Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Readings - Page 2

**Shek** · 01-15-2007, 22:12 PM

A few more sources for the thread. Here's a special edition of Military Review that is a counterinsurgency reader (warning - it is a nearly 20MB Adobe Acrobat file).

For the interagency work that's being done, here's a website to check out:

www.usgcoin.org

Also, Dr. Hillen, who's the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, wrote this piece in this month's Military Review.

zraver · 01-15-2007, 23:44 PM

I will download them from school where I ahve highspeed access.

Shek,
Do we really want a democratic middle east or do we want unifed or at least stable nation states. Much of the region is still too tribal for democracy and too reactionary for major reforms. Perhaps the goal in Iraq should be in creating peaceful states that respect the rule of a just set of laws that recognises both the modern values (UNUDHR) and a form of Sharia, that do not depend on a dictatorship or monarchy.

Quatar is leading the way with the intriduction of modern education and a constatutional monarchy. An Iraqi federation of 3 autonnomous states could further advance this goal. Iraq may be the current battle feild in the head lines but it is just one of several hotspots in the region.

I think the west has confused democracy with liberty and freedom, aka the buy in concept. Stabalizing the price of oil would help every state in the region in the endevour. With reliable budgets they could spend more on social programs aleviating poverty and dissillusionment. The ultimate goal is the subversion and evnetual replacement of the current rulers of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Syria, and Hezzbollah/Hamas.

One big and persistent handicap in dealing with the region is a lack of a coherant policy. You mentioned tha tin dealing with an insurgency the civil and military aims must be united. I agee but we also need to see the whole of the ME as an insurgency not just Iraq. For nearly 100 year snow the west has doled out or with hold favors instead of building lasting foundations. If Iraqies deserve peace and prosperity, so do Palestinians, and Israelies, Lebanese and the Saudi/Gulf States have nots.

**Shek** · 01-16-2007, 18:54 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by zraver

Shek,
Do we really want a democratic middle east or do we want unifed or at least stable nation states. Much of the region is still too tribal for democracy and too reactionary for major reforms. Perhaps the goal in Iraq should be in creating peaceful states that respect the rule of a just set of laws that recognises both the modern values (UNUDHR) and a form of Sharia, that do not depend on a dictatorship or monarchy.

Quatar is leading the way with the intriduction of modern education and a constatutional monarchy. An Iraqi federation of 3 autonnomous states could further advance this goal. Iraq may be the current battle feild in the head lines but it is just one of several hotspots in the region.

I think the west has confused democracy with liberty and freedom, aka the buy in concept. Stabalizing the price of oil would help every state in the region in the endevour. With reliable budgets they could spend more on social programs aleviating poverty and dissillusionment. The ultimate goal is the subversion and evnetual replacement of the current rulers of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Syria, and Hezzbollah/Hamas.

One big and persistent handicap in dealing with the region is a lack of a coherant policy. You mentioned tha tin dealing with an insurgency the civil and military aims must be united. I agee but we also need to see the whole of the ME as an insurgency not just Iraq. For nearly 100 year snow the west has doled out or with hold favors instead of building lasting foundations. If Iraqies deserve peace and prosperity, so do Palestinians, and Israelies, Lebanese and the Saudi/Gulf States have nots.

Zraver,

I'm still undecided as to whether democracy for Iraq is now unattainable, although I don't think that it was an impossible undertaking - we've certainly played our cards poorly with regards to "Phase IV" and have watched the initiative slip away, along with a lot of the middle class professionals that are required to see a functioning democracy. However, without going too far down the Democracy: Mission Impossible, path, I'd redirect discussion to this thread, if possible, so that it could remain more COIN focused.

I fully agree with your thoughts on trying to liberalize within the confines of Sharia. Morocco can serve as a model with this regard.

Not so sure about your thoughts on oil - partly from my perspective as an economist and free market supporter - but more from the fact that it's not any lack of stable oil prices that prevents Arab states from directing the money in productive directions. This is a post from Astralis that captures this point to a degree. Thus, I think it is more of a question of how do you motivate them to put their oil profits to better use, and I don't have an answer of how we can leverage that.

