Blademaster

Vision, unless you got something to say that is relevant to the topic, I will ask you to refrain yourself from posting. You are becoming a disruption to the forum and I have asked the moderator to take a look at your actions.

Please refrain from disrupting the forum any further.

visioninthedark

Interesting articles!

__________________

Please visit http://www.visiongwadar.com/platinum/index.html

Ray

Vision,

I am gald that you have become nice. It honestly pleases me. Let's contribute and appreciate. I am sure even the Colonel would be happy if you continue this change of heart.

Well done. Good for you, old boy.

__________________


"Some have learnt many Tricks of sly Evasion, Instead of Truth they use Equivocation, And eke it out with mental Reservation, Which is to good Men an Abomination."

I don't have to attend every argument I'm invited to.

HAKUNA MATATA

Ray

Colonel,

Thanks.

I have also got what I can get on the internet . I hope you got mine.

Officer of Engineers

Sir,

The last email I've received from you is dated 25 Feb 2004, stating the reason you are interested in Western military articles and publications.

I've sent you two emails, each containing an attachement.

1) Howitizers in Afghanistan - a PDF file of 1.2 Megabytes size
2) CDF Iraq War thread - zipped file of 1 Megabyte in size.

If you did not receive these correctly, then it would mean that there is a limit in document size that I can send you and thus, I will try to reduce the size and the limits of articles and documents I will try to send you through the internet.

I would appreciate your feedback on this technical matter so that I may find other solutions for our communication needs.

__________________
Chimo

Ray

Colonel.

I haven't received those.Would be intersted since ir would be High atlitude and the guns there are never accurate .

Fortunately, we have made fire table and hence things are better.

The weather is so fickle, that do what you may, it plays tricks.

Officer of Engineers

Sir,

Try these links

A Case for Howitzers in Afghanistan, By Captain Joshua D. Mitchell
First Lethal FA Fires in Afghanistan: Lessons Learned at Firebase Shkin, By Captain James A. Sink
Decentralized Fires in Afghanistan: A Glimpse of the Future?, By Lieutenant Colonel Dennis D. Tewksbury and Major Joel E. Hamby


You may also be interested in

Artillery and Counterinsurgency: The Soviet Experience in Afghanistan, by Lieutenant-Colonel Lester W. Grau (Retired), Forieign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth

Blademaster

Ray, pls check ur email regarding the articles.

Officer of Engineers

Military Review
Command & General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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September - October 2001
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2 Training and Developing Leaders in a Transforming Army
by Lieutenant General William M. Steele, US Army; and Lieutenant Colonel Robert P. Walters Jr., US Army



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

"Go Army, Beat Navy!"

"My Other Car is a Porsche"

"If You Can Read This, You Are Following Too Close"

"Airline Pilots on Strike"

"My Kid is an Honor Roll Student
at Patton Junior High"

"I Brake for Animals"

You see them everyday. People plaster their car bumpers with stickers. They hang logo flags on their porches. They walk in picket lines holding signs. They confront police barricades shouting protest slogans. And they skillfully use the 15-second sound bite on "CNN." What are they doing? The answer is simple; they are sending messages. Their messages reflect their beliefs.

In the Army, our actions also speak to our beliefs. In fact, they speak volumes. Our actions, policies and practices let our soldiers, civilians and family members know what the Army values. It does not matter if we believe in locking in our training six weeks out if our practice is to routinely change the training schedule at the last minute. Our soldiers will not believe us if we do not practice what we say. We tell cadets and officer candidates they will lead soldiers when they join the Army, and they believe us. When we move platoon leaders out of their leadership positions quickly into staff jobs, our practice sends a different message. When our practice is not consistent with soldier beliefs, what message are we sending?

We are transforming to a more strategically responsive force that is dominant at every point on the operational spectrum. The Army Vision guiding this transformation has three component parts: Readiness, Transformation and People. As we started down this Transformation path, we began by addressing doctrine, organizational structure and materiel with the Transformation Campaign Plan. In June 2000, the Chief of Staff, United States Army, (CSA) chartered the Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) to look specifically at training and leader development as part of the Army's Transformation Campaign Plan. For three months, the panel conducted exhaustive research and collected data across the Army. Over the subsequent three months, the panel assessed Army training and leader development to determine their suitability for the future. The panel's commissioned officer study was released 25 May 2001. This article continues my previous discussion, "Training and Developing Army Leaders," in the July-August issue of Military Review. Here, I will describe the panel's work on Army culture and discuss the major findings, conclusions and recommendations concerning the Officer Education System (OES), Army training, the systems approach to training (SAT) and the requirement to link training and leader development.

A 4th Infantry Division soldier returns to his family from a Persian Gulf deployment.

Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary defines culture as "the set of shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices that characterizes a company or corporation." While we are not a corporation, our organization, the United States Army, does have its own unique culture. We have a common set of values and goals described as missions, and we have practices that we accept as routine. Soldiers understand that life within the Army culture is not a utopian existence. They recognize that a commitment to duty, honor and country requires personal sacrifice that ebbs and flows with the operational pace of the unit. The pace increases in times of crisis and should decrease during routine peacetime operations. There exists an acceptable level of sacrifice that soldiers and their families accept as part of our professional culture. We will call that level the "acceptable band of tolerance." The ATLDP discovered several beliefs with contradictory practices. The more important ones follow.

Our Practices Contradict Our Beliefs

Our beliefs make Army culture unique, but they compete with negative practices. Officers surveyed by the ATLDP voiced a common theme—an excessive operational pace pervades nearly all aspects of their personal and professional lives. Their commitment and service ethic conflict with their commitment to their families. Officers perceive that the Army is not as committed to them and their families as the Army expects them to be committed in return. Trust, an essential component of an effective military organization, suffers from lack of senior to subordinate contacts and from perceptions of inequity in the Officer Evaluation Report (OER) system. The warrior ethos for lieutenants diminishes when confronted by an often too-brief experience as a platoon leader or other small-unit leader to fill staff positions left vacant by our shortage of captains. There is a frequent inability to conduct training in accordance with the Army's training doctrine due to resource constraints and the undisciplined application of our training doctrine. Junior officers find themselves performing jobs for which they are not prepared. In turn, senior leaders oversupervise and micromanage. Finally, the overall personnel management system appears to focus not on leader development in organizational assignments but rather on placing "faces in spaces."

Belief: Doctrine is sound.
Practice: We do not follow the doctrine.

