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Commentary from Paksitan

OPINION

Afghanistan — not so great games

Columnist Hamid Hussain does a detailed analysis of the present situation.

The post-September 11 events of cosmic proportions have resulted in world focusing on Afghanistan. Renewed interest of many local, regional and international players has resulted in surge of writings on Afghanistan. Policy makers of different countries are looking at the past, present and possible future of Afghanistan more closely. The task is difficult due to the convergence of various complex factors including internal, regional and international involving broad strategic, ethnic, economic and security areas. A closer look at the last twenty five year traumatic history of the region clearly illustrates the complexity of the problem due to clash of divergent aims and objectives of several parties. Neat ideological or rhetorical statements belie the underlying stresses of the society, which is caught in the eye of the storm and trying to control the events, which are beyond its grasp. This article will briefly deal with the interplay of these factors in the last twenty-five years after the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan.

Afghans:

When the war is over, I want to read Persian poetry and go somewhere where there are no damn mountains.

Late Ahmad Shah Masud -
Afghan Commander

Afghanistan over the centuries had incoherent relationship with the external world. However, on domestic front, it exhibited a degree of internal flexibility, which has ‘dampened more extreme turbulence within this multi-ethnic, linguistically heterogeneous, historically composite, and never entirely logical nation-state’.1 The external relationships of Afghanistan are still incoherent but the events of last twenty-five years have shattered that internal flexibility. The relationship between tribes and adjoining states of Pakistan and Afghanistan is a complex one. ‘The relationship is not of war or peace, black or white, but shades of grey; one that reflects the continuing socio-political dynamics of a special, indeed unique, situation that has prevailed in the region’.2 The 1978 Communist coup in Afghanistan changed the country forever. The brutal repression by the government of different segments of the society started a chain reaction of violence, which was going to haunt the Afghans for years to come.3 Despite a popular revolt and little control over the countryside, the Kabul regime was able to maintain the semblance of a central state with working institutions. In 1992 after the fall of Najibullah, Afghanistan gradually fragmented into city-states resembling the medieval model and traditional link between banditry and trade re-emerged. In this slip into disintegration and disorganization, people tend to gravitate to their more primordial beliefs and attachments of clan, tribe and ethnic identity. The state disintegrated and the stage was set for the next level of civil war, which will be more brutal and bloody. The scene is well summarized by one astute observer of Afghan scene in these words, “Billions of dollars worth modern weapons that had outlasted the strategic interests of their providers circulated in a devastated country with neither national institutions nor national identity”.4

The core supporters of many leaders were only their ethnic kins. Burhanuddin Rabbani’s close associates and armed guards were from his native Badakhshan province, Ahmad Shah Masud’s close confidants were Panjsheris while Abdul Rasheed Dostum’s Jowzyani Militia was predominantly Uzbek. De-tribalized Pushtuns were aligned with Gulbadin Hikmatyar while tribal Pushtuns rallied around their traditional heads in the form of local militias. The rise of tribal militias was a complex phenomenon.5 In early 80s, minorities, clans, which were weaker or defeated by their rivals and lower strata of the tribal society, joined the militias. The interior ministry ran the Sarandoy militia. This phenomenon had a devastating effect on the internal cohesion of Afghan society. The clan, tribal and ethnic bonds became stronger at the expense of already weak Afghan nationalism. The alliances were formed and broken at a dizzying speed due to local factors. In Kunduz province in early eighties, fighters belonging to Jamiat-e-Islami killed many civilians on the suspicion of collaboration with the government. The result was that the whole population of the valley went over to the government and became the strongest group of militiamen. In Ghor province, a large number of fighters belonging to Harkat-e-Inqilab joined government militias to fight more effectively against their local rivals belonging to Hizb-e-Islami. In 1986, continuous fighting between Hizb-e-Islami and Jamiat-e-Islami in northern area alienated the local population and 3,000 Uzbek families switched side to the government and became militia members.6 The orgy of bloodshed which followed was unprecedented in the history of Afghanistan. The fall of Khost in March 1991 was a classical example of the reincarnation of medieval thought process of the resistance. Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) deferred to the wishes of local commanders and modified their plans and reached an agreement about the distribution of the booty prior to assault. After the fall of Khost, everything went up in the air and resistance groups pillaged the town rather than administering it.7

After the fall of Najibullah in 1992, the interim set up was predominantly non-Pushtun. Pushtuns resented the coalition of Rabbani-Masud-Dostum which was entrenched in Kabul. Shia Hizb-e-Wahdat was aligned with Rabbani. Hikmatyar made the history by being the only Prime Minister in the world history who rather than coming to capital to assume his post preferred to encamp in the city suburb and periodically shell his capital with barrages of rockets resulting in much death and devastation. The former communist Pushtun defence minister, General Shahnawaz Tanai had earlier defected to Hikmatyar. Later, Pushtun supporters of Najibullah switched their allegiance to Hikmatyar.8 The ethnic and regional polarization was finalized with the defection of Khalqi Sarandoy Militia to Hikmatyar ranks. In 1994, Hikmatyar joined hands with Dostum to oust Masud from Kabul. Hizb-e-Wahdat conveniently dumped Rabbani-Masud government and jumped on the Dostum-Hikmatyar bandwagon. By that time, thoroughly disgusted by the fratricidal war, Pakistan was wooing Taliban in the south. Hikmatyar furious of being unceremoniously dumped by Pakistan did a somersault, joined Rabbani and came to Kabul in June 1996 to assume his post of prime minister. Later, when the Taliban came to the Kabul doors, he left for Iran. Nangarhar Shura led by Haji Abdul Qadeer governed the three eastern provinces. In an ambush, 70 of the key commanders of shura were killed and few hours later Taliban stormed the Jalalabad.9 In the north, in September 1997, a four way duel was going on between militias belonging to Dostum, Abdul Malik, Masud and Hizb-e-Wahdat in Mazar Sharif. The northern seesaw of battles ended when Taliban pacified the region with only remnants of resistance in small pockets.

The rise of Taliban was partly due to Pushtun frustrations. It was the historic phenomenon of coming together of Pushtun tribesmen at the time of crisis. Pushtuns of different inclinations either openly supported or approved of them. They created an ‘artificial unity among Pushtuns’.10 They started in the southern part of the country. After stabilizing their base in Kandahar, they moved outwards, first taking eastern cities and later Kabul and north of the country. The initial dramatic successes were partly due to the frustrations of general populace regarding total anarchy and infighting. Taliban rule brought the much-sought peace. The problem started when Taliban became more closely aligned with radical foreigners mainly Arabs and started to strictly enforce their version of religious law totally ignoring Afghan traditions. In this, Taliban resembled more like their communist predecessors. ‘Just as the isolation of Kabul based Marxist leaders from the lives of the rural poor led them to formulate unrealistic social programmes, so the cloistered society of the all-male madrasa has led the Taliban to create an idealized vision of Afghan villages unmoderated by the domestic influences of women, families, elders, and the everyday realities of tilling fields, tending flocks, and raising children’.11 After the September 11 attacks in United States, US came to Afghanistan with a heavy might to wrap up Taliban and flush out Osama bin Ladin and his network. The total rout of Taliban surprised everybody except those who are well versed with Afghan history. As one correspondent rightly pointed when he was watching US bombing from Northern Alliance frontlines that, ‘the cost of one of these bombs probably would have been enough to purchase the defection of every single Taliban commander in the trenches opposite’.12 Many non-Afghans who were fed on the stories of rhetoric and propaganda didn’t have the knowledge of inner dynamics of Afghan society. While a small core of committed individuals is still attached to Taliban leadership, the majority of general cadres had simply switched the sides to Taliban when they were in firm control. One Pakistani fighter who made it back to Pakistan after the fall of Taliban expressed his frustrations but correct ground realities in these words, “The only people who fought were the non-Afghans. Mullah Omar and his regime would not have fallen if his lieutenants were men of character. Afghans are venal”.13 It was ironic to see the pictures of Taliban fighters with black turbans, carrying same AK-47 rifles and riding in the same pick up trucks. The only difference was that instead of the white flag of Taliban, the old Afghan flag was wavering on the pick up truck and the fighters were smiling accompanied with US Special Forces personnel who were sharing the pick up truck with them. In December 2001, seeing the imminent demise of Taliban, several ministers and close associates defected and showed up in Pakistan. They formed a new party, Khuddamul Furqan Jamiat (KFJ). They publicly supported the interim Karzai government and stated that they will work with the Karzai government to ensure national reconciliation inside the country.

The post-Taliban Afghanistan is as complex and unpredictable as it was before. Various groups, factions and clans with different visions are put under one roof. In Kandahar, after initial tussle between Gul Agha and Maulvi Naqeebullah, Gul Agha emerged as the governor. He tried to get support of American troops to move against Ismael Khan in Herat but Karzai’s skills prevented that. In Paktia, the showdown between Badshah Khan Zardan and Saifullah Khan ended with Badshah Khan becoming governor of Paktia. His brother Kamal Khan is trying to outsmart his rival Zakim Khan Zadran in Khost. Interestingly, Kamal is from Paktia and Zakim is from Paktika thus complicating the regional and clan relations.14 Haji Abdul Qadeer is again the governor of Nangarhar province. In north, Dostum and Fahim are strengthening their position. In the media, only the fighting is getting the coverage. Behind the scene, many Afghans from all over the globe with different skills are trying to start the healing process of their devastated homeland. Many expatriates including teachers, doctors, economic experts have come to Afghanistan to help to re-build their country. The involvement of Afghans of different ethnic backgrounds and with variety of skills has rekindled the hope of a better and peaceful future for Afghanistan.

Regional Players:

The former Chief of Staff (COS) of Zia, Lt. General (r) Syed Rafaqat pointed to the complex and conflicting aims of various regional players, “... Some neighbouring countries are supportive of various ethnic group’s claims and ambitions. The external states are using the ethnic and geographic fault lines of Afghanistan to mirror and advance their own geostrategic interests”.15 Many regional countries, which saw an unstable Afghanistan as a threat to their national interests tried to intervene for variety of reasons. This exercise rather than stabilizing the region resulted in more widespread involvement of external forces. The backing of different Afghan factions further fractured the Afghan society as various players could not accommodate the genuine desires of their competitors.

Pakistan:

‘Pakistan may have to co-exist with a new government in Afghanistan that is not to its entire liking’.