Finally, I think that we are in somewhat of a quandary WRT our ME policy. We cannot subscribe to the failed policy of a "stable" but autocratic ME, but we cannot try a comprehensive redo without risking bringing Islamists to power (e.g. Hamas in Palestine) or without appearing to be engaging in a West vs. Islam policy. So, I think the limited strategy that the Bush Administration engaged in was right in terms of being incremental, but we've certainly played our hand poorly in Iraq and that we underestimated Hamas in Palestine and therefore found ourselves having been beat at our own game, if you will.

zraver · 01-16-2007, 22:29 PM

Shek,

I think that until we inves tthe emperor with his throne again (see my post in democracitzation for the Middle East) Iraq will not enjoy stability let alone any form of represenative goverment. This is the politcal aspect of COIN, The people need a central authroity they have faith in. That faith must be based on culture and the proimise of prosperity.

The military apsect of COIN is simple in comparison. Insurgents and thier supporters must be rooted out and stomped into the ground without mercy until they cry uncle. There is no way to have a good faith dialogue with an insurgent force that feels it has a chance of winning militarily. The only difficult part of the military operation is how to taylor the application of force and violence narrowly enough to claim a moral high ground domestically. After all brutal opression works just ask the ghosts of Mao, Stalin and Ceaser. If America still had the stomach for slaughter, peace however uneasy and dependant on force and repression would already exist in Iraq.

gf0012-aust · 01-18-2007, 04:14 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by shek

The first article that I'd like to post, "Unit Immersion in Mosul," is one written by someone who I've served with before and provides a glimpse into the strategy encouraged by then MG Petraeus in Mosul during OIF I.

mate, could you please flick me this via my email addy. it keeps on carking it for me. the others are all fine

cheers. gf

Stan187 · 01-18-2007, 13:13 PM

Guys, there is one aspect for my paper that have yet to find really good stuff for. I'd appreciate a link to an article on the economics of counterinsurgency, an economic "how to" of sorts, where to give money, how to do it, etc.

Many thanks,

Stan

Stan187 · 01-18-2007, 15:02 PM

Short and sweet, and excellent article in my opinion:

Daily Estimate | Economic tools in counterinsurgency

**Shek** · 01-18-2007, 16:10 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Stan187

Guys, there is one aspect for my paper that have yet to find really good stuff for. I'd appreciate a link to an article on the economics of counterinsurgency, an economic "how to" of sorts, where to give money, how to do it, etc.

Many thanks,

Stan

Stan,

Some more food for thought:

LTG Chiarelli's Winning the Peace
LTG Petraeus' Learning Counterinsurgency
RAND's America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq

Some keys to economic aid is that it needs to reinforce the legitimacy of the government (it can provide basic services), it has to keep folks off the street waiting to be hired guns and put them to work, and it has to create self-sustaining markets. This is just a quick off the top of my head statement, so it's certainly not complete, but I think the big thing is that you have to subordinate and enst the economic program into the political plan for success.

For example, we provided aid to Vietnam under Diem, but all it really did was increase consumption of items that Vietnam normally would import/produce. Thus, it provided no self-sustaining benefit, and instead, it created expectations that were bound to fail. However, the "miracle rice" crops that were later given are an example of a successful program.

In Iraq, we've failed in some of our reconstruction efforts because we went with lowest bidder contracts without thought to how the losing contractors (and their tribes) would react to being shutout. While not as economically efficient, the FL ARNG BDE that operated in Ramadi was cognizant of this and made sure that all the local tribes got a piece of the pie. I think that the two posts below should hopefully get at this story (I hope - I couldn't bring up the blog piece, so I'm not sure how much it does or doesn't).

Marines From Iraq Sound Off About Want Of Armor And Men
COUNTERCOLUMN: With your host, Huck of Darkness

pdf27 · 01-18-2007, 18:17 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Ray

I maybe wrong, but in modern times, the defeat of Malayan insurgency is the only example where regulars were effective.

Oman/Dhofar? That involved a mixture of regular and some thoroughly irregular regular forces. Still, it's illuminating as an example of a western force defeating an insurgency in Arabia.

Shipwreck · 01-26-2007, 18:20 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by shek

I fully agree with your thoughts on trying to liberalize within the confines of Sharia. Morocco can serve as a model with this regard.

Shek,

The example of Morocco is actually difficult to replicate elsewhere, for this country possesses a unique blend of characterics in the Arab world, among which :

* The temporal and spiritual primacy of the Alawite monarchy, the King being the "Commander of the faithful and the Supreme representative of the Muslim community.

* The absence of interethnic conflicts (no Berber separatism in contrast with Algeria), except in Western Sahara.

* The existence of a civil society led by a long-established westernized intelligentsia.

