Thread: Articles and links for the Military Professional

Interesting articles!

Vision,

I am gald that you have become nice. It honestly pleases me. Let's contribute and appreciate. I am sure even the Colonel would be happy if you continue this change of heart.

Well done. Good for you, old boy.

Colonel,

Thanks.

I have also got what I can get on the internet . I hope you got mine.

Sir,

The last email I've received from you is dated 25 Feb 2004, stating the reason you are interested in Western military articles and publications.

I've sent you two emails, each containing an attachement.

1) Howitizers in Afghanistan - a PDF file of 1.2 Megabytes size
2) CDF Iraq War thread - zipped file of 1 Megabyte in size.

If you did not receive these correctly, then it would mean that there is a limit in document size that I can send you and thus, I will try to reduce the size and the limits of articles and documents I will try to send you through the internet.

I would appreciate your feedback on this technical matter so that I may find other solutions for our communication needs.

Colonel.

I haven't received those.Would be intersted since ir would be High atlitude and the guns there are never accurate .

Fortunately, we have made fire table and hence things are better.

The weather is so fickle, that do what you may, it plays tricks.

Sir,

Try these links

A Case for Howitzers in Afghanistan, By Captain Joshua D. Mitchell
First Lethal FA Fires in Afghanistan: Lessons Learned at Firebase Shkin, By Captain James A. Sink
Decentralized Fires in Afghanistan: A Glimpse of the Future?, By Lieutenant Colonel Dennis D. Tewksbury and Major Joel E. Hamby


You may also be interested in

Artillery and Counterinsurgency: The Soviet Experience in Afghanistan, by Lieutenant-Colonel Lester W. Grau (Retired), Forieign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth

Ray, pls check ur email regarding the articles.

Military Review
Command & General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Mil Review Home English Edition Spanish Edition Portuguese Edition



September - October 2001
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2 Training and Developing Leaders in a Transforming Army
by Lieutenant General William M. Steele, US Army; and Lieutenant Colonel Robert P. Walters Jr., US Army



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"Go Army, Beat Navy!"

"My Other Car is a Porsche"

"If You Can Read This, You Are Following Too Close"

"Airline Pilots on Strike"

"My Kid is an Honor Roll Student
at Patton Junior High"

"I Brake for Animals"

You see them everyday. People plaster their car bumpers with stickers. They hang logo flags on their porches. They walk in picket lines holding signs. They confront police barricades shouting protest slogans. And they skillfully use the 15-second sound bite on "CNN." What are they doing? The answer is simple; they are sending messages. Their messages reflect their beliefs.

In the Army, our actions also speak to our beliefs. In fact, they speak volumes. Our actions, policies and practices let our soldiers, civilians and family members know what the Army values. It does not matter if we believe in locking in our training six weeks out if our practice is to routinely change the training schedule at the last minute. Our soldiers will not believe us if we do not practice what we say. We tell cadets and officer candidates they will lead soldiers when they join the Army, and they believe us. When we move platoon leaders out of their leadership positions quickly into staff jobs, our practice sends a different message. When our practice is not consistent with soldier beliefs, what message are we sending?

We are transforming to a more strategically responsive force that is dominant at every point on the operational spectrum. The Army Vision guiding this transformation has three component parts: Readiness, Transformation and People. As we started down this Transformation path, we began by addressing doctrine, organizational structure and materiel with the Transformation Campaign Plan. In June 2000, the Chief of Staff, United States Army, (CSA) chartered the Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) to look specifically at training and leader development as part of the Army's Transformation Campaign Plan. For three months, the panel conducted exhaustive research and collected data across the Army. Over the subsequent three months, the panel assessed Army training and leader development to determine their suitability for the future. The panel's commissioned officer study was released 25 May 2001. This article continues my previous discussion, "Training and Developing Army Leaders," in the July-August issue of Military Review. Here, I will describe the panel's work on Army culture and discuss the major findings, conclusions and recommendations concerning the Officer Education System (OES), Army training, the systems approach to training (SAT) and the requirement to link training and leader development.

A 4th Infantry Division soldier returns to his family from a Persian Gulf deployment.

Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary defines culture as "the set of shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices that characterizes a company or corporation." While we are not a corporation, our organization, the United States Army, does have its own unique culture. We have a common set of values and goals described as missions, and we have practices that we accept as routine. Soldiers understand that life within the Army culture is not a utopian existence. They recognize that a commitment to duty, honor and country requires personal sacrifice that ebbs and flows with the operational pace of the unit. The pace increases in times of crisis and should decrease during routine peacetime operations. There exists an acceptable level of sacrifice that soldiers and their families accept as part of our professional culture. We will call that level the "acceptable band of tolerance." The ATLDP discovered several beliefs with contradictory practices. The more important ones follow.

Our Practices Contradict Our Beliefs

Our beliefs make Army culture unique, but they compete with negative practices. Officers surveyed by the ATLDP voiced a common theme—an excessive operational pace pervades nearly all aspects of their personal and professional lives. Their commitment and service ethic conflict with their commitment to their families. Officers perceive that the Army is not as committed to them and their families as the Army expects them to be committed in return. Trust, an essential component of an effective military organization, suffers from lack of senior to subordinate contacts and from perceptions of inequity in the Officer Evaluation Report (OER) system. The warrior ethos for lieutenants diminishes when confronted by an often too-brief experience as a platoon leader or other small-unit leader to fill staff positions left vacant by our shortage of captains. There is a frequent inability to conduct training in accordance with the Army's training doctrine due to resource constraints and the undisciplined application of our training doctrine. Junior officers find themselves performing jobs for which they are not prepared. In turn, senior leaders oversupervise and micromanage. Finally, the overall personnel management system appears to focus not on leader development in organizational assignments but rather on placing "faces in spaces."

Belief: Doctrine is sound.
Practice: We do not follow the doctrine.

The officer study found that we no longer follow or cannot follow our training management doctrine. We do too many nonmission tasks; make last-minute changes and direct too many top-down prescriptive training events. The study noted that commanders do not enforce the contractual aspects of locking in short and near-term training events. When this happens, predictability for units, soldiers and families is the victim. Scheduled training is overcome by last-minute nonmission events. When units attempt to conduct too many events in a given period, training suffers and units seldom retrain to standard on assessed deficiencies because they are racing to the next event.

Quarterly training briefings (QTBs) no longer follow their intended format. Rather than an opportunity for senior and subordinate commanders to schedule and resource future training, maintain priorities, achieve unity of effort and synchronize actions, today's QTBs have morphed into all-encompassing unit status reports. This emphasis on process (researching data, providing input and preparing briefing slides) consumes an inordinate amount of staff and commander time and detracts from the intended purpose of QTBs.

The panel recommended several policy changes for Army Regulation 350-1, Army Training, and the CSA's training guidance to increase predictability and reduce operational pace. It also recommended that the Army and units discipline the training management process by locking in training schedules as described in doctrine to increase predictability, eliminate nonmission-related compliance training, protect weekends from routine Active Component garrison training and staff activities, and commit to quality family time by scheduling four-day weekends in conjunction with national holidays. Finally, the panel recommended a Department of the Army (DA) policy that vests in one staff agency the publication of taskers to subordinate commands.

Belief: Commanders build cohesive teams.
Practice: OER stifles unit teambuilding and inhibits trust.

The OER is a source of mistrust and anxiety. It has two fundamental purposes: to provide for leader development and to manage personnel. The OER does not yet meet officer expectations as a leader development tool. The leader development aspects of the OER are seldom used, and senior raters seldom counsel subordinates. The current OER does provide selection boards what they need to sort through a high-quality officer population and select those with the greatest potential. Despite recent high promotion rates—98 percent to captain and 92 percent to major—and three years' experience with the current OER, there remains considerable anxiety over the evaluation system.

Who wants to be labeled a "center of mass" (COM) officer? The OER's forced distribution formula requires at least 51 percent of the officer corps to be COM. Field feedback indicates officers are concerned about the impact of a COM rating on career progression. Officers believe the forced distribution system causes senior raters to pool offi- cers and rate by position. They consider the term "center of mass" as negative and believe a COM OER in a branch-qualifying position is career-ending. A comment from the General Officer Army Training and Leader Development Con-ference at Fort Hood, Texas, on the term "center of mass": "Center of mass is an adequate description of the aiming point for a weapon's sight picture, but not to describe the abilities and potential of our leaders."

Belief: Leader development is essential.
Practice: Platoon leader longevity is
determined by time vice the quality of the
developmental experience.

How can a brigade commander build a cohesive team of leaders if he or she has to senior rate more than half of the unit's captains as COM? Many officers do not believe that the senior rating accurately reflects actual job performance or future potential. They see the top block as being reserved for purposes outside the stated OER construct. Perceived manipulations of the system include reserving above centers of mass (ACOMs) for company commanders at the expense of staff officers, automatic COMs on initial OERs so that subsequent reports show improvement and ACOMs on OERs issued just before selection boards meet. In short, in its current form and application, the OER counters team-building; promotes competition among unit officers; and inhibits bonding, trust, cohesion and loyalty at the battalion and brigade levels.

The panel recommended that the Army review the OER this year to examine its leader development aspects, the terms ACOM and COM, counseling and forced distribution requirements. To get a balanced look at the system, it is important to involve the field in the OER review. Brigade and battalion commanders need an effective evaluation/assessment tool that reinforces trust, cohesion, team-building and loyalty at unit level; the current OER fails this test.

Junior officers' initial experiences must be protected by ensuring adequate time in jobs with associated criteria-based, quality job experiences. To mitigate the tendency to use lieutenants to fill officer personnel gaps around post, general officer approval should be required to assign lieutenants above brigade. When lieutenants are moved out of branch jobs, we must provide the appropriate training required for their success.


Belief: OES will prepare officers for the future.
Practice: OES is focused on the last war.

Officer Education System

Many of the institutional tools that served the Army well during the Cold War are no longer adequate. Largely untouched since the collapse of the Soviet Union and progressively underresourced during Army downsizing, the OES is out of synch with Army needs today and the needs of the Objective Force tomorrow. We must adapt OES curricula to prepare for a new operating environment characterized by regional threats, full spectrum operations and information-age technology. To prepare for asymmetric threats, and noncontiguous and inear nonlinear battlefields in our present operating environment, all Army leaders must be warfighters. Officers must be competent in conducting small-unit operations and bonded to the Army before, and as a higher priority than, their branch. They must be cohesive as year groups and as officer cohorts, self-aware and adaptive, and committed to lifelong learning. Adapting the OES requires a new approach that focuses each school on a central task and purpose, links schools horizontally and vertically in the educational process, synchronizes the educational and operational experiences of officers, and educates officers to established common standards.



A soldier from the 755th Military Police Company provides security during a weapons search in the village of Crnilo, Kosovo.

At Fort Benning, Georgia, the US Army Infantry School has conducted the first two of four pilot courses of a common Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC). Phase I takes newly commissioned second lieutenants from all branches and trains them on what is expected of Army commissioned officer leaders in, what amounts to, a leadership laboratory. During the course, the lieutenants are immersed in hands-on leadership training built around small-unit leadership skills required by all officers on full spectrum battlefields. In addition to weapons qualification, physical training and confidence-building exercises, the common core focuses on the development of basic leadership skills in a field environment. Upon completion of BOLC, Phase I, the officers attend their branch basic officer course to receive the necessary branch-specific technical training. The intent of this common BOLC is to produce officers, regardless of commissioning source or branch, who are self-aware, adaptable and prepared to meet the challenges of leading our soldiers in full spectrum operations. During BOLC, Phase I, officers establish bonds to their year group cohort that transcends branch parochial biases. Although this BOLC is just one step toward transforming OES to meet the demands of the new operational environment, initial feedback indicates that the Army is on the right track.

A new Captains Career Course (CCC) should provide combined arms training to all captains. This course will focus on establishing a common Army standard for fighting, leading and training combined arms units. The CCC instructors will teach company combined arms skills, reinforce officership and prepare officers to be battalion and brigade combined arms battle captains. The end product of the new CCC will be captains ready to be combined arms company commanders or battle captains who can plan, prepare, execute and assess operations and training at the company, battalion and brigade levels.

Belief: Right officer, right education, right time.
Practice: 50 percent of our officers do not get resident schooling.

All majors need a resident intermediate-level education (ILE) based on the Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) XXI. We should eliminate selection to the Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) as a discriminator. The panel recommended eliminating the CGSOC selection board starting with Academic Year 2003-2004. The Army is planning and preparing to execute an ILE program to replace the current CGSOC. The goal is simple—provide all majors with a quality resident ILE based on OPMS XXI. This ILE will give all majors a common core of Army operational instruction of approximately three months. Career field, branch or functional area education will follow common core instruction and be tailored to prepare officers for future service in the Army. Lengths and locations will vary depending on the educational requirements of their career fields and/or functional area designations. This ILE program will end our current practice of using educational opportunities as a discriminator for branch qualification, promotion and command selection. The product the Army receives with ILE is a cohort of majors with a common knowledge of division, corps and joint operations who better understand their career fields. ILE graduates will have the technical, tactical and leadership skills required to be successful in their career fields, branches and/or functional areas.