The officer study found that we no longer follow or cannot follow our training management doctrine. We do too many nonmission tasks; make last-minute changes and direct too many top-down prescriptive training events. The study noted that commanders do not enforce the contractual aspects of locking in short and near-term training events. When this happens, predictability for units, soldiers and families is the victim. Scheduled training is overcome by last-minute nonmission events. When units attempt to conduct too many events in a given period, training suffers and units seldom retrain to standard on assessed deficiencies because they are racing to the next event.

Quarterly training briefings (QTBs) no longer follow their intended format. Rather than an opportunity for senior and subordinate commanders to schedule and resource future training, maintain priorities, achieve unity of effort and synchronize actions, today's QTBs have morphed into all-encompassing unit status reports. This emphasis on process (researching data, providing input and preparing briefing slides) consumes an inordinate amount of staff and commander time and detracts from the intended purpose of QTBs.

The panel recommended several policy changes for Army Regulation 350-1, Army Training, and the CSA's training guidance to increase predictability and reduce operational pace. It also recommended that the Army and units discipline the training management process by locking in training schedules as described in doctrine to increase predictability, eliminate nonmission-related compliance training, protect weekends from routine Active Component garrison training and staff activities, and commit to quality family time by scheduling four-day weekends in conjunction with national holidays. Finally, the panel recommended a Department of the Army (DA) policy that vests in one staff agency the publication of taskers to subordinate commands.

Belief: Commanders build cohesive teams.
Practice: OER stifles unit teambuilding and inhibits trust.

The OER is a source of mistrust and anxiety. It has two fundamental purposes: to provide for leader development and to manage personnel. The OER does not yet meet officer expectations as a leader development tool. The leader development aspects of the OER are seldom used, and senior raters seldom counsel subordinates. The current OER does provide selection boards what they need to sort through a high-quality officer population and select those with the greatest potential. Despite recent high promotion rates—98 percent to captain and 92 percent to major—and three years' experience with the current OER, there remains considerable anxiety over the evaluation system.

Who wants to be labeled a "center of mass" (COM) officer? The OER's forced distribution formula requires at least 51 percent of the officer corps to be COM. Field feedback indicates officers are concerned about the impact of a COM rating on career progression. Officers believe the forced distribution system causes senior raters to pool offi- cers and rate by position. They consider the term "center of mass" as negative and believe a COM OER in a branch-qualifying position is career-ending. A comment from the General Officer Army Training and Leader Development Con-ference at Fort Hood, Texas, on the term "center of mass": "Center of mass is an adequate description of the aiming point for a weapon's sight picture, but not to describe the abilities and potential of our leaders."

Belief: Leader development is essential.
Practice: Platoon leader longevity is
determined by time vice the quality of the
developmental experience.

How can a brigade commander build a cohesive team of leaders if he or she has to senior rate more than half of the unit's captains as COM? Many officers do not believe that the senior rating accurately reflects actual job performance or future potential. They see the top block as being reserved for purposes outside the stated OER construct. Perceived manipulations of the system include reserving above centers of mass (ACOMs) for company commanders at the expense of staff officers, automatic COMs on initial OERs so that subsequent reports show improvement and ACOMs on OERs issued just before selection boards meet. In short, in its current form and application, the OER counters team-building; promotes competition among unit officers; and inhibits bonding, trust, cohesion and loyalty at the battalion and brigade levels.

The panel recommended that the Army review the OER this year to examine its leader development aspects, the terms ACOM and COM, counseling and forced distribution requirements. To get a balanced look at the system, it is important to involve the field in the OER review. Brigade and battalion commanders need an effective evaluation/assessment tool that reinforces trust, cohesion, team-building and loyalty at unit level; the current OER fails this test.

Junior officers' initial experiences must be protected by ensuring adequate time in jobs with associated criteria-based, quality job experiences. To mitigate the tendency to use lieutenants to fill officer personnel gaps around post, general officer approval should be required to assign lieutenants above brigade. When lieutenants are moved out of branch jobs, we must provide the appropriate training required for their success.


Belief: OES will prepare officers for the future.
Practice: OES is focused on the last war.

Officer Education System

Many of the institutional tools that served the Army well during the Cold War are no longer adequate. Largely untouched since the collapse of the Soviet Union and progressively underresourced during Army downsizing, the OES is out of synch with Army needs today and the needs of the Objective Force tomorrow. We must adapt OES curricula to prepare for a new operating environment characterized by regional threats, full spectrum operations and information-age technology. To prepare for asymmetric threats, and noncontiguous and inear nonlinear battlefields in our present operating environment, all Army leaders must be warfighters. Officers must be competent in conducting small-unit operations and bonded to the Army before, and as a higher priority than, their branch. They must be cohesive as year groups and as officer cohorts, self-aware and adaptive, and committed to lifelong learning. Adapting the OES requires a new approach that focuses each school on a central task and purpose, links schools horizontally and vertically in the educational process, synchronizes the educational and operational experiences of officers, and educates officers to established common standards.



A soldier from the 755th Military Police Company provides security during a weapons search in the village of Crnilo, Kosovo.

At Fort Benning, Georgia, the US Army Infantry School has conducted the first two of four pilot courses of a common Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC). Phase I takes newly commissioned second lieutenants from all branches and trains them on what is expected of Army commissioned officer leaders in, what amounts to, a leadership laboratory. During the course, the lieutenants are immersed in hands-on leadership training built around small-unit leadership skills required by all officers on full spectrum battlefields. In addition to weapons qualification, physical training and confidence-building exercises, the common core focuses on the development of basic leadership skills in a field environment. Upon completion of BOLC, Phase I, the officers attend their branch basic officer course to receive the necessary branch-specific technical training. The intent of this common BOLC is to produce officers, regardless of commissioning source or branch, who are self-aware, adaptable and prepared to meet the challenges of leading our soldiers in full spectrum operations. During BOLC, Phase I, officers establish bonds to their year group cohort that transcends branch parochial biases. Although this BOLC is just one step toward transforming OES to meet the demands of the new operational environment, initial feedback indicates that the Army is on the right track.

A new Captains Career Course (CCC) should provide combined arms training to all captains. This course will focus on establishing a common Army standard for fighting, leading and training combined arms units. The CCC instructors will teach company combined arms skills, reinforce officership and prepare officers to be battalion and brigade combined arms battle captains. The end product of the new CCC will be captains ready to be combined arms company commanders or battle captains who can plan, prepare, execute and assess operations and training at the company, battalion and brigade levels.

