Blademaster

I can contribute the failure of generalship to one source: Rummy Dumbfield. Ever since his sacking of General Shineski who spoke his mind and warned publicily, he basically silenced dissent, thus shutting down an avenue of feedback and response that is essentially to identifying potential problems and nipping them in the bud. To correct this galling cluster**** created by Dummy Rumsfield who appointed generals on one criteria: You shall not dissent or criticise me, you need to seriously revamp the way how generals are appointed and promoted set up by Rummy Dumbfield regime. That seriously has to go.

Notice that Dummy Rumsfield has not made a peep in the media? He's untouchable. No one wants to do anything with him. Democrats hate him and the Republicans are very pissed off at him for costing them the election. The media doesn't like him because of his abrasive manner with the press corps.

Shek

This is a complete and utter fallacy. There are absolutely too many examples of senior field grades and general officers out there who demonstrated an inability to adapt to the environment that they found themselves in in Iraq. Guess where we promote our general officers from? That same pool of senior field grade officers who have demonstrated an inability to adapt.

Rumsfeld can be blamed for not firing the incompetent generals, for stifling open debate within the professional community, and for placing some troop level constraints that have made the job in Iraq exponentially harder, but he absolutely CANNOT be blamed for the everyday behavior of those officers who were not restricted by Rumsfeld's decisions for making making decisions of their own that were not in congruence with the environment and enemy they faced in Iraq.

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"So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

Blademaster

He destroyed the mindset, the one that questions the status quo, the current way of thinking and see what it can be improve, in other words, the mindset that encourages innovation and firm grasp of the basics and building on top of that. When he destroyed that mindset, it is no surprise that the system promoted the ones that did not have that mindset or conform to Dummy Rumsfield's way of thinking.

Yes there was a pool of senior officers but why were those who had those mindset not promoted to senior grade? It goes back to Rumsfield who wanted a cadre of officers that did not question his authority or way of thinking.

Blademaster

As I am going over his article, I disagree with some of his points:

Well Shineski was right about the post-combat operations requirements. Guess what? He got dismissed. Tommy Franks was right about the necessary level to defeat Saddam Hussein's forces. Granted, he failed to bring up the levels required to win the peace but he was counting on the Iraqi Army to take up the slack, hence the lowered level of U.S. forces but guess what? Dummy Rumsfield and his minion, Paul Bremer, overruled that and disbanded the Iraqi Army and the Ba'ath Party.

Uhh... the VietCong was destroyed, the NVA was basically destroyed 3 times. Where is the failure? It was at home as US leaders lost political support from the populace. They were wondering why the hell we didn't cross into North Vietnam territory. So what stopped the US forces from crossing into NVA territory: geopolitics and US politicians's unwillingness to upset China as US leaders saw China as a potential counterweight to USSR in the larger picture, the Cold War. So one would argue that US politicians in the greater scheme of things, sacrificed Vietnam as a pawn in order to win the bigger war, the Cold War.

As for the failures in Iraq II, I agree with him on many points but I contribute the source of the problem to Dummy Rumsfield as he destroyed the atmosphere necessary for CI innovation and thinking.

Shek

Rumsfeld didn't destroy the mindset. Rumsfeld didn't personally promote the battalion commanders, brigade commanders, 1 stars, or 2 stars. He affected the behavior of some 3 and 4 stars. A SecDef that serves for 6 years cannot destroy 15, 20, 25 years of training. This is shaped by the institution, and Rumsfeld didn't even make a dent on the institution other than some current serving 3 and 4 stars and equipment spending. He didn't touch the personnel system. Heck, he couldn't get his civilian personnel system changes pushed through.

You are WAY overestimating the impact of Rumsfeld on the institution. When your corps commander (Chiarelli last year) in Iraq says that only 1/3 of his battalion and brigade commanders understand COIN, they "get it," 1/3 don't "get it" but execute because they understand they need to do that to have a chance of promotion, and 1/3 just flat out don't "get it," that is 100% an institutional problem that goes back to generalship in the 1990s and building an army to fight the war they want and not the one that should be preparing for. The behavior of battalion and brigade commanders has 0% to do with Rumsfeld, as he doesn't touch their promotions one bit.

There's no argument from me whatsoever that Rumsfeld was a force in the negative direction, but you cannot explain away the fact there are those within the institution whose career advancement didn't depend whatsoever on Rumsfeld, and yet the failed to adapt. Sorry, but even if Rumsfeld was never SecDef, you'd still have GOs stepping all over themselves in an Iraq scenario.