General Khalid M. Arif

After Soviet invasion, Pakistan’s involvement with Afghanistan was limited to training, equipping and planning of operations for the resistance fighters to tie down Soviet Union in Afghanistan as no one expected that Soviets will leave. Later, when it became clear that Soviets may leave, Pakistan became more ambitious and worked to have a government in Afghanistan which is friendly to Islamabad. In 1988, when the Soviet withdrawal was imminent, ISI and CIA predicted that after Soviet withdrawal, the Najibullah regime will crumble quickly. In May 1988, Zia promised Congressman Charles Wilson that ‘I will give you Jalalabad as a Christmas present, with Hikmatyar in charge’.17 In 1989, during Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s first term in office, ISI embarked on the Jalalabad offensive to take the city as a base for interim government. At that time, both United States and Pakistan agreed on this plan but for different reasons. It was the wish of some hawkish Americans to see the outright bloody assault on major cities and seeing the humiliation of Soviets clinging to their helicopters as this would be the befitting revenge of Vietnam. On Pakistani side, some born again ‘holy warriors’ of defence establishment were dreaming of heading the victory parade and entering Kabul as modern day Saladin and to earn the lofty title of ‘Victors of Kabul’. ISI Chief, Lt. General Hamid Gul told the Afghan Cell (the meetings were attended by Prime Minister Benazir, her National Security Advisor, Iqbal Akhund, Chief of ISI and US ambassador) that the city could be taken in a week ‘if the government was prepared to allow for a certain degree of bloodshed’.18 Pakistanis were not too much concerned with the nuisance of bloodshed as it was mainly Afghan. Some astute Afghan commanders on the field were furious about ISIs decision of frontal attack of the city. One commander considered it a ‘dumb’ idea as it was dumb to lose ten thousand lives.19 In one commentator’s words, ‘a major Afghan war decision was taken by the Pakistanis with no Afghans present, but with the US ambassador looking on’.20 Many Afghans resented this blatant interference and several commanders were alienated. In October 1990 meeting of national commanders shura in Kunar, Afghans blocked the participation of ISI Chief Asad Durrani and opposed the ISI plan of direct attack on Kabul.21 By 1994, Pakistan was disgusted by the civil war and disappointed due to constant failures of their main ally, Hikmatyar and started to look for new ‘potential Pushtun proxies in Afghanistan’.22 Initially Benazir Bhutto’s Pushtun interior minister, Major General (r) Naseerullah Khan Babar did the ground breaking work. Later, ISI took the charge of providing logistic support and broker alliances of General Dostum, General Shahnawaz Tanai and former commander Jalaluddin Haqqani with Taliban. These alliances were vital and provided Taliban with necessary material and technical edge to defeat their rivals. In addition, the close alliance of Taliban with religious seminaries in Pakistan provided them with enough foot soldiers to fight at different fronts in Afghanistan. ISI instructed provincial governments of Balochistan and North West Frontier Province (N.W.F.P.) not to allow any political activities of Afghans who were against Taliban. Many anti-Taliban individuals were asked to leave Pakistan thus preventing any organized opposition to the Taliban.

After the September 11 attacks, when United States decided to take care of Osama bin Ladin and Taliban, Pakistan had to make a difficult decision. General Musharraf decided to distance itself from the fire in Afghanistan and supported US war efforts in the neighbouring Afghanistan. Pakistan after the unsuccessful attempts to convince Taliban of the gravity of the situation, worked with US in toppling them. In view of the dramatic shift in the Afghan policy, Pakistan now allowed anti-Taliban elements to organize their activities and open offices in Pakistan.23 Pakistani intelligence helped bring together various groups in Peshawar and Quetta and several members of Afghan diaspora in Europe and United States. This included pro-Zahir Shah elements, former commanders Abdul Haq, Haji Zaman, Syed Ahmad Gilani, General Rahim Wardak and Hamid Karzai. These efforts of Pakistani intelligence in coordination with CIA and the generous amount of money provided by US were crucial in neutralizing the southern and eastern Pushtun areas.

The main aim of Pakistan’s Afghan policy was to have a friendly government in Afghanistan to secure the Western border. Unfortunately, the policies, which it adopted, had exactly the opposite effects. None of the Afghan element was willing to subordinate its actions to Pakistan’s wishes. In fact, many Afghan groups developed contacts with various political groups and state institutions of Pakistan giving them leverage. In addition, Pakistan’s Afghan policy roused the suspicion of Pakistan’s traditional friends, i.e. China and Iran due to instability of the region. Ironically, some in Pakistan like Qazi Hussain Ahmad of Jamaat-e-Islami, who has worked closely with Afghans and Pakistani defence establishment are blaming the intelligence agencies with the benefit of hindsight. He stated, ‘Pakistan did not want to see the Afghan people deciding their fate independently’ and ‘were skeptical that if all Afghan people united under one leadership they would become master of their own fate, which in turn, could create trouble for Pakistan’.24 The events had a sobering effect on Pakistani establishment and have resulted in much pondering about the wisdom of following a shortsighted policy.

Iran:

The enemy of my enemy is my friend.

An Arab proverb

In early eighties due to its war with Iraq, Iran was not actively involved in Afghanistan. Iranian activities in Afghanistan quickly increased after the ceasefire with Iraq. The Shia groups who were bitter due to meagre financial and military support from Pakistan became close to Iran. Later some moderate Sunnis including Syed Ahmad Gilani, Burhanuddin Rabbani and Sibghatullah Mujjaddadi also became close to Iran. The eight resistance groups formed a ‘Coalition Council’ in Tehran. They told Cordovez in 1988 that they will not recognize any interim government set up in Peshawar.25 After the emergence of several Central Asian Republics (CARs) as independent countries in 1991, Iran was worried about the increased US influence in the area. This concern was legitimate as US has publicly announced several times its policy of isolating Iran. It was in this context that emergence of Taliban was seen with deep suspicion. Iran believed that Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and US were cooperating in consolidating Taliban, which will be detrimental to Iranian interests in the area. This prompted more active Iranian financial and military support of the groups opposing Taliban. In 1998, the murder of Iranian diplomats when Taliban swept Mazar Sharif brought two countries to the verge of armed conflict.

When United States decided to attack Afghanistan, Iran knowing the proximity of a grave danger to its interests gave verbal support to US efforts. When Gulbadin Hikmatyar issued statements against the interim Afghan government, Iran moved quickly to close his offices in Iran. Iranian interior minister said that opponents of the government of Hamid Karzai ‘who take advantage of the security they enjoy in Iran to say what they like, could create tension between Iran and Afghanistan’.26 Hikmatyar was later asked to leave Tehran. Iran gave active financial, economic and military support to Ismael Khan who is well entrenched in Herat but stayed well away from any measure which would bring US ire. Iran also helped to set up direct contact of Ismael Khan with Pakistan government.

The main concern of the three CARs (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan) bordering Afghanistan was the spill over of militants into their territories. They joined hands with Russia and China to forestall the destabilization of the whole region. Uzbekistan and Turkey had contacts with Dostum. Dostum took refuge in Turkey when Taliban ran over his fiefdom. Recently, Turkish government helped bridging the gap between Dostum and Pakistan.

International Players:

Many countries especially United States and Saudi Arabia had played a large role especially in the last twenty years in the events in Afghanistan. Russia though major player until 1991 had markedly reduced influence since its disintegration into many independent states. It has given limited military help to the Taliban opposition and deployed troops in Tajikistan near the border of Afghanistan. It is suspicious of increasing US influence in the area traditionally seen by them as their area of influence but not in a position to challenge the US in any meaningful way. In addition, it is also concerned with the increasing influence of militant Islamists in Chechnya and Daghestan.

Saudi Arabia:

We expect men to be wrong about the most important changes through which they live.

Harold Lasswel

In late seventies, Saudis were facing severe criticism for their close alliance with US both from Arab governments not in line with US policies and Iran. After the 1979 Iranian revolution, the Saudi-Iranian relations became hostile. Saudis used the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as a springboard to portray their commitment to Muslim causes and brush up their Islamic credentials. In early eighties in close cooperation with America, Saudi Arabia provided a large amount of financial aid for military and humanitarian purposes for Afghanistan. Several humanitarian organizations of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf sheikdoms opened offices and ran clinics and hospitals in Pakistan. Saudi Arabia was able to develop direct relations with some resistance groups especially Abdul Rasul Sayyaf and Hikmatyar. During the Gulf war, the support of Iraq by Hikmatyar and Sayyaf brought the ire of Saudis and they worked on new proxies. In 1991, about 7,000 tons of captured Iraqi military arms and ammunition including heavy equipment was delivered to Mujahideen.27 Pakistan had close working relations with all Sunni groups, most of them based in Peshawar. They never tried to bring Shia groups into the coalition to avoid friction with Saudis. After the cut off of US funds, Saudis became the largest provider of funds for Afghan adventure. The direct role of Saudi Arabia also dramatically increased. Chief of Saudi intelligence, Prince Turki developed close relationship with ISI and some Afghan factions. He travelled frequently to Islamabad and Afghanistan. In July 1996, he visited Kandahar and Islamabad and was actively involved in the planning of fresh offensives of Taliban in close consultations with Taliban and ISI. Later, the warm relations between Taliban and Saudis hit the bottom when Taliban refused to cooperate on Osama bin Ladin issue. Saudi Arabia also funded many charitable institutions and religious seminaries in Pakistan. Saudis funded the most conservative individuals and organizations in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Ironically, most of them turned against the Saudi royal family and had openly criticized the royal family for its close relationship with US.



United States:

All wars end. I think that’s a universal rule. So one of these days this war too will end. Then I believe the pipeline will be secure. John Maresca, Vice President of UNOCAL for International Relations commenting on Afghan civil war in February 1998

President Carter had signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of pro-Soviet regime in Kabul in July 1979, about five months before the Soviet army entered Afghanistan. His national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote to him the same day that this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention. When Soviets finally came in December 1979, Brzezinski wrote to Carter that ‘we now have the opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam war’.28 And the rest is history. Large-scale supply of arms and ammunition to Afghan resistance during the eighties was largely the CIA not so covert operation. After the Soviet withdrawal, CIA let ISI deal with the ugly mess of Afghanistan.

