Thread: Democratic Peace and the Middle East

Originally Posted by Economist

In my view democracy is an alien concept for the Middle East.

It is a concept born out of the enlightnment and emancipation that followed the AMERICAN and FRENCH revolutions which led to the rise of the ideologies of the modern age.

The fundamentals lie in the WESTERN society and I doubt these ideologies can be imported into the societies of MIDDLE EAST.

They were imported other places too, the danger is in how to do it. An instable and fledgeling democracy is actually more likely to go to war than dictatorship. That's why successful "non-Western" democracies like South Korea and Taiwan improved stability and economic conditions long before trying to institute democracy. In the former USSR, this was considered the greatest mistake, the perestroika and glasnost came simultaneously.

What is happenning in Iraq right now is particularly dangerous to the concept of democracy in the Middle East. It's bad enough to have an illegitemate government that institutes discriminationary policies. In Iraq now, we have a legitimately elected government that is going after the minority but not the majority. From an Arab standpoint, if this is how a legitimate democratic government functions, then what hope is there for democracy.

What they have there, is not quite democracy yet, and we shouldn't call it such. The fact that we do, means that what that government does is contributed under the name of democracy, and I personally don't want that. If that is what Arabs will end up thinking democracies do, then they are right not to want one.

You guys understand what I'm arguing?

Originally Posted by shek

The strategic vision of the Bush Administration for the Middle East has been the spread of democracy, with the accompanying freedom serving as the antithesis to the tyranny of the terrorists.

Morning, Sir,

In general, one oft heard complaint among the fence sitters in the region--and elsewhere, not just the Arab world--is that the U.S. allows its friends to indulge in autocracy and tyranny yet reserves democracy as a punishment for its enemies.

Fixing something to wholley or partially ameliorate this perception would be a step in the right direction and might bring a hundred million more people on board for "our side".

How viable is this approach? Can you build it (democracy) and they will come (Arabs)?

IIRC the ancient Greeks who did some of the pioneering work with democracy were of the opinion that democracy had to come from within a political entity, it could not be imposed from without.

If this is truly the case, than the "build it and they will come" approach might be problematical at best.

As to the Arabs being able to "handle" democracy, I do not see why not if the literacy rate and degree of economic liberalization in a particular area are at the threshold which will support that type of political liberalization.

Too, the Ummah as originally articulated and administered was a pretty liberal entity so there is a historical and religious precedent for pluralization after a fashion amongst Muslims.

Are we conflating democracy with liberalization?

This may indeed be the case.

What Islamic reformists are out there that we are ignoring at our own peril?

Supporting those that are critical of the autocrats and tyrants would be nice but then we might run afoul of some of our allies.

Can we support them without at the same time de-legitimizing them?

I would say yes but with caveats related to the nature of the aid and how close a liason local political conditions might support.

I've attached an article as some food for thought and a potential starting point for the discussion. This thread also has some good philosophical underpinnings to why democracy can/cannot work in a build it and they will come scenario.

I think that Brumberg has defined the problem and the institutional dynamics nicely for purposes of argument.

Regards,

William

I found this from my hard disk.

This was from a Weinberg Founders Conference of the Washington Institute

Hala Mustafa, Editor of al-Dimuqratiya, Egypt: Everyone knows the complications of talking about democracy in the Middle East. Usually when we talk about the process of democratization, we mention three main paths: contested elections, as in Eastern Europe; modernized economies, as in China and East Asia; and political liberalization. By the latter I mean adopting an incremental, evolutionary approach to reform from within the system.

Which of these three paths would best work in the Arab Muslim societies of the Middle East? I would argue that the first, which emphasizes the electoral dimension of democratization, is not suitable. It worked in Eastern Europe and could work in some other parts of the world, but it does not really suit Arab countries for several reasons. Elections can be a vehicle for change if other democratic institutions and liberal values are already in place (by liberal values I mean those that give priority to freedom of expression, individual rights, protection for minorities, freedom of worship, and so on). But without these, a merely electoral approach could lead us to “illiberal democracy,” as Fareed Zakaria pointed out in his latest book, The Future of Freedom. This is the dilemma for the Arab world: we want to democratize, but we lack democratic institutions and liberal values. In their absence, we should not depend merely on the electoral dimension.