Belief: Bottom-up approach is best.
Practice: Training is driven from the top.

Training

During the Armywide study, the field reported that although we are training hard, we are not training to doctrinal standard for a myriad of reasons. Nonmission taskings, an excessive operational pace and a shortage of training resources make it harder to execute home station training in accordance with Army training doctrine. Beyond the day-to-day consequences of missed training opportunities, there is a long-term impact on leader development when junior officers become our future battalion and brigade commanders. Many will not know or understand what right looks like and may not fully understand the principles of planning, preparing, executing and assessing training and retraining to standard. The principles and processes of current training doctrine are sound, but the Army must adapt them to the operational environment for table of organization and equipment (TOE) and table of distribution and allowances units. A rewrite of Field Manual (FM) 7-0 (25-100), Training the Force, and FM 7-10 (25-101), Battle Focused Training, is needed. Training aids, devices, simulators and simulations (TADSS) are outdated and do not adequately model Army system behaviors and characteristics. Many units reported having weapons and command and control systems with no associated TADSS.

A bright spot in training is the operational and leader development experience the combat training centers (CTCs) provide to soldiers, leaders and units. The panel found that the Army must sustain the CTCs through robust recapitalization and modernization. In the late 1990s, we deferred CTC recapitalization and modernization requirements. CTC recapitalization sustains near-term readiness requirements for worn-out instrumentation, aging opposing force (OPFOR) vehicles, lack of aviation tactical engagement systems and interim fixes at CTCs until objective systems are fielded. CTC modernization provides for future requirements for TADSS, OPFOR and objective instrumentation—moving CTCs to commonality, digitization and an operational environment that enables Army Transformation. In 2000, the Army forecast funding for only 6 percent of the CTC recapitalization and modernization requirement. Today, we are forecasting funding through Fiscal Year (FY) 2007 at 70 percent of the CTC recapitalization and modernization requirement—more than $780 million. The intent is to sustain these training centers as the crown jewels of the Army training program.

With the Army keeping the bar high at the CTCs, home station resourcing must improve to get the most out of the coveted CTC training and leader development experience. One example would be a portable CTC-like instrumentation package that commanders could use to train soldiers at home station. We are moving in that direction with Portable Range Instrumentation Systems to aid with training assessments and fixed tactical Internets to provide communications support that will drive the Army Battle Command System and its associated components. These automated systems will assist commanders conducting combined arms training locally by reducing support requirements.

Belief: Train to standard.
Practice: Standards do not exist.

Systems Approach to Training

The panel found that the SAT process is fundamentally sound but not executed well. Due to a lack of training development resources, the Army does not have up-to-date training and educational products, the foundation for standards-based training and leader development. How can soldiers train to standard if the Army standard is outdated or has not been defined?

Standards are the basis for developing training, assessing performance and providing feedback. Without common standards, soldier, leader and unit readiness—and battlefield success—are in doubt. These common standards must be documented, accessible and digital. We need to reinforce the importance of standards-based training and enforce the SAT process. In the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), we should redesign the SAT development and support structure to leverage the subject matter expertise in the CTCs for training and doctrine development. The intent is not to put additional requirements on the observer/controllers and operations groups but to reallocate some training developers and doctrine writers and place them under operational control of the CTC operations group to capture training lessons learned and produce timely training products. Additionally, we need to invest in and exploit network technology to develop a more streamlined and effective SAT process where training and doctrine publications are web-based and updated. Up-to-date training and educational products are the foundation for standards-based training and leader development. Currently, we only have on hand 10 percent of the mission training plans (MTPs) required to support unit training. Of this 10 percent, most are obsolete.

Soldier training publications (STPs) are similarly obsolete or outdated. There are 273 of these publications addressing military oc-cupational specialties at the -10, -20, -30 and -40 skill levels. Seventy STPs are less than five years old, 155 STPs are five to 10 years old, 40 STPs are 10 to 15 years old, and 10 STPs are more than 15 years old. These publications are not specifically designed to support Army of Excellence, Limited Conversion Division, Force XXI or Initial Brigade Combat Team forces and generally do not reflect digital skill requirements and training.

Reenergizing SAT will directly support the Army requirement for all battalions to receive an external evaluation (EXEVAL) annually. The goal is to start EXEVALs in FY 01 and to execute them for every TOE battalion annually thereafter. To meet this requirement, TRADOC reviewed the status of MTPs, the documents that provide the battalion-specific training standards. As of April 2001, there were 361 MTPs identified for review or revision; 86 are complete and the remainder are under revision. TRADOC's priority for MTP development is to immediately revise or develop, as appropriate, all divisional battalion and supporting/support unit MTPs this FY, then publish MTPs for nondivisional battalions by FY 02. This is a challenging plan, but rejuvenating the SAT process is clearly worth the time and effort.

Belief: Training and leader development are inextricably linked.
Practice: They are under separate DA staff proponencies.

Training and Leader Development

In the Army, we train soldiers, and we grow leaders. To excel at these two fundamentally necessary processes, we must look at them as one. Currently, the Army has a disjointed approach to training and leader development. The panel's work provides compelling evidence that a main effort in Army Transformation should be to link training and leader development. Linking these two imperatives commits the Army to training soldiers and growing them into leaders.

The panel recommended that the Army establish a single proponent for training and leader development to improve the link between training and leader development, policy and resourcing. Currently, the proponency for training and leader development is vested in separate staff elements at DA level. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans is responsible for matters relating to training, and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel is responsible for matters relating to leader development. The lack of a single proponent for training and leader development results in unsynchronized policy and resourcing of these two key imperatives. There is no funding line for leader development in the Program Objective Memorandum, and leader development currently tends to compete poorly for funding against training priorities. If training and leader development are to be fully linked, the responsibility for both should rest with a single proponent on the DA staff.

We need a training and leader development model that clearly communicates the Army leadership's intent and is understandable for junior leaders, staffs and outside agencies. The proposed model is a balanced, integrated, progressive training and leader development model that assures full spectrum capability. The model shows the components of a combined Army training and leader development program, the process and the products that link training and leader development into a single entity. The components of the model are linked and intrarelated. Army culture, our beliefs and practices, is the foundation block on which this model builds. At its core are values, service ethic, warrior ethos and commitment to lifelong learning. Standards build on the culture foundation and illustrate the importance of setting a bar that our soldiers, leaders and units must achieve. Standards provide the mechanism for the next portion of the model, feedback. It is required for commanders to assess training and retrain and develop to standard. Feedback is required for our leaders, units and the Army as an institution. The top portion of the model represents the balance between operational and educational experiences needed to train soldiers and grow our own leaders. The model requires action by our soldiers, leaders and units to self-develop, educate and train. The result is leaders who are self-aware and adaptable. It also emphasizes the enduring principles of both training and leader development.

Our Army must be a learning organization. Our leaders must commit to lifelong learning through a balance of educational and operational experiences, complemented by self-development, to fill knowledge gaps educational and operational experiences do not provide. To be a learning organization that supports this lifelong learning, the panel recommends that the Army provide the training and educational standards and products that are the foundation for standards-based training and leader development. Needed are the doctrine, tools and support to foster lifelong learning. We must develop, fund and maintain an Armywide Warrior Development Center using information technology where soldiers, leaders and units go to find standards, training and education publications, doctrinal manuals, assessment and feedback tools and access distance and distributed learning programs for self-development.

We have to teach the importance of lifelong learning and the enduring competencies of self-awareness and adaptability throughout OES and strengthen this approach through organizations and self-development. In this context, self-awareness is the ability to assess abilities, determine strengths and weaknesses in an operational environment, and learn how to sustain strengths and correct weaknesses. Adaptability is the ability to recognize changes to the environment, determine what is new and what must be learned to be effective, and includes the learning process that follows that determination—all performed to standard and with feedback. The competencies of self-awareness and adaptability are all about lifelong learning. Their mastery leads to success in using many of the other skills required in full spectrum operations.

With this article and its predecessor, I have described the ATLDP and its conclusions from the commissioned officer study. The results from the panel's work confirm that leaders and soldiers must be at the center of our Army's Transformation process. For this to happen, we must take charge of our Army culture—set our own path vice yielding to external pressures. Additionally, we need to commit to training and growing our leaders by allocating the necessary resources to the OES, Army training and SAT. This commitment, along with inextricably linking training and leader development and arming our leadership with a management process to track and assess progress, will better align our beliefs and practices.

To move ahead with our Transformation process, we must be willing to challenge everything from doctrine; to OERs; to OPMS XXI; to unit status reporting; to the way the Army designs forces, assigns operational missions and allocates resources. We must send the right message by balancing our practices with our beliefs. The ATLDP Commissioned Officer Study was just one component of our Army's transformation. The panel's findings, conclusions and 84 recommendations provided the CSA with credible information to improve our training and leader development programs and to balance our beliefs with our practices. Acting on these recommendations, along with the other ongoing Transformation efforts, will require extensive work. The good news is that our Army leaders are equal to the task. MR



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Lieutenant General William M. Steele is the study director for the Army Training and Leader Development Panel. He is the Commanding General, US Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. His career includes six tours (more than 12 years) in the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), during which he addressed training and leader development issues. He has commanded at every level from company through division and Army major command. His command and staff positions include commanding general, US Army Pacific, Fort Shafter, Hawaii; director for operations, J3, US Atlantic Command, Norfolk, Virginia; commanding general, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; deputy commandant, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth; assistant division commander, 8th Infantry Division (Mechanized), US Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany; assistant commandant, US Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia; executive officer to the commanding general, TRADOC, Fort Monroe, Virginia; commander, 1st Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg; and commander, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 504th Infantry, 82d Airborne Division. His article "Training and Developing Army Leaders" was published in the July-August 2001 Military Review .

Lieutenant Colonel Robert P. Walters Jr. is aide-de-camp for the Commanding General, Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth. He received a B.A. from the University of Maryland, an M.P.A. from Golden Gate University and an M.A. from Webster University. He is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College. He has served in various command and staff positions in the United States, Korea, Persian Gulf, Haiti and Bosnia.


Photos:
US Army

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Contact the Military Review Updated: 31 Jul 2002

Military Review
Command & General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Mil Review Home English Edition Spanish Edition Portuguese Edition



January - February 2002
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22 Ground Combat at High Altitude
by Lieutenant Colonel Lester W. Grau, U.S. Army, Retired, and
Lieutenant Colonel Hernán Vázquez, Argentine Army



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A general who allows himself to be decisively defeated in an extended mountain position deserves to be court-martialed.

—Carl von Clausewitz1

High mountain terrain is often inacces-sible, uninhabitable or of no apparent value, yet peoples and states still fight to possess it. Long, bloody wars have been fought, and are being fought, for mountain real estate located between 10,000 and 23,000 feet [3050 and 7015 meters]. Over the past fifty years, high-altitude combat has raged in Africa, Asia, and South America. The Chinese invaded Tibet in 1953 and fought a subsequent guerrilla war there until 1974. From 1953 to 1958, British troops fought Mau-Mau separatists in the Aberdares Mountains of Kenya. In 1962, China and India battled in the Himalayan Mountains bordering Bhutan and Tibet. Soviets fought Afghan Mujahideen in the towering Hindu Kush Mountains from 1979 to 1989. The Peruvian government hunted the Sendero Luminoso guerrillas in the Andes Mountains throughout the 1980s. India and Pakistan have continually battled for possession of the Siachen Glacier since April 1984 and fight sporadically over disputed Kashmir as they have since 1948. Today, Colombia's government troops are fighting the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and the National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrillas high in the Andes, and Russian soldiers are fighting Chechen separatists high in the Caucasus Mountains.

The U.S. Army has no experience fighting in truly high mountains and its mountain warfare manuals deal primarily with low and medium mountains and stress the use of helicopter aviation to conduct that combat. However, helicopters cannot haul normal loads over 13,000 feet [3965 meters] since their rotors lack thick enough air to "bite" into, and high altitude weather conditions will frequently shut down flying for days. High-altitude combat differs from medium- and low-mountain altitude combat and requires a different orientation and force structure. Other armies have experience in truly high mountains and can provide valuable guidance and expertise. The U.S. Army needs to know how to conduct high-altitude mountain warfare, develop the tactics, techniques, and procedures to do so, and share the experience of other armies to understand and prepare for possible high-altitude conflicts.