I find it amazing that there hasn't been a single GO fired in theater (heck, LTC(Ret) Sanchez was offered up for promotion - talk about someone who just didn't get it), and there hasn't been a single "battlefield" promotion. Why is COL McMaster still a COL? Why didn't we pin a star on him and say "you're what we need right now and so here's your star"? It's because we're still stuck in the rules of a bureaucratic system created back at the turn of the last century under Elihu Root.

S-2

"It's because we're still stuck in the rules of a bureaucratic system created back at the turn of the last century under Elihu Root."

Those rules have, on occasion, been suspended in acknowledgement of the nation's needs during times of war. Real war. Not this phooey. Did I say that? Sure, because it's so.

If this military, administration, government, congress, and public REALLY felt and UNDERSTOOD the threat, we'd see the suspension of bueraucratic impediments to the promotion of good men, ideas, and equipment. It comes naturally when the survival instinct kicks in. To date it hasn't- for any of us. Thems the facts.

We possess NO institutional agility. The notion itself is an oxymoron. For a military that's prided itself on dominating the opponent's decision cycle, our sloth-like response to emerging assymetric threats places us consistently behind the power curve. By the time our analysis catches up with solutions, the problem has mutated. Thus a need for yet another "business plan".

In the world of bureaucracies and consultancies, THAT is a near-optimal condition of "business as usual". And "business" remains very good, indeed. Heaven forbid that anybody should get so excited about winning and losing.

Shek

Tommy Franks was wrong about the levels required to win. The mission wasn't just to destroy the regime. Strategy 101. He failed. Heck, he didn't even ensure that the number of troops required in his own plan were deployed.

The NLF was destroyed and rebuilt, although certainly nowhere near as robust as it had been. Next, where's the legitimate SVN government that had buy-in? Remember, COIN is about the population, and they didn't buy into the SVN government, which is what CORDS and CAP were geared towards. CAP was killed by Westmoreland, and CORDS only received support under Abrams. Vietnam is certainly a case of a failure in generalship. They fought the war they wanted to, not the war they had.

Next, you're correct that folks were worried about China, and not just the politicians. However, it wasn't because we wanted them to be friends. That didn't happen until 1969 when Nixon-Kissinger came into the White House and saw containment through a geopolitical lens rather than an ideological lens. No, they saw what happened in 1951 in Korea and didn't want a land war in Asia against the Chinese.

So, you still had a failure in generalship in Vietnam, and I'd highly encourage to read the following books if you haven't already:

Amazon.com: Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam: Books: H. R. McMaster
Amazon.com: Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam: Books: H. R. McMaster
Amazon.com: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Books: John A. Nagl,Peter J. Schoomaker

Please explain Petraues, Chiarelli, McMaster. If Rumsfeld stifled innovation (which I disagree with - discovering COIN isn't much innovation at all, but rather just digging out lessons from the past 50 years), then why do you have these outliers within the senior ranks? He didn't stifle them. What made them successful?

As I stated earlier, it all goes back to the institution and what it incentivizes and rewards. The track to general officer requires that you keep your boots "muddy" all the time. It's no surprise that we produce GOs that know tactics, but then receive a crash course in strategy at the 22-25 year mark in their careers and find it hard to contextualize an experience that is alien to how they've had to approach things for their first two decades in the Army. No wonder they struggle with strategy.

WECIV

The Vietcong never was destroyed. We did kill a lot of civilians...the Vietcong was smart enough to hug our forces or dig in and wait out. That is why we found so few bodies and so few weapons. But in a system like ours those kind of answers are not wanted so the officers lied like they do now. If you are not seeing results...just lie about it and make your next grade. Then it becomes institutional and only successful liars are promoted. Because if you tell the truth then the question is...why were you not successful like colonel so and so who lied? That is why there is a lack of backbone in today's general or field grade officers. It is an institutional...not rocking the boat...I am happy if you are happy. There is a lack of mavericks who are willing to tactically and strategically adaptive and experimental...because these ppl challenge the status quo and do different things than the way it has always been done.

W

Shek

W,

Your generalization that liars get promoted is off the mark and fundamentally misinterprets what is going on today. Most posers get busted and booted before they even make captain. It is rare for someone to make it to battalion command on a sham record. I'd cool it on this line of reasoning because it is highly inflammatory and not correct.