The Middle East is not Eastern Europe. In the late 1980s, when democracy swept that part of the European continent, we saw that a pro-Western culture preexisted there. Concepts of individualism were more inherent in that society, and the whole culture was more receptive to democratic change. This is not the case in Arab Muslim societies. For these reasons, we must go beyond the electoral approach in democratizing the Arab world.

It is simply unrealistic to talk about democracy in the Middle East without talking about modernizing, liberalizing, and secularizing Arab societies. These must come before electoral democratization. These processes would revitalize political life in the Middle East, and confront the “anti-individual” culture, or at least help to alleviate the political stagnation in the Arab world.

I believe there are two main factors behind this stagnation. The first is the socalled populist trends in Arab politics and culture. Pan-Arab nationalism and Islamism have been growing in the region since the 1950s, and both are deeply rooted in Arab political culture. These trends by nature contradict pluralism, democratic transformation, liberalism, individualism, and other Western values. The growth of the former trends has historically come at the expense of the liberal trends. We need to reconsider the populist trends that have done the undermining.

The second reason for political stagnation in Arab countries is the lack of value accorded to the individual. Arab culture and politics still express a kind of collectivism and anti-individualism that impede progress toward democracy. This ethic of collectivism can be seen in the heavy hand of the centralized state and in the patriarchal focus of political Islam. It can also be seen in the socialism that impedes growth and progress in the private sector.

This is the predicament of the Arab world. Without promoting liberalism and backing liberal trends, we can expect nothing to change on either the economic or the political levels. First, we need to talk about reforming the Arab media. Instead of having just one voice expressing one political point of view all the time, we need to open the door to voices expressing a diversity of political visions. Second, we need to “rationalize” politics in the Arab world. Rationalizing Arab politics means undergoing a transformation from identity politics to performance politics. In other words, political success should depend on genuine achievement, not just on ideology and rhetoric.

The third issue here is the empowerment of women. I mention it not because I am a woman, but because this issue is important if we really want to talk about reform. Women’s empowerment is not merely a social issue; it is mostly a political issue confronting patriarchal politics and culture. The issue of women has been used by Islamists and extremists as a tool in the Islamicization of Arab societies to gain political advantage. Most Arab governments sacrifice women’s rights in their battles against the Islamists.

So when we talk about empowering women, we should not limit ourselves to a gender-based approach. In discussing real reform, we need to ensure greater representation of women in Arab political life. Women should be included in the decisionmaking process, taking into consideration that Arab women have never been so included. They were deprived of this right long ago.

The last issue I want to focus on is generational representation. Younger generations are not well represented in most Arab countries, politically or institutionally, and it is time to embrace them. A new generation is not only defined by age, but also by new ways of thinking. This is exactly what we need: to look to the future and not remain focused on the past.

A goverment of the people, by the people, and for the people is the ideal, but that does not nessecerily mean democracy.

A Goverment of the people can take many forms so long as it is answereable for it actions to the people it governs. China seems to be headed down this road according to some. It will remain a one aprty system, but has allowed for upward social advancement and begun installing an indipendant judicary and increased local control.

An impose democracy is not a goverment by the people, a smuch as we might say it is for them. Democracy is failing in Iraq. Why, beucas emany of the people don't want it. They want stability, justice, and prosperity in order to lead happy secure lives. Any imposed system of goverment is inherently tyrannical unless and until it is adopted by the population it seeks to represent. Germany and Japan adopte democracy and did well with it. They were also utterly defeated and had been sufferign under years of brutal repression. So did Iraq, so why didn't this work?

Germany got bought off post war. The Marshall plan rebuilt its cities and the US and UK shouldered the burden of its defence agaisnt a clear and to the German view vile enemy. No such enemy existed in Iraq to focus the people on a forgien threat which in contrast made the occupiers look like liberators. With out a clear and imminent forgien threat the occupiers looked like occupiers no matter thier good intentions. The failur eof the US to properly re-construct Iraq also played a key role by failing to install the reasonable hope of a better future legitmate govemrents depend on.

Japan held the key to democracy in Iraq but the US ignored MaCarthur and the fundamental truth he understood. Cultural respect, in Iraq unlike Japan we did not respect the tribal and religious structure of the nation. Tribal affilation and religion are the two pillars of Iraqi society, as the emperor unifed Japan. We didn't leave the emperor on his throne becuase he was blameless, but becuase it unified Japan and prevented social disintigration.

With no external threat and no internal glue is it any wonder Iraq caught the express train to hell? What we did in Iraq was not of the people, and it is not for them either.