The Environment

Mountains are generally classified as low (600 to 1500 meters), medium (from 1500 to 3500 meters) and high-altitude mountains (above 3600 meters). The world's highest mountains are not in the United States, Europe, or Korea—where the U.S. Army is accustomed to working. The Himalayan Mountain chains of Asia stretches 1,500 miles and contains 9 of the world's 10 highest peaks. The Hindu Kush/Karakoram mountain chain of Asia stretches well over 500 miles with its highest peak at 28,250 feet [8,616 meters]. The South American Andes stretches over 5,000 miles and rise above 22,000 feet [6,710 meters] at many points. The Caucasus Mountains, which divide Europe and Asia, run some 700 miles with many peaks over 15,000 feet [4572 meters]. The Himalayan Mount Everest towers at 29,028 feet [8,853.5 meters] whereas the highest point in the United States, Mount McKinley in Alaska, is 20,320 feet [6,197.6 meters]. The highest point in the Colorado Rockies is Mount Elbert at 14,433 feet [4,402.1 meters]. The highest point in the European Alps is Mont Blanc at 15,771 feet [4,810.2 meters].2

Although high mountains occupy a good portion of the earth's surface, man is not naturally designed to live and work at these high altitudes. When a person travels to an altitude of 8,000 to10,000 feet [2440 to 3050 meters] or higher, the atmospheric changes in pressure and available oxygen cause physiological changes, which attempt to ensure that the body gets enough oxygen.3 These physiological changes are pronounced among mountain people who have lived in cold, high altitudes for generations. Compared to lowlanders, their bodies are short, squat, stocky, and barrel-chested, and their hands and feet are stubby. Their hearts are bigger and slower beating and their capillaries are wider. Their bodies contain 20 percent more red blood cells than lowlanders' do and these red blood cells are larger. The alveoli in their lungs are more open for oxygen absorption. Many develop a fatty epithelial pouch around the eyes to counteract cataract and snow blindness.4 Populations at high altitude often use narcotics, such as coca or hashish, to help manage the pain and stress of high altitude.

High altitudes are characterized by extreme cold, strong winds, thin air, intense solar and ultraviolet radiation, deep snow, raging thunderstorms and blizzards, and heavy fog and rapidly changing weather, including severe storms which can cut off outside contact for a week or longer. Avalanches and rockslides are not uncommon. Although jungle or forest may hug the mountain base, trees do not grow past 10,000 to 11,500 feet [3,000 to 3,500 meters], depending on the latitude.

Physical conditions at high altitude are often more dangerous than enemy fire. Superficial bullet and shrapnel wounds can quickly turn fatal at altitude. Movement in the high mountains often results in broken bones, severe lacerations, contusions, and internal injuries caused by falls and falling rock. Frostbite and hypothermia are a constant danger. Acute mountain sickness, high altitude pulmonary edema, and cerebral edema are frequently fatal consequences of working at high altitude. Mental and physical abilities decrease at high altitude and high altitude also induces personality disorders. Sudden weight loss is often a problem. The rarefied atmosphere permits increased ultraviolet ray exposure, which creates problems with sunburn and snow blindness. High altitude shelter heating is often by unvented kerosene stoves, which means that personnel breathe air, which is thick with soot.5

Equipment will not function, or functions marginally, at high altitudes. On the average, vehicles lose 20 to 25 percent of their rated carrying capability and use up to 75 percent more fuel.6 Military generators and vehicles are often diesel-powered, but standard diesel engines lose efficiency at 10,000 feet [3050 meters] and eventually stop functioning altogether because of insufficient oxygen. Artillery firing tables are wildly inaccurate as the changed environment allows rounds to fly much farther. Lubricants freeze; altitude and weather limit helicopters; and additional animal or gasoline-fueled overland transport adds to the physical demands and logistic requirements of this environment.

Getting There is Half the Fun

At high altitude, personnel have difficulty breathing because of decreased atmospheric pressure and subsequent rarified oxygen. Soldiers selected for high-altitude duty should be screened for their ability to function in this environment. Soldiers should be in excellent physical condition and have sound hearts and lungs. Short, wiry soldiers are preferred to tall, muscular soldiers. Selected soldiers should have above-average intelligence to allow them to more-readily adapt to the trying terrain. Personnel who have had radial keratotomy corrective eye surgery should not go to high altitudes because their vision may permanently cloud.


Pakistani soldiers train in rappelling techniques at the Mountain School.

All personnel should undergo an acclimatization program to accustom them to their new environment and to improve their respiratory and cardiovascular systems. A physically fit soldier can adapt to the cold in about 3 weeks.7 The body normally adapts to a higher altitude in about 2 week's time. During the acclimatization phase, the body accumulates additional red blood cells which help transport needed oxygen.8 The Pakistani army acclimates their personnel over 7 weeks. They begin with a 3-week stay at 10,000 feet [3050 meters] where personnel acclimate to the cold while they undergo daily physical conditioning and learn mountaineering, rock climbing, rappelling, and mountain survival. During the final 4 weeks, soldiers learn advanced mountaineering techniques, trek to 14,000 feet [4270 meters] and return; trek to 17,000 feet [5185 meters] and return; and finally trek to 19,135 feet [5836 meters].9

Despite all training and efforts, acclimatization is not possible at heights over 18,000 feet [5418 meters], so exposure at these heights must be limited and closely supervised. Personnel at high altitudes need to be rotated out every 10 to 14 days. The Indian army acclimates its personnel over a 14-day schedule with increases in altitude at 6 days, 4 days and then another 4 days. The Indian army characteristically conducts its acclimatization by having the battalion hike from its road head to the staging area. All experienced armies agree that high-altitude acclimatization cannot be achieved in less than 10 days. An acclimated soldier is still not an experienced mountaineer. Experience counts and is not gained in 2 months of training. Some armies, such as Italy's, believe that 10 years is not too long to produce a truly capable, experienced mountain warrior.




Nothing is fast in high-altitude combat. Logistics support is key and the location of logistics dumps determines operational axes. The distance between the road head—the furthest point that supplies can be moved by truck—and the forward posts determines how many troops can actually man the forward posts. Forward posts can be a 3 to 14 day foot march from the road head. The farther the forward post is from the road head, the greater the number of troops necessary to support it. Base camps are usually built around road heads. Supplies and men travel forward from the base camps through intermittent staging posts to the forward posts. Helicopters, porters, or mules are used to move supplies from the road head. Despite attempted technology fixes, the mule is the most efficient way of moving material in the high mountains. Mules require care, attention, and training. Armies with experience in high mountains maintain trained mules and muleteers. Even mules cannot reach the higher elevations, and porters must haul the supplies forward.

Movement is calculated in time rather than distance at high altitude. Figure 1 shows average movement rates of trained, acclimated personnel and pack animals in the mountains.

The terrain slope as well as physical conditioning and altitude acclimatization of the troops determines the distance that can be covered. Figure 2 gives a rough average for determining distances over time using conditioned, acclimated troops.

Moving in the high mountains can be perilous. Weather can rapidly change and columns can become lost in blizzards or fog. Trail markers can quickly disappear under falling snow. Snow bridges can collapse and swallow climbers into deep crevasses. Entire patrols have disappeared without a trace while moving to the Siachen Glacier.



Line-of-sight communications is excellent in the mountains but difficult to achieve because of high peaks. Therefore, communications sites are carefully selected and often become key terrain. Very-high frequency radios with automatic frequency hopping, encryption, and burst transmission capabilities work best. Normal batteries quickly lose power in the cold, so lithium batteries should be the normal issue.10 Frequently, mountain tops become part of the national communications infrastructure because they are crowded with military, national, and commercial radio and television sites and telephone relay towers. These vital areas need to be protected, and military platoons often garrison such communications sites against guerrilla attacks.

Combat at Altitude

There are two primary scenarios for combat at altitude. First, two states dispute the boundary between their countries and maintain forces supporting a rough line of demarcation along the disputed zone (Kashmir and Siachen Glacier between India and Pakistan, and the Kameng Frontier Division between India and China). In this scenario, opposing forces hold linear defenses along the line of demarcation, regardless of altitude, and conduct a fairly positional fight.

Second, a light infantry force of guerrillas, smugglers, bandits, or forces from a neighboring state transverses the mountainous region to establish base camps in the mountains from which they patrol, launch raids, or maintain smuggling routes. This has been the pattern for a number of high-altitude disputes such as the Mau Mau uprising, Soviet-Afghan war, Sendero Luminoso in Peru, Russo-Chechen wars, and Colombian efforts against the FARC and ELN. In this scenario, the fighting does not automatically gravitate to a border zone, but usually stays below the tree line.

At altitude, the first enemy is the environment. The second enemy is the human foe. At altitude, high ground is not always key terrain. Frequently, key terrain is related to mobility—passes, main supply routes, road heads, and intermittent staging posts. Light infantry and artillery are the primary combat forces.

Offensive actions in the mountains include infiltration, ambush, raids, patrolling, shelling attacks, limited air assault, and limited offensives. Pursuit is seldom possible. Envelopment is the most common maneuver and the frontal attack is the least desired option. Defensive actions include counter-infiltration, ambush, patrolling, and positional defense. Relief in place is routine small-unit action.

Offensive actions should focus on interdicting logistics by blocking passes, denying use of supply and transit routes, capturing base camps and intermittent staging posts, and destroying transport.11 Force oriented offensive actions, such as interdicting patrols or raiding artillery positions, make great headlines and can boost morale, but they seldom have the long-term effect as actions against logistics. Offensive actions are small-unit actions, since only small units can be supported at altitude and frequently the terrain is so restricted that too many soldiers would hamper the effort. Movement is by small groups moving at a walk to avoid sweating because sweat freezes quickly leading to frostbite. Objectives are close at hand so the attackers will not be exhausted before they arrive and will not be caught in the open by rapidly changing weather. Assembly areas may be nonexistent and the attackers will have to move directly from forward positions. The attack may have to go in waves if suppressive fire is inadequate or the enemy is conducting a reverse-slope defense. The offensive plan must be clear, as most mountain maps are problematic. Maneuver is dictated by terrain and the reserve is committed early since movement is slow and mutual support is very difficult to achieve. Maneuver is slow and limited in distance. A maneuver force can range from one or two men to a full battalion if weather and the enemy situation permits.

Defending at altitude is difficult because of limited troops and material. When defending along a border, a battalion holds an extended frontage (7,000 to 8,000 yards) while a company holds 1,500 yards, so there is little depth, or large gaps, in the defense.12 Further, the complete battalion is seldom on line simultaneously. Often, a platoon holds a company position since the rest of the company is being held in reserve at lower elevations where the deterioration of the body is not as rapid. The platoon is rotated every 10 to 14 days. The entire company must still be rotated to lower elevations to recoup every 3 to 4 months. This means that the long, linear defense is actually a string of strong points built around a machine gun. Reverse slope defense, with forward slope observation posts is preferred, since the defensive positions often lack overhead cover and are susceptible to artillery airburst.
Argentinean mountain troops carefully cross the Castano Overo Glacier on Mount Tronador (11,800 feet). They are roped together, moving cautiously in single file, in case one of them falls into a snow-covered crevasse. At such altitudes, artillery remains the around-the-clock fire support system because of aircraft limitations.


A great deal of daily effort is required to keep snow from completely filling the defensive positions and hiding the trails. Permanent shelter, such as portable fiberglass huts, are essential at the defensive positions.13 Fortifying defensive positions is difficult since this usually requires the delivery of heavy materials such as cement, sand, water, and roofing timbers. Sensors are a welcome addition to the defense in those areas where they will not be rapidly covered by snow. Defensive positions should be designed and stocked to hold out independently for days since relief in the mountains is problematic due to weather. Conversely, when the enemy is a guerrilla force, the defensive position is a perimeter defense from which patrols, ambushes, and raids are launched.

Mountain patrolling is a common feature of the offense and defense. Small patrols are at risk, so platoon-sized patrols are common. Single patrols are useless, so multiple patrols are normal. Local guides or scouts are an essential part of each patrol. Detailed planning is an essential part of the patrol plan and includes a reaction force or reserve. The meeting battle is normal combat at altitude resulting from probing actions by opposing patrols.

Raids are a common offensive and defensive tactic. They are designed to seize a point, exploit success, and then withdraw. Raids are a temporary measure to capture personnel and equipment, destroy installations, bait traps to draw enemy reaction, and attack morale. Since there is no intention of holding the objective for a length of time, the logistics burden is less onerous than a deliberate attack. Successful mountain raids normally incorporate an assault force, a fire support group, and a security element.14

Fire Support at Altitude

Mountains restrict effective bombing and strafing by jet aircraft. It is difficult for them to pick out targets that are camouflaged or concealed by natural cover. Weather, deep shadows, and the environment also restrict pilots' vision. There are few approach routes and most of those are along valleys, which are covered by air defense and infantry forces using massed fire. Climate and terrain restrict jet aircraft from diving freely or flying low enough to engage targets effectively. Still, camouflage discipline, controlled movement, and layered air defense are essential to prevent savaging by high-performance aircraft.15 Helicopter gunships are more of a danger to ground forces, but eventually altitude limits their effectiveness. Lightweight helicopters can serve effectively as artillery spotters. All aviation is subject to the vagaries of weather at high elevation, which is powerful, constantly changing, and often shuts down flying. Dense fog, high winds, and blizzards are common and whiteouts are a constant threat to pilots.