Belief: Right officer, right education, right time.
Practice: 50 percent of our officers do not get resident schooling.

All majors need a resident intermediate-level education (ILE) based on the Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) XXI. We should eliminate selection to the Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) as a discriminator. The panel recommended eliminating the CGSOC selection board starting with Academic Year 2003-2004. The Army is planning and preparing to execute an ILE program to replace the current CGSOC. The goal is simple—provide all majors with a quality resident ILE based on OPMS XXI. This ILE will give all majors a common core of Army operational instruction of approximately three months. Career field, branch or functional area education will follow common core instruction and be tailored to prepare officers for future service in the Army. Lengths and locations will vary depending on the educational requirements of their career fields and/or functional area designations. This ILE program will end our current practice of using educational opportunities as a discriminator for branch qualification, promotion and command selection. The product the Army receives with ILE is a cohort of majors with a common knowledge of division, corps and joint operations who better understand their career fields. ILE graduates will have the technical, tactical and leadership skills required to be successful in their career fields, branches and/or functional areas.

Belief: Bottom-up approach is best.
Practice: Training is driven from the top.

Training

During the Armywide study, the field reported that although we are training hard, we are not training to doctrinal standard for a myriad of reasons. Nonmission taskings, an excessive operational pace and a shortage of training resources make it harder to execute home station training in accordance with Army training doctrine. Beyond the day-to-day consequences of missed training opportunities, there is a long-term impact on leader development when junior officers become our future battalion and brigade commanders. Many will not know or understand what right looks like and may not fully understand the principles of planning, preparing, executing and assessing training and retraining to standard. The principles and processes of current training doctrine are sound, but the Army must adapt them to the operational environment for table of organization and equipment (TOE) and table of distribution and allowances units. A rewrite of Field Manual (FM) 7-0 (25-100), Training the Force, and FM 7-10 (25-101), Battle Focused Training, is needed. Training aids, devices, simulators and simulations (TADSS) are outdated and do not adequately model Army system behaviors and characteristics. Many units reported having weapons and command and control systems with no associated TADSS.

A bright spot in training is the operational and leader development experience the combat training centers (CTCs) provide to soldiers, leaders and units. The panel found that the Army must sustain the CTCs through robust recapitalization and modernization. In the late 1990s, we deferred CTC recapitalization and modernization requirements. CTC recapitalization sustains near-term readiness requirements for worn-out instrumentation, aging opposing force (OPFOR) vehicles, lack of aviation tactical engagement systems and interim fixes at CTCs until objective systems are fielded. CTC modernization provides for future requirements for TADSS, OPFOR and objective instrumentation—moving CTCs to commonality, digitization and an operational environment that enables Army Transformation. In 2000, the Army forecast funding for only 6 percent of the CTC recapitalization and modernization requirement. Today, we are forecasting funding through Fiscal Year (FY) 2007 at 70 percent of the CTC recapitalization and modernization requirement—more than $780 million. The intent is to sustain these training centers as the crown jewels of the Army training program.

With the Army keeping the bar high at the CTCs, home station resourcing must improve to get the most out of the coveted CTC training and leader development experience. One example would be a portable CTC-like instrumentation package that commanders could use to train soldiers at home station. We are moving in that direction with Portable Range Instrumentation Systems to aid with training assessments and fixed tactical Internets to provide communications support that will drive the Army Battle Command System and its associated components. These automated systems will assist commanders conducting combined arms training locally by reducing support requirements.

Belief: Train to standard.
Practice: Standards do not exist.

Systems Approach to Training

The panel found that the SAT process is fundamentally sound but not executed well. Due to a lack of training development resources, the Army does not have up-to-date training and educational products, the foundation for standards-based training and leader development. How can soldiers train to standard if the Army standard is outdated or has not been defined?

Standards are the basis for developing training, assessing performance and providing feedback. Without common standards, soldier, leader and unit readiness—and battlefield success—are in doubt. These common standards must be documented, accessible and digital. We need to reinforce the importance of standards-based training and enforce the SAT process. In the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), we should redesign the SAT development and support structure to leverage the subject matter expertise in the CTCs for training and doctrine development. The intent is not to put additional requirements on the observer/controllers and operations groups but to reallocate some training developers and doctrine writers and place them under operational control of the CTC operations group to capture training lessons learned and produce timely training products. Additionally, we need to invest in and exploit network technology to develop a more streamlined and effective SAT process where training and doctrine publications are web-based and updated. Up-to-date training and educational products are the foundation for standards-based training and leader development. Currently, we only have on hand 10 percent of the mission training plans (MTPs) required to support unit training. Of this 10 percent, most are obsolete.

Soldier training publications (STPs) are similarly obsolete or outdated. There are 273 of these publications addressing military oc-cupational specialties at the -10, -20, -30 and -40 skill levels. Seventy STPs are less than five years old, 155 STPs are five to 10 years old, 40 STPs are 10 to 15 years old, and 10 STPs are more than 15 years old. These publications are not specifically designed to support Army of Excellence, Limited Conversion Division, Force XXI or Initial Brigade Combat Team forces and generally do not reflect digital skill requirements and training.

Reenergizing SAT will directly support the Army requirement for all battalions to receive an external evaluation (EXEVAL) annually. The goal is to start EXEVALs in FY 01 and to execute them for every TOE battalion annually thereafter. To meet this requirement, TRADOC reviewed the status of MTPs, the documents that provide the battalion-specific training standards. As of April 2001, there were 361 MTPs identified for review or revision; 86 are complete and the remainder are under revision. TRADOC's priority for MTP development is to immediately revise or develop, as appropriate, all divisional battalion and supporting/support unit MTPs this FY, then publish MTPs for nondivisional battalions by FY 02. This is a challenging plan, but rejuvenating the SAT process is clearly worth the time and effort.

Belief: Training and leader development are inextricably linked.
Practice: They are under separate DA staff proponencies.

Training and Leader Development

In the Army, we train soldiers, and we grow leaders. To excel at these two fundamentally necessary processes, we must look at them as one. Currently, the Army has a disjointed approach to training and leader development. The panel's work provides compelling evidence that a main effort in Army Transformation should be to link training and leader development. Linking these two imperatives commits the Army to training soldiers and growing them into leaders.