That being said, Morocco is much more fragile that it appears and the recent progress (legislative elections of 1997 and 2002, reform of the Mudawana in 2004, Equity and Reconciliation Commission in 2004) shouldn't hide the rise of radical Islam in the country.

**Shek** · 01-29-2007, 15:13 PM

Here's something that definitely isn't pie in the sky, but it is very powerful.

Quote:

Looking out from the Forest of Iraq by William Christie

The Theory of Counterinsurgency in Six Easy Paragraphs

By William Christie

January 31, 2006

Special to Defense and the National Interest

A neighbor and I were discussing my previous commentary, Still Looking Out From the Forest of Iraq: At Iran.

“I know the media’s all hot about Iran,” he said. “But I’m a lot more worried about Iraq.”

“You’re not alone,” I said. “Even when the military officers I correspond with talk about Iran, their minds are still on Iraq.”

“I don’t know who to believe,” he said. “If you listen to the press, it’s all bad and the military and government are selling you a bill of goods. If you listen to the military and government, we’re winning and the press is only looking for the bad.”

“They might both be right,” I said. “In counterinsurgency you can win all the battles and still lose the war.”

He asked me to explain that, and I said I’d try and put a few thoughts down on paper.

“Wait a minute,” he said. “I know you writers like to write. How about something short.”

“That’s a tall order,” I said. “It’s a subject that doesn’t led itself to short.”

“I have a job and a wife and kids I like to spent time with,” he replied. “I need short. And how about something I can relate to?”

So here is a theory of counterinsurgency. In six paragraphs and the form of a parable. Set in the rural South, where we both live.

The house next door to you is sold, and the people who move in are white supremacist skinheads. You discover that they’ve started up a methamphetamine lab in their basement. You think about calling your County Sheriff’s Department, but you’re not so sure. The cops strike you as generally overweight and none too swift. The only time you ever see them is in the mall, two cruisers parked side by side, the deputies gossiping and waiting for the next radio call instead of being on patrol. You’re afraid that if you tell them about your neighbors the news will leak out and you’ll get your house burned down one night. After all, you have a wife and kids and a mortgage.

But one day the SWAT team shows up to serve a warrant and kicks down the neighbor’s door and drags them off to jail. You’re incredibly pleased and highly relieved. You vow that the next time the Department is doing some charity work you’ll write a check. And you tell one of the deputies that if he sees you out in the yard to stop and you’ll let him know what’s going on in the neighborhood.

Now let’s shift that scenario to a slightly alternate universe where the Bill of Rights doesn’t apply. The Sheriff’s Department gets the word that someone in the neighborhood is cooking meth. They don’t know who, but since no one in the neighborhood is telling them anything they think everyone might be white supremacists. So one night they kick down your door looking for the meth lab. They point guns at your kids and your wife and scare them half to death. While searching your home they break your furniture and throw your belongings everywhere. And they slap you around trying to get you to tell them where the meth lab is. By now you’ve forgotten all about your scary neighbors—you just want to get even with those cops.

Even worse, let’s say that the cops find out exactly where the meth lab is. But they’re afraid of the neighborhood, and they don’t want to get shot at taking down the lab. So they call in a fighter bomber and drop a 500 lb guided bomb on your neighbor’s house. That takes care of the meth lab, but it also blows down one wall of your house, breaks every window, and destroys the car you need to get to work every day. You don’t know what you’re going to do.

A couple of nights later, another neighbor comes to your door and says he’s making a bomb to blow up the next patrol car that comes down the road. And would you help him dig the hole for $100?

You’d probably do it for nothing, wouldn’t you?

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

William Christie is a former Marine Corps infantry officer who left the Corps as a First Lieutenant in 1987. He is the author of 5 novels, including most recently The Blood We Shed, currently in hardcover from ibooks. And Threat Level, which will be published in October by Pinnacle Books/Kensington Press. He can be reached at christieauthor@yahoo.com.

**Shek** · 02-05-2007, 17:21 PM

Two articles from the winter edition of Parameters

http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/P...ter/millen.pdf
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/P...er/muckian.pdf

The first article deals with the Hobbesian nature that insurgencies can create, leading to the conclusion that a population-centric strategy must be pursued.

The second article highlights the differences between a Maoist insurgency and current insurgencies that use psyops and terrorism as their primary means to victory, and the implications that follow - mainly that while the study of the past is useful, "know[ing] your enemy" as Sun Tzu advises is still of primary importance.

**Shek** · 02-09-2007, 16:17 PM

Another great article from Kilcullen.