What you see is not lying to get ahead, but working towards those things that will get them ahead. The problem is that it's a self-sustaining system, and so the wrong metrics are used to measure who is successful. Those that advance have no problem with the metrics, as it allowed them to succeed, and so they often have a hard time seeing reasong to change. Thus, you have your self-perpetuating problem.

To fix the problem, you need to change the incentives. Instead of rewarding only those who remain in tactical units up through colonel, make civilian graduate school a requirement for getting a battalion command. I guarantee that you'll get folks who are better attuned to culture and strategy if you do this. Make a mid-level foreign language proficiency a requirement for battalion command. I guarantee that you'll get folks who are better able to understand culture. You can see where I'm going with this. It's not folks lying to get ahead, it's folks doing the things the system tells them to do to get ahead. Change the incentives, and you'll get the product you want.

WECIV

I did not say everyone...or maybe I did. If so that was a mistake.

W

Shek

Name the generals who have lied, i.e., made up facts, in Iraq. Rose tinted glasses, accentuate the positive, etc. there are a few, but not lies.

Bigfella

Blademaster,

A few points. I'm happy to take shots at Rumsfeld. he certainly bears a heavy burden for the problems that have emerged in Iraq. He is not, however, to blame for institutional flaws in the upper levels of the officer corps of the US Army.

I have a book at home called 'The Perfect War: Technowar In Vietnam' by James William Gibson. While the book is flawed, what it does better than any account I have ever read is point out how the adoption of management structures based on corporate models adversley affected the US military (he looks at land & air) in Vietnam. He identifies the root of the problem as being post-WW2 changes in structure, but the problems may well predate that. Whatever failures Rumsfeld is responsible for (and they are legion), he inhereted a military culture that predated him by decades. I would contend that his behaviour ensured that culture would produce negative results, but he didn't create the culture.

I have to respectfully disagree with your analysis of Vietnam. The 4 years of Westmoreland's leadership of MACV were crucial to US involvement in Vietnam. Johnson knew that after Korea, getting America into a big, drawn out war in Asia would be unpopular, so he picked a General with a plan to 'win' quickly. That plan amounted to a fancified version of attrition - we kill so many of them that they cry 'uncle' & stop fighting in the South.

The plan succeeded brilliantly as far as killing people (mostly the enemy) went. Unfortunately the enemy didn't give up. In fact, they fought hard enough to kill well over 30,000 Americans by the time Westmoreland had fiished his tour. This is why Tet was such a disaster for America, it showed that after 3 years of intense combat & a lot of dead Americans, the Vietnamese could still mount a massive offensive. Indeed, that capability remained even after Tet, as several more large offensives were launched later in 1968. Johnson was one of the most skilled politicians in US history. he knew that he had limited time to win in Vietnam & he knew, after Tet, that time was up.

After Tet, under Gen Abrams, Us forces actually adopted a successful CION strategy. He dramatically changed metrics of success & tactics. These tactics were valuable in crippling offensives later in 1968. It was these offensives, rather than Tet, which actually crippled VC infrastructure in the Sth (it was slowly rebuilt, but was never as effective). Unfortunately it was too little too late, America was leaving, and the RVN was never going to be able to defeat the DRV without a powerful US ground presence.

Invading the North was never going to happen. No way, no how. It had zero to do with playing nice for China. There were a number of interrelated factors ensuring this would never happen. Whenever you look at Vietnam, remeber the context - the war in Korea had been costly, mismanaged & every bit as unpopular as Vietnam would become. This cast a huge shadow over the policies of every US administration from Eisenhower to Johnson. Invading the North threatened a very direct repeat of the great disaster in Korea - Chinese intervention.

There is considerable evidence, by way of military infrastructure & depolyments, that China was prepared to intervene conventionally in Vietnam. This was as good a reason as required not to invade the DRV, but it wasn't the only one. Selling an invasion of a nation that could not concievably threaten the US would not have been easy, even in the early 1960s. It was, however, doable. What would have killed the operation, however, is losses. In both Korea & Vietnam opinion began to shift against the war as death passed 20,000, and had passed 50% against by 30,000.