Other nations in the Middle east are seeking thier way to liberty as defined by thier cultures values and the modern view on the vlaue of the sexes. Some are moving faster than others, Quatar and Jordan stand out in this regard. Others already have a form of democracy however imperfect that we need to work to streangthen nations like Iran and Lebanon prove that represenative goverment can work in the Middle East.

The west needs to act to streangthen the bond between the people and a people chosen goverment even if we don't agree with it.

I will have to read the Brumberg article at a later time and I will have to tackle the rest of the questions at a later time. For now, I'll focus on whether democracy can be sustained in a build it and they will come approach. I'm a fan of promoting liberal democracy in both the political and economic sense. The number of states under a liberal democracy has grown since it's conception, though with cycles of ups and downs. I just went over a list of the 61 liberal democracies of the world as of 1990 in Francis Fukuyama's The end of History and the Last Man and I can't think of one example of the top of my head, though there may be an example, of a country being changed to a liberal democracy under military action. Therefore, it is not in my belief that trying to change a country to a liberal democracy or a "liberal autocracy" via military force is the best option on the table. I'm sure it can be done but if military force is to be used, all the factors would have to be controlled perfectly and in war, you can't control everything perfectly. I mean, look at Iraq as a prime example. I'm going to agree with the economist that democracy is a very foreign concept to those of the middle east but not all because there are countries in this region slowly progressing towards a liberal democracy. I think Iraq, having known nothing but a brutal dictatorship over the last 4 decades, is a very difficult country to try and tackle military in the quest for promotion of democracy. These people have have been supressed and everyone I've talked to (Shi'ites) all agree that they want to be free but when they have a government that is unable to provide that security for them to live in a free state, they find themselves polarizing towards the nearest source of protection, the militias. I think we will all agree that though Iraq may have a government that was voted in democratically, the fact that many of the people are going to the militia's for security undermines the credibility of the government. I like Bush's vision of promoting democracy because it seems to be one of the best things going for humanity but at the same time, I don't think it can be forced upon people. I believe democracy has to come from the will of the people and will naturally occur on it's own over time. Under Hegel's and Marx's and I can't remember if Kant used these, but "Dialects", where different forms of government have gone up against each other and the one's with the most intercontradictions have failed, I believe this process will occur eventually in the Middle East as with the rest of the world and democracy will prevail. But now the question is, how do you quicken the expansion of democracy to the rest of the world via non-military force? What are the preferred methods? Does the meadling of this process by any foreign government quicken or slow the process?

Originally Posted by TheChosenOne

But now the question is, how do you quicken the expansion of democracy to the rest of the world via non-military force? What are the preferred methods? Does the meadling of this process by any foreign government quicken or slow the process?

I'm curious how people see the election of Hamas into power in the Palestinian territories. No longer the underdog, they've had to actually be able to produce, and given the squeeze on aid to the Hamas government, they haven't enjoyed complete success.

However, how much does this delegitimize them, and maybe push the process closer towards a liberal democracy in the western sense, or will it just create a seesaw between Fatah and Hamas in the sense of a true democracy where it is purely the tryanny of the majority? Is there an opportunity to exploit this in a manner that furthers the transition, however slowly.

I've got more questions than answers

TheChosenOne,

I just went over a list of the 61 liberal democracies of the world as of 1990 in Francis Fukuyama's The end of History and the Last Man and I can't think of one example of the top of my head, though there may be an example, of a country being changed to a liberal democracy under military action. Therefore, it is not in my belief that trying to change a country to a liberal democracy or a "liberal autocracy" via military force is the best option on the table.

Germany/Austria, Italy,and Japan

Originally Posted by zraver

Germany/Austria, Italy,and Japan

Wow, I spaced on that one. That is true and under all circumstances it was definetly one of the "dialects" of the 20th century by the means of military force. But I think we are inferring from the original question to the present time where liberal democracy is literally unabted since the end of the cold war. Of course, it must be taken into account that every situation is going to be different and in today's age, would military force work really work in bringing democracy?

Originally Posted by TheChosenOne

Wow, I spaced on that one. That is true and under all circumstances it was definetly one of the "dialects" of the 20th century by the means of military force. But I think we are inferring from the original question to the present time where liberal democracy is literally unabted since the end of the cold war. Of course, it must be taken into account that every situation is going to be different and in today's age, would military force work really work in bringing democracy?