Quote:

Counter-insurgency is fashionable again: more has been written on it in the last four years than in the last four decades. This is heartening for those who were in the wilderness during the years when Western governments regarded counter-insurgency as a distraction, of interest only to historians. So it is no surprise that some have urged the re-discovery of classical, ‘proven’ counter-insurgency methods.1 But some of this enthusiasm may be misplaced. Today’s insurgencies differ significantly – at the level of policy, strategy, operational art and tactical

technique – from those of earlier eras. An enormous amount of classical counter-insurgency remains relevant. Indeed, counter-insurgency provides the ‘best fit’ framework for strategic problems in the ‘war on terror’.2 But much is new in counter-insurgency redux, possibly requiring fundamental re-appraisals of conventional wisdom.

***

Today’s insurgencies differ significantly from those of the 1960s. Insurgents may not be seeking to overthrow the state, may have no coherent strategy or may pursue a faith-based approach difficult to counter with traditional methods. There may be numerous competing insurgencies in one theatre, meaning that the counter-insurgent must control the overall environment rather than defeat a specific enemy. The actions of individuals and the propaganda effect of a subjective ‘single narrative’ may far outweigh practical progress, rendering counter-insurgency even more non-linear and unpredictable. The counter-insurgent, not the insurgent, may initiate the conflict and represent the forces of revolutionary change. The economic relationship between insurgent and population
may be diametrically opposed to classical theory. And insurgent tactics, based on exploiting the propaganda effects of urban bombing, may invalidate some classical tactics and render others, like patrolling, counterproductive under some circumstances. Thus, field evidence suggests, classical theory is necessary but not sufficient for success against contemporary insurgencies.

WECIV · 02-13-2007, 16:18 PM

http://d-n-i.net/lind/fmfm_1a_r3.pdf

fmfm1a on 4GW

Rather good read. Our force structure and the last 100 yrs only allow us the capability for the Hama model though (not to mention our leadership and doctrine which is 2GW in the extreme).

W

**Shek** · 02-26-2007, 21:34 PM

Quote:

As our long column of tan trucks rode down Iraq’s Business Highway 10 at 6 o’clock in the morning on April 9, 2003, I focused on my instincts and battle training, keeping an open mind and preparing for whatever lay ahead. After three weeks of intense firefights, the Fedayeen Saddam fighters had finally slithered away. The last thing I expected to do once we entered Ar Rutbah, a Sunni city of about 25,000 in the Anbar province near Jordan and Syria, was to begin postwar reconstruction. I had not planned or prepared for governing, nor had I received any guidance or assistance in how to do so. But then, nothing in war is expected.

With just six 12-man teams and an area of desert about the size of New Jersey, we viewed the city as a major complication in our mission to stop the ballistic missile launches from western Iraq. A town the size of Ar Rutbah could easily swallow the entire company. And in this conflict where special ops forces were in high demand, we had to move to Baghdad as soon as possible. Civil administration would have to be the responsibility of conventional troops following in our tracks. Of course, the Fedayeen were not interested in our itinerary. For weeks, they had entrenched themselves in the city, using civilians as shields. Every time we approached, Ar Rutbah became a hornet’s nest, and small-arms fire turned into machine gun and rocket fire. Although we overwhelmed the enemy each time, it became clear that the Fedayeen had to be forced out. So on that day in early April, as the rest of the world watched a statue of Saddam fall in Baghdad, we began our own small revolution.

Long before we entered, we had developed channels of communication with people inside the city. Every time we encountered civilians on our patrols or used loudspeakers, we would announce, “We are at war with Saddam, not you.” We were friendly and respectful whenever we met a Bedouin or farmer, often sharing tea with them in the middle of the open desert. Our behavior sent the clearest message: We cared more about the people of Ar Rutbah than did the Fedayeen. After all, we had done everything possible to limit damage to civilian infrastructure and private property. We didn’t bomb schools or mosques, even though they were used as military bases. We treated enemy wounded and distributed contraband food. I stopped our final assault to institute a day-long cease-fire as a gesture to the people of the city. Our early signals of respect would prove to be vital in earning the trust of the people of Ar Rutbah.

Yet we still didn’t know what to expect as we rolled into town. All our intelligence predicted no resistance, but we were still bracing for a fight. Ar Rutbah was tan and dusty, with connected concrete buildings that displayed battle scars from our bombs and firefights. As we entered, street traffic came to a standstill. Iraqis gathered along the main and side streets. Most people just watched, a little apprehensive. Some were glad we were there and shook our hands. We asked them to stay out of the way so no one would get hurt. We cleared known enemy positions, scouring each sandbagged bunker, room, and compound to ensure that all hostile fighters were gone. Finally, we located the police station, a fort built by the British in 1927. The police chief had locked it when the enemy fled. It would be the perfect location for my company’s headquarters.

