Thread: Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime

Historians have pointed out that the U.S. operational approach that contributed to our defeat in Vietnam was the creature of the uniformed military. And they have observed that the original -- unimaginative -- military plan for Operation Desert Storm in the Gulf War was rejected by the civilian leadership, which ordered a return to the drawing board. The revised plan was far more imaginative, and effective

If you'll pardon the amatuer questions....

What was the original plan?
What made it so "unimaginative"?
How did the civilian leadership come about finding so unimaginative?
How did an unimaginative military pull a 180 and suddenly drag an imaginative plan out of their hats?

Originally Posted by TopHatter

If you'll pardon the amatuer questions....

What was the original plan?
What made it so "unimaginative"?
How did the civilian leadership come about finding so unimaginative?
How did an unimaginative military pull a 180 and suddenly drag an imaginative plan out of their hats?

The original plan was the fullback up the middle. The revised plan was running the option around the end. IIRC, Schwarzkopf wasn't happy with the original plan as well and had some SAMSters come out to draw up the new plan.

Originally Posted by Shek

The original plan was the fullback up the middle. The revised plan was running the option around the end. IIRC, Schwarzkopf wasn't happy with the original plan as well and had some SAMSters come out to draw up the new plan.

"Hey D iddle- D iddle And Straight Up The Middle" ?

Who thought that would be a good idea?

I mean, didn't the guys drawing up the plan ever use something more subtle than a war club in their life?

I'm just a stupid civilian who grew up playing wargames (paper and computer) and that "up the middle" thing is just...dumb!

Originally Posted by TopHatter

"Hey D iddle- D iddle And Straight Up The Middle" ?

Who thought that would be a good idea?

I mean, didn't the guys drawing up the plan ever use something more subtle than a war club in their life?

I'm just a stupid civilian who grew up playing wargames (paper and computer) and that "up the middle" thing is just...dumb!

Depends. If you're a marine, you wouldn't know any better. But in all seriousness, sometimes you're restricted by the terrain or your logistics, and so it is the best option.

Originally Posted by Shek

Depends. If you're a marine, you wouldn't know any better. But in all seriousness, sometimes you're restricted by the terrain or your logistics, and so it is the best option.

True enough.

I guess I was thinking of an open featureless desert which of course is not the case, especially with Iraqi fortifications on the border.

Originally Posted by TopHatter

True enough.

I guess I was thinking of an open featureless desert which of course is not the case, especially with Iraqi fortifications on the border.

It also depends on your objective. If the enemy force is your objective, then sometimes it's best to just get on with it. Supreme Command addresses Lincoln as one of the subjects - Lincoln ascertained that the Confederate Army was the center of gravity of the Confederacy, and so he vetoed Grant's original idea for using an amphibious route via North Carolina for attacking into the South. This is also why we didn't see another Peninsular Campaign and thus why the newspapers got it wrong in June 1864 when they spoke about how Grant achieved nothing that McClellan hadn't, except that McClellan had done it with very little casualties. The goal wasn't Richmond, but the ANV.

"I mean, didn't the guys drawing up the plan ever use something more subtle than a war club in their life?"

Given the assets available originally, the fullback plunge was the only option available. 18th Airborne Corps and the Marine MEF were only capable of attacking in one location and the primary objective remained Kuwait City. We could demonstrate an amphibious threat but the ground force still had to hold proximity to Kuwait City. Thus the shortest line between two points.

Along with SAMsters came assets-VII Corps and a second MEF. Those additional reinforcements provided adequate forces to create a viable demonstration while allowing 18th Airborne Corps to be dropped out of the main attack and assigned both a flank security and deep penetration mission initiated from the far west. VII Corps was pushed west as per SAMster recommendation for an envelopement.

Fix 'em to the front and boot 'em in the rear.

"What made it so "unimaginative"?"

DESERT SHIELD was the original mission-securing KSA. The forces available for that mission were adequate. Stalemate to the political situation demanded an offensive option and Schwartzkopf was required to generate an offensive plan to support that option.

It took a change of thinking with our political masters to understand what was necessary to truly generate combat power. In some respects only a plan premised on the limited available assets and promising the liklihood of hard fighting could provide the impetus for our political leadership to step up THEIR game and authorize additional forces to support new thinking.

S-2,
Thanks - it's been awhile since I had read Schwarzkopf's self-serving autobiography and had forgotten that it was VII Corps that had allowed the left hook.

There are some that argue it still was an unimaginative waste....at least in the timing.

The reasons are you had everyone attacking at once....or, in essence, the Marines serving as a piston to drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait so VII Corps hit an enemy who was moving NORTHWARD retreating from the battlefield rather than an enemy fixed in place facing south. That is what Schwarzkopf implied by his bluster in his conferences afterwards. XVIII Airborne Corps had only 1 heavy unit to conduct an attack (24th ID) so VIIth Corps gave 3rd Army (yes, that was the ground component) the heavy metal punch.

But did it swing and hit?

The Center of gravity were the RG divisions....and how many escaped?

I highly recommend Lucky War: Third Army in Desert Storm By Richard M. Swain a good look at the ground campaign warts and all.

"at least in the timing.

The reasons are you had everyone attacking at once....or, in essence, the Marines serving as a piston to drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait..."

I don't think anybody initially anticipated the success that the Marines would have in the east. I'm sure they premised a slog that would draw the RG forward into the fight. I think the distances that VII Corps had to traverse necessitated a simultaneous advance.

That was the plan. Don't know at what point prior or during that it became clear the breaching would go easier and resistance far lighter than expected. I know we "plinked" away with our air to degrade their ground forces. Turns out we "plinked" them into giving up without a shot.

Yeah I exaggerate. The marines had a good tussle around the oil fields and we slammed into elements of two RG divisions with VII Corps. I'm wondering, though, if the attack could have factored the after-the-fact reality beforehand and recalibrated?

I just re-read the chapter of the book on Lincoln - still a great read.

Having had my fair share of Clausewitz in the past bit, I love the following quote by Lincoln's two secretaries in his biography. Even though Clausewitz had written On War nearly a century prior to this quote, it hadn't been translated into English yet, I believe (and even if it had, it certainly hadn't reached an audience), and yet they capture the essence of Clausewitz's great insight and why Lincoln shone heads and tails above Davis.

War and politics, campaign and statecraft, are Siamese twins, inseparable and interdependent; and to talk of military operations without the direction and interference of an administrator is as absurd as to plan a campaign without recruits, pay or rations.

"War and politics, campaign and statecraft, are Siamese twins, inseparable and interdependent; and to talk of military operations without the direction and interference of an administrator is as absurd as to plan a campaign without recruits, pay or rations."

Hard in my discussions here of late about Afghanistan not to relate the component of civil authority within the overall mix. Finding statesmen with the acumen to manage with visionary oversight the enormous apparatus of state power at their control has never seemingly been more difficult.

As usual, great observations from both of you guys.