After the emergence of Central Asian Republics (CARs) as independent countries in 1991 and the prospects of availability of huge oil and gas reserves in the area brought that area to the attention of various energy corporations. In 1997, a multinational consortium, Central Asia Gas Pipeline Consortium (CentGas) was evaluating the construction of a gas pipeline. The proposed 790-mile pipeline will link Daulatabad gas field in Turkmenistan, pass through southern Afghanistan to Multan in Pakistan. In the next stage, from Multan the pipeline will reach Delhi for the growing energy market of India. UNOCAL of California and Delta of Saudi Arabia was working on another 1040 mile long oil pipeline from Turkmenistan via Afghanistan to a port to be constructed on the coast of Pakistan.29 Many members of President Bush team and Afghans involved in current situation have links with energy corporations. President Bush’s National Security Advisor, Condoleeza Rice has been former member of the board of Chevron, a large US oil firm. Vice President Dick Cheney has headed Halliburton, a large oil pipeline construction firm. Laila Helms, an Afghan-American and niece-in-law of former CIA director Richard Helms was contact person between Taliban and UNOCAL and arranged for the visit of Taliban representatives to United States. The interim chief, Hamid Karzai has been an advisor to UNOCAL. He has been involved in negotiations of UNOCAL with Taliban. The former Reagan National Security Advisor, Robert McFarlane runs a K-Street oil-consulting firm. He was working closely with Abdul Haq in the region after September 11. In fact, when Haq was trapped inside Afghanistan, McFarlane made frantic calls to CIA to rescue him. Taliban promptly executed Haq to discourage other potential troublemakers. This did not deterred Hamid Karzai who worked with various groups inside Afghanistan. The gathering of Afghans from all over the world in Bonn resulted in the temporary agreement on an interim government which will pave the way for the Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly) to deliberate on the future of Afghanistan. The dilemma of present interim government is that it has to have a sufficient distance from its American supporters so that Afghans do not perceive it as a puppet of US.

Conclusion

The major problem of Afghanistan is the relatively low level of Afghan nationalism. The internal conflict of last two decades with atrocities committed by all sides on ethnic rivals and forced displacements will make the task of rekindling the flame of nationalism more difficult. Only educated urban Afghans have enough nationalistic fervour to overcome strong underlying sub-national sentiments. This political instability is the major hindering factor in the resolution of differences among different groups. Political reconstruction is the essential pre-requisite for the economic reconstruction of the country. Afghanistan is at a major crossroad of its history today. The chain of events, which has led to the present situation, was beyond the control of Afghans. But now, it is Afghans who will have to do soul searching and make some difficult choices. It depends a lot on what are long-term objectives of United States. If their aim is short to medium range that after stabilization to a reasonable level, they will pull their troops out and may leave it to an international force dominated by Turkish troops, then Afghans may be more independent in their decision making in near future. On the contrary, if US decide that American troops are going to protect the potential oil and gas pipelines passing through Afghanistan, then choices for Afghans will be limited. This will ultimately bring the clash between US and some Afghan groups. The second scenario is less likely as due to domestic concerns, US may not be able to keep troops in Afghanistan for long even if it wished. Second, economically, the oil and gas pipelines are mainly corporate concerns and not US national concern, therefore the broad national support for continued long term troop deployment will be limited. The potential pipelines are mainly for emerging energy markets of Asia, not much for the rest of the world. Recent decision of British to gradually hand over the peacekeeping responsibility to Turkish troops is a sign that British and US would limit their direct troop involvement. Afghans have to do the mind-boggling calculations to decide which path to follow, which not only restores the dignity and morale of Afghan nation but also allays the fears of its immediate neighbours, Iran and Pakistan and satisfy the concerns of United States. On the positive side, a balanced and low key Afghan rejuvenation may bring a bright future for its new generation. Failure to achieve a modest stabilization may herald the nightmare of anarchy and bloodshed. Another round of orgy of blood may cause the division of Afghanistan at the Hindu Kush. The northern Tajik, Uzbek and Turkeman drifting toward their ethnic kins across the border while southern and eastern Pushtuns gravitating to Pushtuns across Durand line.

Consider not only present but future discords...... If one waits until they are at hand, the medicine is no longer in time as the malady has become incurable. Machiavelli

Notes

1Edwards, David B. Before Taliban: Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad (Berkely & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002), p. 299
2Ahmed, Akbar S. Pakistan Society: Islam, Ethnicity and Leadership in South Asia (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 133
3For the details of atrocities committed by all sides during Soviet occupation see Laber, Jeri and Rubin, Barnett R. A Nation is Dying (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1988) pp. 22-35, 66-69, 77-99
4Rubin, Barnett R. Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1995), p. 266
5For the details of the phenomenon of militias and their role in Afghanistan see Giustozzi, Antonio. War, Politics and Society in Afghanistan 1978-1992 (London: Hurst & Co., 2000), pp. 198-225
6Giustozzi, Antonio. War, Politics and Society in Afghanistan, p. 124-25
7Rubin, Barnett. Fragmentation of Afghanistan, p. 255
8Amin, Tahir. Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asian States in Banuazizi, Ali and Weiner, Myron (Ed.) The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and Its Borderlands (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994), p. 226
9Griffin, Michael. Reaping The Whirlwind: The Taliban Movement in Afghanistan (London: Pluto Press, 2001), p. 15-16
10Roy, Olivier. Has Islamism a Future in Afghanistan in Maley, William (Ed.) Fundamentalism Reborn: Afghanistan and Taliban (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1998) , p. 208
11Edwards, David. Before Taliban, p. 300
12Simpson, John. Afghanistan’s Tragedy in Baxter, Jenny and Downing, Malcolm (Ed.) BBC Reports (Woodstock & New York: The Overlook Press, 2002), p. 100
13The Friday Times, March 03, 2002
14Afridi, Fazal-ur-Rehman. The Phenomenon of Afghan Warlords. The Frontier Post (Internet Edition), February 11, 2002
15Rafaqat, Syed. Lt. General (r). Afghanistan Imbroglio: Then and Now. Dawn (Internet Edition), October 31, 2001
16Arif, Khalid M. General (r). Afghanistan’s Difficult Hour. Dawn (Internet Edition), November 28, 2001
17Kaplan, Robert D. Soldiers of God (New York: Vintage Books, 2001), p. 137
18Akhund, Iqbal. Trial and Error: The Rise and Eclipse of Benazir Bhutto (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 200), p. 175
19Kaplan, Robert. Soldiers of God, p. 166
20Kux, Dennis. The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 - Disenchanted Allies (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 298
21Rubin, Barnett. Fragmentation of Afghanistan, p. 254
22Rashid, Ahmad. Taliban, Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 26
23The News (Internet Edition), October 26, 2001
24Ahmad, Hussain Qazi. Compelling Lessons From The Afghan Crisis.The News (Internet Edition), December 10, 2001
25Cordovez, Diego and Harrison, Selig S.Out of Afghanistan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 371
26Dawn (Internet Edition), February 11, 2002
27Weinbaum, Marvin G. Pakistan and the Resolution of Afghan Conflict in Kennedy, Charles H. (Ed.) Pakistan: 1992, p. 121 & 131
28Brzezinski’s interview with French newspaper Le Nouvel Observateur in 1998
29Testimony of vice president, International Relations of UNOCAL John Maresca to House Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific and Committee on International Relations, February 12, 1998. http;//commdocs.house.gov/committees. March 07, 2002
Afghanistan — not so great games

Op-Ed
By Abid Ullah Jan
The Inevitable Pak-Afghan Union


THE US and its allies occupy both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The only difference is that the former is under the direct military occupation as a result of full-scale war waged against its former government. Pakistan, on the other hand, suffers from partial occupation. Unlike Hamid Karzai, the US forces have not waged a war to install General Musharraf. Nevertheless, compared to Afghanistan, the US can achieve its objectives more freely and conveniently in Pakistan. Along these full and partial occupations, natural resources, strategic positions, Pakistan’s nuclear capability and various other factors within and outside Pakistan and Afghanistan are pushing these countries are at work to somehow alter their present status.

Whatever may be the outcome, one can safely say that Pakistan and Afghanistan will not remain as two states on the world map for too long. Almost all the visible forces are engaged in somehow disintegrating these states. The invisible forces, nevertheless, are brining these countries towards an ultimate unification — towards the formation of a greater Afghanistan. A thorough analysis reveals that results of the visible forces, working for disintegrating these states, would also indirectly lead to strengthen position of the forces invisibly leading these states towards unification.

The disintegration options are presented as the best security option for the region. A broad identification in this regard shows the forces for domestic liberalization (demilitarising, democratising, or "secularising") and the forces advocating South Asian regional cooperation (even Pakistan’s reunion with India) are the forces acting for disintegration of Pakistan.

There are also plans under consideration since long for dividing Afghanistan into different states to neutralise any prospects of its emergence as an “Islamic fundamentalist” state. Pakistan and Afghanistan's future security and survival as viable states is self-evident in none of these propositions. Interestingly, all efforts made towards disintegrating these states are indirectly leading to the realisation of most plausible security alternative: the union of Pakistan and Afghanistan. They strengthen the invisible forces of trans-pseudo-national religious and cultural identity which are leading these countries towards the inevitable union.

In Pakistan, there are two clear ends of the spectrum. At one end, visionaries like Dr. Israr Ahmed of Tanzeem-i-Islami foresee confederation between Pakistan and Afghanistan for countering Indian and other hegemonic designs.[1] On the other end, the self-proclaimed “liberals” like Najam Sethi come up with inflammatory and scare-mongering articles and editorials. For example a February 02, 2001 editorial of the Friday Times shows how much deep contempt some quarters have for the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), Pakhtoons and Afghans.

The idea of a multi-ethnic, multi-sectarian and democratic Pakistan seems to exclude the inhabitants of NWFP. By making disparaging remarks about Pakhtoons, the editorial is an example of how the forces of disintegration are actually not only promoting sectarianism, hatred, intolerance and xenophobia but also paving the way for unification of Pakistan and Afghanistan.

In an article published in Asian Affairs, an American Review, Washington October 1995, Sandy Gordon argued that at the end of the Cold War, India had emerged as the winner and Pakistan the loser in South Asia. "Far from having lost out as a result of the end of the Cold War," he wrote, India is poised to emerge in the early 21st century as a far more important and influential power in the Indian Ocean region, and even globally, than it was in the latter part of the 20th.[2] Pro-India transmissions of BBC World Service abroad and rhetoric of pro-India “peace lobby’ together with anti-religious organisation campaign in Pakistan indicate the pace of uncontrollable events that are soon going to push the pendulum towards the inevitable unification.