The panel recommended that the Army establish a single proponent for training and leader development to improve the link between training and leader development, policy and resourcing. Currently, the proponency for training and leader development is vested in separate staff elements at DA level. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans is responsible for matters relating to training, and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel is responsible for matters relating to leader development. The lack of a single proponent for training and leader development results in unsynchronized policy and resourcing of these two key imperatives. There is no funding line for leader development in the Program Objective Memorandum, and leader development currently tends to compete poorly for funding against training priorities. If training and leader development are to be fully linked, the responsibility for both should rest with a single proponent on the DA staff.

We need a training and leader development model that clearly communicates the Army leadership's intent and is understandable for junior leaders, staffs and outside agencies. The proposed model is a balanced, integrated, progressive training and leader development model that assures full spectrum capability. The model shows the components of a combined Army training and leader development program, the process and the products that link training and leader development into a single entity. The components of the model are linked and intrarelated. Army culture, our beliefs and practices, is the foundation block on which this model builds. At its core are values, service ethic, warrior ethos and commitment to lifelong learning. Standards build on the culture foundation and illustrate the importance of setting a bar that our soldiers, leaders and units must achieve. Standards provide the mechanism for the next portion of the model, feedback. It is required for commanders to assess training and retrain and develop to standard. Feedback is required for our leaders, units and the Army as an institution. The top portion of the model represents the balance between operational and educational experiences needed to train soldiers and grow our own leaders. The model requires action by our soldiers, leaders and units to self-develop, educate and train. The result is leaders who are self-aware and adaptable. It also emphasizes the enduring principles of both training and leader development.

Our Army must be a learning organization. Our leaders must commit to lifelong learning through a balance of educational and operational experiences, complemented by self-development, to fill knowledge gaps educational and operational experiences do not provide. To be a learning organization that supports this lifelong learning, the panel recommends that the Army provide the training and educational standards and products that are the foundation for standards-based training and leader development. Needed are the doctrine, tools and support to foster lifelong learning. We must develop, fund and maintain an Armywide Warrior Development Center using information technology where soldiers, leaders and units go to find standards, training and education publications, doctrinal manuals, assessment and feedback tools and access distance and distributed learning programs for self-development.

We have to teach the importance of lifelong learning and the enduring competencies of self-awareness and adaptability throughout OES and strengthen this approach through organizations and self-development. In this context, self-awareness is the ability to assess abilities, determine strengths and weaknesses in an operational environment, and learn how to sustain strengths and correct weaknesses. Adaptability is the ability to recognize changes to the environment, determine what is new and what must be learned to be effective, and includes the learning process that follows that determination—all performed to standard and with feedback. The competencies of self-awareness and adaptability are all about lifelong learning. Their mastery leads to success in using many of the other skills required in full spectrum operations.

With this article and its predecessor, I have described the ATLDP and its conclusions from the commissioned officer study. The results from the panel's work confirm that leaders and soldiers must be at the center of our Army's Transformation process. For this to happen, we must take charge of our Army culture—set our own path vice yielding to external pressures. Additionally, we need to commit to training and growing our leaders by allocating the necessary resources to the OES, Army training and SAT. This commitment, along with inextricably linking training and leader development and arming our leadership with a management process to track and assess progress, will better align our beliefs and practices.

To move ahead with our Transformation process, we must be willing to challenge everything from doctrine; to OERs; to OPMS XXI; to unit status reporting; to the way the Army designs forces, assigns operational missions and allocates resources. We must send the right message by balancing our practices with our beliefs. The ATLDP Commissioned Officer Study was just one component of our Army's transformation. The panel's findings, conclusions and 84 recommendations provided the CSA with credible information to improve our training and leader development programs and to balance our beliefs with our practices. Acting on these recommendations, along with the other ongoing Transformation efforts, will require extensive work. The good news is that our Army leaders are equal to the task. MR



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Lieutenant General William M. Steele is the study director for the Army Training and Leader Development Panel. He is the Commanding General, US Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. His career includes six tours (more than 12 years) in the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), during which he addressed training and leader development issues. He has commanded at every level from company through division and Army major command. His command and staff positions include commanding general, US Army Pacific, Fort Shafter, Hawaii; director for operations, J3, US Atlantic Command, Norfolk, Virginia; commanding general, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; deputy commandant, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth; assistant division commander, 8th Infantry Division (Mechanized), US Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany; assistant commandant, US Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia; executive officer to the commanding general, TRADOC, Fort Monroe, Virginia; commander, 1st Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg; and commander, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 504th Infantry, 82d Airborne Division. His article "Training and Developing Army Leaders" was published in the July-August 2001 Military Review .

Lieutenant Colonel Robert P. Walters Jr. is aide-de-camp for the Commanding General, Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth. He received a B.A. from the University of Maryland, an M.P.A. from Golden Gate University and an M.A. from Webster University. He is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College. He has served in various command and staff positions in the United States, Korea, Persian Gulf, Haiti and Bosnia.


Photos:
US Army

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Contact the Military Review Updated: 31 Jul 2002

Officer of Engineers

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January - February 2002
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22 Ground Combat at High Altitude
by Lieutenant Colonel Lester W. Grau, U.S. Army, Retired, and
Lieutenant Colonel Hernán Vázquez, Argentine Army



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

A general who allows himself to be decisively defeated in an extended mountain position deserves to be court-martialed.

—Carl von Clausewitz1

High mountain terrain is often inacces-sible, uninhabitable or of no apparent value, yet peoples and states still fight to possess it. Long, bloody wars have been fought, and are being fought, for mountain real estate located between 10,000 and 23,000 feet [3050 and 7015 meters]. Over the past fifty years, high-altitude combat has raged in Africa, Asia, and South America. The Chinese invaded Tibet in 1953 and fought a subsequent guerrilla war there until 1974. From 1953 to 1958, British troops fought Mau-Mau separatists in the Aberdares Mountains of Kenya. In 1962, China and India battled in the Himalayan Mountains bordering Bhutan and Tibet. Soviets fought Afghan Mujahideen in the towering Hindu Kush Mountains from 1979 to 1989. The Peruvian government hunted the Sendero Luminoso guerrillas in the Andes Mountains throughout the 1980s. India and Pakistan have continually battled for possession of the Siachen Glacier since April 1984 and fight sporadically over disputed Kashmir as they have since 1948. Today, Colombia's government troops are fighting the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and the National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrillas high in the Andes, and Russian soldiers are fighting Chechen separatists high in the Caucasus Mountains.