Artillery remains the round-the-clock fire support system. However, artillery is often constrained during high-altitude combat. Sharp bends, high gradients, and the general condition of mountain roads restrict the movement of artillery, towed guns in particular. There are a limited number of gun positions, so artillery batteries are seldom deployed intact. One- and two-gun or rocket launcher positions are common. Consequently, the number of alternate firing positions is also restricted and these positions tend to become permanent. Guns should be moved at night for protection against enemy aircraft and artillery. However, night movement of guns in mountainous terrain is risky and accident-prone. Artillery positions should be constructed so that gun crews can defend them against ground attack. Firing positions should be on reverse slopes and as close to the crest as possible—considering crest clearance and flash-cover. Individual guns should be sited in terrain folds and other places where they are naturally concealed.16 Artillery plays a major role in logistics interdiction, counterbattery and shelling front-line units. Artillery can create havoc with a forward defense by targeting living accommodations and using airbursts against troops in the open.17 Mortars are frequently more effective than guns or howitzers. They are easier to shift around, can better engage reverse slopes and can be moved closer to the forward posts.

Transport frequently determines the location of artillery and mortars and the supporting range of artillery. Artillery cannot be readily moved where there are not roads. Artillery firing points are usually located where ammunition can be delivered—in valleys, villages, and near road heads.

Logistics Support

High-altitude logistics are key since the terrain and unique environment hamper delivery to the forward troops. Logistics always drives the battle, but in high-altitude combat, this is especially so. Without good highways or railroads, dump sites cannot be readily moved, it takes an inordinate amount of time to shift troops from one sector to another, and logistics demands are considerably higher than in other types of light infantry combat. Trucks, helicopters, mechanical mules, and snowmobiles are key to mountain logistics, but above 13,000 feet, the logistics effort shifts to the backs of mules and porters. Naturally, this is the point where the logistics delivery system snarls since porters and mules have distinct limitations and there are never enough of them.

Trucks are important to logistics support and gasoline-powered trucks are clearly preferred over diesel. As the truck ascends the mountain, the amount of oxygen available is reduced and the engine efficiency drops off. Cross-country and climbing capability decline as fuel usage soars. Diesel engines may need to be fitted with turbochargers and gasoline engines may need their carburetors adjusted. Figure 3 shows the average increase in fuel consumption at altitude.




Helicopter-based logistics are the preferred mode in mountain warfare, but the mountains are not the optimum helicopter environment. Air density decreases with altitude and mountain winds and updrafts are unpredictable and dangerous. Proper landing zones are difficult to find and, if close to the enemy, probably under enemy mortar and small-arms coverage. Helicopters must follow the terrain features of the mountains adding predictability to their approaches and increasing the risk to the crew. Fog, sudden storms, icing, and variable winds can quickly shut down helicopter support. Mountain terrain interferes with air-to-ground communications and with air-to-air communications. Planning for helicopter support in the mountains requires detailed planning, first-rate liaison, and a habitual association between the helicopter and ground unit encompassing training and social events. Flying in the mountains is so different that the armies of India, Pakistan, Columbia, Argentina, and Switzerland have special mountain flight courses for their helicopter crews.

A Step Back in Time

High mountains are countertechnology. Mules are a good option for high-altitude logistics. They can use very narrow trails, can carry more than a human porter, and tire less over long distance. American mules can carry up to 20 percent of their body weight (150-300 pounds) for 15 to 20 miles per day in mountains.18 Smaller mules in other locales will carry less. The maximum carrying weight for an Argentine mule is between 200 and 250 pounds. However, this is for low- and medium-altitude mountains. At high altitude, the maximum carrying weight drops below 200 pounds. Organized mule cargo units, rather than ad hoc teams led by local teamsters, are the preferred option, but local mules are always preferred over deployed mules.
U.S. Army mules support the 5th Army advance in Italy during World War II while a cargo truck lies helplessly on its back.

Mules were part of the U.S. Army during World War II in Burma and Italy and were a critical element of the Mujahideen supply effort in the Soviet-Afghan war. They remain part of the force structure of many contemporary forces with high-altitude mountain troops. Other armies contract mule transport through local teamsters. Yet mules have their limitations. If the snow is too deep, they simply refuse to move.

American mules require 10 pounds of grain and 14 pounds of hay per day, which also becomes part of the logistics load.19 The smaller mules of Argentina require eight pounds of grain and eight pounds of hay per day. Mules consume 25 to 30 liters of water a day and up to 50 liters in desert country. They also require a daily ounce of salt. Like humans, mules require time to acclimate to altitude. Muleteers and mules require about a month's training to get them ready to work above 3,000 meters. Like humans, mules tire easily above 4,000 meters and need to be rested frequently. Mules also have to be trained not to fear the noise of firearms and explosives so that they do not run off during a march.20

Mules are subject to colic, heat exhaustion, injuries, and wounds. Most injuries and wounds result from poorly adjusted saddles, pack frames and harnesses. Stones, rocks, and debris on the trail can also wound a mule's hoof. Local mules are more immune to disease at altitude than humans and all mules have a keen sense of self-preservation that keeps them alive in mountain storms.21 Mules require a great deal of daily care and training. Muleteers, farriers, blacksmiths, and large animal veterinarians, who have been absent from many armies for decades, are essential for mule-borne logistics. Mules need new shoes every 30 days and there are special mule shoes for snow and ice. Figure 4 shows the supply and transport estimate for a 171-man light infantry company planning a mountain march, attack and defense lasting for a total of 6 days. Since much of the material will be kept in dumps and moved in stages, the commander has managed to keep his transport requirements in hand.



Porters should be hired from the local populace since they are acclimated to the elevation and are accustomed to moving around the mountains safely. Locals used to carrying loads have developed endurance and are accustomed to breathing thin air. Although a porter cannot carry as much as a mule, they can move in places where mules cannot. However, porters will probably be reluctant to work too far away from their homes and villages. There is always a security consideration when using local porters. Figure 5 shows porter-carrying capabilities.

During the Peru-Ecuador border conflict for the Condor Cordillera in 1994, the Peruvian army relied on porters exclusively for resupply. Although the fight was in medium-altitude mountains, not over 2500 meters, the forward logistics support was restricted to porters because the steep mountains were covered with thick jungle, had few trails, and the Peruvian army lacked trained mules and muleteers. The Peruvian army moved its supplies from one small village to the next, using local villagers as porters to carry the supplies eventually to the fighting up on the Condor Cordillera.

Front-line combatants need daily supplies of ammunition, food, water, and heat for survival. Figure 6 shows daily consumption rates of water and wood fuel.


In the mountains, a battalion task force tries to carry and stockpile enough supplies to operate for 1 to 2 weeks. This requires expending time and energy to establish supply dumps along the main supply route. Naturally, the shorter the supply route, the easier it is to protect. If roads, tracks, and trails are under enemy control, the unit might be restricted to helicopter supply and its inherent problems in the mountains. Logistics support at higher altitudes during winter may become impossible causing opposing forces to withdraw.

Medical evacuation at altitude is frequently difficult. Weather or weight limitations may prevent a helicopter from flying to a patient. Often, patients must be carried on stretchers to lower elevations where the helicopters can reach. Soviet experience in the mountains of Afghanistan proved that 13 to 15 men might be involved in carrying one patient. Exertion at altitude is difficult and the stretcher party has to provide its own security as well.22 Patients cannot be effectively treated at altitude, but have to be evacuated to lower altitudes to survive.23

The Eternal Mountains

Mountain terrain is difficult, movement is slow and the hazards to health and physical well being are significant and constant. Combat at high altitude is a historical constant and a contemporary fact. It cannot always be avoided. Training for mountain combat is not simply light infantry training. Special training and acclimatization is necessary.

Leadership is particularly important in mountain combat. The harsh living conditions, physical deterioration, and psychological depression inherent in mountain combat require skilled leaders. Armies with regimental systems and years-long association find it easier to cope with the leadership challenges of mountain combat. Combat is primarily small unit, placing a great deal of responsibility on platoon and squad leaders.

Fire support is difficult. Artillery firing tables are inaccurate and artillery is hard to move on mountain roads. Transporting guns by helicopter is recommended where possible. Moving guns and ammunition takes an unusual amount of time. Helicopter gunships provide excellent support at lower altitudes. Mortars are excellent for hitting reverse slope positions, but have limited range.

Logistics are a primary concern in mountain combat with transport to altitude requiring special effort. Sustained combat requires an inordinate logistics effort. Small-unit actions, where units do not remain for extended periods of time, do not impose the same logistics burden.

Although the U.S. Army has not fought at truly high altitude, this may not always be the case. High mountains occupy much of the world's surface and they are not immune to the world's conflicts. Other nations have successfully fought at altitudes above 10,000 feet. Should the U.S. Army find itself committed at these altitudes, the experiences of other nations are invaluable. Preparation for such an eventuality should begin well before crisis dictates deployment. MR



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1.Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 432. The authors thank mountain warriors Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) German Giraldo, Army of Colombia; LTC Foto Duro, Albanian Army; Major (MAJ) Alejandro Valero, Army of Argentina, MAJ Akbar Khan, Army of Pakistan; and LTC Tejbir Singh, Army of India, for their input, suggestions, critique, and guidance. The authors retain responsibility for the accuracy and ideas in the article.

2.The Houghton-Mifflin Dictionary of Geography: Places and Peoples of the World (Boston, MA: Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1997), 48, 164, 165, and 450.

3.Tim J. Setnicka, Wilderness Search and Rescue (Boston, MA: Appalachian Mountain Club, 1980), 620.

4.Syed Ishfaq Ali, Fangs of Ice: The Story of Siachen (Rawalpindi, Pakistan: American Commercial PVT Ltd., 1991), 15-16 and 110-11.

5.Lester W. Grau and William A. Jorgensen, "Medical Implications of High-Altitude Combat," U.S. Army Medical Department Journal, to be published April 2002.

6.Aleksey Svetlanov, "Osobennosti razvedki v gorakh" (Peculiarities of Mountain Reconnaissance), Voyennye znaniya (Military Banneri) (June 2000), 13.

7.Salman Beg Punjab, "Operations in Glaciated Areas," Pakistan Army Journal (Spring 1994), 5.

8.Setnicka, 623.

9.Ali, 16-17; Punjab, 5-6.

10.Punjab, 7.

11.Ibid., 8-9.

12.Iftikhar ur Rahman, "Defensive Battle in Mountains," Pakistan Army Journal (September 1984), 31.

13.Punjab, 4.

14.Ali Ahmad Jalali and Lester W. Grau, The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War (Quantico, VA: U.S. Marine Corps Study: DM: 980701, 1998), 69-103 and 211-25.

15.Sikandar Hameed, "Local Defence of Gun Area in Mountainous Terrain," Pakistan Army Journal (March 1983), 35-41.

16.Ibid.

17.Punjab, 10.

18.U.S. Army Field Manual 31-27, Pack Animals in Support of Army Special Operations Forces (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 2000), 1-2.

19.Ibid., 2-14.

20.Reglamento Funcional Público (Public Functional Regulation) 24-02, Reglamento Ganado de Servicio (Service Livestock Regulation) (Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1994), 36.

21.Ibid, Annex 18.

22. 22.Boris Gromov, Ogranichennyy kontingent (Limited Contingent) (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1994), 186.

23.Grau and Jorgensen.



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Lieutenant Colonel Lester W. Grau, U.S. Army, Retired, is a military analyst in the Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He received a B.A. from the University of Texas at El Paso and an M.A. from Kent State University. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), the U.S. Army Russian Institute, the Defense Language Institute and the U.S. Air Force War College. He held a variety of command and staff positions in the continental United States, Europe and Vietnam, including deputy director, Center for Army Tactics, and chief, Soviet Tactics Instruction Branch, CGSC; political and economic adviser, Headquarters, Allied Forces, Central Europe, Brunssum, the Netherlands; and diplomatic courier, Moscow. His article "Hydrocarbons and a New Strategic Region: The Caspian Sea and Central Asia" appeared in the May-June 2001 issue of Military Review.

Lieutenant Colonel Hernán Vázquez is the Argentine Army´s liaison officer to the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and a consulting editor for the Hispano-American edition of Military Review, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He is a graduate of the Argentine Army War College. He has served in a variety of infantry and mountain units in Argentina. He served as S3 of a Motorized Light Infantry Battalion in the Patagonia Desert; S3 of the Military Mountain School Battalion; two tours as a member of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus with the Joint Operations Center, Operations Department, Headquarters Peacekeeping Force; operations officer for Argentine Task Force 10 "Chipre"; and tactics and MDMP instructor at the Argentine Army War School. He is a qualified mountain troop leader, commando, and paratrooper.