Durability of Pakistan borders are constantly questioned by Indian and western analysts with a hope to see a disintegrated Pakistan. At home, media outlets like Friday Times use the acronym, 'NWFP' throughout specific pieces of articles and editorials in a way to relegate a constituent unit of the Pak Nation. Perhaps in their vision of a multi-ethnic, multi-sectarian and democratic Pakistan, the 'NWFP' will merely be an appendage i.e. a buffer zone to protect a multi-ethnic, multi-sectarian and democratic Pakistan from their co-religionists in Afghanistan.

At the moment, ethnic separatism is not a significant threat in the NWFP, where the Pakhtunistan movement is mostly moribund and, beyond that, tends to be seen less as a product of grievances of Pakhtoons than as a device exploited and fostered at times by external forces. At the same time, Pakhtoons nationalism is by no means a thing of the past, however, and seems bound to become more troublesome with Pakhtoon and non-Pakhtoon struggle in Afghanistan on the one hand and irresponsible attitude of the “liberal” leaders and media pundits in Pakistan on the other. The new version of this movement, nevertheless, would be in favour of confederation with Afghanistan rather than dismemberment of Pakistan.

This paper looks into various aspects that are leading Pakistan and Afghanistan to end up as a united country.

Early History

It is probable that there were well-developed civilizations in Afghanistan in prehistoric times, but the archaeological record is not clear. Certainly cultures had flourished in the north and east before the Persian king Darius I (c.500 B.C.) conquered these areas. Later, Alexander the Great conquered (329–327 B.C.) them on his way to India, which never included the present land area of Pakistan.

After Alexander's death (323 B.C.) the region at first was part of the Seleucid empire. In the north, Bactria became independent, and the south was acquired by the Maurya dynasty. Bactria expanded southward but fell (mid-2d cent. B.C.) to the Parthians and rebellious tribes (notably the Saka). Buddhism was introduced from the east by the Yüechi, who founded the Kushan dynasty (early 2d cent. B.C.). Their capital was Peshawar. The Kushans declined (3d cent. A.D.) and were supplanted by the Sassanids, the Ephthalites, and the Turkish Tu-Kuie.

Muslim conquests

Eastern Flank of Islam under the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs Islam spread to the borders of Afghanistan under Caliph Othman (644-656) and Caliph Ali (656-661). Under the Umayyads (661-750), Islam spread to Afghanistan: Kabul (664), Punjab, Sindh and Central Asia: Transoxania, Merv (710), Samarkand (710). In 711 C.E., Muhmmad Bin Qasim under command of the ruler of Spain and Central Asia came into South Asia reaching as far as Multan, where he settled 4000 Arab families.

The Muslim conquest of Afghanistan began in the 7th century. Several short-lived Muslim dynasties were founded, the most powerful of them having its capital at Ghazni. Mehmud Gahnavi, who conquered the lands from Khorasan in Iran to the Punjab in India early in the 11th cent., was the greatest of Afghanistan's rulers. Jenghiz Khan (c.1220) and Timur (late 14th cent.) were subsequent conquerors of renown. Babur, a descendant of Timur, used Kabul as the base for his conquest of India and the establishment of the Mughal empire in the 16th cent. In the 18th cent. the Persian Nadir Shah extended his rule to N of the Hindu Kush. After his death (1747) his lieutenant, Ahmad Shah, an Afghan tribal leader, established a united state covering most of present-day Afghanistan. His dynasty, the Durrani, gave the Afghans the name (Durrani) that they themselves frequently use.

Abbasid Caliphate

The Abbbasid Caliphate (750-850) with its capital in Baghdad was at its greatest extent during the rule of Haroun al-Rashid (786-809). Its eastern limits included Herat in Afghanistan and Balkh, Bukhara, Merv, Samarkand and Transoxania in Central Asia. The Ghaznavids who ruled Kabul, Ghazni, Kandahar, Multan, Lahore and Kashmir all recognised the Abbasid Caliphate by 1090.[3]

Mahmud of Ghazni

Mahmud of Ghazni (born 971, reigned 998-1030) was the first Turk to invade Iran and South Asia from the Northwest. His conquests stretched deep into Central Asia (Balkh). He ventured far south as Gujerat, attaching Punjab to his Central Asian empire. The western limit of his empire included Hamadan and Isfahan; Peshawar, Jhelum, Amritsar, Lahore, Multan in the east; and Gujerat in the south.[4]

The Ghaznavids recognised the Abbasid Caliphate and played the main part in the expansion of Islam into South Asia. The Ghaznavids were succeeded by Afgans from Ghor - Ghurids Dynasty 1148-1206. The last Ghurid ruler of Afghanistan brought the whole of northern India under Islamic rule.[5] The Delhi Sultanate (1206-1526) with its capital in Delhi, followed under the leadership of four major dynasties - the Mamluks (Turkish slaves), Khaljis, Tughlaqs and Lodis.[6] During this time there was an intermixing of Turkish, Persian and Afghan culture, for example the word Urdu is of Turkish origin meaning military camp.

Timur

A Barlas Turk (Turko-Mongol) warrior called Timur (the Earth Shaker) born in 1336 near Samarkand created a single unified empire that included Central Asia (Bukhara, Merv, Tashkent), Iraq; Iran, Afghanistan, and much of Pakistan (Peshawar, Taxila, Lahore, Multan, etc).[7] His capital was Samarkand. He added Delhi to his empire in 1398.

South Asia before Babur's Invasion

When Christians from Europe became interested in India, e.g. Christopher Columbus (1492), Vasco Da Gama (1497), the continent as with any continent was made up of several nations of which one was Islamic : the Sultanate of Delhi ruled by the Afghan Lodhis since 1451. The Sultanate was a narrow strip that ran across North India stretching from Afghanistan in the west to Bihar Bengal in the east; whilst its southern limit was Delhi. Other nations in the continent included Bengal, Multan, Rajput Confederacy, Arghun Kingdom of Sindh, Gujerat, Malwa, Khandesh, Gondwana, Orissa, Ahmadnagar, Berar, Bidar, Golconda and Vijayanagar.

Mughal Empire

Six years after Da Gama's arrival in South Asia, a Sufi Dervish (also an adventurer, poet and writer) from Farghana, Uzbekistan in Central Asia called Zahiruddin Muhammad Babur - the Tiger/Leopard (a descendent of Timur), invaded Afghanistan at the instigation of the governor of Punjab.

In 1504, he seized power from the existing Muslim rulers - the Afghan Lodhis (1451-1526). The foundations and first capital of the Mughal Empire was Kabul in Afghanistan. Babur then took Kandahar in 1522 and Lahore in 1524. For ten years, Babur divided his ambitions between Central Asia and South Asia.[8]

In 1526 at the Battle of Panipat, Babur defeated the last Lodhi called Ibrahim who had ruled Delhi, Bihar and Punjab. Babur used guns, matchlocks and mortars which have not been seen in South Asia before. With this victory, he gained control of Delhi and Agra. Having secured the traditional invasion routes of the Khyber Pass in Afghania (North West Frontier) and Kashmir, he advanced deep into South Asia. Babur was an outsider and would pine for his Central Asian homeland.[9]

The objective of the Mughal Empire was to colonise the whole peninsula of South Asia, even if it meant compromising the religion of Islam by making alliances with non-Muslims, so as to bring the vast continent of different nations under a single unified administration. The task was completed by the British Raj, who virtually inherited the administration. Thus it only took 150,000 British personnel to rule South Asia, while it took 400,000 French soldiers to colonise Algeria.

Ahmad Shah Abdali

The break-up of the Mughal Empire began with an invasion by Nadir Shah the Turk who in 1739 conquered Iran, attacked Peshawar, Lahore and Delhi, looting Delhi's vast treasures before retiring to Kabul. In 1747, Afghanistan and today's Pakistan separated from the Mughal Empire under Ahmed Shah Abdali Durrani (an Afghan born in Multan). Between 1747 and 1769, Abdali invaded the North-west, Kashmir, Lahore (1752) nine times killing many Sikhs and defiling their temple. In 1761, Abdali defeated the Marathas, but a mutiny in the Afghan army forced him to withdraw, leaving a power
vacuum for the East India Company.[10]

Beginning of the international problem

The reign of the Durrani line ended in 1818, and no predominant ruler emerged until Dost Muhammad became emir in 1826. During his rule the status of Afghanistan became an international problem, as Britain and Russia contested for influence in central Asia. Aiming to control access to the northern approaches to India, the British tried to replace Dost Muhammad with a former emir, subordinate to them. This policy caused the first Afghan War (1838–42) between the British and the Afghans.

Dost Muhammad was at first deposed but, after an Afghan revolt in Kabul, was restored. In 1857, Dost Muhammad signed an alliance with the British. He died in 1863 and was succeeded, after familial fighting, by his third son, Sher Ali.

As the Russians acquired territory bordering on the Amu Darya, Sher Ali and the British quarreled, and the second Afghan War began (1878). Sher Ali died in 1879. His successor, Yakub Khan, ceded the Khyber Pass and other areas to the British, and after a British envoy was murdered the British occupied Kabul. Eventually Abd ar-Rahman Khan was recognized (1880) as emir.

In the following years Afghanistan's borders were more precisely defined. Border agreements were reached with Russia (1885 and 1895), British India (the Durand Treaty, 1893 for which the sitting Kind was forced to sign in person), and Persia (1905). The Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 guaranteed the independence of Afghanistan under British influence in foreign affairs. Abd ar-Rahman Khan died in 1901 and was succeeded by his son Habibullah. Despite British pressure, Afghanistan remained neutral in World War I. Habibullah was assassinated in 1919. His successor, Amanullah, attempting to free himself of British influence, invaded India (1919). This third Afghan War was ended by the Treaty of Rawalpindi, which gave Afghanistan full control over its foreign relations.

It is important to note that Afghanistan’s southern border was drawn by Sir Mortimer Durand, the colonial government of India's foreign secretary, expressly to divide the Pashtun tribe's homeland in half, thereby establishing a buffer state on India's northwest frontier. The document was to be ratified by the legislative body in Afghanistan. However, it never happened. Moreover, the text of the Treaty is clear in identifying the Amir and not the people or government of Afghanistan as party to the document.

