citanon

But couldn't one argue that Yugoslav ground forces were the wrong target anyways. What won the fight, at the end of the day, without ground forces having to fire a single shot, was the economic destruction and the resulting political fallout for the Yugoslav leadership.

Shek

What were the goals of the operation? A win is certainly the desired outcome, but was it really in question, i.e., NATO vs. Serbia? It is best to look at the factual and then determine the counterfactual. One problem in this case was the fact that ground forces were taken off of the table early on, meaning that it would be harder to get at the targets since they didn't have to deploy to counter a possible ground threat, but it's still the analysis that needs to be done.

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"So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

Shek

My thoughts on air power vs. land power is that it is too often seen as a zero sum game, if air power gets more budget $$, then land power loses, and vice versa. I think both areas are underfunded currently based on the recapitalization that we need to do b/c of Iraq and Afghanistan.

Nonetheless, I will still offer up one of my favorite quotes in the debate. Unfortunately, I couldn't source this quote to an official site, but I do remember it from my cadet days in mililtary history.

ofogs

The Yugoslav ground forces became the target because they stepped up their killings after the air war started. Air power was unable to stop them. Furthermore, this thing lasted almost four months when the planners expected it to last days. Definitely not the finest hour of air forcing a decision.

1idvet

Wasn't that from an interview that was conducted with then Capt. McMaster? He was the Troop commander at 73 Easting that kicked some Republican Guard butt.

I seem to remember that quote and was looking for it as well. It always has to be boots on the ground. The AF contribution to the war is unmitigated, but it is not the be all, end all solution to war.

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In Omnia Paratus

citanon

But this more precisely a problem with the expectations regarding the effects of airpower. It doesn't necessarily speak to airpower's ability to shape the political outcome at acceptable cost.

Officer of Engineers

The Russians were the ones who shaped the political outcome.

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Chimo

S-2

"I think both areas are underfunded currently based on the recapitalization that we need to do b/c of Iraq and Afghanistan."

Airpower provides America with decisive overmatch on the ground through mobility, ISR, and firepower enhancements. It is overtaxed and airframes are grossly worn (see F-15 groundings).

We're upon the hard decisions now. Ships, aircraft, vehicles, and men absorbing the impact of these operating tempos without relief. A demanding conflict requiring significant operational and tactical adjustments. A diminished/altered training environ (I suspect) that's relegating conventional war-fighting doctrine/training to the back-burner.

The money needed appears daunting. That's a frightening prospect to each service. I'm unaware of an overarching policy that governs these mix-decisions. Hell, the Air Force is just coming to grips with their doctrinal revisions/alternatives to FM 3-24.

So much to debate. So little time and money.

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"This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski