Shek

I'd like to dedicate a thread to counterinsurgency, especially since many of the members of the board have either participated directly in a COIN/CI operation, or their own states and military forces are involved.

__________________
"So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

Bulgaroctonus

Sir,

That is an excellent idea. I am not affiliated with the military, but I am interested in how to effectively counter an insurgency. I think this issue is especially relevant to Iraq, for obvious reasons.

I look forward to learning from this thread.

Shek

The first article that I'd like to post, "Unit Immersion in Mosul," is one written by someone who I've served with before and provides a glimpse into the strategy encouraged by then MG Petraeus in Mosul during OIF I.

It really hits home at the requirement to live among the people whom you are trying to win over - unfortunately, we played to the tune that our presence was fueling the insurgency, and so we began consolidating our forces onto mega-FOBs, providing the insurgency with the freedom of movement through the battlespace, where they could intimidate the population. Living amongst the population is one of the biggest points made by LTC Galula in his COIN classic, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice.

Ray

1. While the situation can be turbulent once a foreign occupation occurs, apart from units being assigned the areas of operation for counter operations, civic action should immediately be taken up in tandem. It is important to identify with the local problems and try to alleviate them. In third world countries, very few understand or care for national problems as such. They are more concerned with their lives and their problems. What will a long way is to take action on issues where their last government failed and the occupation army immediately achieves results, even if marginally, in this failed area. It may not endear the population, but it will neutralise (make them indifferent) to the frenzy the local rabble leaders may try.

The author does mention this aspect. Can someone throw more light on this issue as far as Iraq is concerned and if it were actually done.

2. Establishing security is important and it is important that some sort of a local administration is established. However, this must be done with care so that the local administration does not appear to have been 'foisted' by the occupation forces. If the local administration appears too aligned with the occupation forces, it will lose its credibility and hence its effectiveness.

In Iraq, there was a vacuum in administration after the Baathists were sent packing and whatever was brought in were discredited since they were seen to be pro occupation forces!

3. Having a Counter Insurgency school in the Area of Occupation is an absolute must. Units or individuals who are being inducted should undergo training in CI Ops (since it is not the same as normal combat battle drills and battle procedures), including lessons on the local conditions, ways to undertake civic actions and knowledge about local customs and traditions.

A word of caution is that while it is essential for units deployed in CI areas to obtain information and intelligence, intelligence gather is a real technical issue. Incorrect handling of suspects or sources can skew up the issue and good information may thus get lost!

An interesting article with many issues highlighted that should be implemented if COIN is to be successful.

__________________


"Some have learnt many Tricks of sly Evasion, Instead of Truth they use Equivocation, And eke it out with mental Reservation, Which is to good Men an Abomination."

I don't have to attend every argument I'm invited to.

HAKUNA MATATA

zraver

This is jsut my point .02


Alot of people in the west labor under the mistaken impression that regular forces cannot beat an insurgency. This is historically false, more regular formations have defeated insurgencies than the other way around.

What seems to be lacking in the western model is the level of brutaility needed to defeat insurgents. The west has the mistaken idea that war has rules and thier are classes of protected persons. The simple fact is war is the controlled application of force agaisnt your enemies center of gravity to make your enemy choose peace. Anymeans you have of achieivng this are thus valid.

The UK knew this in Mayalasia and systematically stripped the communist of thier access to the peasant population through relocation and land/politcal reforms, and cutitng off external supply lines from the PRC.

What the UK did, that America is seemingly incapable of is properly identifying the enemies centers of gravity. Although Britian learned this lesson of distiguishing between what is and isn't the hard way with dozens of brushfire wars during the course of its empire.

The US persist in beleiving that military might alone can win a limited war. America conquered its hinterland with force, smashed the Confederacy, defeated hitler and achieved many other victories with force alone. And force alone can work, excpet the spectre of burnt out cities prevents the level of force that won those past victories. Unwilling to engage in the required level of brutality, but still shackeld to the idea of victory won on the battlefeild America doesn't seem to understand the nature of war.

As a nation the US has forgotten how to win. The only way to win any war is to break your enemies will to resist. The simplest and easiest method is to kill him, kill his neighbors, smash his cities and lay waste to his country side. And then when he raises his hands in surrender beucase fighting is costing him more than defeat establish order and begin the rebuilding process. Every empire in history has followed this model in COIN ops for a reason, it works.

However in the modern age where we have deluded ourselves that war can be fought with out killing this age old recipe won't work. If you can't make your enemy say uncle by killing him then you have to find some other way to remove his centers of gravity. The insurgent depends on five things things to continue to fight: recruits, an idea, freedom of movement, media, and poverty. Remove any three and the insurgency will fail.

Recruits- The easiest way to rmeove the recruits is to create jobs. Young men make up the overwhelming percentage of combatants. They must be other wise occupied with gainful employment. A man with small children fears beign fired and not beign able t0o feed his kids far more than he hates or resents goverment forces fighting the insurgents. Jobs also ease poverty.

Idea- Despite what Bush and Blai think no one ideal links all mankind. Insurgents rally around an idea or beleif that must be combated. Vietnam was lost not on the battlefeild, but for lack of land reform and religious equality. Iraq is being lost in the name of democracy vs Islam and Shia vs Sunni, when it could be won in the name of a theological and tribal federation.

Freedom of movement- quite simply put iraqies have to muchy freedom to come and go as they please allowing the insurgents to be jsut one more fish ina great big sea. In an area beset by anarchy rigid controls need to be emplaced and this requires alot more troops and cops. The borders also need to be sealed to reduce the amount of arms being shipped in. Resticted travel also creates neighborhood security by blocking the movement of the death squads.

Media- be it word of mouth radio, television, print or any othe rmeans the forces fighting agiasnt the insurgents must show themselves in a positive light by contrasting themselves agains tthe darkness of the enemy. The US was winnign the batlt eof the hearts and minds in Iraqvs Al Queda. Then AQ changed tactics stopped beheadings and attacks on religious sites and recast themsevles as Islamic's resiting the agressor infidels. At the same time the US had service men convicted of murder, rape, and of course Abu Gahib playing into AQ's hands. The terrorist could not have asked for better press. Speaking of press, press freedom anhd internet acess is great for a democracy or stable goverment. It is pure suicide during an insurgency. If you don't rigidly control the information the population in the warzone has acess to you can't interupt the enemies communications and recruitment efforts.

Poverty- Not just economic but also in areas like political access, education, religious freedom, amnesty for fighters etc. The goverment forces need to actively work to reduce poverty. Intially on the economic front, this reduces the pool of avaible fighters and lends credence to the goverments media war in other areas. Politcal, social, and religious issues are the carrots to the miltiary stick used to encourage an end to hostilities and the begining of diplomacy, but the goverment must negotiate in good faith. people have to beleive that they have more to gain through peace than they ever gain through war.

astralis

zraver,

this is no longer as tenable as it was in the past. the individual in this age of technology has far more power than he did in the past, and unless you can kill every single individual, you risk just ONE individual doing terrific damage in revenge. thus we talk about winning hearts and minds, because inducement to fear a la machiavelli is less useful against today's individual than it was against feudal peasants, uneducated, isolated, and powerless.

__________________
Never let the future disturb you. You will meet it, if you have to, with the same weapons of reason which today arm you against the present.

-Marcus Aurelius, Meditations

Ray

Malaysia is possibly the only example where the military has been able to defeat insurgency. There are good reasons why that could have been done and which cannot be replicated in contemporary times, without decrying in any way the good work done by Templar.

I maybe wrong, but in modern times, the defeat of Malayan insurgency is the only example where regulars were effective.

It also need to be understood that the environment of each insurgency is totally different from the next. Therefore, superimposing of one mode on another may not be correct, even though the principles of application may hold good to some extent.

While one can suppress insurgency with cruel and inhuman methods (as possibly could have been done in Communist countries and military dictatorship or by regimes like Mugabe), it cannot be done by democracies. Therefore, it cannot be taken as a means or mode of suppressing insurrections.

In Vietnam, village relocation was also done. The final outcome of Vietnam is in no way reflective of the village relocation policy. This brings out the point that while ground level methods can lead to results, the whole effort can fail if there is no clear cut mission and aim and it being made worse by having a corrupt govt in place in the insurgency ridden country and which has no credibility. The Vietnam govt had very little credibility since it was corrupt and full of self seekers.

The contention that the US should smash cities, burn villages or pillage or destroy is not valid because the world has changed! A large majority of shackled populations in the colonies who had no voice are today independent. Like it or not, they matter! Hypothetically, if the British Empire was still there in contemporary times, then finances, resources, manpower, strategic material would be in abundance! Iraq could have been subdued or even bought over! The Indian and other Armies of the British Empire would have been in Iraq and Afghanistan. Pragmatically speaking, their death for the 'cause' would have not have had the same revulsion as it has with US and British deaths that occur in Iraq and Afghanistan! And so, the Iraq war would have been pressed on with more vigour and without "change of strategy"! Of course, the shabash would have flowed for the loyal native troops etc and a few sops like the Victoria Cross thrown their way!

Unfortunately, since the colonies are now their own masters, these Armies, which could have been material are in the Coalition of the Unwilling! One cannot say whether it is for the good or bad.

One cannot thus agree with the contention that the US has forgotten how to win wars! The US Army is at its best and they are facing numerous odds, both in the US policy making arena as also because of a recalcitrant Iraqi govt.

It is true that the insurgent depends on five things things to continue to fight: recruits, an idea, freedom of movement, media, and poverty. Remove any three and the insurgency will fail.

The issue is how to remove these things.

There is no doubt that if the economic environment of the individuals is improved it will go along way to choke the insurgency since the 'idea' is basically causative of abject poverty that the breakdown of administration brings and removing the complete Administrative structure in Iraq after the invasion was the biggest folly.

The religious fervour amongst the Iraqis was not that pronounced as with other Islamic nations since that was totally suppressed by Saddam. However, because of the occupation and the attempt to Divide and Rule, it has surfaced with vengeance. And the Sunni Shia nonsense is a historical legacy that cannot be subdued unless one is a Saddam.

Indeed, movement of the population should be not only regulated but also put under the microscope. Likewise, the media has to be controlled. It may not be democratic an action, but nonetheless, it has to be enforced till the situation comes closer to normalcy.

Religious activities should be controlled since most problems occur because of misrepresentation of facts by the religious leaders who have their own axe to grind and the also because the population is illiterate and can be swayed by twisting the religion to suit the convenience!

Notwithstanding my comments, zraver, your post was most thought provoking and a pleasure to read.

zraver

Thank you Brigadier Ray,

Mayalasia succeeded primarily beucase of the dual use of relocation and cutting of supply lines. Becuase the islands did not lend them selves to a Ho Chi Mihn Trail the amount of amteriual that could be smuggled in was small. The key in Veitnam wasn't relocation, but land reform. Most of the magor land owners in South Vietnam were absentee and British experts urged such reforms. One of the big draws of the VC and thier Northern amsters was land reform. If the RV had done this a signifigant base of support could have been cut off, and the VC defeated before the North was ready for full sclae operations in the south. The insurgewncy in Vietnam was beaten by miltiary force and all but ceased to exist as an efective miltiary force after Tet 68. However by then the NVA was in the south in force.

other conventional victories over guerilla forces include the defeat of the SS Werewolf campaign in post war Germany, the nazi defeat of the Chetniks and Tito's partisans in 43-44. And in the post war defeat of the Forest Brothers in the Baltic states. All used the massive application of force. while the world hasn't changed bleeding hearts have forced the democracies to labor under the mistaken concept that war has rules regarding its conduct.

One day the democracies will wake up and realize that in war people die and you can either do the killing up front and break the enemies will to resist, or you can do it in dribs and dabs and end up with even more deaths in the long run. The US create the insurgency by not understanding the politcal dynamic of the nation. It could have recovered from this early on, but instead of providing order, drinking water, jobs,and power it provided elections for its own domestic politcal agenda. This allowed the insurgency to snowball.

The US is now faced with two choices, continue to pander to the US doemstic market, or fight to win. The peace could be won in six months if the US and iraq's goverment could stomach the bloodletting it would require and if the US was willing to shoulder the burden of a massive increase in rebuilding to prevent a fresh wave of attacks when the survivors regrouped.

Kill Sadr and as many of his zealots as possible. No last minute reprive trap him and burn him out like a rat. This would cripple the extra-govemrental shia miltias who are acting as death squads and lend some faith to the Sunni's that laying down thier arms wont expose them to even more sectarian violence. Thier are persistent rumors of the US meeting with Sunni insurgent leaders: security in a Shia dominated iraq is surely high on thier list. With Sadr and by extnesion Iran silenced at least for a short time begin talks on an autonomous federation: Shiastan, Sunnistan, and Kurdistan. This will require massed relocation to seperate the warring parties.

The big blocks to this are of course Turkey and Iran. Europe can help by offering Turkey EU membership in trade for Turkish support.Without Turkey Kurdistan will become a reality. Iran has already margnalized itself with its atomic program.

Once the parties are seperated several things nee to be done. 1-the water and oil need to be fairly divided and administered by the UN, via Moslem officals from nuetral countries like Pakistan and Indonesia until the new federations civil service is mature. 2- Iraq's debt needs to be forgiven without hesitation and its goverment needs to be extended billions in credits on very favorable terms according to Islamic not World Bank/IMF fiscal guidelines. 3- massive influx of reconstruction aid probsaby 10-30 billion a year for several years. While the money and material must come from the developed world (not just the US but from any nation that made money selling arms to Saddam), the sweat and muscle must come from Iraqies. 4- as soon as the major fighting is over true peace keepers empowered to enforce the peace must replace the US military. Again I would look to Islamic nations like Egypt, Indonesia, and Pakistan. Unles the Iraqies have faith that the US will leave as soon as it can do so in good faith a signifigant minority will feel the need to "liberate" thier nation. 5- Remove oil from the commodities lsit and set its price at a fair level and tie it to the global inflation rate. Say 55 USD a barrel. This would give all the oil exporting nations not just iraq some stable income.n Iraq it would give the 3 major groups hard numbers to work with in the division of Iraq's riches.

Garuda

Ray Sir,

Is GOC ARTRAC Lt. Gen. KS Jamwal your entry mate?

Ray

Lt Gen KS Jamwal is GOC in C Eastern Command and he is my junior in service.

His elder brother Lt Gen As Jamwal was my coursemate. We were from the same Sqn in the NDA.

Both are very decent chaps.

Typical Jammu Dogras.

Shek

Zraver,

The hamlets achieved marginal success in Malaya. If not for the Korean War boom in the tin and rubber industries, providing the funds necessary to provide minimal quality of life services in the various hamlets, this program would have been a complete disaster. When you execute a hamlet program, you put all your eggs in one basket. If your hamlet conditions are poor, then you delegitimze your own efforts. Furthermore, the hamlet only serves to protect and maintain control while the hamlet members are in the hamlet. Those in the hamlets still faced insurgent coercion while they were out in the fields or on the plantations.

I've attached a presentation script that I did two years back on the political successes coupled with the MCP decision to revert from Phase II back to Phase I that I think were the main elements in the success of ending the Malayan Emergency.

In the end, it is the totality of your strategy that will yield your end result, and so it wasn't solely the political successes that yielded victory, but I do think that they were the most successful line of operation.

Attached Files

History of Irregular Warfare - Malaya.doc (34.0 KB, 11 views)

zraver

Astralis,

the lone gunman or small group is not an insurgency. A group of Serb nationalist started WW1, but they were not an insurgency. Inducement to fear does work even in the modern age. We have the same programming and evolutonary instincts as our caveman ancestors. The idea is not to rule by fear or repression, but to induce an aversion to violent struggle by providing a fear on one hand and hope on the other. The plan to woin the peace must be as agressively poursued as the efforts to win the fight.

Shek,

Great read and I detect a similar goal in the original US plan. However the Malay situation didn't have the level of inter-group animosity to contend with. it also did not face 10's of thousands of combatants from myraid politcal and religious groups. Iraq is not going to work as a federal state and the groups have to be seperated, and unified only so mfar as national security and resource sharing. Existing in an automous system in other areas, and Irans voice has to be squelched.

Shek

Here are three more articles.

The first article, "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency," is written by LTC Kalev Sepp, PhD. He served in El Salvador as a brigade advisor and as a A-Team leader in Panama.

The second one, "28 Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency," is written by LTC David Kilcullen, PhD, from the Australian Army, and is an easy read.

The third one, Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958, is a book written for RAND by LTC David Galula, on his experiences as a commander in Algeria. It is a long read, although the summary provides a good synopsis.

Attached Files

Best Practices in Counterinsurgency - Sepp.pdf (65.2 KB, 6 views)

Shek

I fully agree that Iraq is much more complex - one cannot simply cut and paste solutions from history as a template. Malaya was an essentially isolated country (tough on external support) fought in a rural environment. Thus, one must be careful and determine which lessons can be applicable.

Some that you can gather from Malaya are: unity of command between the military and civilian components are a must (the arrival of Sir Templer marked this era in Malaya - we suffered from a disjointed effort under the not so dream team of Sanchez/Bremer). A political outcome that achieves buy-in will take the wind out of the sails of an insurgency (in general, most confused voter turn-out with buy-in in Iraq).

In the end, religion has been the wild card in Iraq, whether it's the ease at which it can be exploited to the various insurgent groups' advantage, or whether because of the multitude of religious militias, some of which have experienced their own splintering. Whether Iraq has experienced a Balkanization to the point that reconciliation is irretreivable, I don't think so - not quite, yet. However, we are no doubt much closer to that edge than we were in the summer of 2003 and enjoyed the initiative, and the task of developing a legitimacy for a central government.

I would wrap up by stating that we must come back to the ends and means of Iraq. The means of achieving the ends (a democratic Iraq that facilitates a democratic Middle East) must not be self-contradictory (i.e. using a ruthlessness that stirs up a flavor of Saddam rather than a flavor of freedom). However, I think that there are strong arguments that point to the fact that the ends may no longer be achievable, and so there may come a time where your means to support a different end could be necessary.

Stan187

This is an excellent thread. I'm writing a paper on this right now, I can contribute it, as well as all my sources, in approximately two weeks.

Here is a good website I used for some research:

http://www.jihadmonitor.org/category...unterterrorism