Following the procurement of this Treaty, the Durand line was not demarcated in any areas with the exception of Chaman-SpinBoldak and the Torkhum region. On the map, however, the areas of Chaman, Peshin, Chaghai, Waziristan, BulandKhail, Koram, ParaChinar, Afraidi, Bajawur, Suwat, Bajawar, Chilas and Chitral, part of the Afghan sovereign territory, were annexed to the British India. Neither the people of Afghanistan nor the people of above region have had at any time agreed to this arrangement.

When the Pakhtoons who found themselves on the Indian side of the Durand line failed to integrate themselves peaceably under the Raj, the North-West Frontier Province was sliced off from the Punjab to establish a second, inner buffer. These two tribal belts were incorporated formally within the boundaries of Pakistan when that nation separated from a newly independent India under the 1947 Partition Plan.

When the British left India in 1947 for good, it should have returned Afghan territory up to river Sutlej, or at least including the area up to the natural border, the River Indus to Afghanistan. Instead, still dreaming of keeping its colonial interests alive in the subcontinent the British gave this territory to Pakistan, thus creating a double buffer zone between the expansionist Soviet Union and the Indian Ocean. This deprived Afghanistan of direct access to the sea.

Mr. Ludwig W. Adamec of the US Department of Near Eastern Studies, who has done a thorough study of Afghan history and extensively wrote on Afghan issues, writes in one of his 1998 write ups, titled “Greater Afghanistan, A Missed Chance” that the areas previously under Afghanistan rule “were not given the right to vote for independence or union with Afghanistan - the choice was rather for union with Pakistan or India.” He writes in a well publicized article: "The British Foreign Office sought legal advice in the matter in case the frontier dispute was taken for arbitration to an international tribunal."

Although Afghan nationalists would have liked to Integrate all of the North-West Frontier Province of India and Baluchistan into "historical" Afghanistan, London confined this issue to "the tribal area lying between the outer boundary of the Province and the line recognized by Article 2 of the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1921"[ Ludwig W. Adamec, Afghanistan, 1900-1923: A Diplomatic History California Univ. Press 1967. This volume contains copies of the Anglo-Afghan agreements and treaties]. The area in question included the five Tribal Agencies: Malakand, Khaibar, Kurram, North Waziristan, and South Waziristan."[11]

In fact, the British agreed with the Russians that neither of them could dominate the Afghans the way they wanted to, so they tried something else. They formed an ostensibly independent country. Sir Thomas Holdich wrote in 1901, “We have contributed much to give a national unity to that nebulous community which we call Afghanistan...by drawing a boundary all round it and elevating it to the position of a buffer state between England and Russia.”[12]

The Durand line’s failure to respect customary tribal territorial claims and to accommodate existing regional social, linguistic and cultural networks has had disastrous consequences for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakhtoons in particular found themselves on opposite sides of new, unwanted borders.

Furthermore, history shows that the present land area occupied by Pakistan has always remain part of Afghanistan. The above mentioned map of 1892 shows the area of NWFP and Baluchistan were even until then part of Afghanistan. Therefore, Afghans have never accepted separation of some of their territories by force. A resolution adopted soon after the creation of Pakistan during the General Assembly session of the National Assembly of Afghanistan (7th Shura) states, “Previous treaties which are aimed at separating the eastern provinces of Afghanistan were forcefully imposed on Afghan rulers. Thus, they are no longer considered valid.[13] More importantly, Amir Abdur Rehman Khan of Afghanistan was not acting as an independent head of state while signing the Durand agreement with British. He was on British subsidy, a kind of payroll, and a clause in the agreement hints to this reality. The Durand Line Treaty states:

"Further, in order to mark their sense of the friendly spirit in which His Highness the Amir has entered into these negotiations, the Government of India undertake to increase by the sum of six lakhs of rupees a year the subsidy of twelve lakhs now granted to His Highness."[14]

In 1901, Abdur Rahman's son, Habibullah, succeeded him. Lord Curzon entered into a same treaty with him for continuing his subsidy and quite clearly suggesting that the Durand Line is not an international frontier. He was assassinated in February 1919 and his son Amanullah succeeded his. In May 1919 Amanullah began their War of Independence, generally called the Third Anglo-Afghan War. Afghan forces crossed the Durand Line. Pakhtoons on both sides of the Durand Line rallied to the cause of unification. But their power was of no match to the British military strength which was further solidified with introduction of fighter aircrafts.

After World War I, the British began deploying Hawker Hart bombers along the frontier “to chastise rebellious Pathans,” familiar behavior for those of us acquainted with policies of the US, Israel and their allies. In 1920 after one border incursion, the British flew bombing raids over Jalalabad, Dacca, Kabul, and other cities inside Afghanistan. Six tons of bombs were dropped on Jalalabad, and the raid over Dacca lasted from morning to evening, causing 600 casualties. The Kabul bombing was on May 24, British Empire Day, and just to show who was boss, the Amir’s Palace was a target. An armistice was signed in November 1921. British soldiers “penetrated the valleys, extracted fines and pledges for good behavior and, when neither were forthcoming, burned crops and villages.” Major Gen. Harold Lewis wrote in his diary, “I am afraid that they will undergo most awful hardships this and next year, until they have got their crops going again.”[15]

The Treaty of Rawalpindi that followed gave the Afghans control over their foreign affairs but the Afghan territory remained in British India. Afterwards Afghans remained embroiled in their own problems from the Civil War in which the British supported General Nadir Khan, to taking over rule by the 19 year old Zahir Shah and his ouster by Sardar Daoud Khan, to the communists arrival and the subsequent longest war on the Afghan soil.

It is interesting to note that the arrival of communists into Afghanistan is also part of the unequal treaties imposed by British and its drawing lines on the Afghan map for separating major portions of its territory and people. Afghanistan never got the position of strength where it could dictate terms of enforce a desired settlement to regain its lost territories. Afghan government under Daoud sought military and economic assistance from the USA. But with Pakistan as its chosen ally, the USA turned its back on Afghanistan. Daoud had no option but to turn to Russia for assistance.

It pushed Afghanistan into the Soviet Union lap and made it become dependent upon it. Afghans got addicted to many things from the Soviet Union from essentials like food and energy to the ideology of communism due to their close interaction.

When Daoud came to power for the second time in 1973, he revived the issue of lost territories. In 1979, a new Afghan government once more formally repudiated the Durand Line. But for the next 23 years Afghanistan was beset by a cruel and callous war, which kept the issue from resurfacing. However, during this period, the world witnessed the insignificance of Durand Lind. Pakistan and Afghanistan remained almost borderless on their North Western and North Eastern borders respectively. During the Taliban period the concept and existence of border between Pakistan and Afghanistan virtually disappeared. After the US occupation of Afghanistan, and Pakistan’s sending troops to the Durand Line has once more revived the unfinished issue.

The indivisible people and land

Henry Mortimer Durand, Foreign Secretary of the Government of British India could draw a line on the map to separate Afghanistan from the rest of its people and land but the 110 years since then have proved that indivisible people and land will once more lead into merger of the two most strategic countries of the world. As mentioned earlier, the forces that are focusing on the break up of Afghanistan and Pakistan are also indirectly leading into the unification of these two countries.

While concluding a recent article on the border dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan, Mohan Guruswamy of Deccan Chronicle concludes: “It is now only a question of time before the demand for the reunification of all their people becomes a rallying call for the Pashtun nation. Even the internal dynamics within Afghanistan demand it. There is much unfinished business here.”[16] We must remember that the same Indian analysts were highlighting importance of the Durand Line during the time of the Taliban, when they feared that Pakistan and Afghanistan have virtually merged into a single state.[17]

The forces working for disintegration of Pakistan believes that revival of the Durand Line issue will cause only separation of NWFP and Baluchistan from Pakistan. They forget that in the post 1947 situation has considerably altered the socio-cultural set up of the area presently under Pakistan’s territory. Even if we look at the following map of India, drawn by Shepherd in 1923, shows that the areas well beyond river Sutlaj, including Kashmir were part of Afghanistan. Similarly, Sindh remained part of Afghanistan under Ahmad Shah Abdali. India for most of the time remained limited to its core of Mahratta states.

Thus the present territory of Pakistan has always been part of Afhgnaistan. Today, the similarities s are starker and deeper than ever. The common will of the people of both countries to be free from any external subjugation and living by Islam are some of the binding elements which turn the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan to a pure fiction. Drawing a line on the map to mark the empire’s edge could hardly subside the Pakhtoon struggle for their own land.

The fury of the Pakhtoons about the US and allies assault on Afghanistan is directed not only at the western powers, but also at the Pakistan authorities for backing an unjust war. It is wrong to assume that anger is just confined to the NWFP. From Chitral in the far north to the stews of Karachi on the edge of the Arabian Sea, the war in Afghanistan is stirring already potent religious, national and ethnic resentments.

The people rage against the corrupt elite, who are fighting the US misnomered war on terrorism for gaining personal benefits. Limited number of self-proclaimed “liberal” Muslims would hardly be able to stem the tides of unification. At the moment, the intelligentsia rage against the craven bowing of the national leadership to American pressure. Although the anti-government elements do not get much exposure, but it is evident that the forces yearning for true independence are increasing and getting stronger by the day.

Both Pakistan and Afghanistan have faced such outbreaks of rage in the past. The lines which divide ethnic groups, rich and poor, Islamists and secularists, Sunni and Shia Muslims, have seldom threatened to close ranks and confront the occupiers. Many attempts, such as the bombing in Quetta to kill Shi’ite, have been made to weaken the glue which binds Pakistan’s constituent parts has held fast. But with a protracted war in Afghanistan, and a sense of creeping anarchy within, the forces of unification on both sides of the divide are gaining strength to confront the real enemy.

Recent border tensions

The outsiders assessment that Afghans no more love Pakistanis is correct. However, this loss of trust is limited to the government level because instead of sincerely assisting Afghans in stabilising their country, Pakistan has always played into the US hands to serve its agenda in Afghanistan. As far as the common people are concerned, there is as much trust among them as ever was. Afghans associated with the Northern Alliance complain because the Pakistani government propped up the Taliban in the directives from Washington. The same were later abandoned due to changed mindset in Washington again.

The speed with which the US occupation has moved has left Musharraf's efforts to salvage Pakistan's Afghanistan policy in tatters. Musharraf fully supported the US in its war on the Taliban. He then failed to get the “moderate” Taliban into the post-war equation. With political turbulence in its settled and tribal areas rising, Pakistan faces the prospect of a further polarization following what is seen as the failure of incoherent and Washington-dictated internal and external policies.