The U.S. Army has no experience fighting in truly high mountains and its mountain warfare manuals deal primarily with low and medium mountains and stress the use of helicopter aviation to conduct that combat. However, helicopters cannot haul normal loads over 13,000 feet [3965 meters] since their rotors lack thick enough air to "bite" into, and high altitude weather conditions will frequently shut down flying for days. High-altitude combat differs from medium- and low-mountain altitude combat and requires a different orientation and force structure. Other armies have experience in truly high mountains and can provide valuable guidance and expertise. The U.S. Army needs to know how to conduct high-altitude mountain warfare, develop the tactics, techniques, and procedures to do so, and share the experience of other armies to understand and prepare for possible high-altitude conflicts.

The Environment

Mountains are generally classified as low (600 to 1500 meters), medium (from 1500 to 3500 meters) and high-altitude mountains (above 3600 meters). The world's highest mountains are not in the United States, Europe, or Korea—where the U.S. Army is accustomed to working. The Himalayan Mountain chains of Asia stretches 1,500 miles and contains 9 of the world's 10 highest peaks. The Hindu Kush/Karakoram mountain chain of Asia stretches well over 500 miles with its highest peak at 28,250 feet [8,616 meters]. The South American Andes stretches over 5,000 miles and rise above 22,000 feet [6,710 meters] at many points. The Caucasus Mountains, which divide Europe and Asia, run some 700 miles with many peaks over 15,000 feet [4572 meters]. The Himalayan Mount Everest towers at 29,028 feet [8,853.5 meters] whereas the highest point in the United States, Mount McKinley in Alaska, is 20,320 feet [6,197.6 meters]. The highest point in the Colorado Rockies is Mount Elbert at 14,433 feet [4,402.1 meters]. The highest point in the European Alps is Mont Blanc at 15,771 feet [4,810.2 meters].2

Although high mountains occupy a good portion of the earth's surface, man is not naturally designed to live and work at these high altitudes. When a person travels to an altitude of 8,000 to10,000 feet [2440 to 3050 meters] or higher, the atmospheric changes in pressure and available oxygen cause physiological changes, which attempt to ensure that the body gets enough oxygen.3 These physiological changes are pronounced among mountain people who have lived in cold, high altitudes for generations. Compared to lowlanders, their bodies are short, squat, stocky, and barrel-chested, and their hands and feet are stubby. Their hearts are bigger and slower beating and their capillaries are wider. Their bodies contain 20 percent more red blood cells than lowlanders' do and these red blood cells are larger. The alveoli in their lungs are more open for oxygen absorption. Many develop a fatty epithelial pouch around the eyes to counteract cataract and snow blindness.4 Populations at high altitude often use narcotics, such as coca or hashish, to help manage the pain and stress of high altitude.

High altitudes are characterized by extreme cold, strong winds, thin air, intense solar and ultraviolet radiation, deep snow, raging thunderstorms and blizzards, and heavy fog and rapidly changing weather, including severe storms which can cut off outside contact for a week or longer. Avalanches and rockslides are not uncommon. Although jungle or forest may hug the mountain base, trees do not grow past 10,000 to 11,500 feet [3,000 to 3,500 meters], depending on the latitude.

Physical conditions at high altitude are often more dangerous than enemy fire. Superficial bullet and shrapnel wounds can quickly turn fatal at altitude. Movement in the high mountains often results in broken bones, severe lacerations, contusions, and internal injuries caused by falls and falling rock. Frostbite and hypothermia are a constant danger. Acute mountain sickness, high altitude pulmonary edema, and cerebral edema are frequently fatal consequences of working at high altitude. Mental and physical abilities decrease at high altitude and high altitude also induces personality disorders. Sudden weight loss is often a problem. The rarefied atmosphere permits increased ultraviolet ray exposure, which creates problems with sunburn and snow blindness. High altitude shelter heating is often by unvented kerosene stoves, which means that personnel breathe air, which is thick with soot.5

Equipment will not function, or functions marginally, at high altitudes. On the average, vehicles lose 20 to 25 percent of their rated carrying capability and use up to 75 percent more fuel.6 Military generators and vehicles are often diesel-powered, but standard diesel engines lose efficiency at 10,000 feet [3050 meters] and eventually stop functioning altogether because of insufficient oxygen. Artillery firing tables are wildly inaccurate as the changed environment allows rounds to fly much farther. Lubricants freeze; altitude and weather limit helicopters; and additional animal or gasoline-fueled overland transport adds to the physical demands and logistic requirements of this environment.

Getting There is Half the Fun

At high altitude, personnel have difficulty breathing because of decreased atmospheric pressure and subsequent rarified oxygen. Soldiers selected for high-altitude duty should be screened for their ability to function in this environment. Soldiers should be in excellent physical condition and have sound hearts and lungs. Short, wiry soldiers are preferred to tall, muscular soldiers. Selected soldiers should have above-average intelligence to allow them to more-readily adapt to the trying terrain. Personnel who have had radial keratotomy corrective eye surgery should not go to high altitudes because their vision may permanently cloud.


Pakistani soldiers train in rappelling techniques at the Mountain School.

All personnel should undergo an acclimatization program to accustom them to their new environment and to improve their respiratory and cardiovascular systems. A physically fit soldier can adapt to the cold in about 3 weeks.7 The body normally adapts to a higher altitude in about 2 week's time. During the acclimatization phase, the body accumulates additional red blood cells which help transport needed oxygen.8 The Pakistani army acclimates their personnel over 7 weeks. They begin with a 3-week stay at 10,000 feet [3050 meters] where personnel acclimate to the cold while they undergo daily physical conditioning and learn mountaineering, rock climbing, rappelling, and mountain survival. During the final 4 weeks, soldiers learn advanced mountaineering techniques, trek to 14,000 feet [4270 meters] and return; trek to 17,000 feet [5185 meters] and return; and finally trek to 19,135 feet [5836 meters].9

Despite all training and efforts, acclimatization is not possible at heights over 18,000 feet [5418 meters], so exposure at these heights must be limited and closely supervised. Personnel at high altitudes need to be rotated out every 10 to 14 days. The Indian army acclimates its personnel over a 14-day schedule with increases in altitude at 6 days, 4 days and then another 4 days. The Indian army characteristically conducts its acclimatization by having the battalion hike from its road head to the staging area. All experienced armies agree that high-altitude acclimatization cannot be achieved in less than 10 days. An acclimated soldier is still not an experienced mountaineer. Experience counts and is not gained in 2 months of training. Some armies, such as Italy's, believe that 10 years is not too long to produce a truly capable, experienced mountain warrior.




Nothing is fast in high-altitude combat. Logistics support is key and the location of logistics dumps determines operational axes. The distance between the road head—the furthest point that supplies can be moved by truck—and the forward posts determines how many troops can actually man the forward posts. Forward posts can be a 3 to 14 day foot march from the road head. The farther the forward post is from the road head, the greater the number of troops necessary to support it. Base camps are usually built around road heads. Supplies and men travel forward from the base camps through intermittent staging posts to the forward posts. Helicopters, porters, or mules are used to move supplies from the road head. Despite attempted technology fixes, the mule is the most efficient way of moving material in the high mountains. Mules require care, attention, and training. Armies with experience in high mountains maintain trained mules and muleteers. Even mules cannot reach the higher elevations, and porters must haul the supplies forward.

Movement is calculated in time rather than distance at high altitude. Figure 1 shows average movement rates of trained, acclimated personnel and pack animals in the mountains.

The terrain slope as well as physical conditioning and altitude acclimatization of the troops determines the distance that can be covered. Figure 2 gives a rough average for determining distances over time using conditioned, acclimated troops.

Moving in the high mountains can be perilous. Weather can rapidly change and columns can become lost in blizzards or fog. Trail markers can quickly disappear under falling snow. Snow bridges can collapse and swallow climbers into deep crevasses. Entire patrols have disappeared without a trace while moving to the Siachen Glacier.



Line-of-sight communications is excellent in the mountains but difficult to achieve because of high peaks. Therefore, communications sites are carefully selected and often become key terrain. Very-high frequency radios with automatic frequency hopping, encryption, and burst transmission capabilities work best. Normal batteries quickly lose power in the cold, so lithium batteries should be the normal issue.10 Frequently, mountain tops become part of the national communications infrastructure because they are crowded with military, national, and commercial radio and television sites and telephone relay towers. These vital areas need to be protected, and military platoons often garrison such communications sites against guerrilla attacks.

Combat at Altitude

There are two primary scenarios for combat at altitude. First, two states dispute the boundary between their countries and maintain forces supporting a rough line of demarcation along the disputed zone (Kashmir and Siachen Glacier between India and Pakistan, and the Kameng Frontier Division between India and China). In this scenario, opposing forces hold linear defenses along the line of demarcation, regardless of altitude, and conduct a fairly positional fight.

Second, a light infantry force of guerrillas, smugglers, bandits, or forces from a neighboring state transverses the mountainous region to establish base camps in the mountains from which they patrol, launch raids, or maintain smuggling routes. This has been the pattern for a number of high-altitude disputes such as the Mau Mau uprising, Soviet-Afghan war, Sendero Luminoso in Peru, Russo-Chechen wars, and Colombian efforts against the FARC and ELN. In this scenario, the fighting does not automatically gravitate to a border zone, but usually stays below the tree line.

At altitude, the first enemy is the environment. The second enemy is the human foe. At altitude, high ground is not always key terrain. Frequently, key terrain is related to mobility—passes, main supply routes, road heads, and intermittent staging posts. Light infantry and artillery are the primary combat forces.

Offensive actions in the mountains include infiltration, ambush, raids, patrolling, shelling attacks, limited air assault, and limited offensives. Pursuit is seldom possible. Envelopment is the most common maneuver and the frontal attack is the least desired option. Defensive actions include counter-infiltration, ambush, patrolling, and positional defense. Relief in place is routine small-unit action.

Offensive actions should focus on interdicting logistics by blocking passes, denying use of supply and transit routes, capturing base camps and intermittent staging posts, and destroying transport.11 Force oriented offensive actions, such as interdicting patrols or raiding artillery positions, make great headlines and can boost morale, but they seldom have the long-term effect as actions against logistics. Offensive actions are small-unit actions, since only small units can be supported at altitude and frequently the terrain is so restricted that too many soldiers would hamper the effort. Movement is by small groups moving at a walk to avoid sweating because sweat freezes quickly leading to frostbite. Objectives are close at hand so the attackers will not be exhausted before they arrive and will not be caught in the open by rapidly changing weather. Assembly areas may be nonexistent and the attackers will have to move directly from forward positions. The attack may have to go in waves if suppressive fire is inadequate or the enemy is conducting a reverse-slope defense. The offensive plan must be clear, as most mountain maps are problematic. Maneuver is dictated by terrain and the reserve is committed early since movement is slow and mutual support is very difficult to achieve. Maneuver is slow and limited in distance. A maneuver force can range from one or two men to a full battalion if weather and the enemy situation permits.

Defending at altitude is difficult because of limited troops and material. When defending along a border, a battalion holds an extended frontage (7,000 to 8,000 yards) while a company holds 1,500 yards, so there is little depth, or large gaps, in the defense.12 Further, the complete battalion is seldom on line simultaneously. Often, a platoon holds a company position since the rest of the company is being held in reserve at lower elevations where the deterioration of the body is not as rapid. The platoon is rotated every 10 to 14 days. The entire company must still be rotated to lower elevations to recoup every 3 to 4 months. This means that the long, linear defense is actually a string of strong points built around a machine gun. Reverse slope defense, with forward slope observation posts is preferred, since the defensive positions often lack overhead cover and are susceptible to artillery airburst.
Argentinean mountain troops carefully cross the Castano Overo Glacier on Mount Tronador (11,800 feet). They are roped together, moving cautiously in single file, in case one of them falls into a snow-covered crevasse. At such altitudes, artillery remains the around-the-clock fire support system because of aircraft limitations.


A great deal of daily effort is required to keep snow from completely filling the defensive positions and hiding the trails. Permanent shelter, such as portable fiberglass huts, are essential at the defensive positions.13 Fortifying defensive positions is difficult since this usually requires the delivery of heavy materials such as cement, sand, water, and roofing timbers. Sensors are a welcome addition to the defense in those areas where they will not be rapidly covered by snow. Defensive positions should be designed and stocked to hold out independently for days since relief in the mountains is problematic due to weather. Conversely, when the enemy is a guerrilla force, the defensive position is a perimeter defense from which patrols, ambushes, and raids are launched.

Mountain patrolling is a common feature of the offense and defense. Small patrols are at risk, so platoon-sized patrols are common. Single patrols are useless, so multiple patrols are normal. Local guides or scouts are an essential part of each patrol. Detailed planning is an essential part of the patrol plan and includes a reaction force or reserve. The meeting battle is normal combat at altitude resulting from probing actions by opposing patrols.

