Thread: Grant and the Operational Art

The Overland and Petersburg campaign occurred inside of three other important factors. The first is Grant's mind- his mental abilities and skill at using them to frame the war and figure out how to prosecute it. Since Grant didn't spring fully formed from the mind of Zeus, your probably going to need to show either an early use of his mastery, or its evolution over time as he learned and refined. Some references to how X mimicked Vicksburg, or differed significantly in concept etc.

Secondly, since Grant was not a field commander but occupied a role more like Ike in WWII in many ways, your going to need to reference his planning with Sherman and other Union commanders to created a system where the Confederacy was never able free up and shift reserves and achieve and then sustain even a local reversal of the Union tide.

Finally, a reference to Scott's Anaconda plan and how or if this vision shaped the way he framed the prosecution of the war. Combined Operations of the Civil War by Reed and Milligan argue that Plan was ineffectual since the Union was not able to brign its commanders to hell. Grant did bring them to heel and then did conduct an organized campaign to reduce the South.

Z,

Thanks for the thoughts. For the purposes of what I'm writing, I don't need to trace Grant's evolution as a commander, although Forts Henry and Donelson and Vicksburg both provide examples of some earlier actions where you can see components of the operational art. However, it wasn't until he was at a level as a quasi-group commander in the East that you can trace an actual conceptualization of a strategy that is distilled into a campaign.

What I will do is develop an argument that it took until the levee en masse to potentially see an operational level of war, and then it took the technology to C2 at this level to see the characteristics of the operational art (as well as seeing a shift away from the "decisive battle").

As far as his strategy, he chose to attack the CoG directly in the East while using an indirect approach in the West. However, after the failure of the Overland Campaign to bring about decision, he shifted to an indirect approach in the East as well. This differs from the the Anaconda plan which was a grand scale slow squeeze - Grant's pulling of forces from peripheral operations that would amount to a slow squeeze is a visible example of where he didn't see the Anaconda Plan as getting the job done quick enough (notwithstanding that his earliest operations would be consistent with the Anaconda Plan, but he was executing and not devising the concept here).

shek,

However, after the failure of the Overland Campaign to bring about decision, he shifted to an indirect approach in the East as well. This differs from the the Anaconda plan which was a grand scale slow squeeze - Grant's pulling of forces from peripheral operations that would amount to a slow squeeze is a visible example of where he didn't see the Anaconda Plan as getting the job done quick enough (notwithstanding that his earliest operations would be consistent with the Anaconda Plan, but he was executing and not devising the concept here).

i always figured that grant was looking at a high opstempo during the overland campaign simply to keep lee occupied and unavailable to shift reinforcements west. while he pushed lee hard, i'm not sure he tried to "set up" a decisive battle in the whole campaign.

Originally Posted by astralis

shek,

i always figured that grant was looking at a high opstempo during the overland campaign simply to keep lee occupied and unavailable to shift reinforcements west. while he pushed lee hard, i'm not sure he tried to "set up" a decisive battle in the whole campaign.

That's my point . Operational art is about tying together major operations to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. It rejects the notion of a "decisive battle." This is what made Grant different than his peers - he conceptualized a campaign to achieve the destruction of Lee's ANV, and while he wanted to force Lee into a position where he'd have to fight Grant on his terms/terrain to make the job easier, he wasn't seeking a single, decisive battle.

shek,

i was looking at this sentence:

However, after the failure of the Overland Campaign to bring about decision,

so was he already conceptualizing the operational art prior to the overland campaign? it seems to me this conceptualizing was in response to his setbacks there-- i am not sure, for instance, why he would want to fight the Battle of Cold Harbor if not to seek out that decisive battle.

Originally Posted by astralis

shek, why he would want to fight the Battle of Cold Harbor if not to seek out that decisive battle.

It pinned Lee and kept him from being able to send meaningful help to Johnston vs Sherman. He was also running out of room, Lee was able to slide faster than the Union army and Grant was rapidly approaching the James river, if he wanted Richmond it was now or never. A crushing defeat of Lee would work wonders to end the war but attritional warfare favored the Union and and so even a defeat could be a win if Lee lost enough men.