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Pakistan Army Journal
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24 Military Leaders' Obligation to Justify Killing in War
by Major Peter Kilner, U.S. Army



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The methods that the military currently uses to train and execute combat operations enable soldiers to kill the enemy, but they leave soldiers liable to postcombat psychological trauma caused by guilt. This is a leadership issue. Combat training should be augmented by explaining to soldiers the moral justification for killing in combat to reduce postcombat guilt. Soldiers deserve to understand whom they can kill morally and why those actions are indeed moral.

Military leaders are charged with two primary tasks—to train and lead units to fight effectively in combat in accordance with the war convention and to care for the soldiers they command. Military professionals generally hold these two tasks to be complementary, accepting Field Marshal Erwin Rommel's statement that the best form of welfare for troops is first-class training.

American military leaders have been very successful in creating combat-effective units. In response to the U.S. War Department's research indicating that less than half of World War II riflemen fired their weapons at the enemy in combat, the military instituted training techniques. These techniques—fire commands, battle drills, and realistic marksmanship ranges—resulted in much-improved combat firing rates. During the Vietnam war, similar research reveals combat firing rates of 90 percent.1 Unfortunately, this improved combat effectiveness has come at a cost to soldiers' welfare. The training techniques leaders have employed to generate the advances in combat firing rates have resulted in increased rates of postcombat psychological trauma among combat veterans.

Training that drills soldiers on how to kill without explaining to them why it is morally permissible to kill is harmful to them, yet that is currently the norm. Modern combat training conditions soldiers to act reflexively to stimuli, such as fire commands, enemy contact, or the sudden appearance of a "target," that maximizes soldiers' lethality, but it does so by bypassing their moral autonomy. Soldiers are conditioned to act without considering the moral repercussions of their actions; they kill without making the conscious decision to do so. In and of itself, such training is appropriate and morally permissible. Battles are won by killing the enemy, so military leaders should strive to produce the most efficient killers. The problem, however, is that soldiers who kill reflexively in combat will likely one day reconsider their actions reflectively. If they are unable to justify to themselves that they killed another human being, they will likely, and understandably, suffer enormous guilt. This guilt manifests itself as posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and it has damaged the lives of thousands of men who performed their duty in combat.2

This article argues that military leaders' important and legitimate role—transforming civilians into combat soldiers who kill to defend their country—carries with it the obligation to help soldiers cope with the moral repercussions of their actions. If military leaders train soldiers to kill others in combat, they should also educate soldiers to live with themselves in the years after combat. Military leaders should augment current training by morally justifying killing in combat to soldiers.3 This education would improve the U.S. Army's mission effectiveness.

Why Soldiers Deserve a Moral Justification for Killing

Military leaders should be concerned with morally justifying killing in combat; it stems from their duty to care for their troops. Soldiers are human beings who naturally feel it is morally wrong to kill other human beings. As a result, without training that overcomes that moral aversion, most soldiers in combat would choose not to kill the enemy. Military leaders enable soldiers to kill by using training techniques, such as popup marksmanship ranges, fire commands, and battle drills, that emphasize reflexive rather than reflective action. Such techniques create a bypass around an individual's normal moral decisionmaking process so that soldiers act without deciding to do so. While these techniques have greatly increased combat effectiveness, they have exacted a psychological cost on many soldiers.

Many soldiers who have killed in combat—yet are unable to justify to themselves what they did—suffer from PTSD. Finally, proactive leadership can solve this problem. Military leaders do not need to abandon proven training techniques. What they must do, however, is to prepare their soldiers' consciences for postbattle reflections. Leaders must help soldiers understand that what they learn to do reflexively would be the same choice they would have made reflectively because it is the morally right choice. They must also enable soldiers to make morally justified decisions in morally ambiguous circumstances. By doing so, military leaders can empower their soldiers to live with clear consciences after they have justifiably killed for their country.

Most soldiers do not want to kill. Soldiers are people. People are taught from their earliest days that it is wrong to kill another human being. "Thou shalt not murder" is arguably the closest thing there is to a universally accepted moral norm. Yet, military leaders expect young soldiers to ignore well-learned moral codes and to kill whenever ordered to do so. Leaders should know better. Research conducted on U.S. soldiers in World War II suggests that most infantry soldiers chose not to engage the enemy, primarily for moral reasons.

In Men Against Fire, Brigadier General S.L.A. Marshall, the official historian of the Central Pacific and European theaters of operations, describes the problem: "[The American soldier] is what his home, his religion, his schooling, and the moral code and ideals of his society have made him. The Army cannot unmake him. It must reckon with the fact that he comes from a civilization in which aggression, connected with the taking of life, is prohibited and unacceptable. The teaching and ideals of that civilization are against killing, against taking advantage. The fear of aggression has been expressed to him so strongly and absorbed by him so deeply and pervadingly—practically with his mother's milk—that it is part of a normal man's emotional make-up. This is his great handicap when he enters combat. It stays his finger even though he is hardly conscious that it is a constraint upon him."4

Marshall claims that his extensive postcombat interviews with combat soldiers reveal that most of them were unable to overcome their moral reservations about killing. 5 He asserts that less than 25 percent of the riflemen in combat fired their weapons, and "that fear of killing, rather than fear of being killed, was the most common cause of battle failure."6 Many subsequent researchers criticize Marshall's research methods and dispute his precise claim, yet all serious students of World War II do recognize that a significant number of World War II soldiers were nonfirers.7

In The American Soldier: Combat and Its Aftermath, the authoritative study of World War II soldiers, Samuel Stouffer and his associates do not directly address firing ratios, but they do make this understated observation about soldiers' moral reservations about killing: "Combat required a sharp break with many moral prescriptions of peacetime society. As easy as it seems to be for men to kill when their immediate group sanctions it, and as ambivalent as normal people often are about killing, it is still true that to kill another human being requires of most men from our culture an effort to overcome an initial moral repugnance. Under the requirements of the situation, men in combat were careful to hide this feeling, and it was not a subject of much discussion among soldiers. Killing is the business of the combat soldier, and if he is to function at all he must accept its necessity. Yet the acceptance of killing did not prevent the ambivalence revealed by such comments as that of a veteran rifleman who said, `I'll tell you a man sure feels funny inside the first time he squeezes down on a Kraut.'"8

Lest we think that people are somehow fundamentally different today than they were during World War II, consider the experience of this U.S. Army officer during the Gulf war: "Well, later that evening, the battalion that I was supporting (as Engineers) hit four T-72s and a multitude of dismounts in trenches. The action lasted approximately 1/2 hour. Take note of this. The only soldiers who fired during that entire period were the tankers. They fired both main gun and coax. Not even [the engineer unit's] .50 cals engaged the enemy. I have since often wondered what it would take to get a U.S. soldier to fire in combat. Although we had rounds flying by our heads, we failed to engage the enemy. I think it merits mentioning that the main gun rounds were fired using thermal sights and you know how a coax works [again, thermal sights]. Did the gunner ever really see the people he was shooting at? Why didn't my soldiers fire? Did they not see enemy whom they could engage? I doubt that. I could see them from my track without the use of NVGs [night-vision goggles]. Were we confident that the tanks could take out all resistance? A possibility, but shouldn't we have returned fire when fired upon? Hard to say what went through our minds. I'm not so sure that I would have the courage to fire a round if I knew that it was going to result in the death of another human being. Sure, I can fire on a range and score expert. I can fire a round blindly. Then I can justify to myself that I wasn't responsible for any deaths that occurred. I would say that long distance killing is easier than facing an enemy face to face. They say that artillery is the King of Battle. No doubt considering that they don't actually see who they are killing."9

While some may find the idea of military professionals being unwilling to kill during battle a bit embarrassing, we should instead think of it as encouraging. We want soldiers who choose to do what is morally right, who kill enemy combatants yet protect all noncombatants, who reintegrate into civil society after a war. What military leaders have to do, then, is to explain to their soldiers why what they expect them to do is morally right.

Military leaders train soldiers to kill reflexively. Despite this Gulf war platoon's unwillingness to fire in combat, the military has made great strides in improving its soldiers' firing rates since World War II.10 Whether or not Marshall's research was rigorous, the Army responded to it as if it were. Marshall's claim about nonfiring rates lifted the taboo surrounding the issue, and the Army took action to increase firing rates. By adopting Marshall's recommendations and incorporating lessons from psychological research, the American military improved its riflemen's firing rates to 55 percent during the Korean war and to 90 percent during the Vietnam war.11

Marshall notes that "at the vital moment, [the rifleman] becomes a conscientious objector."12 To help soldiers overcome their aversion to killing, Marshall offers several recommendations, two of which are that military leaders give fire commands and that they train on more realistic marksmanship ranges.13 Marshall also notes that soldiers who otherwise would not fire their weapons did so when their officers were watching them and when they fired crew-served weapons.14 He therefore recommends that junior leaders give specific firing orders to their troops.15 Subsequent civilian research on obedience and aggression demonstrates that people are much more capable of aggression when ordered by an authority figure.16 As the military instituted the doctrinal use of fire commands down to squad level, firing rates increased. In fact, in a 1973 study, Vietnam war combat veterans listed "being told to fire" as the most critical factor in making them fire, even more important than "being fired upon."17

Marshall further notes that soldiers have great difficulty shooting at another human being, so he recommends that they be trained to fire at locations rather than at persons: "We need to free the rifle-man's mind with respect to the nature of targets. . . . The proper educating of group fire requires constant insistence on the principle of spontaneous action de-veloping out of a fresh and unexpected situation."18

The modern-day transitional (popup-target) marksmanship ranges follow Marshall's advice. They enable soldiers to overcome their aversion to killing by conditioning them to act spontaneously to conditions that are combat-like, yet morally benign. In his book, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society, psychologist Dave Grossman explains the process: "What is being taught in this environment is the ability to shoot reflexively and instantly and a precise mimicry of the act of killing on the modern battlefield. In behavioral terms, the man shape popping up [E-type silhouette] in the soldier's field of fire is the `conditioned stimulus,' the immediate engaging of the target is the `target behavior.' `Positive reinforcement' is given in the form of immediate feedback when the target drops if it is hit. In the form of `token economy' these hits are then exchanged for marksmanship badges that usually have some form of privilege or reward (praise, public recognition, three-day passes, and so on) associated with them."19

This conditioning, training on popup marksmanship ranges, enables soldiers to kill on the battlefield, and the 1993 battle at Mogadishu provides evidence of that. In that 17-hour fight, a few hundred soldiers from Task Force Ranger and the 10th Mountain Division battled thousands of Somalis in fierce, urban combat. The United States suffered only 19 dead while they killed an estimated 300 to 1,000 Somalis. They achieved this extraordinary casualty ratio by being well trained. Based on extensive interviews with the soldiers involved, journalist Mark Bowden wrote a best-selling account of the battle, Black Hawk Down, which states: "[Ranger Sergeant Scott] Galentine just pointed his M16 at someone down the street, aimed at center mass, and squeezed off rounds. The man would drop. Just like target practice, only cooler."20

Bowden continues: "[Specialist John] Waddel shot the man. In books and movies when a soldier shot a man for the first time he went through a moment of soul searching. He didn't give it a second thought. He just reacted."21 During an interview with CNN/Frontline, Ranger Private First Class Jason Moore described his willingness to kill: "I just started picking them out as they were running across the intersection two blocks away, and it was weird because it was so much easier than you would think. You hear all these stories about `the first time you kill somebody is very hard.' And it was so much like basic training, they were just targets out there, and I don't know if it was the training that we had ingrained in us, but it seemed to me it was just like a moving target range, and you could just hit the target and watch it fall and hit the target and watch it fall, and it wasn't real. They were far enough away so that you didn't see, or I didn't see, all the guts and the gore and things like that, but you would just see this target running across in your sight picture, you pull the trigger and the target would fall, so it was a lot easier then than it is now, as far as that goes."22

Clearly, modern military leaders are doing half their duty—they are training soldiers to fight effectively on the battlefield. They are doing so using techniques that allow soldiers to fire their weapons at the enemy despite the natural moral reservations they may harbor. By conditioning combat soldiers to reflexively engage targets and giving them leaders who issue fire commands, military leaders greatly reduce moral deliberation for soldiers in combat.

At one level, this training accomplishes both aspects of military leaders' duty—it accomplishes the mission, and it takes care of soldiers by keeping them alive. At a deeper level, however, this approach is inadequate. It makes soldiers able to kill even if they are not willing to kill. Conditioning soldiers to reflexively engage targets prepares them to deal with the enemy, but it does not prepare them to deal with their own consciences.

Reflexive killing training may be harmful. Training soldiers to kill efficiently is good for them because it helps them survive on the battlefield. However, training soldiers to kill without explaining to them why it is morally permissible to kill in combat is harmful because it can lead to psychological trauma. When soldiers kill reflexively—when military training has effectively undermined their moral autonomy—they morally deliberate their actions only after the fact. If they are unable to justify what they have done, they often suffer guilt and psychological trauma.