Externally, the puppet Afghan regime has thrown the ball in US court to settle the issue of Duran Line, a treaty which has been expired in 1993. Afghan officials have reportedly asked the United States to use its influence to help renegotiate its border with Pakistan. Pakistan has already rejected this demand saying that the Durand Line is a settled issue and that it did not have any desire to re-open it.

The issue has already caused several skirmishes between the two countries that led to the formation of a tripartite commission to resolve the issue. However, the tripartite commission comprised of officials from Pakistan, Afghanistan and the United States failed to come up with a unanimous decision to resolve the border row that led to a request by Afghan officials to the US government seeking its assistance. Washington has already made it clear to both Pakistan and Afghanistan that it has no desire to get involved in re-negotiating a deal made more than 100 years ago.[18]

Interestingly what the British Empire faced on the Northern Frontiers of India, the Americans are facing on the Eastern frontiers. The situation is almost identical, only directions are different. It would be naïve to assume that the US is not considering moves to expand the Afghan borders to include all the tribal areas of Pakistan, at the very least, for establishing Afghanistan’s national security. That’s how the British created buffer zones for itself in the north and that is how Israel went for its business in Lebanon.

Musharraf and his cronies would be living in fool’s paradise if they believe that the US would not take any steps that would jeopardize its stability or its existing territorial integrity. MB Naqvi nicely summarizes this situation in his Deccan Herald column.

"…if you posit that US and Pakistan are old friends and allies there should be no threat from a basically America-run Afghan government. Is that really so? No clear answer emerges. There are Pakistani commentators who hold that, looking in a historic perspective, the US is doing to Pakistan now what it used to do to India during the cold war: use Pakistan to pressurise India. The US may be doing the same to Pakistan through Afghanistan today." [19]

However, Pakistan would be lucky if the American tactics are limited only to pressurising Pakistan. Unfortunately, it will not be so.

The reality is that America was not as troubled about the Taliban as it is about Pakistan. It certainly trust its ally, General Musharraf, and his devoted services. It is rather the Israeli fear and Indian propaganda that occupies the US mindset. No matter how much Musharraf may surrender, the danger of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of “fundamentalists” will forever lurk in American mind. The more Musharraf uses tactics such as brining MMA into power to show the US that he is an indispensable secular bulwark, the more these moves back fire, keeping the US wary of the “fundamentalists” take over in Pakistan.
Compared to the minds that run the British Empire, Americans are far more novices. They have been playing such games but only under the influences of neo-cons and Zionists pulling the strings from behind the scene. For them coming to Afghanistan is the first step toward neutralizing Pakistan’s threat. For them overtaking Pakistan, or giving both Pakistan and Afghanistan under the control of a reliable hand would be more secure than creating a small buffer zone between Afghanistan and Pakistan. This could be one of the moves that would pave the way for eventual unification of Afghanistan and Pakistan, against all efforts of their dismemberment.

We must not ignore that the recent border skirmishes must be due to green light by Washington to either Kabul or Islamabad. The same thing happened before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the same pattorn of prior knowledge followed the course of events before 9/11. Similarly, the US had anticipated the war in Afghanistan well before the Afghan government’s invitation to the Soviet Union, which we dubbed as Soviet invasion. In fact, in the words of National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, the Carter Administration did what it could to “draw the Russians into the Afghan trap.” Six months before the Afghan government’s request to Soviet for military assistance, the first covert CIA aid to the Mujaheddin was authorized.

Brzezinski admitted in a 1998 interview that, “I wrote a note to the President in which I explained to him that in my opinion, this aid would result in military intervention by the Soviets...we didn’t push the Russians to intervene, but we consciously increased the probability that they would do so.”[20] So, the continued devastation of Afghanistan is a matter of US policy and we cannot deny the probability that the recent Pak-Afghan tension is part of an American ploy to exploit the situation for a more direct role in Pakistan affairs — turning the indirect occupation to a more direct one.

Talks of division

The forces of disintegration have long been engaged in discussing division of Pakistan and Afghanistan in various ways. The more justified attempt would be in the name of fighting terrorism and Islamic extremism, terms that have no meaning except to inspire irrational fear and justify unjust policies; just as “communism” was used during the Cold War. In the name of “fighting terrorism,” the US got together with Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and India to sponsor a second round of UN Security Council sanctions on the Taliban. The vote was 13-0, with China and Malaysia dissenting, but abstaining. Nobody wanted to appear “soft on terrorism.” The US ambassador Nancy Soderberg called the vote “a strong stand against terrorism and for the maintenance of international peace and security.”

The Canadian ambassador said he voted for the resolution “because of the strong anti-terrorist message it sent.” The Dutch ambassador agreed that “it was important that the Council should send a political signal and send it with one voice.” In secret, Britain, Canada, and the Netherlands were against the sanctions, because “the only outcome of the sanctions would be to make the already appalling humanitarian situation in Afghanistan even worse.”[21]

Now imagine the same hype gaining momentum with the objective to reshape the geography of South Asia in order to combat international terrorism. The news stories and almost all analysis revolve around the assumption that the entire terrorism network has been managed by terrorist forces stationed in Pakistan under the safe umbrella of Government of Pakistan. These terrorist forces have taken the shelter of Islamic identity in order to implement their dangerous designs of dominating South Asia and make it an Islamic territory. ISI is fully supporting these groups in order to keep the US engaged in Afghanistan.

There are write ups on the net and a subtle indications in many op-ed pieces towards the proposal that disintegration of Pakistan is the only option for collapsing the terrorists' network altogether. Under such proposals, the whole NWFO should be transfored into a buffer zone, accountable to “the international comity of nations” so as to cut ISI’s access to the terrorists in Afghanistan.

Similalry there have been plans to divide Afghanistan in 4 parts. If the ethnic concept is implemented, practically it would result in the country being divided into four main regions - Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek and Pashtu. This delineation has been incorporated in the Dushanbe Plan, a strategy the US has developed for sending its forces into Afghanistan from the Central Asian republics.[22] Due to prolonged US stay in Afghanistan and it continued failure to bring peace and stability according to its own vision, the US might be tempted to pave the way for such partition.[23] This plan makes sense, when it is already on cards for too long and when the objectives of occupation have already been achieved.[24]

Greater Afghanistan

Despite all these plans of dividing Afghanistan and Pakistan, historical, social, economic, political and even security factors indicate that formation of Greater Afghanistan in inevitable. Interestingly all the forces of disintegration indirectly hasten such unification of Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s policy since its inception has been focused on maintaining a situation that could help it avoid controversy over the Durand Line merging of the communities along this line. The chances of this merger are so obvious that the central government in Pakistan did not accept even naming the nameless NWFP according to the wishes of its people and unanimous resolutions of their representatives in provincial assembly, as if just naming it Pakhtoonistan or Pakhtoonkhwa would be enough for its separation from Pakistan.

One needs to ask if Pakistan and Afghanistan’s security is in staying unstable and exploited by outside forces or in uniting and forming greater Afghanistan. As far Pakistan’s security is concerned throughout its existence it has depended on major power wielders. This dependence is getting perilously in an environment in which Pakistan has to sacrifice its raison d'être and Islamic identity if it has to maintain the favored nation statu.

Cooperation with the US during the anti-Soviet was justified in the name of Islam and the US kept on feeding Pakistan for it was fighting its war. In the post 9/11 environment, Pakistan has to fight the US wars for domination and colonization if it has to remain in Washington’s good books. It has to get approval from Washington as to what kind of Islam it can follow. Pakistan has to live under perpetual dictatorship under the pretext of "assurance against any possible Talibanisation of the governance system"?[25] According to the same report the U.S. will accept "limited Islamisation" in Pakistan, as if it is the US which will approve and reject the “kind” and level of acceptable Islam for us.

It means Pakistan’s security and survival is conditional upon the pleasure of Washington. If it could please it, it will live; otherwise, there is no guarantee of its existence. Internally, except the opportunist politicians, people from almost all segments of the society are against the US sponsored dictatorship, which keeps the state as much unstable as its leaders living on borrowed time.

Pakistan’s deepening involvement in the hoax US war on terrorism against its own citizens further alienates its government from the public. Externally, the arms gap with India is as wide as ever. Furthermore, India’s alliance with Israel make the situation even worse for Pakistan. As early as October 1995, Sandy Gordon predicted that in the 21 st century,

"India is poised to emerge… as a far more important and influential power in the Indian Ocean region, and even globally, than it was in the latter part of the 20th. Some of the constraining factors in India's rise to power, particularly domestic and regional South Asian instability, are still present and will continue to snap at India's heels for some years to come. But the end ofthe Cold War has also enabled India to jettison some of the more burdensome foreign and economic policies that had constrained it in the past…. [whereas] Pakistan, which has long been India's only serious competitor in South Asia, has lost out seriously as a result of the end of the Cold War. While India suffers from internal instability, Pakistan's problems are potentially far more serious."[26]

The incidents of 9/11 in particular have changed the view that Gordon may be overstating India's ability to take advantage of the potential benefits to it of the Cold War's end. Today, Pakistan’s diplomatic position both on the Afghan and Kashmir front is very weak in the sense that no one is ready to listen to it point of view. Just as the world is silent over Israel’s nuclear and chemical programmes and issuing warnings and dealines to Iran, Pakistan pleas for addressing the ever worsening human rights situation in Kashmir are falling on deaf ear. On top of it, enormous problems of rural poverty, disease, environmental degradation, and overpopulation remain largely unaddressed.


As a reward for Musharraf’s services, Washington's decision to unclog the aid pipeline to Pakistan, however, scarcely begins to address Pakistan's security dilemma. After all, Pakistan is still not considered fit for F-16 and other major military sales. Furthermore, beyond Islamabad’s present close relations to Washington, lies the greater security problem for Pakistan: the gradual drying up of any promising alliance prospects to serve Pakistan's requirement for great-power insurance against joint Indo-Israel military might. Dream of an "Islamic bloc" solidly aligned behind Pakistan has failed utterly to materialize; and there are signs of etiolation as well in the fidelity to Pakistan even of China.