Raids are a common offensive and defensive tactic. They are designed to seize a point, exploit success, and then withdraw. Raids are a temporary measure to capture personnel and equipment, destroy installations, bait traps to draw enemy reaction, and attack morale. Since there is no intention of holding the objective for a length of time, the logistics burden is less onerous than a deliberate attack. Successful mountain raids normally incorporate an assault force, a fire support group, and a security element.14

Fire Support at Altitude

Mountains restrict effective bombing and strafing by jet aircraft. It is difficult for them to pick out targets that are camouflaged or concealed by natural cover. Weather, deep shadows, and the environment also restrict pilots' vision. There are few approach routes and most of those are along valleys, which are covered by air defense and infantry forces using massed fire. Climate and terrain restrict jet aircraft from diving freely or flying low enough to engage targets effectively. Still, camouflage discipline, controlled movement, and layered air defense are essential to prevent savaging by high-performance aircraft.15 Helicopter gunships are more of a danger to ground forces, but eventually altitude limits their effectiveness. Lightweight helicopters can serve effectively as artillery spotters. All aviation is subject to the vagaries of weather at high elevation, which is powerful, constantly changing, and often shuts down flying. Dense fog, high winds, and blizzards are common and whiteouts are a constant threat to pilots.

Artillery remains the round-the-clock fire support system. However, artillery is often constrained during high-altitude combat. Sharp bends, high gradients, and the general condition of mountain roads restrict the movement of artillery, towed guns in particular. There are a limited number of gun positions, so artillery batteries are seldom deployed intact. One- and two-gun or rocket launcher positions are common. Consequently, the number of alternate firing positions is also restricted and these positions tend to become permanent. Guns should be moved at night for protection against enemy aircraft and artillery. However, night movement of guns in mountainous terrain is risky and accident-prone. Artillery positions should be constructed so that gun crews can defend them against ground attack. Firing positions should be on reverse slopes and as close to the crest as possible—considering crest clearance and flash-cover. Individual guns should be sited in terrain folds and other places where they are naturally concealed.16 Artillery plays a major role in logistics interdiction, counterbattery and shelling front-line units. Artillery can create havoc with a forward defense by targeting living accommodations and using airbursts against troops in the open.17 Mortars are frequently more effective than guns or howitzers. They are easier to shift around, can better engage reverse slopes and can be moved closer to the forward posts.

Transport frequently determines the location of artillery and mortars and the supporting range of artillery. Artillery cannot be readily moved where there are not roads. Artillery firing points are usually located where ammunition can be delivered—in valleys, villages, and near road heads.

Logistics Support

High-altitude logistics are key since the terrain and unique environment hamper delivery to the forward troops. Logistics always drives the battle, but in high-altitude combat, this is especially so. Without good highways or railroads, dump sites cannot be readily moved, it takes an inordinate amount of time to shift troops from one sector to another, and logistics demands are considerably higher than in other types of light infantry combat. Trucks, helicopters, mechanical mules, and snowmobiles are key to mountain logistics, but above 13,000 feet, the logistics effort shifts to the backs of mules and porters. Naturally, this is the point where the logistics delivery system snarls since porters and mules have distinct limitations and there are never enough of them.

Trucks are important to logistics support and gasoline-powered trucks are clearly preferred over diesel. As the truck ascends the mountain, the amount of oxygen available is reduced and the engine efficiency drops off. Cross-country and climbing capability decline as fuel usage soars. Diesel engines may need to be fitted with turbochargers and gasoline engines may need their carburetors adjusted. Figure 3 shows the average increase in fuel consumption at altitude.




Helicopter-based logistics are the preferred mode in mountain warfare, but the mountains are not the optimum helicopter environment. Air density decreases with altitude and mountain winds and updrafts are unpredictable and dangerous. Proper landing zones are difficult to find and, if close to the enemy, probably under enemy mortar and small-arms coverage. Helicopters must follow the terrain features of the mountains adding predictability to their approaches and increasing the risk to the crew. Fog, sudden storms, icing, and variable winds can quickly shut down helicopter support. Mountain terrain interferes with air-to-ground communications and with air-to-air communications. Planning for helicopter support in the mountains requires detailed planning, first-rate liaison, and a habitual association between the helicopter and ground unit encompassing training and social events. Flying in the mountains is so different that the armies of India, Pakistan, Columbia, Argentina, and Switzerland have special mountain flight courses for their helicopter crews.

A Step Back in Time

High mountains are countertechnology. Mules are a good option for high-altitude logistics. They can use very narrow trails, can carry more than a human porter, and tire less over long distance. American mules can carry up to 20 percent of their body weight (150-300 pounds) for 15 to 20 miles per day in mountains.18 Smaller mules in other locales will carry less. The maximum carrying weight for an Argentine mule is between 200 and 250 pounds. However, this is for low- and medium-altitude mountains. At high altitude, the maximum carrying weight drops below 200 pounds. Organized mule cargo units, rather than ad hoc teams led by local teamsters, are the preferred option, but local mules are always preferred over deployed mules.
U.S. Army mules support the 5th Army advance in Italy during World War II while a cargo truck lies helplessly on its back.

Mules were part of the U.S. Army during World War II in Burma and Italy and were a critical element of the Mujahideen supply effort in the Soviet-Afghan war. They remain part of the force structure of many contemporary forces with high-altitude mountain troops. Other armies contract mule transport through local teamsters. Yet mules have their limitations. If the snow is too deep, they simply refuse to move.

American mules require 10 pounds of grain and 14 pounds of hay per day, which also becomes part of the logistics load.19 The smaller mules of Argentina require eight pounds of grain and eight pounds of hay per day. Mules consume 25 to 30 liters of water a day and up to 50 liters in desert country. They also require a daily ounce of salt. Like humans, mules require time to acclimate to altitude. Muleteers and mules require about a month's training to get them ready to work above 3,000 meters. Like humans, mules tire easily above 4,000 meters and need to be rested frequently. Mules also have to be trained not to fear the noise of firearms and explosives so that they do not run off during a march.20

Mules are subject to colic, heat exhaustion, injuries, and wounds. Most injuries and wounds result from poorly adjusted saddles, pack frames and harnesses. Stones, rocks, and debris on the trail can also wound a mule's hoof. Local mules are more immune to disease at altitude than humans and all mules have a keen sense of self-preservation that keeps them alive in mountain storms.21 Mules require a great deal of daily care and training. Muleteers, farriers, blacksmiths, and large animal veterinarians, who have been absent from many armies for decades, are essential for mule-borne logistics. Mules need new shoes every 30 days and there are special mule shoes for snow and ice. Figure 4 shows the supply and transport estimate for a 171-man light infantry company planning a mountain march, attack and defense lasting for a total of 6 days. Since much of the material will be kept in dumps and moved in stages, the commander has managed to keep his transport requirements in hand.