Many combat soldiers experience feelings of guilt in the months and years following their wartime actions. The following are reflections from combat veterans who performed their wartime duties as their leaders trained them to do. A young soldier who fought in Somalia shares his experience: "Well, that day, I had absolutely no ethical or moral problems with pulling the trigger and taking out as many people as I could. And being back here, years later, I think that they had wives, children, mothers, sons, just like I have a mother and a dog, and all these things. Our government sent us there to do a mission, and I'm sure somebody was paying him to do a mission. [I just] reali[zed] that he was another human being, just like I am. And so that's hard to deal with, but that day it was too easy. That upsets me more than anything else, how easy it was to pull the trigger over and over again. . . . It took a long time to wear off, a real long time, because we were still there for a little while, and then when we came back you were still sort of riding the waves of what happened. And I know for me, the hardest thing to live with is knowing that you took another human life, for no other reason than your government told you to. That's hard. I mean, I'm sure it's been said before but here I would have [gone] to jail for exactly what I did over there and got medals for."23

At least one senior enlisted soldier who killed during the Gulf war may have found his actions to be too much to live with. An officer in his unit describes the situation: "Let me give you the results of one person who did kill. We will call him 1SG [First Sergeant] Doe. He was a 12B, combat engineer first sergeant. Known as hard charging and didn't put up with much bullshit. While in Desert Storm, he was assigned to my unit. He volunteered for a bunker-searching mission. Upon coming to one particular bunker, he heard movement inside. Without bothering to clear the bunker, he yelled at the people inside to come out. When they failed to respond, 1SG Doe fired three rounds from his .45 pistol into the bunker. The noises ceased. They then entered the bunker. 1SG Doe seemed okay with the fact that he had killed two Iraqis at the time. It was a very disturbing experience for everyone else. Note this. He is now [1999] at the psychiatric ward at Walter Reed [Army Medical Center]. The pressures of his actions during Desert Storm and Somalia led him to two suicide attempts in the past few months. He is a great guy and I consider him a good friend. However, I believe that in the heat of battle he did something contrary to his (and possibly human) nature. I don't believe that there really is a moral justification to killing in combat."24

In On Killing, Grossman writes about a soldier who struggles to justify his combat actions. Ray, a veteran of close combat in the 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama, told [Grossman] of a recurring dream in which he would talk with the young Panamanian soldier he had killed in close combat. "Why did you kill me?" asked the soldier each time. And in his dreams Ray would attempt to explain to his victim, but in reality he was explaining and rationalizing the act of killing to himself: "Well, if you were in my place, wouldn't you have done the same? . . . It was either you or us."25

These soldiers were good soldiers who effectively killed the enemy when their nation and its leaders asked them to do so, only to later suffer guilt. Their experiences are not exceptional. In fact, one senior noncommissioned officer who fought in the battle at Mogadishu commented that many of the veterans of Mogadishu suffer from PTSD. The senior noncommissioned officer explains, "I have come to terms with what I did. I talked to my priest. I have religious faith and a supportive family. The guys that don't have these [tools] are pretty torn up."26 The psychological toll of the battle fell most heavily on the junior enlisted Rangers. Nearly all of them left the military at the first opportunity, and at least one committed suicide.27

This is a leadership issue. It is not surprising that soldiers, such as 1SG Doe, suffer debilitating guilt over killing in combat when even their own leaders believe that their actions were unjustified. Soldiers who perform their duty in combat deserve better from their leaders. If killing in combat was not morally justified, then the military profession would be an evil one. Because, however, at least some killing in war is morally justifiable, military leaders must understand that justification—train soldiers to kill only when justified, and explain to soldiers why it is justified. Military leaders who train soldiers to kill in combat without justifying that killing are treating their soldiers as commodities, not as persons. A values-based Army can and must do better than that.

Refuting a Concern About Offering a Moral Argument

Teaching soldiers the morality of killing would actually harm them by fostering hesitancy on the battlefield. Soldiers who are morally aware of their actions, after all, may be less willing to respond immediately to orders to kill. Such delay could, in turn, cost them their lives and compromise the mission. In fact, the opposite is more likely true. Soldiers who are confident that killing in war is justified and that their leaders are morally informed would be more likely to respond quickly to orders and combat stimuli. Akin to religious crusaders, they would fight with the assurance of moral rightness. Moreover, warfare is becoming increasingly decentralized and ambiguous, so military leaders must move beyond reflexive training. The U.S. Army requires soldiers to make life-or-death decisions in the absence of fire commands or obvious stimuli. In operations other than war, soldiers must make judgment calls that cannot be trained in the traditional sense. To maximize military effectiveness, leaders must empower soldiers to make morally informed decisions about when and whom to kill.
An 83d Infantry Division soldier stops to load a clip near Houffalize, Belgium, 15 January 1945.

The words of an infantry battalion commander during Operation Just Cause in Panama should serve as a wakeup call to improve the moral element of combat training. He recognized that the nature of the battlefield—urban, full of civilians, with enemy soldiers of uncertain loyalties—could lead to morally ambiguous situations, and he gave these final instructions to his combat troops before launching an attack: "Let me tell you the bottom line on our rules of engagement, your conscience . . . your moral conscience is going to carry it. I don't want you shot; I don't want your buddies shot . . . you don't have time to call me to clear fires. Make your best call."28 That was an enormous burden to place on soldiers whose "moral consciences" had not been prepared for the moral complexities of combat. Soldiers who cannot morally justify killing would be more likely to hesitate on the modern, low-intensity, make-your-best-call battlefield.

Justified killing in self-defense. The moral justification for killing in combat is based on elements that provide legal and moral justification for killing in self-defense in civilian circumstances.29 This justification presumes a rights-based morality that is consistent with Judeo-Christian and Kantian moral thought.

It is morally permissible to kill another person under certain conditions: that another person has consciously decided to threaten your life or liberty, that that person is imminently executing that threat, and that you have no other reasonable way to avoid the threat.30 Moreover, it is morally obligatory to use the force necessary to protect an innocent person from such an attacker as long as you have the means to do so, especially when you have volunteered to protect that person. For example, if a person intentionally attacks you with a lethal weapon and you have no reasonable way to escape, you are justified in using lethal force to protect yourself. Likewise, if you are a police officer, you are morally obligated to use force to defend an innocent person's life against an attacker.

All four of these conditions—a conscious choice, a threat to human life or a comparable value, an imminent threat, and no lifesaving option—must be met to ensure that the killing is morally justified by self-defense. For example, if the attacker were a 2-year-old child or a sleepwalker, then the attacker probably would not have chosen to cause the threat and thus would not be morally responsible for it, so killing the attacker in self-defense would not be justified, although it might be excusable. The "conscious choice" condition would not have been met. If, likewise, the attacker were a robber who only wanted someone's wallet, the value at stake would not justify killing him. The "value comparable to human life" condition would not have been met. A human being should not be killed to prevent mere monetary inconvenience and loss.

If someone were to threaten to kill you next week, you would not be justified in killing him today; the threat must be imminent. The choice to kill in self-defense must be in response to the attacker's actions, not merely his intentions. Finally, if the attacker were wielding a knife but confined to a wheelchair and you were fully mobile with access to a staircase, you would not be justified in killing him. Instead, you should simply escape up the stairs. There must be a forced choice between fundamental values. If there is a way to escape the situation without compromising life or liberty, you are obligated to choose that lifesaving option and are prohibited from using lethal force in self-defense.

These conditions also apply to justify killing an attacker's accomplice. For example, if a gang member were chasing you with a knife intending to kill you and you had to escape from the room but another (unarmed) gang member consciously blocked your escape, you would be justified in using lethal force against your attacker's unarmed accomplice. In legal terms, that person would be a conspirator to attempted murder. Morally, that accomplice would have chosen to threaten your life, and you would have had no other way to avoid the imminent threat. These conditions are more stringent than those required for legally justified homicide in self-defense, yet they are met when soldiers kill enemy soldiers in combat.

Justified killing applied to war. When soldiers kill enemies in war, they meet the conditions of justified killing in self-defense. Enemy soldiers are morally responsible for the threat they pose. At some time, they chose to be soldiers, and they must know they are at war against other people. Fully informed volunteers, of course, are more responsible than poorly informed conscripts, yet even conscripts chose to become soldiers. They had other options, however unpleasant they may have been. Human beings, after all, are not responsible for circumstances beyond their control such as whether their nation goes to war. They are, however, responsible for the choices they make within those circumstances. People who choose to be soldiers in war are morally responsible for the threat they pose to their enemy.

Soldiers fight to defend values that are worth killing and dying for.31 At least, they hope so. In a just war, that is the case. Because the moral responsibility for going to war lies with political authorities and because the political authorities' intentions are often opaque, soldiers should be largely immune from judgments about the just ends of a war. Therefore, unless soldiers have strong reason to believe that war is being fought for values other than defending life and liberty, they can assume they are fighting to defend those fundamental values.

Soldiers do face an imminent threat from the enemy. All enemies are either direct threats or accomplices to direct threats. They all act for the same end—to deny the target any right to life and liberty. Soldiers have no recourse to a higher authority to defend them; they must fight, or they will lose those rights.

Finally, soldiers do not have a nonlethal option. If they flee before the enemy, the enemy will follow them. Again, there is no higher authority to protect them or those who depend on them to defend their lives and freedom. Therefore, not only is it morally permissible for soldiers to kill enemy soldiers in combat, but they are also morally obliged to use the force necessary to defend those who depend on them. Soldiers are the last line of defense for the rights of life and liberty.


Honest reflection on the moral demands of military service should play a part in the Army's transformation. Soldiers who are empowered to make well-reasoned moral decisions would more likely exercise proper initiative and less likely err by commission or omission. Rules of engagement are by nature static; the battlefields of the future will be fluid. The Army must grow soldiers who can think for themselves.

The Army should include the moral justification for killing in combat in training not only because it would enhance the Army's effectiveness but also because it is the right thing to do. The profession of arms is a noble calling, and military leaders perform their duties honorably. They devote their lives to preparing soldiers—mentally, physically, and materially—for the rigors of combat. They conduct demanding, realistic training; they keep them physically fit; and they equip them with the best weapons. Unfortunately, they fail to prepare them morally, and in doing so, they fail to care for soldiers' welfare. They leave soldiers unprepared to deal with their postcombat consciences and unprepared to make morally right decisions about who to kill in morally ambiguous circumstances. This is a leadership problem that is solvable, and it demands military leaders' attention. MR



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1.Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society (New York: Little, Brown, and Company, 1996), 189.

2.The prevalence and degree of PTSD among combat veterans is a disputed issue. See Jonathan Shay, Achilles in Vietnam (New York: Atheneum Publishing, 1994). Shay, Grossman, and others contend that PTSD severely affects hundreds of thousands of veterans. Other researchers, such as B.G. Burkett, Stolen Valor (Bangor, ME: Verity Press Inc., 1 September 1998) and syndicated columnist Michael Kelly, dispute their claims as being exaggerated. All informed parties recognize that combat-induced PTSD does exist to some extent and is a problem worth solving.

3.It goes without saying that military leaders must first understand moral justification themselves before they can teach it to others. Therefore, military leaders have a duty to develop their own skills of moral discernment. I owe this good point to Major Tony Pfaff.

4.S.L.A. Marshall, Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1961), 78.

5.Many military officers disputed Marshall's findings, which did not surprise him: "In the course of holding post-combat interviews with approximately four hundred infantry companies in the Central Pacific and European Theaters, [Marshall] did not find one battalion, company, or platoon commander who had made the slightest effort to determine how many of his men had actually engaged the enemy with a weapon." Marshall discovered that what the military's leaders had taken for granted—that well-trained soldiers will use their training to kill the enemy—was a false assumption.

6.Marshall, 78.

7.Roger Spiller, "S.L.A. Marshall and the Ratio of Fire," Journal of the Royal United Service Institution (December 1988), 63-71; and Russell W. Glenn, Reading Athena's Dance Card: Men Against Fire in Vietnam (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000), 134-36.

8.Samuel Stouffer, et al., The American Soldier: Combat and Its Aftermath, Vol. 1 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1949), 85-87.

9.Captain John "Ike" Eisenhauer, personal e-mail correspondence with author, November 1997. Ike is an outstanding officer whom I greatly respect. His candor on this issue is admirable; others with whom I have spoken share his sentiments, but they are not willing to be quoted.

10.Joanna Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing (Great Britain: Basic Books, 1999), 57-90. The practice of employing psychologists to train men to kill in combat is not a post-World War II phenomenon.

11.Grossman, 35. I have not yet found data on more recent wars.

12.Marshall, 79.

13.Ibid., 71 and 81-82.

14.This perhaps explains why nearly all the officers Marshall interviewed reported that all their soldiers fired their weapons. The ones they were watching fired their weapons.

15.Marshall, 82.

16.Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), 186-89.

17.Grossman, 143. He identifies the researchers as Kranss, Kaplan, and Kranss.

18.Marshall, 82.

19.Grossman, 254.

20.Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999), 64.

21.Ibid., 46.