Shek,
Sir,I'll argue that Grant was the first Industrial Age(with the advent of rail and communications networks that allow effective C2) commander to practice operational art.You can find otherwise examples of operational art from Alexander through Romans,Byzantines,Mongols to Napoleon.

Originally Posted by Mihais

Shek,
Sir,I'll argue that Grant was the first Industrial Age(with the advent of rail and communications networks that allow effective C2) commander to practice operational art.You can find otherwise examples of operational art from Alexander through Romans,Byzantines,Mongols to Napoleon.

Subutai yes, but not so sure about the others.

Originally Posted by Mihais

Shek,
Sir,I'll argue that Grant was the first Industrial Age(with the advent of rail and communications networks that allow effective C2) commander to practice operational art.You can find otherwise examples of operational art from Alexander through Romans,Byzantines,Mongols to Napoleon.

Mihais,

How did they operate at the operational level of war? The operational art is a very specific conceptualization, and the first of prerequisites is to be at the operational level or war.

Actually, Major, the first person to try to avoid a decisive battle was Fabius Maximus, aka as the Fabian Strategy. The other person who comes to mind is Julius Caesar who had a knack for refusing battle.

Originally Posted by Shek

Mihais,

How did they operate at the operational level of war? The operational art is a very specific conceptualization, and the first of prerequisites is to be at the operational level or war.

The early Mongol tumens certainly used operational concepts using not just tactics to win local battles, but fighting those local battles for the benefit of "national" objectives and to secure the advantage of other tumens working towards a unified goal at great distance. The mongols unified will and ability to coordinate its units over vast distances to pursue its objectives wouldn't be successfully seen again until Grant/Sherman/Farraguat in the summer of 64. Although British efforts in the American Revolution to coordinate its efforts across the Eastern seaboard seem to be based on concepts similar to the operational arts

The pacing, audacity, and C2 of the mongol armies were perhaps more important to their victories than their mobility and bows. They also moved past the pure physicalness of war and waged it in their opponents minds as well. Mongols are past masters at fighting and winning the recon battle, using deception, combined arms, using intelligence gained by non-military means, politics, and using terror to create both open cities and clogged roads.

Originally Posted by Shek

Mihais,

How did they operate at the operational level of war? The operational art is a very specific conceptualization, and the first of prerequisites is to be at the operational level or war.

Sir,I'm thinking of several elements of operational art that existed long before ACW:
-understanding conditions for victory before the engagements
-look beyond current situation
-create the most favorable conditions for the subordinates at tactical levels.
Just a few that come to my mind now:Alexander's Bactrian campaigns,Hamilcar Barca in Sicily,Pompeius vs the pirates,Ulm campaign in 1805 etc...
Now,is obvious that many wars in ancient or medieval times were decided in one battle/siege (or a few not directly linked to each other).The fact that these are a majority should not cloud the fact that there were exceptions.
Also I think the Napoleonic practice of decisive battle had aquired an infamous reputation,because nobody was really capable of emulating Napoleon.In his best days the battle occurred after the enemy was already in an impossible situation.Much like Grant would have liked to do to Lee if given the chance.

Originally Posted by Mihais

Sir,I'm thinking of several elements of operational art that existed long before ACW:
-understanding conditions for victory before the engagements
-look beyond current situation
-create the most favorable conditions for the subordinates at tactical levels.

This isn't operational art.

Not yet at that level,but those were considered attributes of operational commander in FM3-0 last time I checked.Maybe I need to re-read it.
Thinking a bit harder,sinchronization(as allowed by communications),direct/indirect approach,center of gravity(although not recognized as such),tempo and timing(again limited by technology),engaging the enemy in depth, were all known and practiced with various degrees of success before the Industrial Revolution.If I get some time I'll check deeper,because the subject is surely fascinating.