Thread: Modern Warfare Doctrine

FM3-0 TABLE OF CONTENTS Operations

Preface

Army forces are the decisive component of land warfare in joint and multinational operations. Army forces aggressively gain the initiative, build and maintain momentum, and exploit success to control the nature, scope, and tempo of full spectrum operations in war and military operations other than war. Execution of this doctrine requires well-trained soldiers and units fueled with the warrior ethos, the best weapons and equipment available, and the solid leadership of officers and noncommissioned officers of character and competence.
PURPOSE

FM 3-0 establishes the Army’s keystone doctrine for full spectrum operations. The doctrine holds warfighting as the Army’s primary focus and recognizes that the ability of Army forces to dominate land warfare also provides the ability to dominate any situation in military operations other than war. The foundation of FM 3-0 is built upon global strategic responsiveness for prompt, sustained Army force operations on land as a member of a joint or multinational force.

FM 3-0 is compatible with joint doctrine. It provides overarching doctrinal direction for the conduct of full spectrum operations detailed in other Army manuals. As the Army’s principal tool for professional education in the art and the science of war, FM 3-0 presents a stable body of operational doctrine rooted in actual military experience. FM 3-0 provides a foundation for the development of tactics, techniques, and procedures.

OoE, sir, I wonder how 3.0 will change now that we've had almost 7 years of wartime experience to add to our knowledge base. Where did we make mistakes and was that a result of the doctrine or was the doctrine sound and just not executed properly? For example, if the Army is supposed to fight and win the nation's wars, did it plan to do this during the Iraq invasion, or did it instead focus on winning the battle and not achieving the desired endstate of a Saddam free and democratic, stable Iraq? In either case, it seems there have been ample experiences all across the spectrum of operations to serve as test cases for the doctrine- so, where will that take us?

I don't think 3.0 will change much. It is OPERATIONS. However, 3.7.22 might take more of emphasis than before. It's nothing new here. The British and Canadians have emphasized the post conflict situation more than combat operations for decades.

You might have lost me on 3.7.22. If you're referencing the COIN manual, that became 3-24, and it has most definitely been emphasized and continues to be. Most interestingly, we are seeing the major author actually get to use his work in Iraq. If not 3.7.22 is not that, sir, then please inform.

Referencing 3.0, I think there will have to be some major changes. For one, Stability and Support, even as a term, is out of favor now, replaced with Stability and Reconstruction. I should think this is a precursor to significant changes to how these are done in the future.

My mistake. My copy is still referenced as 3.7.22 instead of 3.24.

I get your point now. Rewrites are always inevitable. I don't see a mechanized enemy who will demand a rewrite on the battle end.

Originally Posted by ofogs

OoE, sir, I wonder how 3.0 will change now that we've had almost 7 years of wartime experience to add to our knowledge base. Where did we make mistakes and was that a result of the doctrine or was the doctrine sound and just not executed properly? For example, if the Army is supposed to fight and win the nation's wars, did it plan to do this during the Iraq invasion, or did it instead focus on winning the battle and not achieving the desired endstate of a Saddam free and democratic, stable Iraq? In either case, it seems there have been ample experiences all across the spectrum of operations to serve as test cases for the doctrine- so, where will that take us?

Ofogs,

The US Army is great at operations, but not necessarily at strategy. Re: Iraq, COIN and other operations at the lower end of the conflict spectrum were considered to be lesser included cases of higher intensity operations vice unique operations that required additional/different skill sets. In terms of the next rewrite of 3.0, the question becomes what future do we expect to see AND are are there any missions that the senior leadership wants to write out of existence.

For example, post-Vietnam, there was a specific attitude and focus on "we don't do COIN." To a degree, with the Red Army right across the Fulda Gap, it was a smart decision to focus on the immediate threat. However, the only other potential peer competitor is the Chinese, and that capability (high intensity) is a decade or two away. So, that same pressure to immediate refocus on high intensity operations doesn't exist now. This will be interesting over the next few years to see who wins the battle over the "soul" of the US Army and what will be the state missions that we will prepare for.

Originally Posted by MKD

ofogs, Agree 100% with your point, when you talk an RMA centered on information the goal is either to achieve 100% accuracy (Cebrowski & Garstka, "NCW: It's origins and future" Proceedings Jan 1998) or simply to achieve information dominance (the goal as stated in US Joint Doctrine). This may sound geeky, but I think the proponents of NCW tend to fall into a trap that Clausewitz mentions, namely not understanding the difference between war in theory and war in practice.

I would say to this sometimes yes (higher ups over ruling the SEALs and Pilots on the scene during Anaconda) and sometimes no (the mauling of either Tawalkhana or Hamarubi Divsions of the RG during the mother of all sand storms). I think it definately puts a premium on a leadership style that knows how to delegate.

You are also correct about micromanagement at ridiculous levels. It is a problem in all US services and the benefit in time does not outweigh the loss of organizational initiative, but I think the issue is with the commanders that micromanage, not because more information is available.

I think in part this is a result of the up or out structure of the US Military that forces ticket punching and thus a fear of relying on others to get something down when your career is on the line. It is worth noting that perhaps the greatest generation of US officers came out of the depression era when promotions were rare and so the officers concentrated on thier trade rather than ticket punching. the US should encourage (via pay, slots and incentives) career junior and field grade officers and junior-mid level NCO's who can reach thier ideal level and then sit there. Not every good battalion commander will make a good general. I think but am not sure that the British do something like this. It encourages experts to sit where they can be experts.

I also think the new unit station system will help reduce the tendency to micromanage. The longer you have to work with someone the more you know what they can, will, and won't do and this builds trust.

Maybe we are seeing information actually replacing the Clausewitzian concept of military genius?

I think information requires even more genius. When you have only partial information your list of responses is also limited. As information increases so do the options. This is a double edged sword specially at higher levels. The danger of course is that if you forecast wrong and begin shifting assets you could pull your whole force out of place if you choose wrong or if your information was not as complete as you thought. Or you could over fixate on one aspect of the mission and leave other critical areas uncovered. We saw elements of both of these problems in 2003.

Originally Posted by Officer of Engineers

*** sigh *** On this thread, I can count possibly four (including myself) who've read FM 3.0 Operations. There's the hint.

Required reading of the PLA.