China’s record from the Gulf War I to war on Serbia, Afghanistan and then Iraq shows that if the going get really touch, it will not care more for the consistency of support for Pakistan over the past forty years. In recent years, Beijing has retreated to a conspicuously neutral position on Kashmir, unquestionably an important litmus test of friendship from Islamabad's point of view, and China's steadily expanding rapprochement with India, as Sandy Gordon has observed, "has provided India with a significant peace dividend in the context of its competition with Pakistan."[27]

On the Afghan front, Pakistan has completely lost trust of public in NWFP and Baluchistan, not to speak of feelings in the tribal areas. The geopolitical situation in Afghanistan on the other hand is, by any standard, extremely unstable. US and its allies have a very large stake in the stability of Karzai’s puppet regime. Pakistan, at least as much as any of the other external contenders, considers Afghanistan's stability and its leaders’ pro-Pakistan orientation to be matters of the most vital state interest. However, other than using its armed forces on the directions from Washington, Pakistan is totally marginalized at the moment.

The viable option for addressing Pakistan’s vulnerable political geography and its military-demographic-economic weakness relative to India lies in Pakistan’s Union with Afghanistan. Irrespective of the present situation in which both Pakistan and Afghanistan are fully and partially occupied by the US, Pakistan and Afghanistan may apply the central argument of Huntington's thesis, the "kin-country rallying"— the mobilizing of interstate support systems or alliances on religious or civilizational grounds, in the first available opportunity.

In this regard, Pakistan's past (the secession of Muslim East Bengal) and in its present (in regard to Afghanistan, for instance), clearly suggest that merely relying on a trans-state Islamic bond has very definite limits. Every state has its own policies and every state finds itself at odds not only with numerous groups within, but also with other states with which it is allied. Therefore, a symbolic Pak-Afghan Union would not work. It has to be a merger of these states into one greater Afghanistan within its former frontiers that include all the territory presently within Pakistan borders.

An obvious example that paves the way for the confederation with Afghanistan is February 2, 2002 editorial of The Friday Times, where it writes:

“ the supergenerals… may have been thinking of some such strategic notion when he [Musharraf] recently said that Pakistan had to be friends with the Taliban because they were comprised of ethnic Pakhtuns who formed the main ethnic community of our own NWFP that borders Afghanistan. This leads us to postulate the supergenerals' strategic thinking that a strong Pakhtun state in Afghanistan would suit Pakistan immeasurably more than a weak Pakhtun or non-Pakhtun state. Is that right? No, it isn't.…a weak non-Pakhtun dominated state in Afghanistan has never posed any threat to Pakistan because it has neither had any ideological bearings or religious extra-national ambitions nor any ethnic or sub-nationalist stirrings. On the other hand, whenever there has been a strong Pakhtun dominated state in Afghanistan…, its government has been compelled by the logic of its own composition to pander to ethnic nationalism by supporting Pakhtun separatism (refusal to accept the Durand Line) or try and export religious fundamentalism (Talibanism) to the NWFP and Balochistan… This would suggest that a strong Taliban state in Afghanistan, which combines the worst elements of ethnic Pakhtun nationalism and religious exclusivism, would eventually pose a threat to the territorial integrity and political solidarity of multi-ethnic, multi-sectarian, democratic Pakistan.”

Such bigoted views are completely at odds with the reality on the ground and founding concepts of Pakistan. There is no need to shed light on the so obvious anti-Pakistan feelings in the hearts of Persian speaking Afghans. Attitude and policies of pro-Indian Northern Alliance and its leaders are good examples for those who understand. With regard to Pakhtuns and NWFP, it is worth quoting what Ch. Rahmat Ali - the man who formulated the name and concept of Pakistan, said about 'NWFP' and the Pakhtoon people in his book “Pakistan: The Fatherland of Pak Nation” 1940:

"North West Frontier Province - is semantically non-descript and socially wrongful. It is non-descript because it merely indicates their geographical situation as a province of old 'British India' [which no longer exists]. It is wrongful because it suppresses the social entity of these people. In fact, it suppresses that entity so completely that when composing the name 'Pakistan' for our homelands, I had to call the North West Frontier Province the Afghan Province. "

Essentially what Rahmat Ali is saying is that the NWFP is a gross distortion because it is the British term for the North western region of their Indian empire that no longer exists. Also, NWFP is not a Frontier as far as the indigenous population, the Pakhtoon, are concerned. "It must be remembered that the Pathans are a great, gifted, and Pan-Islamic people. This is borne out by History which records that they were the first to accept Islam and lay the foundations of its twelve-century rule in India; that they were the last to stop the fight against the British and the first to resume that fight on the Afghan and Baloch frontiers; and that they are the people one of whom, the writer, however unworthy, was blessed by Allah to create the Ideal of Pakistan. itself and start the fight for the realisation of that Ideal - the Ideal which so inspired all Muslims as to make them join the fight and establish this Fatherland which is the home and heritage of all Paks".

Finally, in his book, Ch. Rahmat Ali advocates a family re-union of our Asian and Indian homelands i.e. Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia. The views expressed by people associated with domestic secular-liberal movement and people advocating South Asian regional cooperation are indirectly paving the way for this reunion. From outside, the UN sanctions on Afghanistan, western attitude towards the Taliban and Pakistan, and now the seemingly indefinite occupation of Afghanistan are the main forces that would not disintegrate Pakistan and Afghanistan as their objective may be but it may lead to their least expected Union and further a federation with the neighbouring and ancestral Muslim homelands of Central Asia, Iran, etc. Commenting on the issue of pan-Islamic federation, Robert G Wirsing writes:

“This idea has gestated in Pakistani minds that both its vulnerable political geography and its military-demographic-economic weakness relative to India could be compensated for, at least to an extent, by expanding and deepening its ties to the many coreligionist states of the Islamic world… [However] the pan-Islamic option, for all its bluster and for all its promise, is for most practical purposes (and certainly for Pakistan's basic security requirements) a fiction.”[28]

Apparently it might seem that under present circumstances, Pakistan is coming up short of reliable Islamic allies, but attitudes of “liberal” elite in Pakistan, and policies and actions of the western nations suggest that the same forces are indirectly leading to developing a mindset among Pakistanis and Afghans that they are the same people facing common destiny and also reinforcing the trans-state Islamic bond. Besides the undeniable civilisational, political and security need for Pakistan’s reunion with Afghnaistan, there is plenty of evidence that the rallying of Muslims to pan-Islamic causes has become a matter of some significance in the South Asian environment, particularly in a situation where the western powers are bent upon prematurely turning India into super power of the 21st century.

According to a report by Jyoti Malhotra, the British are now talking of a 'partnership of equals' between Britain and India in the new century.[29] To directly challenge the Indian and western efforts, Pakistan would be well advised to move towards substantive initiatives such as the notion of a 'Community of Power' to be evolved between Iran and Pakistan to begin with and gradually fanning out into Afghanistan and other Muslim states to form the eastern flank to the heart of Islam as it had been before it was broken up through the Mongol invasions beginning in 1221; then through infighting by the Afghans, Mughals and Safavids; and finally by the colonial legacy of the McMahon, Durand and Goldsmid Borders. Greater Afghanistan would play a pivotal role in the whole set up.

Concluded

The above discourse is based on logical arguments in the light of history and current realities, which shows that Union of Pakistan and Afghanistan is both necessary, inevitable and possible. Any reference to religion has been purposely avoided to keep it understandable. If analysed from the religious point of view, there are authentic sayings of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) which show that there would be a strong government towards the Eastern side of Arab Peninsula, which will play a leading role in Islamic revival. The continued struggle in Afghanistan, the unflinching determination of both Afghans and Pakistanis never to live under occupation and the military strength that Pakistan has acquired are some of the indications towards realisation of Prophet Muhammad’s (PBUH) prophesies and the establishment of Greater Afghanistan.

Notes:

[1]. News report, daily Frontier Post, March 29,2000. See also Tanzeem-i-Islami web site ::: Tanzeem e Islami :::

[2]. Sandy Gordon, "South Asia After the Cold War: Winners and Losers," Asian Survey 35 (October 1995): 894-95. For an extended discussion of the themes in this article, see Gordon's recent study, India's Rise to Power in the Twentieth Century and Beyond (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995). Gordon is a Fellow at the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University.

[3]. The Times Atlas of World History, Fourth Edition, 1993, Times Books, a division of Harper-Collins Publishers, 77-85 Fulham Palace Road, Hammersmith, London, W6 8JB, page 133.

[4]. Ibid. The Times Atlas, page 128, 129.

[5]. Williams, Jonathan. (1997). Money - A History. Published for the Trustees of the British Museum by British Museum Press, a division of the British Museum Company Ltd, 46 Bloomsbury, London, WC1B 3QQ. ISBN: 0 7141 0885 5, page 121.

[6]. Bose, Sugata & Jalal, Ayesha. (1998). Modern South Asia - History, Culture, Political Economy, London: Routledge, pg. 28

[7]. Ibid. Time Atlas, page 126-7.

[8]. Berinstain, Valeri. (1998). Mughal India - Splendours of the Peacock Throne. Thames and Hudson, 30 Bloomsbury Street, London. WC1B 3QP. ISBN: 0-500-30083-6, page 21.

[9]. Ahmed, Akbar S. (1997). Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity. New York: Routledge. ISBN: 0-415-14966-5, pg. 37

[10] Eastern Eye - Independence Magazine (1947-1997); published by Ethnic Media Group. 148 Cambridge Heath Road, London E1 5QJ. Tel:0171-702-8012. Fax:0171-702-7937, page. 9.

[11]. Ludwig W. Adamec, “Greater Afghanistan, a missed chance,” written in Tucson (Arizona), January 1998. Published by Online Centre for Afghan Studies, 2001. http:www.afghan-politics.org/greater_afghanistan.html

[12]. Thomas Holdich 1901, The Indian Borderland, (London: Methuen), p366, quoted in Griffiths op cit, p 36.

[13]. Daily Anis, Issue No., 87, July 3, 1949.

[14]. Durand Line Treaty annexed at the end.

[15]. Lawrence James 2000, Raj: The Making and Unmaking of British India (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin), page 475-477.

[16]. Mohan Guruswamy, “Scratch Across Pashtun Hearts,” Deccan Chronicle, July 18, 2003.

[17]. See for example W. P. S. Sidhu’s article, “Why the Durand Line is important,” in Indian Express, November 16, 1999. Sidhu is MacArthur Scholar at the Centre for International Studies, University of Oxford.

