information at the top of the spectrum. EBO differs. It's focus is uni-minded with disparate parts acting within a pre-defined manner to events within their environment with a singular controlling element at the center-not unlike a brain.

Maj. Davison says,

"Concepts based on this biological model permeate EBO, as demonstrated by the effect-node-action-resources process that acts on a part of the system to trigger the desired behavior change of the whole. EBO applies the elements of national power against the threat’s political, military, economic, social, informational, and infrastructural systems to cause the threat to behave in a pre-determined manner."

As I understand that, she's saying I might use x resources in y manner against z nodes to generate a predictable and desired outcome. We flatten distinct organizations, link them to one another and the center thus sharing information, and utilize some elements within some of the time as determined by the "brain".

Where EBO hits the wall is when applied against complex adaptive systems here-

"The effect-node-action-resources process relies on identifying cause-and-effect relationships. However, establishing even short-term causes and effects in a complex adaptive system is difficult due to the nature of its interactions."

What constitutes and defines a complex adaptive system? One with autonomous agents interacting through a variety of ways and means while responding to environmental interaction by spontaneously self-organizing to turn outcomes (good or bad) to advantage.

That response to environmental interaction compels a thinking, learning, and evolving entity. EBO-generated predicted outcomes are no longer possible in this undefined and chaotic environment. This analysis is further complicated by a notion of emergent properties. In a complex and adaptive system these are properties possessed within a system but not uniformly. They emerge in dissimilar fashion where they emerge at all. As such, one can't understand the system by understanding its disparate parts. Predicting, therefore, what structures might arise from such an open system becomes an unrealistic expectation.

While having only a few classes in grad school on organizational theory and design, I'm fascinated by this topic. Inevitably, it's value stems beyond the military. I might argue that business is non-lethal warfare. I certainly wouldn't be the first.

Streamlining both organizations and decision-generating processes creates competitive edges in the marketplace. Frankly, most commercial enterprises large and small give far too little thought to such. For want of resources and time they become complex adaptive entities that are amorphous, continually evolving with some possessing emergent properties. If major multi-national corporations are the grand armies of enterprise then the emerging small business might be the assymetric warrior seeking to create an agile platform able to dodge corporate-directed PGMs and survive sufficient to ultimately thrive.

Originally Posted by S-2

Here's where I reach my first hurdle. I understand that (grand) strategy has generally operated at what I euphemistically call "echelons above reality"-i.e, win the war stuff. Operational planning evolves and is executed in support of that strategic goal and ITS planning. Tactical planning and execution, in turn, supports the operational objectives.

Simple enough. However, where I become confused is in my unwillingness to ignore that within each level of command-from the highest to the lowest- these characteristics of strategy, operation, and tactic assert themselves. Does not the platoon leader have a strategic objective within his defined world that is imparted operationally to his squad leaders and implemented tactically by his fire-teams and individual soldiers? If so, isn't it fair to say that strategy, operations, and tactics not only define the levels of command but the methods of implementation within a hierarchical MDMP (Military Decision-Making Process) system?

Steve, this is where CACD and JP 3.0 are your friend (there's one more source that gets at this as well, but I'm blanking on finding it right now

http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/p525-5-500.pdf
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_0.pdf

The three levels of war still work in a complex environment, but instead of working as a snowman (think Venn diagram) with distinct distinctions, complex environments make it more of a continuum that is much more compact. However, a PL still doesn't operate at the strategic level (i.e, he/she cannot accomplish strategic level goals, although the inverse is disproportionate - he/she can do something to prevent them from being achieved). Operations string events across time and space to achieve both operational and strategic goals. When equating levels of command, the theater level is the first time that you are operating as a strategic commander (thus, Petraeus as MNF-I Commander and McChrystal as the ISAF Commander were operational level commanders).

Originally Posted by S-2

My first dilemma-as yet not fully understood. MDMP, as described by Davison, is hierarchical, mechanistic, and concentrates information at the top of the spectrum.

I disagree with Davison's description as you've portrayed it (sorry, I still need to read his monograph). MDMP is not mechanistic and doesn't concetrate information at the top of the spectrum. It can be iterative and doesn't necessarily prescribe mechanistic causality. It excels where the problem is relatively well understood. Where design comes in is as a pre-cursor to MDMP. What is the problem? Design is centered around exploring what your problem statement is, allow you then to plan against that problem using MDMP. It also explicitly emphasizes going back and revisiting your problem statement to see if it still holds (which is not exclusive to MDMP, but not an explicit consideration per se).