22.Ranger Private First Class Jason Moore during an interview with CNN/Frontline, at <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontl...ambush/rangers /moore.html>.

23.Ibid.

24.Eisenhauer.

25.Grossman, 240.

26.Discussion between author and anonymous senior noncommissioned officer, veteran of Mogadishu, West Point, New York, 20 November 1999.

27.E-mail exchange between author and an officer veteran of Task Force Ranger, 30 January 2002.

28.Lieutenant Colonel Harry B. Axson, commander, 2d Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, during Operation Just Cause, quoted in U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-100-2, Leadership and Command on the Battlefield (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), 21-22.

29.Major Pete Kilner, Master's degree thesis, "Soldiers, Self-Defense, and Killing in War," at <http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/pub...etd-title.html>.

30.Richard Norman, Ethics, Killing, and War (Great Britain: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

31.Although my argument addresses what are traditionally considered jus in bello concerns, I reject the absolute jus in bello/jus ad bellum distinction held by Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (Portland, OR: Book News Inc., February 2000) and others, because I reject the concept of invincible ignorance. Soldiers are responsible moral agents, so they should concern themselves with the jus ad bellum question of the justice of the war, and they should not kill in war if their nation's war is immoral.



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Major Peter G. Kilner, U.S. Army, is a student at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He received a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy (USMA) and an M.A. from Virginia Polytechnic Institute. He has served in various command and staff positions, including assistant professor, Department of English, USMA, West Point, New York; company commander, D Company, 2d Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; and scout platoon leader, 4th Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment, 1st Armored Division, Sandhofen, Germany.


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March-April 2002 English Edition
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91 FM 3-0: Doctrine for a Transforming Force
by Lieutenant Colonel Michael D. Burke, U.S. Army, Retired



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On 14 June 2001, the U.S. Army released its new operations manual, U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations.1 This edition supersedes the 1993 edition of FM 100-5.2 It is number 14 in a series of Army field service regulations dating back to 1905 that provide basic operational doctrine for Army forces. FM 3-0 complements and expands on the Army doctrine contained in FM 1, The Army, also released on 14 June 2001.3 As the Army's keystone doctrinal manual, FM 3-0 establishes a foundation for developing the tactics, techniques, and procedures detailed in other Army manuals.

Publishing both of the Army's top-end doctrinal manuals is not only unusual it is also unique. Typically, the revision and publication of FM 1 and FM 3-0 proceeded independently and out of cycle, as was the case with publishing FM 100-5 in June 1993 and FM 100-1 in June 1994.4 This time, however, the coincidence of Army transformation, ongoing joint doctrine revision, and the decision to rewrite FM 100-5 precipitated a major doctrinal shift.5 FM 1 and FM 3-0 herald a top-to-bottom revision of Army doctrine that supports Army transformation. This revision is already well under way with the first of the supporting doctrinal publications, FM 3-90, Tactics, appearing in July 2001.6 Additional supporting publications, such as FM 6-0, Command and Control, and FM 3-13, Information Operations, are nearing completion. FM 3-06, Urban Operations; FM 3-07, Stability Operations and Support Operations; FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production; and FM 7-15, Army Universal Task List, are in draft for Armywide staffing.7 Similar efforts are under way to rewrite FM 1-0, Personnel; FM 2-0, Intelligence Operations; FM 4-0, Combat Service Support ; and FM 7-0, Training the Force.8 With this magnitude of doctrinal shift under way, this article places FM 3-0 in context and provides some insights into not only the doctrine contained in FM 3-0 but also why it has changed and the significance of the change. It examines the major conceptual changes in the doctrine.

Whether one fully embraces the changes to Army keystone doctrine or not, comparing the new FM 3-0 with previous editions reveals a major shift in Army doctrine, arguably as significant as adopting AirLand Battle in 1982. Changes in content and context bear this out. This is the first edition of the operations manual to appear under the aegis of a mature and authoritative joint body of doctrine.9 For the first time, it defines Army mission-essential tasks lists (METLs), the operational expression of the Army core competencies found in FM 1. Additionally, FM 3-0 recognizes a profound shift in the operational environment and examines the increased complexity of modern operations from that perspective. In consonance with Army transformation, FM 3-0 recognizes that Army forces must be strategically responsive, not just deploying faster. To a greater degree than almost any doctrine since the Korean war, this doctrine is offensive, stressing op-erations that are more nonlinear and simultaneous. It discusses and illustrates operations conducted throughout expanded and noncontiguous areas of operations (AOs).

Army operations are full spectrum, spanning decisive action in major theater war, peacetime military engagement, and domestic support activities. FM 3-0 is commander focused and expands the importance of battle command—the ability to visualize, describe, direct, lead, and continually assess operations. Information technologies powerfully influence how commanders conceptualize the battlespace, how they plan and operate, and how they engage adversaries. The manual retains and restates hard-won lessons from 226 years of Army experience, revising and reapplying them in old and new ways. So, while it represents a significant shift in doctrine, it would be wrong to label the new edition as being revolutionary. Undoubtedly, some question the timing and argue that it may have been better for the Army to wait for the new administra-tion's defense review results.

It is illuminating to review where the Army has been since FM 100-5 appeared in 1993. Following Operation Desert Storm, force projection and major regional contingencies against conventional threats were paramount strategic planning considerations. Hurricane Andrew relief efforts in south Florida had just ended. The Soviet Union dismembered itself in late 1991 and early 1992, but the extent to which that superpower's military power would devolve remained unknown. In late 1992, Operation Restore Hope in Somalia had yet to deteriorate. And the Army was in the midst of a massive reduction from its peak cold war strength. While the 1993 version was prescient in its emphasis on force projection and battle command, it could not envision the events in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, central Africa, and other contingencies. Nor could the doctrine authors foresee the astonishing advances in information technology or the degree to which U.S. conventional forces would dominate the military environment following the Soviet Union's collapse. Clearly, doctrine developed to fight against Soviet forces or surrogates was obsolete at best, completely outdated at worst.

The new operations manual postulates no single threat. Rather, it describes a range of threat characteristics and likely modus operandi. The unifying theme emerging from discussion is that U.S. adversaries are neither stupid nor complacent. They recognize that joint U.S. forces will dominate any conventional engagement unless they can find ways to nullify or bypass our strengths. Thus, FM 3-0 discusses asymmetry, urban operations, the continued threat of weapons of mass destruction, and the two-way street of technology. These ideas will drive the way we present potential adversaries in exercises and training. But there is a larger impetus evident in the manual's tone. The U.S. Army is now the premier land force in the world; its capabilities present almost insuperable challenges to any opponent. Consequently, this is a fundamentally offensive doctrine, and that is captured immediately in the foreword written by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army: "Warfighting, and by extension less violent actions, depends on a few `rules of thumb.' First, we win on the offense; we must be able to defend well, but you win on the offense. Next we want to initiate combat on our terms—at a time, in a place, and with a method of our choosing. Third, we want to gain the initiative and retain it—never surrender it if possible. Fourth, we want to build momentum quickly. And finally we want to win—decisively."10

In his study of the process and outcome of the work to revise FM 100-5, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) historian John Romjue characterized the 1993 book as "doctrine for the post-cold war world."11 The new FM 3-0 captures the experiential period of the intervening years. It is not cold war doctrine, nor is it even post-cold war doctrine. This is new. This is doctrine for an Army in the midst of transforming to a strategically responsive, full-spectrum force; one that is meeting today's deterrence, engagement, and support missions; and one that is ready, when necessary, to fight and win—decisively. The doctrine is neither strategy-specific nor keyed to some particular force size or echelon. Rather, FM 3-0 solidifies Army experience and Army conceptual thinking into a basic document that should serve the force over the next 4 to 7 years.

To understand what role FM 3-0 plays in transformation, we must consider that it has to serve three different Army forces. The first is the existing force that makes up most of the Army. These units, both heavy and light, are incrementally improved versions of the force that fought in Desert Storm 11 years ago. They may have modest numbers of improved systems, and some are receiving suites of improved command and control (C2) equipment, But for the most part, they are familiar organizations whose designs and purposes trace back through the cold war to World War II. This force is hardly obsolete; it makes up the Army's principal striking power and provides the conventional hedge against the outbreak of major theater war.

The second force is much more extensively modernized—the so-called digitized force. These units are just beginning to reach war readiness after years of experimentation. Although still maturing, they already demonstrate capabilities that change the tactical nature of operations. Finally, the interim force appeared in the inventory. This force is entirely new and represents the first Army formations designed for the complex operational environment of the early 21st century. FM 3-0 provides the doctrine that is suited for these forces; even so, it also looks ahead. Even as it captures how we do things now, FM 3-0 pulls the Army toward Objective Force operations.

The latter point is important. Although it is forward looking, FM 3-0 is not doctrine for the Objective Force. The combination of immediate relevancy and forward focus circumscribes its shelf life. It will serve the Army only until its successor addresses advanced operations conducted by objective forces. Today's edition addresses operations conducted by less modernized forces, modernized and digitally enhanced forces, and interim forces. But it also introduces operational concepts that herald capabilities that only the most modernized Army units may exploit. In so doing, it pulls the entire force toward Objective Force operations—operations that will feature extraordinarily versatile and lethal forces with future combat systems, extremely advanced C2 systems, and a degree of joint integration well beyond that possible today.

Together with FM 1, FM 3-0 initiates a doctrinal numbering system that parallels the joint doctrine numbering convention. Aside from the obvious ease with which joint and Army planners can refer to supporting doctrine, this signifies the Army's maturing role in joint operations. This edition of the Army operations manual is the first written to support an authoritative and mature body of joint doctrine. More important, it is written from the position that Army forces act as part of a joint force, neither more nor less important than the other services' forces. The manual states: "Army forces may be the supported force for some portions of a joint operation and be the supporting force in others."12 FM 3-0 describes Army forces in unified action—the part of the joint forces that often includes multinational forces and interagency elements. It recognizes that Army forces are an indispensable component of most joint forces and will be the decisive component of sustained land warfare. But it does not, as in the past, proceed from an underlying assumption that Army units are the sole basis of decisions made within a campaign. Implicit in the Army's maturing as a component of a joint force is that this relationship is mutually complementary. Army forces depend on the other services for enablers necessary to conduct full-spectrum operations just as the other services require Army forces to realize the full potential of joint operations. While FM 3-0 is indisputably about Army operations, it still recognizes and affirms the enduring qualities of land forces. The manual states, "Army forces make permanent the otherwise temporary effect of fires alone."13

The Army METL provides the operational expression of the Army core competencies discussed in FM 1.14 The Army METL includes shaping the security environment, responding promptly to crises, mobilizing the Army, conducting forcible entry operations, dominating land operations, and providing support to civil authorities. Framing the Army's fundamental contributions to national security as mission-essential tasks permits FM 3-0 to establish the link from operations to Army force responsiveness and hence to training. For the first time, the operations manual states that units focus their training on warfighting tasks unless a senior commander—three-star or higher—directs otherwise.15

A theme initiated in discussing Army METL and carried forward is Army forces' need to close with and destroy the enemy. FM 3-0 emphasizes the complementary nature of fires and maneuver and reiterates that relationship. It contains an interesting discussion of the element of combat power: "All tactical actions inevitably require seizing or securing terrain as a means to an end or an end in itself. Close combat is necessary if the enemy is skilled and resolute; fires alone will neither drive him from his position nor convince him to abandon his cause. Ultimately, the outcome of battles, major operations, and campaigns depends on the ability of Army forces to close with and destroy the enemy. During offensive and defensive operations, the certainty of destruction may persuade the enemy to yield. In stability operations, close combat dominance is the principal means Army forces use to influence adversary actions. In all cases, the ability of Army forces to engage in close combat, combined with their willingness to do so, is the decisive factor in defeating an enemy or controlling a situation."16
M1A1 Abrams and AH-64A Apaches of the 1st Armored Division coordinate their fire at a range in Glamoc, Bosnia.

FM 3-0 moves beyond war and military operations other than war (MOOTW) to the complex challenges of today's operating environment. It establishes full-spectrum operations as a flexible means of conceptualizing what the Army does during peace, conflict, and war. Every operation is a combination of the following types of military operations: offensive, defensive, stability, and support. Offensive operations are decisive; they destroy or defeat an enemy. Their purpose is to impose U.S. will on the enemy and win—decisively. Defensive operations defeat an attack, buy time, economize forces, or develop favorable conditions for offensive operations. Stability operations include such activities as peace operations, noncombatant evacuation, and foreign internal defense. Stability operations also address the vital role that Army forces play in peacetime military engagements to improve international relationships and moderate factors that could explode into crises. Support operations describe how Army forces respond to disaster and domestic requirements, the latter in support of civil authorities.

Examined individually, these types of operations are not new. What is new is recognizing that, increasingly, these operations are interrelated and make up land operations. Versatile, adaptive Army forces combine and transition between and among these operations throughout a campaign, major operation, or other mission.

Offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations are not intended to supplant war and MOOTW at the operational level. Rather, FM 3-0 defines a range of operations that Army forces conduct to support a joint campaign. It captures the requirements of today's land operations where there is no clear demarcation between war and MOOTW. For Army forces, credibility in peacekeeping operations stems first and foremost from the potential enemy's certain conviction that the U.S. Army would defeat them if the situation resulted in combat. Conversely, Army forces may conduct a major offensive operation within which designated Army forces support displaced civilians and local populations. In this respect, doctrine reconciles operational experience with the conceptual basis for envisioning and teaching land operations. Consequently, both Army doctrine and transformation plans stress the requirement for Army forces to transition rapidly and effectively between types of operations to maintain the momentum of the campaign.



Army doctrine addresses full-spectrum operations across the spectrum of conflict as shown in Figure 1. Army commanders at all echelons may combine different types of operations simultaneously and sequentially to accomplish missions in war and MOOTW. For each mission, the joint forces commander (JFC) and Army component commander determine the emphasis Army forces place on each operation. Offensive and defensive operations normally dominate military operations in war and some smaller-scale contingencies (SSCs). Stability operations and support operations predominate in MOOTW that include certain SSCs and peacetime military engagements (PMEs).17

The complex nature of ground operations today requires a more flexible battlefield organization than the cold war construct of close, deep, and rear operations. FM 3-0 provides a purpose-based battlefield organization that uses decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations as shown in Figure 2. This permits our view of operations to accommodate increasingly simultaneous and nonlinear operations conducted in greater depth than ever before in noncontiguous AOs. It also extends the battlefield organization down to lower echelons, which is necessary, given the range of SSCs that require Army forces.18 In adapting a purpose-based framework, FM 3-0 retains the older deep, close, and rear organization but assigns them strictly spatial qualities in terms of areas. Deep, close, and rear areas help commanders describe where shaping, decisive, and sustaining operations may occur, particularly in operations characterized by linear action and contiguous AOs.

Strategic responsiveness is a primary theme of FM 3-0. Strategic responsiveness is more than simply deploying faster. It includes generating, training, swiftly deploying, and simultaneously employing the right forces at the time and place the JFC requires them. It is about giving the JFC options in using decisive land power while creating operational dilemmas for the adversary. The message here is both internal and external. Internally, it provides the doctrinal basis for changing the Army's mind-set toward Army transformation. Externally, it reinforces to JFCs the complementary nature of air, land, and sea operations.

Advances in information technology are changing the way Army forces operate, just as information technology continues to change every aspect of society. FM 3-0 shifts Army doctrine forward through two related concepts. First, the manual adds information as an element of combat power—joining leadership, firepower, maneuver, and protection. Information is both a powerful enabler and a tool that creates the conditions for decisive action.19 Information superiority, then, becomes a vital objective of operations. To deliver a decisive combination of combat power, Army forces must see, understand, and act before making contact with the enemy. This requires combinations of several things—intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance to see the situation; information management to provide the right information to the right people at the right time; and information operations to distort and disrupt the opponent's understanding of the situation while protecting our own—all linked through sophisticated information systems.

But, as history instructs, information technology may stifle as easily as it encourages initiative. Hence, FM 3-0 includes cautions as well: "Information technology can reduce, but not eliminate, uncertainty. It gives commanders windows of opportunity that, with quick and decisive action, help them seize the initiative. Commanders may lose opportunities if the quest for certainty leads them to centralize control and decision making. Technologically assisted situational understanding may tempt senior leaders to micromanage subordinate actions. This is not new; the telegraph and the command helicopter created similar tensions. Senior commanders need to develop command styles that exploit information technology while allowing subordinates authority to accomplish their missions. Exploiting the capabilities of information technology demands well-trained leaders willing to take risks within the bounds of the commander's intent. An understanding of the capabilities and limitations of information technology mitigates those risks."20

The Army views land warfare as intensely human, and FM 3-0 emphasizes the art of operations throughout. Soldiers execute operations. Commanders provide the impetus for planning, preparing, executing, and assessing operations. Their ability to successfully command land forces depends on how well they master the art and apply the science of war.

Because of this, the battle command concept receives considerable attention. As shown in Figure 3, FM 3-0 retains the emphasis on leadership while offering a new model for battle command—one that requires commanders to visualize opera-tions, describe their vision to subordinates, and direct operations to conclusion. Throughout, commanders lead soldiers and assess the situation. The new model recognizes that in an increasingly simultaneous, noncontiguous environment, the commander must establish and update a mental picture of the battlespace to truly communicate his intent. Perhaps more important, an informed mental vision of the operation permits the commander to be proactive, to fully exploit the power of C2 technology, and act rather than wait to be surprised by events and cursed with missed opportunity.



FM 3-0 concludes with a chapter on combat service support (CSS) that emphasizes the evolving concept of CSS reach operations: "Combat service support reach operations involve the operational positioning and efficient use of all available CSS assets and capabilities, from the industrial base to the soldier in the field."21 CSS reach operations focus on logistic efficiencies, not just for their own sake, which is important in terms of responsiveness, but in terms of extending operational reach.22 Army forces can extend their effectiveness across a greatly expanded area of operations while reducing their logistic footprint.

FM 3-0 is transformation doctrine for a transforming force. It is a significant shift from its predecessors, although it would be wrong to label it as revolutionary. To use an analogy, FM 3-0 is like the howitzer, ship, or bomber that returns to the factory for a service life extension overhaul. Every piece is disassembled and renewed, or it is replaced with something that is a generation ahead of the old system. What emerges from the factory retains the original's appearance and basic function; however, the updated platform can perform its mission more effectively in changed operational conditions. FM 3-0 is that kind of doctrine. It contains much that is old and familiar but contains a great deal that is new. It addresses the operating environment of today while anticipating the requirements of tomorrow. It is a stepping-stone to the doctrine that will drive Objective Force operations. FM 3-0 also provides a firm basis that Army forces can use to conduct full-spectrum operations today. MR



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1.U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 14 June 2001).

2.FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, 14 June 1993).

3.FM 1, The Army (Washington, DC: GPO, 14 June 2001).

4.FM 100-1, The Army (Washington, DC: GPO, 14 June 1994).

5.The FM 3-0 writing team originally intended to follow the release of a new edition of Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations. The FM 3-0 authors not only reviewed all JP 3-0 drafts, they also embodied language from those drafts throughout FM 3-0.

6.FM 3-90, Tactics (Washington, DC: GPO, 4 July 2001).

7.FM 3-06, Urban Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, TBP); FM 3-07, Stability Operations and Support Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, TBP); FM 3-13, Information Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, TBP); FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production (Washington, DC: GPO, TBP); FM 6-0, Command and Control (Washington, DC: GPO, TBP); FM 7-15, Army Universal Task List (AUTL) (Washington, DC: GPO, TBP).

8.FM 1-0, Personnel (Washington, DC: GPO, TBP); FM 2-0, Intelligence Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, TBP); FM 4-0, Combat Service Support (Washington, DC: TBP); FM 7-0, Training the Force (Washington, DC: TBP).

9.The current edition of JP 3-0 was published in 1995. Before that, joint publications were essentially recapitulations of service procedures. Compounding the problem, joint doctrine was difficult to obtain and doctrine on hand was often out of date. The 1993 version of FM 100-5 influenced the current JP 3-0 heavily. Since 1995, joint doctrine has undergone a revolution, and joint doctrine now establishes the bounds of Army doctrine.

10.FM 3-0, Foreword.

11.John L. Romjue, American Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold War World (Fort Monroe, VA: Military History Office, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1996).

12.FM 3-0, chapter 1, paragraph 1-33.

13.Ibid., chapter 1, paragraph 1-18.

14.FM 1, chapter 3.

15.FM 3-0, chapter 1, paragraph 1-52 and chapter 3, paragraph 3-35.

16.Ibid., chapter 4, paragraph 4-10.

17.Ibid., chapter 1, paragraph 1-47.

18.The 1982 construct of deep, close, and rear operations was intended for division and higher operations. The 1986 FM 100-5 elevated the focus of deep, close, and rear operations to the corps and echelons above corps, although divisions continued to organize their operations accordingly. However, that doctrine did not envision brigades and lower echelons conducting deep operations—lower echelons than divisions conducted close operations. The distinction between deep, close, and rear all related to the existence of a more or less distinguishable forward line of own troops created by the array of forces side by side. This construct breaks down in terms of modern operations where smaller Army forces are conducting more nonlinear and noncontiguous operations as integral components of joint task forces.

19.FM 3-0, chapter 4, paragraph 4-28.

20.Ibid., chapter 11, paragraph 11-87.

21.Ibid., chapter 12, paragraph 12-4.

22.Ibid., chapter 5, paragraph 5-41. Operational reach is the distance over which military power can be employed decisively; it is a tether.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Lieutenant Colonel Michael D. Burke, U.S. Army, Retired, is coauthor of FM 3-0, Operations, Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He received a B.A. from the University of California at Los Angeles and an M.B.A. from Long Island University. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He held various command and staff positions in the United States, Europe, Korea, and Southwest Asia. He worked on this version of FM 3-0 both as an Army officer and as a civilian.

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Index

2 Turkey and an Army Forward
Lieutenant Colonal Patrick Warren, U.S. Army Europe, and
Major Michael Morrissey, U.S. Army Europe

As part of a joint force positioned in central Europe, forward-deployed U.S. Army forces are needed to provide a responsive, flexible deterrent. USAREUR meets the criteria.

11 Operation Airborne Dragon, Northern Iraq
Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Warren, U.S. Army Europe, and
Major Keith Barclay, U.S. Army Europe

On 7 April 2003, Task Force 1-63 landed M1A1 tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and a battalion command post with satellite communications at Bashur Airfield in northern Iraq. Much of the Iraqi military capitulated 3 days later.

15 Transforming USAREUR for a Strategy of Preemption
Brian J. Dunn, Research Analyst, Michigan Legislative Service Bureau, Lansing

U.S. Army Europe is not optimally configured to conduct rapid decisive operations to support the U.S. strategy of preemption. The Army needs lighter, more strategically mobile troops in Europe. Dunn proposes a new array of forces for USAREUR that would include the XVII Airborne Corps.

21 Insurgent Groups in Chechnya
Colonel Sergey A. Kulikov, Russia Federation, and Robert R. Love, Translator

Kulikov, a former Russian Special Forces commander, describes the audacity of Chechen insurgents engaging in raids, ambushes, hostage taking, and terrorism in the Russian Federation. By studying insurgents' ploys, a counterinsurgency force can learn how to protect itself while taking the battle to the enemy.

31 Kosovo: Present and Future
Sarah E. Archer, RN, DrPH

A more democratic civil society is evolving in Kosovo even as it struggles with its socialist past. Major problems to overcome include the economy, privatization of industries, relations among Kosovar Albanians and minority groups, and health care. Over all hangs the continuing uncertainty of whether it will become an independent nation or remain a province of Serbia.

41 Ten Ways Great Leaders Lead
Lieutenant Colonel Christopher D. Kolenda, U.S. Army

Drawing on 19 years of service to the Nation, Kolenda sets forth 10 principles for excellence in leadership. Ranging from the practical to the profound, the principles will help all leaders leave a legacy of excellence in the hearts and minds of soldiers.

50 Air-Ground Cooperation Perspectives
Phillip S. Meilinger, Ph.D., McLean, Virginia

Air-ground cooperation, the interaction of air and ground forces to ensure the synchronization, coordination, and integration of air operations with the joint commander's campaign plan, has been a persistent concern among the services, which need to identify the sources of trouble and highlight instances where coordination has improved joint operations.

59 The Army Vision: The 4th AD in World War II
Robert S. Cameron, Ph.D., Fort Knox, Kentucky

The U.S. Army's 4th Armored Division had remarkable success during World War II. Cameron concludes that the Division embodied many of the qualities the Army is hoping to instill through Transformation, as Army Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki outlined in 1999

.60 The Army Vision: Excerpts (Sidebar)
General Eric K. Shinseki, former Army Chief of Staff

69 America's Army: Expeditionary and Enduring—Foreign and Domestic
Lieutenant General Frederic J. Brown, U.S. Army, Retired

While the Army continues Transformation, it must still defend against foreign threats. Doing so calls for new combinations of quick, expeditionary and enduring response.


Review Essays

78 Another Such Victory
Major Michael E. Long, U.S. Army Reserve, Retired, New Port Richey, Florida

While President Harry S. Truman has often been touted as someone to emulate, Arnold A. Offner sees Truman's downside, including the fact that his sheltered vice presidency handicapped him in assuming the role of President.

79 The Wound and the Dream
Major Jeffrey C. Alfier, U.S. Air Force, Retired, Ramstein, Germany

The Wound and the Dream is a meticulous, compelling anthology of poetry that underscores the fascination that the antifascist cause of the Spanish Civil war has long held for American poets.

80 Book Reviews contemporary readings for the professional

85 2003 Index

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Contact the Military Review Updated: 13 Jan 2004