Porters should be hired from the local populace since they are acclimated to the elevation and are accustomed to moving around the mountains safely. Locals used to carrying loads have developed endurance and are accustomed to breathing thin air. Although a porter cannot carry as much as a mule, they can move in places where mules cannot. However, porters will probably be reluctant to work too far away from their homes and villages. There is always a security consideration when using local porters. Figure 5 shows porter-carrying capabilities.

During the Peru-Ecuador border conflict for the Condor Cordillera in 1994, the Peruvian army relied on porters exclusively for resupply. Although the fight was in medium-altitude mountains, not over 2500 meters, the forward logistics support was restricted to porters because the steep mountains were covered with thick jungle, had few trails, and the Peruvian army lacked trained mules and muleteers. The Peruvian army moved its supplies from one small village to the next, using local villagers as porters to carry the supplies eventually to the fighting up on the Condor Cordillera.

Front-line combatants need daily supplies of ammunition, food, water, and heat for survival. Figure 6 shows daily consumption rates of water and wood fuel.


In the mountains, a battalion task force tries to carry and stockpile enough supplies to operate for 1 to 2 weeks. This requires expending time and energy to establish supply dumps along the main supply route. Naturally, the shorter the supply route, the easier it is to protect. If roads, tracks, and trails are under enemy control, the unit might be restricted to helicopter supply and its inherent problems in the mountains. Logistics support at higher altitudes during winter may become impossible causing opposing forces to withdraw.

Medical evacuation at altitude is frequently difficult. Weather or weight limitations may prevent a helicopter from flying to a patient. Often, patients must be carried on stretchers to lower elevations where the helicopters can reach. Soviet experience in the mountains of Afghanistan proved that 13 to 15 men might be involved in carrying one patient. Exertion at altitude is difficult and the stretcher party has to provide its own security as well.22 Patients cannot be effectively treated at altitude, but have to be evacuated to lower altitudes to survive.23

The Eternal Mountains

Mountain terrain is difficult, movement is slow and the hazards to health and physical well being are significant and constant. Combat at high altitude is a historical constant and a contemporary fact. It cannot always be avoided. Training for mountain combat is not simply light infantry training. Special training and acclimatization is necessary.

Leadership is particularly important in mountain combat. The harsh living conditions, physical deterioration, and psychological depression inherent in mountain combat require skilled leaders. Armies with regimental systems and years-long association find it easier to cope with the leadership challenges of mountain combat. Combat is primarily small unit, placing a great deal of responsibility on platoon and squad leaders.

Fire support is difficult. Artillery firing tables are inaccurate and artillery is hard to move on mountain roads. Transporting guns by helicopter is recommended where possible. Moving guns and ammunition takes an unusual amount of time. Helicopter gunships provide excellent support at lower altitudes. Mortars are excellent for hitting reverse slope positions, but have limited range.

Logistics are a primary concern in mountain combat with transport to altitude requiring special effort. Sustained combat requires an inordinate logistics effort. Small-unit actions, where units do not remain for extended periods of time, do not impose the same logistics burden.

Although the U.S. Army has not fought at truly high altitude, this may not always be the case. High mountains occupy much of the world's surface and they are not immune to the world's conflicts. Other nations have successfully fought at altitudes above 10,000 feet. Should the U.S. Army find itself committed at these altitudes, the experiences of other nations are invaluable. Preparation for such an eventuality should begin well before crisis dictates deployment. MR



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1.Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 432. The authors thank mountain warriors Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) German Giraldo, Army of Colombia; LTC Foto Duro, Albanian Army; Major (MAJ) Alejandro Valero, Army of Argentina, MAJ Akbar Khan, Army of Pakistan; and LTC Tejbir Singh, Army of India, for their input, suggestions, critique, and guidance. The authors retain responsibility for the accuracy and ideas in the article.

2.The Houghton-Mifflin Dictionary of Geography: Places and Peoples of the World (Boston, MA: Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1997), 48, 164, 165, and 450.

3.Tim J. Setnicka, Wilderness Search and Rescue (Boston, MA: Appalachian Mountain Club, 1980), 620.

4.Syed Ishfaq Ali, Fangs of Ice: The Story of Siachen (Rawalpindi, Pakistan: American Commercial PVT Ltd., 1991), 15-16 and 110-11.

5.Lester W. Grau and William A. Jorgensen, "Medical Implications of High-Altitude Combat," U.S. Army Medical Department Journal, to be published April 2002.

6.Aleksey Svetlanov, "Osobennosti razvedki v gorakh" (Peculiarities of Mountain Reconnaissance), Voyennye znaniya (Military Banneri) (June 2000), 13.

7.Salman Beg Punjab, "Operations in Glaciated Areas," Pakistan Army Journal (Spring 1994), 5.

8.Setnicka, 623.

9.Ali, 16-17; Punjab, 5-6.

10.Punjab, 7.

11.Ibid., 8-9.

12.Iftikhar ur Rahman, "Defensive Battle in Mountains," Pakistan Army Journal (September 1984), 31.

13.Punjab, 4.

14.Ali Ahmad Jalali and Lester W. Grau, The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War (Quantico, VA: U.S. Marine Corps Study: DM: 980701, 1998), 69-103 and 211-25.

15.Sikandar Hameed, "Local Defence of Gun Area in Mountainous Terrain," Pakistan Army Journal (March 1983), 35-41.

16.Ibid.

17.Punjab, 10.

18.U.S. Army Field Manual 31-27, Pack Animals in Support of Army Special Operations Forces (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 2000), 1-2.

19.Ibid., 2-14.

20.Reglamento Funcional Público (Public Functional Regulation) 24-02, Reglamento Ganado de Servicio (Service Livestock Regulation) (Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1994), 36.

21.Ibid, Annex 18.

22. 22.Boris Gromov, Ogranichennyy kontingent (Limited Contingent) (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1994), 186.

23.Grau and Jorgensen.



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Lieutenant Colonel Lester W. Grau, U.S. Army, Retired, is a military analyst in the Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He received a B.A. from the University of Texas at El Paso and an M.A. from Kent State University. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), the U.S. Army Russian Institute, the Defense Language Institute and the U.S. Air Force War College. He held a variety of command and staff positions in the contin