[18]. Asia-Pacific Daily Report, “Afghanistan seeks US help to renegotiate its border with Pakistan,” Cenre of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance, August 29, 2003. See also: “America feels entangled in Durand Line dispute,” Daily Dawn, August 28, 2003. UK soldier killed by Iraqi crowd -DAWN - Top Stories; August 29, 2003

[19]. M. B. Naqvi, “US Role in Pak-Afghan Conflict: An Elaborate Charade,” Deccan Herald, July 18, 2003.

[20]. Interview with Brzezinski by Vincent Javert in Le Nouvel Observateur, 15-21 Jan. 1998, p. 76, cited in John Cooley 1999, Unholy Wars, (Sterling: Pluto Press), p 19-20.

[21]. Ewen MacAskill 22 Dec. 2000, “Britain Fought to Block UN Sanctions Against Taliban,” The Guardian.

[22]. Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Pakistan Fears the Great Afghan Divide,” Asia Times, September 29, 2003.

[23]. “The United States is overtly trying to divide Afghanistan along Pakhtoon and non-Pakhtoon lines and it is covertly trying for fragmentation of Pakistan.” Dawn Report, “US trying to divide Afghanistan, claims scholar,” November 09, 2002.

[24]. “Washington and Moscow has reached an understanding to divide Afghanistan along ethnic lines, The Frontier Post learnt on Wednesday.” Fakh-ur-Rehman, “Plan to Divide Afghanistan,” The Frontier Post, November 01, 2001.
[25] Alam, Absar. "US okays MMA, Musharraf alliance," The Nation, June 02, 2003.


[26]. Sandy Gordon, "South Asia After the Cold War: Winners and Losers," Asian Survey 35 (October 1995): 894-95. For an extended discussion of the themes in this article, see Gordon's recent study, India's Rise to Power in the Twentieth Century and Beyond (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995). Gordon is a Fellow at the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University.

[27]. Gordon, "South Asia After the Cold War," 881.

[28]. Robert G Wirsing, Asian Affairs, an American Review, Washington; Summer 1996

[29]. published in the Indian Express, November 20th, 1999.

Annex

AGREEMENT BETWEEN HIS HIGHNESS AMIR ABDUR RAHMAN KHAN, G.C.S.I., AMIR OF AFGHANISTAN AND ITS DEPENDENCIES, ON THE ONE PART, AND SIR HENRY MORTIMER DURAND, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., FOREIGN SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, REPRESENTING THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ON THE OTHER PART

Whereas certain questions have arisen regarding the frontier of Afghanistan on the side of India, and whereas both His Highness the Amir and the Government of India are desirous of settling these questions by a friendly understanding, and of fixing the limit of their respective spheres of influence, so that for the future there be no difference of opinion on the subject between the allied Governnments, it is hereby agreed as follows:

(I) The eastern and southern frontier of His Highness's dominions, from Wakhan to the Persian border, shall follow the line shown in the map attached to this agreement.

(2) The Government of India will at no time exercise interference in the territories living beyond this line on the side of Afghanistan, and His Highness the Amir will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of India.

(3) The British Government thus agrees to His Highness the Amir retaining Asmar and the valley above it, as far at Chanak. His Highness agrees on the other hand that he will at no time exercise interference in Swat, Bajaur or Chitral, including the Arnawai or Bashgal valley. The British Government also agrees to leave to His Highness -the Birmal tract as shown in the detailed map already given to His Highness, who relinquishes his claim to the rest of the Waziri country and Dawar. His Highness also relinquishes his claim to Chageh.

(4) The frontier line will hereafter be laid down in detail and demarcated, wherever this may be practicable and desirable, by joint British and Afghan Commissioners, whose object will be to arrive by mutual understanding at a boundary which shall adhere with the greatest possible exactness to the line shown in the map attached to this agreement, having due regard to the existing local rights of villages adjoining the frontier.

(5) With reference to the question of Chaman, the Amir thidraws his objection to the new British Cantonment and concedes to the British Government the rights purchased by him in the Sirkai Tibrai water. At this part of the frontier, the line will be drawn as follows:

From the crest of the Khwaja Amran range near the Peha Kotal, which remains in British territory, the line will run in such a direction as to leave Murgha Chaman and the Sharobo spring to Afghanistan, and to pass half-way between the new Chaman Fort and the Afghan outpost known locally as Lashkar Dandi The line will then pass half-way between the railway station and the hill known as the Mian Baldak, and turning southwards, will rejoin the Khwaja Amran range, leaving the Gwasha Post in British territory and the road to Shorawak to the west and south of Gwasha in Afghanistan. The British Government will not exercise any interference within half a mile of the road.

(6) The above articles of agreement are regarded by the Government of India and His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan as a full and satisfactory settlement of all the principal differences of opinion which have arisen between them in regard to the frontier, and both the Government of India and His Highness the Amir undertake that any differences of detail, such as those which will have to be considered hereafter by the officers appointed to demarcate the boundary line, shall be settled in a friendly spirit, so as to remove for the future, as far as possible, all causes of doubt and misunderstanding between the two Governments.

The writer is a Canada-based political analyst and is affiliated with The Independent Centre for Strategic Studies and Analysis (ICSSA). He is also the author of "A War on Islam?" and "The End of Democracy."
© 2004 Abid Ullah Jan

Pakistan Times | Op-Ed: The Inevitable Pak-Afghan Union (by Abid Ullah Jan)

The above two articles are interesting to understand the Islamic, and more importantly, the Pakistani dream of the 'ummah' (pan Islam) and leadership of the Islamic world (as observed during the OIC (meet of the Islamic countries) in Malaysia).

What is the central issue is that the 'dream' of Islamic oneness is obstructed by an equally powerful sentiment amongst Moslems - of being the leader (Khalifa) that is the raison d' être for the to disarray Islam finds itself inspite of the dream of the Ummah and the Caliphate. Islam cannot reconcile with this psychological handicap of besting each other. It is ingrained in the religion to be supreme and it visits individuals, tribes, nations and even the 'difference' between the Sects, mainly Shia and Sunni! The temporal aspirations of leadership clashes with horrendous signature with the spiritual!

Yet, it is an interesting commentary to find a lot of articles on the dream of one Islamic nation and equally interesting is the fact, incongruous issues are cranked in and 'dressed up' equally forced, to present a plausible solution!

The Pathans and Pakistanis are as close bred as Chalk and Cheese. The Pathans are looked down as rustics and bumpkins and hence there is the turmoil on the western front of Pakistan, inspite of aerial bombings and a large military presence.

Pathans, in comparison to the Pakistanis, are ruthlessly cruel against their enemies and hence it is not surprising that the Pakistani Army two companies minus surrendered without a shot being fired!

The only solution is that the Pashtuns should be allowed to have their own country wherein the Pastun parts of Pakistan and Afghanistan become one country, but as Afghanistan finds itself landlocked, such a country will be landlocked and dependant on its neighbours.

The Pashtun and Tajiks are Sunnis, Hazaras are Shias. Even so, Persian is taken as the language of sophistication and of the educated over Pashto!

Afghanistan as a country of different ethnicities has always seemed to be troubled with its identities, yet another taboo topic amongst the people. The threat of being called a “traitor” and a “foreigner” hangs over those who dare tread upon the topic of national identity.

The region was called Khorasan for 1500 years and the name was fairer and represented the state as well as the people better. It clearly doesn’t favor one ethnicity over another. As Khorasan, the region was once an advancing civilization and embodied many ethnicities. However, as the Pashtun nomads entered and invaded the regions, they scattered and spread over, imposing their existence as well as a need for a country.

Here is a commentaries on the issue:
faiq5

Afghans hurt themselves through tribalism - Reports from The Birmingham News - al.com

The factionalism in Islam cannot be better understood that this article, where though they are of one country, with one religion and of the same sect of Islam trust is absent:

Musharraf Contends with the Pashtun Element in the Pakistani Army
Musharraf Contends with the Pashtun Element in the Pakistani Army

Therefore Pakistani writers seems to lack perspective of Pakistan, a country at sixes and sevens with itself, and is yet to discover their identity as a nation that was carved out for the Moslem identity, wishes to bite more than it can chew - by dreaming of a partial ummah of Pakistan taking over Afghanistan!

It would also be fair to state, that though a large number of Pakistani intellectuals tend to what appears a incongruous 'dream', there are also those who are pragmatists as Musharraf. While he is as good as a Moslem and a Pakistani as the most 'patriotic' of them, he is well aware of the shortcomings and the strength and keeps Pakistan over Islam, even though that is contrary to the Moslem concept, where Islam is above nationality!

The fact that the Durand Line is such a contentious issue in Pakistan indicates the worries of the pragmatic amongst the Pakistani leaders that given the fierce independence of the Pashtun mind, Pakhtoonistan may be the real roadmap the Pashtuns, including Karzai is pursuing.

For Pakistan, Afghanistan is critical to the existence as a country and not as merely to obtain "strategic depth" vis a vis a conflict with India. The biggest fear is that if Pakhtoonistan takes root, then the subjugated sub nationalism that has been kept under control by the extensive use of Islam as a glue, as also by repressive measures of using artillery and air against their own people and also by changing the sectarian composition in the Northern Area and Balwaristan with the aim of changing the Shia majority to Sunni, would erupt!

Therefore, every method including indoctrination of Islam as one and more so, by crushing the Taliban which is becoming the fountainhead of separatism requires to be undertaken if Pakistan is to remain one!

Those who are the Islamic fanatics in Pakistan are the real enemies of Pakistan.

Instead of the ummah, they will herald the end of Pakistan!

It is also in the interest of China and India, that Pakistan remains stable or else the Islamic fundamentalists will create immense problems, not only in the Moslem majority areas, but also wherever there are Moslems in the their respective countries.

The only solution is that the Pashtuns should be allowed to have their own country wherein the Pastun parts of Pakistan and Afghanistan become one country, but as Afghanistan finds itself landlocked, such a country will be landlocked and dependant on its neighbours.

Ray, what would you propose for the non-Pashtun areas of Afghanistan? Accede to Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Iran?

I wonder if that will work.

Whatever little I know of Afghanis is that though they are of different ethnicity, they are fiercely proud of being Afghanis.

This was what I perceived in my interaction with them (and there are a lot of them in India) before the Mujahideens and the Taliban.

I wouldn't know their latest thinking!