What is mechanistic is EBO and it's cause-effect chain. While destroying an electrical grid with foil leaflets may have a mechanistic cause-effect chain (which is why EBO was attractive to air power advocates), human behavior is not so mechanistic. This is where SOD comes in, as it is predicated in studying the system with the recognition that there's no silver bullet. You may affect the system how you wanted, but that effect may trigger an unintended consequence. Thus, there is a need to go back and reframe/rethink through your problem statement.

Originally Posted by S-2

While having only a few classes in grad school on organizational theory and design, I'm fascinated by this topic. Inevitably, it's value stems beyond the military. I might argue that business is non-lethal warfare. I certainly wouldn't be the first.

Streamlining both organizations and decision-generating processes creates competitive edges in the marketplace. Frankly, most commercial enterprises large and small give far too little thought to such. For want of resources and time they become complex adaptive entities that are amorphous, continually evolving with some possessing emergent properties. If major multi-national corporations are the grand armies of enterprise then the emerging small business might be the assymetric warrior seeking to create an agile platform able to dodge corporate-directed PGMs and survive sufficient to ultimately thrive.

Read Taleb. I think he is a very appropriate caution against investing too heavily in design - the random nature of the world and our heuristic to assign causality where it may not exist causes us to often get it wrong and do more harm than good.

"Where design comes in is as a pre-cursor to MDMP. What is the problem? Design is centered around exploring what your problem statement is, allow you then to plan against that problem using MDMP. It also explicitly emphasizes going back and revisiting your problem statement to see if it still holds (which is not exclusive to MDMP, but not an explicit consideration per se)."

Davison's monograph looks at MDMP, EBO, and SOD both chronologically and functionally. By that I mean she places each in historical order while attempting to also define them.

WRT to the above commment by you, I'm certain she would agree. Davison looks at SOD from a design-plan-act-learn process which reconnects "learn" at the far end to inform re-design. Thus the process is re-activated within the continuum. MDMP finds its continued validity/place, it seems, in the plan phase.

"SOD uses intuitive decision-making to spot anomalies from experience and develops inferences about appropriate action. SOD takes the lock-step out of effects-based thinking by rigorously recognizing and processing the need to adapt to likelihoods presented by anomalies. It takes advantage of intuitive decision-making to identify points of departure from previous experience. Intuitive decision-makers are able to recognize when an emerging context does not match their experience base, and calls for either a new approach or a reframing of the problem."

In this respect, I might view the OODA loop similarly-orient and observe would translate to design, decide would translate to plan, act equals act, and attach learn to the back of OODA to complete the loop.

Her footnotes are extensive and I doubt I'll have the time to digest them. It's obvious that she's put a considerable amount of effort into becoming an SME in this area.

Early in the monograph she says,

"Continued evolution of operational thought is vital to gaining and maintaining the cognitive initiative and maintaining effectiveness in the rapidly changing operating environment."

That is the title of another monograph on this topic by her-SOD: Gaining And Maintaining The Cognitive Initiative. I'll be going there next while the last is still fresh in my mind.

EDIT: SOD: Gaining and Maintaining The Cognitive Initiative is the earlier of her contributions, written in 2005-2006 as a SAMS student-and longer (76 pages). She said here by way of introduction-

"This monograph began as an investigation to determine if either Effects-Based Operations (EBO) or Systemic Operational Design (SOD) should replace the traditional MilitaryDecision-Making Process (MDMP). It soon became clear that the approaches do not accomplish the same functions, are not applicable at the same levels, and are not mutually exclusive. The Military Decision-Making Process originated as a tactical decision-making process, and remains the most appropriate of the three approaches at that level. It deals with the physical threat on the ground with a decisiveness enabled by an organization of hierarchical authority. Effects-Based Operations is suitable only at the operational level. It takes the time to model the threat as a holistic system and contemplates the desired behavior changes various actions on that system would produce. It exceeds the physical realm of the tactical and explicitly translates strategic directives into tactical effects. Systemic Operational Design is a holistic approach that introduces the discrete element of design in order to inform planning. It is abstract and conceptual. It creates a cognitive map and continually updates it by the learning that occurs through action. Fusing Systemic Operational Design with the Military Decision-Making Process might be the best way ahead for operational planning and design."

It's clear that the phrase, "...gaining and maintaining the cognitive initiative..." has been the continuing sign-post framing her interest in SOD.

"...our heuristic to assign causality where it may not exist causes us to often get it wrong and do more harm than good."

I'm sensitive to bandwagon practicioners of organizational design in an evolving and fluid environment and understand your caution generated by my comment. Consciously AVOIDING design where appropriate is, in itself, a form of design and requires understanding of your system framework, rival rationality, command rationality, logistics rationality, operations framework, operating conditions, and forms of function.

