1idvet

This is an article collaborated on by the Brookings Institution and the Strategic Studies Institute.
Here are the key insights to the discussion:


The document is located here:
COIN OF THE REALM: U.S. COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY

I thought this would be a good discussion generator on the merits of COIN and how the US is implementing the COIN strategy and its effect on our operational capabilities for modern conventional warfare.

The impact COIN operations have on the OPTEMPO of our forces is high. If you add another element to the mix, say Iran, what impact would transitioning back to a conventional war would our forces have to endure, if necessary?

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In Omnia Paratus

S-2

Nice article. Metz has posted here occasionally. What's missing is a strategic doctrine shaping our use of COIN as a military art. Our predilection to see COIN as an element of state-craft may be an issue in the absence of nation-states worthy of the name with which to partner. Iraq and Afghanistan are proving that successful COIN ops will require, likely, decades of close involvement. We seem unprepared to do so with those two nations and show less eagerness to add to that list.

That's good because our energies remain mis-directed for various reasons above the military-operational level. "M" dominates diMe, and that's not good.

The greater questions, to me, seem if the future portends an absence of viable nation-states with which to partner, what should our strategic objectives/expectations be and how must we re-configure to attain them? Is it feasible to actively seek local (and marginal) solutions that provide no unifying payoff for the effort extended?

Witness Iraq. What will connect local successes generated by U.S. forces to a national reconciliation or even a more closely-focused sunni-shia rapproachment? We still miss the strategic dimension with little foreseeable hope on the horizon.

Nice find.

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"This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski

1idvet

Thanks.
Just looking to get smarter myself.
I used to be more directly involved in this stuff when I worked at the NTC, but since moving on, I can only keep up on my own.
This looks like a good place to do that.

1idvet

America's enemies at present, and likely in the future, will be irregular fighting forces and they will fight in an unconventional manner. Our forces have to adapt to this type of warfare and still maintain the ability to fight a conventional war.

Where to strike a balance on this issue is the problem. Invest heavily in special operations forces, or continue to feed the conventional forces from the same coffer and sacrifice the needed capability? Or, train our conventional forces in irregular tactics and sacrifice their ability to fight a conventional war?

In my opinion, units such as the 82nd Airborne, 101st Airborne, and 173rd Airborne can be transitioned to units that are more adaptable to special operations. They are already doing a lot of missions that could be considered a part of the special operations realm in Afghanistan and have also done so in Iraq. Maybe if they were more dedicated to this type of fighting, we would be better prepared for irregular warfare and our conventional forces would be able to adapt to the style after the conventional part of the war is over with the support of those units already proficient at it.

Just thinking.

Here's an interesting article from the Strategic Studies Institute:

The article discusses irregular forces and strategy.

IRREGULAR ENEMIES AND THE ESSENCE OF STRATEGY:
CAN THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR ADAPT?


Here's the summary:

Cactus

What do you mean by worthy nation-state partners? From the Cold War paradigm, you can have a number of different types of allies:

1. Allies who can pull their own weight, given some initial help. For example: Western European countries, Germany and Japan.

2. Allies that may come to pull their own weight, but investments are risky - some may pay-off, while others collapse. Ex. South Korea vs. Vietnam.

3. Allies not much more useful than bogging down a conflict - the enemy preferably, sometimes the allied effort itself in worst-case scenario. Ex. Afghanistan.

Every type of ally has its own worth: so the question is, what type of worth are you looking for? Where?

S-2

My comments began w/ my mini-thesis of a useful strategic doctrine. I don't see a functional difference in our desires given your examples even though I disagree that Afghanistan is a completely counter-productive endeavor distracting from some greater purpose.

Iraq and Afghanistan are irrelevancies in any case with respect to future applications except as laboratories for techniques. We're committed in some form or fashion for the foreseeable future and may yet achieve some reasonable modicum of local stability and security. So long as graft, crime, corruption, and chronically poor ethically-driven governance prevail, there's a natural limit to our utility. Useful nonetheless.

Identification of successful candidates for future interventions of similar ilk is my desire. Doing so requires a substantive re-organization of our nat'l instruments of power to assure our optimal performance should we do so. Done correctly, we should be able to ascertain whether we've the means to intervene and whether local conditions would be receptive to our interposition.

Both Afghanistan and Iraq suffered from our inability to rapidly and incisively focus all elements of our nat'l power at decisive moments. We were, and largely remain, unprepared at the inter-cabinet level of government to make lucid decisions of intervention and then to execute with vigor.

I hope not to do so again so haphazardly.

Cactus

The US support to Afghan allies in the Soviet-Afghan War was a productive endeavour; its worth was in the distractive and irritating effect it had on the Soviets. That chapter was closed in 1988. I was referring to different types of US allies in the Cold War time-frame.

S-2

My misunderstanding of your example. Sorry.