Our next move was to summon the civil administrators, chief of police, and tribal leaders. Two hours after we arrived in Ar Rutbah, a dozen Iraqis, the company warrant officer, and I gathered in the dark, dusty office lined with Saddam photos and plaques, and began to plot out the civil administration of the city.

Continue reading at Foreign Policy: The Mayor of Ar Rutbah

01-18-2007, 13:13 PM	#21 (permalink)
Stan187 WAB BOUNCER *Senior Contributor* Join Date: 11-24-06 Posts: 2,323 Country:	Guys, there is one aspect for my paper that have yet to find really good stuff for. I'd appreciate a link to an article on the economics of counterinsurgency, an economic "how to" of sorts, where to give money, how to do it, etc. Many thanks, Stan __________________ In Iran people belive pepsi stands for pay each penny save israel. -urmomma158 The Russian Navy is still a threat, but only to those unlucky enough to be Russian sailors.-highsea

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01-15-2007, 23:44 PM	#17 (permalink)
zraver Contrary by nature. *Military Professional* Join Date: 10-22-06 Location: Arkansas Posts: 2,529 Country:	I will download them from school where I ahve highspeed access. Shek, Do we really want a democratic middle east or do we want unifed or at least stable nation states. Much of the region is still too tribal for democracy and too reactionary for major reforms. Perhaps the goal in Iraq should be in creating peaceful states that respect the rule of a just set of laws that recognises both the modern values (UNUDHR) and a form of Sharia, that do not depend on a dictatorship or monarchy. Quatar is leading the way with the intriduction of modern education and a constatutional monarchy. An Iraqi federation of 3 autonnomous states could further advance this goal. Iraq may be the current battle feild in the head lines but it is just one of several hotspots in the region. I think the west has confused democracy with liberty and freedom, aka the buy in concept. Stabalizing the price of oil would help every state in the region in the endevour. With reliable budgets they could spend more on social programs aleviating poverty and dissillusionment. The ultimate goal is the subversion and evnetual replacement of the current rulers of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Syria, and Hezzbollah/Hamas. One big and persistent handicap in dealing with the region is a lack of a coherant policy. You mentioned tha tin dealing with an insurgency the civil and military aims must be united. I agee but we also need to see the whole of the ME as an insurgency not just Iraq. For nearly 100 year snow the west has doled out or with hold favors instead of building lasting foundations. If Iraqies deserve peace and prosperity, so do Palestinians, and Israelies, Lebanese and the Saudi/Gulf States have nots.

01-16-2007, 22:29 PM	#19 (permalink)
zraver Contrary by nature. *Military Professional* Join Date: 10-22-06 Location: Arkansas Posts: 2,529 Country:	Shek, I think that until we inves tthe emperor with his throne again (see my post in democracitzation for the Middle East) Iraq will not enjoy stability let alone any form of represenative goverment. This is the politcal aspect of COIN, The people need a central authroity they have faith in. That faith must be based on culture and the proimise of prosperity. The military apsect of COIN is simple in comparison. Insurgents and thier supporters must be rooted out and stomped into the ground without mercy until they cry uncle. There is no way to have a good faith dialogue with an insurgent force that feels it has a chance of winning militarily. The only difficult part of the military operation is how to taylor the application of force and violence narrowly enough to claim a moral high ground domestically. After all brutal opression works just ask the ghosts of Mao, Stalin and Ceaser. If America still had the stomach for slaughter, peace however uneasy and dependant on force and repression would already exist in Iraq.

01-18-2007, 15:02 PM	#22 (permalink)
Stan187 WAB BOUNCER *Senior Contributor* Join Date: 11-24-06 Posts: 2,323 Country:	Short and sweet, and excellent article in my opinion: Daily Estimate \| Economic tools in counterinsurgency

02-13-2007, 16:18 PM	#29 (permalink)
WECIV Regular Join Date: 11-13-06 Posts: 88 Country:	http://d-n-i.net/lind/fmfm_1a_r3.pdf fmfm1a on 4GW Rather good read. Our force structure and the last 100 yrs only allow us the capability for the Hama model though (not to mention our leadership and doctrine which is 2GW in the extreme). W

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