I'll look to Taleb for more.

Steve,

I finally got a chance to read through Davison's monograph. There were a few glaring spots that I violently disagree with. First, she describes Clausewitz as mechanistic, which is absolute false. This should shine through even the most basic of readings of Clausewitz, especially given the quotes he uses!

For example, the first chapters (page 85 of the Paret version) of On War speaks to this:

“It is now quite clear how greatly the objective nature of war makes it a matter of assessing probabilities. Only one more element is needed to make war a gamble – chance: the very last thing that war lacks. No other human activitiy is so continuously or universally bound up with chance. And through the element of chance, guesswork and luck come to play a great part in war.”

Mechanistic causal chains would deny the very existence of chance as a major gamble.

Another quote from the first chapter follows:

"We shall not enter into any of the abstruse definitions of war used by publicists. We shall keep to the element of the thing itself, to a duel. War is nothing but a duel on an extensive scale. If we would conceive as a unit the countless number of duels which make up a war, we shall do so best by supposing to ourselves two wrestlers. Each strives by physical force to compel the other to submit to his will: each endeavors to throw his adversary, and thus to render him incapable of further resistance."

That absolutely reads like an adaptable enemy that reacts as opposed to a mechanistic philosophy.

I could use more quotes, but the introduction falls flat based on a total misunderstanding of the history of the philosophy of war.

Next, despite using Heurer earlier in the monograph (and the fact that only Heurer is used, who is really a secondary source, instead of going to the primary sources and folks who did the research, speaks volumes to the depth of understanding IMO), she then makes a case for intuitive decision-making, which by doctrine in existence at the time of the monograph speaks to commanders bypassing MDMP by using their experience and judgment. Yet, behavioral economics/psychology research dating back for decades shows that intuitive decision making is prone to systemic bias. I understand that she labels it as recognizing when situations don't fit one's experience, but it ignores the fact that people are built in general to do this, which makes it a risky proposition, and it also defines it as the exact opposite as the doctrinal definition.

Lastly, she explores the benefits of design teams, which can be true, but completely ignores the downsides of teams: confirmation bias, groupthink, etc. In other words, a very superficial use of a survey method of research on the topic was used, with examples cherry picked. This ties back to my comment about using only Heurer to explore the behavioral aspect of heuristics and biases.

These errors don't kill the entire paper, but some of the subject matter receives only a surface exploration to the point of detracting from some other areas that are strong. To be fair, this was (is) a very ambitious topic that ranges far and wide, and so it would take a Herculean effort to do it all properly. Nonetheless, I'd be weary as to some of the assertions/findings that this paper makes.

Reference my P.M. when you've the chance. I'm concerned whether we're on the same sheet of music. Right now our study team is too narrow and brings only our perspectives-yours with bias developed by study and assimilation; mine with very limited study and an (as yet) incomplete understanding about MDMP, EBO, SOSA, and ONA.

We need more perspectives if only to cover more of your assigned readings. I've only read Davison's "From Tactical Plannig To Operational Design" and am now reading Brig. Gen. Wass de Czege's offering.

"There were a few glaring spots that I violently disagree with."

I found Davison valuable as a point-of-departure. I have to start somewhere and she's introduced me to (I believe) the discussion's framework.

Her definition of MDMP-

"The prevailing planning process, the MDMP, amounts to a mechanistic view of mindless systems. The mechanistic view of the world that evolved in France after the Renaissance maintains that the universe is a machine that works with a regularity dictated by its internal structure and the causal laws of nature. The elements of mechanical systems are “energy-bonded” in that they reflect Newtonian mechanics; laws of classical physics govern the relationships among the elements.3 Concepts based on this mechanistic view pervade current military doctrine, as evidenced by terms such as center of gravity, mass, and friction. The mechanistic perspective focuses on physical logic and is entirely appropriate—at the tactical level."

Davison says of EBO-

"Systems thinking akin to so-called “effects based operations” reflects the second stage of systems theory, a biological view of a uni-minded system.6"

while Wass de Czege says,

"The inherent logic of effects-based planning assumes a mechanistic understanding of causal chains. We can readily understand the logic of cause and effect in physical structures once we map them. Difficulty ensues when mapping social and political relationships: when we think we have a map, relationships shift. Moreover, such maps become unreliable because people need not act the way one expects they should."

He provides his definition of EBO while framing the problem entailed within.