It is my belief that America could easily have lost that many within 12 months invading the Nth, perhaps even more quickly. And all that would have achieved was the occupaton of a populace prepared to fight & die for as long as it took to remove America. There was not going to be any great uprising of people greeting the US as liberators. It is worth remembering that a Vietnamese force made up entirely of low grade border units & local militia held up the PLA for weeks in places & inflicted major casualties in the 1979 invasion. While the PAVN would have been wiped by the US military, it would have come at a cost, and it would just have constituted the first layer of defence. Had America invaded the DRV in 1965 the US people would have been ready to leave all of Vietnam by 1966. America loses almost a decade early.

Officer of Engineers

Sorry but I challenge that assertion. The Vietnamese had months to prepare their defences and prepared they did. Those local militias were made up of battle hardened troops that saw action in the South and they were were armed enough and fortified enough to channel Chinese tanks into killing zones. By all accounts, those Vietnamese militias were 1st rate troops while the Chinese were indeed 2nd rate forces.

Given the relative performances of all three forces, US, Chinese, and Vietnamese, I don't share your pessimism that the US would suffer 10s of 1000s of casualties within months. Given the military performances of Tet, I dare say that whatever obstacles the Vietnamese could have put up would have been fixed, bypassed, and reduced at leisure.

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Chimo

Bigfella

OOE,

Fair enough, but you would have to admit that the best equipped, trained & supported divisions were in Cambodia. I would suggest that for Vietnam to put up the defence it did while simultaneously fighting an even larger war in Cambodia was a pretty impressive achievement. It says something for the morale of those people. I would have expected them to be just as determined against an American force. I would also assume that many of those in local militias during the mid-60s would also have been combat veterans of the French War.

On any potential invasion of the DRV, I don't doubt that PAVN forces would have been crushed whenever they met properly constituted US conventional forces. I believe, however, they would have extracted a price for that victory, especially outside the Red River Delta & coastal lowlands. Pesonally I wouldn't expect the DRV to waste too many of its best troops trying to hold those areas, but to revert to the strategy of 1946/7 when they retreated to mountainous areas where they could reduce the relative advantage of a modern European-style army.

After the initial invasion America would then have to find some way of securing a nation full of very pissed off people who had 7 years to practice guerilla warfare against the French & a few more fighting in the South. Given that America had managed to rack up 30,000 dead by the start of 1968 (almost all since mid-1965), I don't see why a prediction of losses of that magnitude in a situation of much higher intensity combat against an enemy on home turf with much greater civilian support is out of the question.

I certainly don't think that 20,000 dead within 12 months would be an overly high figure, and then what? You are still trying to justify invading a country that poses you no threat & very definately does not want you there. Given that America was unable to pacify the RVN during that period, despite having a freindly government & support from significant sections of the populace, what possible future could an operation have in dramatically less favourable circumstances in the Nth? Even without the possibility of Chinese intervention it is a scenario guaranteed to scare any politician.

Officer of Engineers

I do not agree at all. The Vietnamese not only had the 4th largest army in the world at the time but were also Soviet equipped and signed a defence pact with Moscow. Both Soviet and Vietnamese intel had identified the Chinese forces committed to the Southern action and no one was impressed. The best Chinese divisions went north to counter a possible Soviet counter-strike.

I do know that Hanoi was not expecting the scale of the attack of 200,000+ troops. They were expecting a heavy border clash, not a full penetration against 3 Provincial capitals.

Hanoi had thought her preparations were more than adequate. They were wrong and thus were forced to withdraw divisions from Cambodia.

As bad as the Chinese had performed, all their OPOBJs were achieved and northern Vietnam was devastated through scorched earth. Their northern militias, including their combat veteran troops, were wiped out.

And there was a heavy cost to Vietnam, so much so that they were the ones who lost the 1984 2nd Sino-Vietnam War.

Determined? Yes. Effective? No.

I do expect Hanoi to waste her best troops. That is their style. They lost way more than the French, especially at Diem Bien Phu. And when you consider that they had to REBUILD their armies 3 times against Southern Vietnam. I highly doubt that they can mount the kind of attacks they did against the French. I don't doubt that they would be able to mount company and maybe even brigade strength attacks but I do strongly doubt that they could mount anything close to division, let alone corps as they did against the French.

For the very reason that such a war before in the South was organized. If the Americans had smashed all the way to the Chinese border, the 1st thing the Vietnamese will have to do is to re-organize themselves and 1 year is way too optimistic for me. More than likely, they will have to set up their organization based in Chinese territory and that alone takes time and effort. Especially when it comes to establishing territorial commands and LOCs from China.