Only if those seeking to impose democracy use enough force to win the war and use enough brain cells and dollars to win he peace. All fot eh countries I listed benifitted from massive rebuilding after near total destruction.

All also had very strong unifed national identities, something Iraq lacks. I don't think a federal democracy can be imposed on tribes and religious sects who are only countrymen by reason of former colonial borders.

A question for everyone.

One of the stated goals for Iraq was to provide a beacon and example of the freedom and liberty that a liberal democracy allows. Given that even if this is still possible in the whole of Iraq, that it will be a long, hard road to achieve this to the point that it is self-sustaining. I haven't looked too closely at how democratic the Kurdish Regional Government is, but to what extent is it possible to use the KRG as a fig leaf for our "democratic peace" while abandoning the "united" democratic Iraq, allowing it to fracture along the ethnic lines.

I'd prefer to assume away the potential worst case scenarios of this realignment of borders (the bloodbath that could very well result in fighting over borders that include a share of oil for the Sunni, the mass exodus of ethic refugees, the potential for bordering states to throw their hat in the ring, etc.) for now so the conversation can at least initially focus on whether a Kurdish democracy could provide an example for the rest of the Middle East, e.g. how they have reconciled some of the Islam/democracy conflicts, will some of the Shia/Sunni refugees that have "immigrated" to Kurdistan be able to at some point down the road speak of the benefits to their families/tribes back in Shialand and Sunniland, etc.).

Once the positions on what benefits such a course of action could provide have been voiced, then it'd be great to see what costs such a partition would bring.

I'm looking forward to any thoughts on this possibility.

Germany/Austria, Italy,and Japan

These countries were all progressively developing democratic institutions from the mid-nineteenth century onward, prior to being taken over by fascists (Germany, Austria, Italy) or a junta (Japan), Most historians would agree that the actions of the dominant, victorious Allied powers (France and Britain) instigated the conditions that led to a fascist takeover in these states.

Democratic ideals were not totally alien to the population of these states, as iron-fisted fascist dictatorships/juntas were relatively brief-lived (a generation at most).

Most of the states in the Middle East were either ruled over by the Ottoman Empire or were lands sparsely populated by nomadic peoples. The Ottoman Empire's government administration was akin to a combination of the Roman Empire and Western Christendom under the Pope (Islamic, of course). So really, a form of government not seen in the West since Late Antiquity (polyglot empire) and the early medieval times (theocratic).

The concept of "nationhood" was very recently introduced to the Middle East. At one time this notion was alien to the peoples of Europe as well, who self-identified themselves by religion (Western Christendom), or highly localized entities under feudalism, or even earlier, as part of a polyglot empire (Rome).

France today is a nation-state that despite having large minorities is relatively homogeneous. Once upon a time there were Burgundians, Normans, etc., and so on, and hundreds or a thousand years ago there were marked differences between them.

It was only after hundreds of years of massive bloodshed (defenestration, boiling people alive, inquisitions, revolutions, pogroms, etc.) that the nations on the map of Europe today reached a state where there was sufficient national pride and self-identity for democratic institutions to be able to thrive.

The nations in the Middle East that are progressing toward liberal democracy are those that have the highest nationalistic sentiment... in nations where people identify by religion more than any other factor, liberal democracy may never be possible until these other sentiments are suppressed.

Iraq is divided by tribes, religion (and sects), nations (Kurds and Arabs). Until they begin identifying themselves as Iraqis first, and not Tikritis, Shiites, Kurds, Fallujans, by neighborhood, etc., only then can a truly viable Iraqi liberal democracy be formed, otherwise it will be a failed state that requires force to keep it afloat.

If you ask an American what they are, they would probably say: American, Minnesotan, Minneapolitan, white, maybe a religious identification, and vastly an American first.

States like Germany, Austria, Italy, and Japan... besides having a tradition of progressively evolving democratic institutions, were also states in which the people were nationalist (albeit too much eventually) and fairly liberal religiously, thus removing two of the biggest obstacles in forming a truly liberal democracy.

Originally Posted by Ironduke

The concept of "nationhood" was very recently introduced to the Middle East. At one time this notion was alien to the peoples of Europe as well, who self-identified themselves by religion (Western Christendom), or highly localized entities under feudalism, or even earlier, as part of a polyglot empire (Rome).

This might be nitpicky, but wasn't one of the biggest Roman achievements the distinct lack of "polyglotness"? Because as far as I understand, that was one very unifying part of Roman rule, is that they imposed their language.