WRT to SOD, Davison says,

"SOD is composed of seven sets of structured discourse: “systems framing, rival as rationale, command as rationale, logistics as rationale, operation framing, operational conditions, and forms of function.”24 These discourses provide the framework for continual learning and adaptation. They also permit the rapid incorporation of new information bearing on the problem. Each discourse informs the next in a fluid process that moves from the broad to the narrow and from the abstract to the concrete.25 Three products result from the discourses: a literary text that explains the logic of the system, a visualization sketch that embodies the logic of the form of maneuver, and a conceptual map that communicates the holistic impression of the body of knowledge gained through the dialectic."

Immediately I see contradictions in definition emerging. Davison refers to MDMP as mechanistic in character while seeing EBO as biological within a unitary body. Wass de Czege appears to see matters differently WRT EBO and calls IT mechanistic.

Meanwhile both refer to mapping-Wass de Czege WRT EBO notes our desire to use mapping to denote cause/effect in physical structures while Davison looks to using dialectical discourse over seven key subsets to provide a literary text, visual sketch, and CONCEPTUAL map in a process described as fluid using the design, plan, act, and learn methodology.

Fcuk! No wonder Mattis junked EBO. No wonder he'll be junking SOD once it's morphed in everybody's collective minds. Nobody is operating, even now, in any lock-step understanding with one another. Not about the doctrinal past nor the evolving present. Somebody should tell everybody to shut up, stop writing, and await a doctrinal presentation presented first to the powers-that-be, approved, and then passed as tablets from on high.

Steve,

Go with Waas de Czege. Been around the block a little longer, and as the father of SAMS, he's got a little more credibility under his belt. As far as SOD goes, a filtered version of it has already made it's way into doctrine as "design." The CACD is a great read of it, and FM 5.0 has a chapter that is the official doctrine encompassing "design."

I'll gravitate in those directions and get back when I'm better grounded.

Originally Posted by S-2

I'll gravitate in those directions and get back when I'm better grounded.

Steve,

Let's get you boned up on the behavioral economics/randomness piece. See the attachments. The original papers on behavioral economics are at the two links below:

http://www-psych.stanford.edu/~knuts.../tversky81.pdf
http://psiexp.ss.uci.edu/research/te...neman_1974.pdf

For randomness and complexity, use the following links (most are podcasts, but you can read a summary text at the link and there are follow-on/reference links if anything really catches your fancy):

Taleb on Black Swans, Fragility, and Mistakes | EconTalk | Library of Economics and Liberty
Taleb on the Financial Crisis | EconTalk | Library of Economics and Liberty
Taleb on Black Swans | EconTalk | Library of Economics and Liberty

Let me know if you've got questions on the links/.pdfs.

More to read as generated by Maj. Edward P. W. Hayward of the Royal House Guards while at SAMS-

Planning Beyond Tactics: Towards a Military Application of the Philosophy of Design in the Formulation of Strategy-May 2008

On of my problems here is envisioning the practical implementation and implications of such a design methodology. I suppose implications are a way of measuring desired against actual outcomes.

As example, a rifle battalion's area of operations in Afghanistan encompasses a massive geographical map which poses a huge set of complexities-not simply complications. The A.O. faced by 2-503 and, later, 1-26 INF in the Korengal might serve as good illustrations of geographical size. The complexities emerge not just from the terrain but the vast array of inputs-both physical and social/cultural and the attendant inter-relationships.

This creates an operating environment that is multi-dimensional and dynamic. The dynamism is derived from the fluidity of interaction among the local actors and their emergance or regression into/from prominence. Each player has his moment on stage.
The commander and his staff sit in the center and witness these "performances" except they do so amidst a variety of stages as actors come and go simultaneously playing out their scenes while exchanging lines with other stages. Therein lies much of the complexity.

The battalion commander's A.O., therefore, is an operating environment that's sufficiently complex to demand the benefits that SOD might generate. Given this, he should design with the consideration of command perspectives two levels above him, i.e. both RC-East and his brigade commander. He should PLAN for two levels below him, i.e. his companies and platoons.

How large is his staff and command leadership from which to draw designers? I'd assume both officers and N.C.O.s would be eligible candidates. Will those selected also play roles as planners or commanders? How inculcated with this methodology have they become? This is important to facilitate seamless and rapid assimilation of information and attendant adaptation to consistently evolving complexities.

Then there's the transition at each level when 2-503 transfers A.O. responsibility to 1-26 INF and 173rd does so with 3rd Bde. 1st I.D. What slips through the gaps, if anything? Is 1-26 INF better or worse at conducting SOD? That's an input and concern too, is it not?

Worrisome where the rubber meets the road. Implementing such requires team training and exercises lest it be OJTed with inperfect implementation and, consequently, skewed outcomes.